JUDGMENT : MILIND N. JADHAV, J. 1. This Review Petition is filed on 12.02.2024 for seeking recall of judgment dated 19.01.2024 passed by this Court while deciding Writ Petition No. 1320 of 2023. By virtue of the said judgment, Writ Petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner. At the outset, Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate appearing for Review Petitioner would orally inform across the bar that the cost of Rs. 50,000/- has been paid by Petitioner as directed, since an objection is raised by Mr. Khandeparkar that it was not paid. I do not have any reason to disbelieve Mr. Joshi’s statement. Hence, Review Petition is taken up for hearing. 2. Perusal of Review Petition reveals that review is sought on the basis that there is an error apparent on the face of record in the proceedings. Though, Mr. Joshi would argue that there is an error apparent on the face of record in the detailed judgment dated 09.01.2024 but he would candidly clarify that the alleged error apparent on the face of record is not in the judgment dated 09.01.2024 but it is reflected in Respondent No. 4 - Apex Grievance Redressal Committee’s (for short “AGRC”) order dated 29.09.2022 which was impugned before this Court in the Writ Petition. According to him, the order dated 29.07.2022 passed by AGRC suffered from the vice of it having been passed coram-non-judice. To put it simply it is contended that the order dated 29.09.2022 was signed by 2 out of the 5 members of AGRC and was therefore in violation of Rule 5(4) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Grievance Redressal Committee Rules (for short “the said Rules”). 3. However, in his usual fairness Mr. Joshi would admit before the Court that though the aforesaid ground was reflected in the Writ Petition (being ground ‘w’) it was not pressed or argued before the Court by Petitioner. As usual, it has been always observed that in Review Petition the original arguing Counsel/Advocate who appears in the Writ Petition never appears. A new set of Counsel/Advocate is briefed to appear in the Review Petition. Such is also the case here. However, argument that ground though taken in the Review Petition was never pressed, agitated or argued by the Petitioner is a crucial addition. A new set of Counsel/Advocate is briefed to appear in the Review Petition. Such is also the case here. However, argument that ground though taken in the Review Petition was never pressed, agitated or argued by the Petitioner is a crucial addition. Be that as it may, such a ground that the AGRC order is coram-non-judice cannot be taken by the Review Petitioner at this stage in this case due to the following 3 broad reasons: (i) It was always open to the Review Petitioner on receiving the AGRC’s order dated 29.09.2022 to have immediately approached the AGRC itself on the aforementioned ground, which the Petitioner did not do. In ground ‘c’ of the Review Petition it is stated that in the hearing before AGRC, two members were absent and another member recused himself from the Committee and the Committee comprised of two members as stated therein. If that be so, then it was always open for Petitioner in the first instance to have brought the above discrepancy to the notice of AGRC that it was coram-non-judice, which the Petitioner did not do. (ii) After the impugned order dated 29.09.2022 was passed by AGRC, Petitioner did not approach this Court on the aforementioned ground, but accepted the order and maintained the challenge to the order on merits in Writ Petition No. 1320 of 2023 filed by Petitioner. Today, the Petitioner claims that the aforesaid ground was agitated and taken by the Petitioner in the Writ Petition. Ground ‘w’ on internal page No. 33 of Writ Petition is the ground to which my attention is drawn by Mr. Joshi. The said ground as appearing therein is cursory in nature and it is not at all specific. Above all, admittedly the Petitioner did not press the said ground at the time of arguing the Writ Petition on merits. Here, it needs to be emphasized and stressed that Petitioner has taken 26 grounds in the Writ Petition which was filed but did not press all 26 grounds. I am only concerned with ground ‘w’ in this Review Petition and as delineated herein above, Mr. Joshi has clearly admitted that the said ground ‘w’ was never pressed nor argued by the Petitioner. I am only concerned with ground ‘w’ in this Review Petition and as delineated herein above, Mr. Joshi has clearly admitted that the said ground ‘w’ was never pressed nor argued by the Petitioner. (iii) After maintaining the substantive challenge to the AGRC order dated 29.09.2022 and failing therein, it cannot now be open to the Petitioner to revisit the aforementioned ground and seek not only review of the judgment dated 09.01.2024 but also rehearing before the AGRC. 4. Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate for the Review Petitioner would submit that the principal ground that there is an error apparent on the face of record in the AGRC order dated 29.09.2022 is substantiated by the fact that two members out of the five member Committee of AGRC do not constitute a proper quorum and hence, the said order of AGRC as also the judgment dated 09.01.2024 deserves to be set aside. 4.1. In support of the above proposition, he has relied upon a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: S.C. Gupte, J.) dated 18.12.2020 passed in Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 4402 of 2020 in the case of M/s. Rishika Developers vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority and Others. He has also relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court dated 22.10.2019 passed in Writ Petition No. 93 of 2019 in the case of KKB Developers Private Limited and Others vs. High Power Committee and Others in this regard. However, perusal of both the above two decisions show that such objection as regard to AGRC being coram-non-judice in both the cases was taken in the first instance by the aggrieved party therein. Such is not the case of the Review Petitioner before me and hence both the aforesaid decisions cannot apply to the present Review Petitioner’s case. What is pleaded by the Review Petitioner is that the judgment dated 09.01.2024 suffers from an error apparent on the face of record as it does not consider the aforementioned ground that the AGRC order is coram-non-judice and it therefore could not have been countenanced though the Review Petitioner never pressed and argued the said ground. 