JUDGMENT : Ananda Sen, J. This Criminal Appeal is preferred on behalf of the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction dated 24.01.2011 and order of sentence dated 01.02.2011, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. III, Dhanbad, in Sessions Trial No.199 of 2008, whereby and wherein the appellant has been convicted in connection with Sessions Trial No.199 of 2008, G.R. No.163 of 2008 for offence under Section 302 IPC. She was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for Life with a fine of Rs.10,000/-. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the entire prosecution case hinges on the statement of the deceased Ishmit Kaur, but her statement cannot be accepted as dying declaration as there are contradictions. The Doctor has also not certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to get her statement recorded. In absence of the said certification and considering the nature and extent of injury, which is burn injury, the said statement which forms the basis of the First Information Report becomes doubtful and unreliable. Further, it has been contended that the Investigating Officer has admitted that the deceased had given a different statement at the initial stage from where one could understand that she had got herself burnt accidentally. That being so, the second statement of the deceased which, the prosecution is claiming to be a dying declaration is hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. and cannot be treated to be the first version. The fact that the death was accidental will be substantiated from the statement of P.W.-1 and P.W.-4 who stated that when he reached the place of occurrence, there was no electricity and he was told by the husband of the deceased that the deceased caught fire accidentally from a lamp. The statement of P.W.-3 also clearly suggests that the burn was accidental. Learned counsel argues that the deceased who has sustained 85% burn injury cannot give a detailed statement as she would not have been in a fit state of mind. As per learned counsel for the appellant, it is only the fardbayan of the deceased which forms the basis of conviction in this case. 3. Learned counsel for the State submits that the deceased had recorded the fardbayan, based on which the F.I.R. has been registered. As per learned counsel for the appellant, it is only the fardbayan of the deceased which forms the basis of conviction in this case. 3. Learned counsel for the State submits that the deceased had recorded the fardbayan, based on which the F.I.R. has been registered. In the fardbayan, the Doctor had put his signature which is suggestive of the fact that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. The fardbayan which is in fact a dying declaration clearly suggest that it is this appellant who had sprinkled kerosene oil on the person of the deceased and set her on fire, resulting in burn injury which is the cause of death. The death is homicidal and cannot be said to be accidental, which is clear from the evidence laid by the parties. Thus, this appellant has rightly been convicted. 4. I find that the instant case has been instituted on the fardbayan of Ishmit Kaur. The same was recorded in K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas. She stated that on 11.01.2008, there was some altercation with this appellant in the evening. At about 10:30 P.M. at night, when she was in her bedroom, in presence of her husband, the appellant and the other two accused who are father-in-law and brother-in-law entered with the jar of kerosene oil. This appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire. Her husband tried to save her thus he sustained injuries also. She was brought to the hospital where she was being treated. She alleges that it is this appellant and the other two accused persons who are responsible for the act. Since her hand was bandaged, impression of the left toe was obtained by the police. 5. On basis of the aforesaid statement Jorapokar (Sudamdih) P.S. Case No.12/08 was registered for offences under Sections 498-A, 324, 307/34 IPC. As the deceased died, Section 304 B of the IPC was added but ultimately charge sheet was submitted under Section 302/34 of the IPC. The prosecution in order to prove the charges has examined 11 witnesses who are :- 1. P.W.-1 :- Birendra Agarwal 2. P.W.-2 :- Krishna Mahto 3. P.W.-3 :- Subrat Paul 4. P.W.-4 :