4.2. Mr. What is pleaded by the Review Petitioner is that the judgment dated 09.01.2024 suffers from an error apparent on the face of record as it does not consider the aforementioned ground that the AGRC order is coram-non-judice and it therefore could not have been countenanced though the Review Petitioner never pressed and argued the said ground. 4.2. Mr. Joshi has thereafter referred to and relied upon the following decisions in support of Review Petitioner’s case to argue that such a review would be maintainable if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of record and according to him such a mistake is clearly apparent on the face of record in the present case, in view of the AGRC order dated 29.09.2022 being coram-non-judice: (i) Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others, (2013) 8 SCC 320 (ii) Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 (iii) Yashwant Sinha and Others vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, (2020) 2 SCC 338 (iv) Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs. vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others, (2021) 13 SCC 1 (v) Arun Dev Upadhyaya vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. and Others, (2023) 8 SCC 11 (vi) MCGM vs. Pratibha Industries Ltd. and Others, (2019) 3 SCC 203 (vii) Musammat Jamna Kuar vs. Lal Bahadur and Others, 1949 FCR (662) 4.3. He has taken me through the aforementioned decisions and in my opinion has wasted substantial judicial time. The sum and substance of these decisions is based upon the well settled ratio that if there is an error apparent on the face of the record then the order has to be interfered with. The decision in the case Yashwant Sinha and Others (supra) is in a completely different set of facts. In short, Review is maintainable if there is an error apparent on the face of record. However, the moot question in the present case still remains unanswered. That is “What prevented the Review Petitioner from agitating such a specific ground in the first instance before the AGRC or even before this Court?” Most importantly after waiving the above ground and arguing the case on merits unsuccessfully, it now cannot lie in the mouth of the Review Petitioner to rely on the aforesaid decisions which have been cited. 4.4. Further, Mr. 4.4. Further, Mr. Joshi has referred to and relied upon the following three decisions to contend that the order dated 29.09.2022 passed by AGRC is without jurisdiction and is a nullity: (i) Harshad Chimanlal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another, (2005) 7 SCC 791 (ii) Managing Director, Bhoruka Textiles Ltd. vs. Kashmiri Rice Industries, (2009) 7 SCC 521 (iii) Chief Engineer, Hydel Power Project and Others vs. Ravinder Nath and Others, (2008) 2 SCC 350 4.5. As delineated herein above, it is now not open to the Review Petitioner at this stage to claim that the order dated 29.09.2022 passed by Respondent No. 4-AGRC is a nullity. Once the Review Petitioner has participated in the AGRC hearing, accepted the AGRC order, challenged that order in Writ Petition on merits and subsequently failed in his challenge, the Review Petitioner cannot revisit and re-agitate that the order of AGRC is a nullity and all proceedings should be set aside. 5. The Review Petition is strongly resisted by Respondents and more specifically by Mr. Engineer, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3, Mr. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Advocate for Respondent No. 4-AGRC and Mr. Khandeparkar, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 6. 6. Mr. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 4-AGRC would submit that before the AGRC, Review Petitioner argued the challenge to his termination as Developer by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) on 17.05.2022 without any demur. He would submit that after completion of arguments, AGRC granted 15 days time to parties to file written submissions of oral arguments. He would submit that Review Petitioner filed his written submissions before AGRC on 05.12.2022. He would submit that neither before the AGRC while making oral submissions nor in his written arguments, the Review Petitioner made any grievance about the quorum of AGRC or there being lack of quorum. He would submit that the Review Petitioner took a chance and argued his case on merits before AGRC and this Court without raising the objection to the AGRC order. Next, he would submit that at the time of arguing the Writ Petition before Court, Review Petitioner never raised or argued the aforementioned objection. In view of the above, he would submit that the Review Petitioner is now estopped from claiming that the AGRC decision dated 29.09.2022 is bad in law for lack of quorum. Next, he would submit that at the time of arguing the Writ Petition before Court, Review Petitioner never raised or argued the aforementioned objection. In view of the above, he would submit that the Review Petitioner is now estopped from claiming that the AGRC decision dated 29.09.2022 is bad in law for lack of quorum. He would submit that once the issue was not raised by the Review Petitioner before the Statutory Authority nor it being raised and argued before this Court, then the Review Petitioner cannot claim and revisit the same issue. 6.1. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Dhakephalkar has referred to and relied upon the following decisions: (i) Messers Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society vs. Shri. Kasbekar and Others, AIR 1954 Bom 202 (ii) Advani Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority and Others, 2012 (5) Mh. L.J. 20 (iii) Pannalal Binjraj and Another vs. Union of India and Others, 1956 SCC Online SC 34 (iv) Madan Lal and Others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, 1995 (3) SCC 486 (v) Madras Institute of Development Studies and Another vs. K. Sivasubramaniyan and Others, 2016 (1) SCC 454 7. Mr. Engineer, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3 has adopted the submissions made by Mr. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Advocate and would draw further support from the following four decisions of this Court: (i) Paramjit Kaur and Others vs. Teja Singh and Others, 2016 SCC Online Del 6516 (ii) Priyanka Communications (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. 2021 SCC Online Bom 1595 (iii) Radhakrishna Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Another vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2017 (6) Mh. L.J. 932 (iv) Kavis Fashions Private Limited vs. Rupani Spinning Mills Private Ltd. Review Petition No. 5 of 2023 decided on 22.12.2023 7.1. He would submit that once the issue regarding the AGRC order being coram-non-judice was never urged by the Review Petitioner before the AGRC or this Court in the Writ Petition, the said issue can never be allowed to be urged in review. He has laid emphasis on the fact that once a Court decides a case by detailed judgment referring to all the points urged, then it is impermissible for any of the parties to file a review petition to say that a particular point though admittedly not urged ought to be considered in Review. He has laid emphasis on the fact that once a Court decides a case by detailed judgment referring to all the points urged, then it is impermissible for any of the parties to file a review petition to say that a particular point though admittedly not urged ought to be considered in Review. The same cannot be allowed by the Court and the disposed case cannot be re-decided on merits. He has stressed that review cannot be allowed on a non–argued point. He would next submit that there is a basic fallacy in the submission advanced by Mr. Joshi. According to him an error apparent on the face of record necessarily means an issue which has been considered and decided and which is ex facie illegally decided, but if a point is not urged then there does not arise an issue of there being an error apparent on the face of record. 8. Similarly, Mr. Khandeparkar has laid emphasis on a decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Daman Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 670 and urged that it is not unusual for parties and Counsel to raise innumerable grounds in the Petition but later confine themselves to only a few grounds, obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them as untenable. He would urge that no party or Counsel is entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not argued were not considered by the Court. 9. I have heard Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate for Petitioner; Ms. Sabharwal, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5-SRA; Mr. Engineer, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3; Mr. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Advocate through VC for Respondent No. 4-AGRC and Mr. Khandeparkar, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 6 and with their able assistance perused the pleadings of the case. Submissions made by the learned Advocates have received due consideration of the Court. 10. In the present case, it is seen that the Review Petitioner has accepted and participated in the hearing before the AGRC and has subsequently challenged the AGRC decision dated 29.09.2022 before this Court purely on merits of the matter. Next, it is seen that Review Petitioner has argued against the AGRC decision on merits of the matter. 10. In the present case, it is seen that the Review Petitioner has accepted and participated in the hearing before the AGRC and has subsequently challenged the AGRC decision dated 29.09.2022 before this Court purely on merits of the matter. Next, it is seen that Review Petitioner has argued against the AGRC decision on merits of the matter. Once that is done, the Review Petitioner cannot now agitate a grievance which was never argued and urge the Court to set aside its decision passed on the merits of the matter. 11. From the above submissions, it needs to be reiterated that admittedly the Review Petitioner has not urged the alleged error apparent on the face of record before the AGRC or before this Court. It cannot lie in his mouth to now seek a review of the alleged un-argued ground which was admittedly never argued by him. 12. The facts of the present case are such that the Review Petitioner has taken his chance before the AGRC and this Court and now under the garb of review, the decision passed on merits of the matter is sought to be set aside. In this regard, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Radhakrishna Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Another (supra) is required to be noted. It refers to the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma (supra). Paragraph No. 8 of the said decision is relevant and reproduced below: “8. The same pleas could have been raised but the counsel appearing for the petitioners then realised that it would not be permissible to raise them. The owner (added original respondent No. 6 to the writ petition) was the legal entity from whom the property was acquired by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The respondent No. 6 was divested of its right and title in the property way back in the year 1992. The challenge to the acquisition raised by respondent No. 6 vide Writ Petition No. 1474 of 2007 failed by virtue of this Court’s order therein dated 7th December, 2007 as noted in the order under review. Hence, in the initial round, the petitioners did not raise the contentions now sought to be canvassed. Now, as an afterthought and relying on the above reproduced order they are canvassed. Hence, in the initial round, the petitioners did not raise the contentions now sought to be canvassed. Now, as an afterthought and relying on the above reproduced order they are canvassed. A consideration of that is equivalent to exercising appellate jurisdiction or revisional power, both of which are ruled out in review jurisdiction. We do not think that the exercise, as is now suggested and based on the petitioners’ interpretation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court order, is legally permissible. In the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati, 2013 Mh. L.J. Online (SC) 41 : (2013) 8 SCC 320 : AIR 2013 SC 3301 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “6. Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides for an application for review which reads as under: “Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes. And who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or cold not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” ............ 8. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court, in Sow, Chandra Kante vs. Sheikh Habbib, (1975) 1 SCC 674 : AIR 1975 SC 1500 , held as under: “1. Mr. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court, in Sow, Chandra Kante vs. Sheikh Habbib, (1975) 1 SCC 674 : AIR 1975 SC 1500 , held as under: “1. Mr. Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a re-hearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel’s certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 9. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 9. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167 : AIR 1980 SC 674 , this Court, paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 held as under: “8. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845 . For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta vs. D.N. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189 : AIR 1971 SC 2162 . The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo vs. District Judge, Delhi, (1971) 3 SCC 5 : AIR 1971 SC 107 . Power to review its judgment has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceedings, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility” Sow, Chandra Kante vs. Sheikh Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674 : AIR 1975 SC 1500 . 9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” 10. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court, in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon vs. Union of India, 1980 Supp. SCC 562 : AIR 1980 SC 2041 held as under: “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow, Chandra Kante vs. Sheikh Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674 : AIR 1975 SC 1500 this Court observed: “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility......The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 11. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court, in Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , held as under: “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1964 SC 1372 this Court opined: “What, however, we are nor concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September, 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.’ (Emphasis ours) 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 : AIR 1995 SC 455 while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 SC 1047 this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. 9. Under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” 12. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is a apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : AIR 2000 SC 1650 , held as under: “54. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : AIR 2000 SC 1650 , held as under: “54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: “1. Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a degree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time, when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some-mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” Under Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order XL, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same manner. 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the-limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the-limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. 58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal Case, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : AIR 1995 SC 1531 . It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words “any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code” must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 . Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , it was held: “It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in Batuk K. Vyas vs. Surat Borough Municipality, AIR 1953 Bom. 133 that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. 133 that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinion also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.” Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.” ............ 14. Review is not re-hearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate Court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. This Court, in Jain Studios Ltd. vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 501 : AIR 2006 SC 2686 , held as under: “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate Court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. 12. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. 12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of “second innings” which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.” 15. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. A long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles: 16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: (A) When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him. (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1955) 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954 SC 526 , to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule.” The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. JT 2013 (8) SC 275 : 2013 AIR SCW 2905. (B) When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (B) When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate Court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 13. From the above, it is clearly seen that once the Petitioner has unsuccessfully maintained the challenge to the AGRC order and more specifically never urged, pressed or argued the aforementioned issue of the AGRC’s quorum, it cannot now be available to the Review Petitioner to seek setting aside of the decision passed by this Court on merits. 14. The Review Petition is clearly devoid of merits and allowing it would set a dangerous precedent in as much as any party will approach the Court in review with respect to the grounds which were never urged or argued. 15. In my view, such Review Petition should be dealt with heavy hands and severely. The conduct of the Review Petitioner is arbitrary and high-handed. The Review Petitioner has made a frivolous and vexatious claim and wasted precious judicial time. The Review Petition is comprehensively dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the Review Petitioner to the Respondents within a period of 2 weeks from the date of uploading of this order. 16. All concerned are directed to act on a server copy of this order. 17. In view of the above observations and findings, the Review Petition is dismissed.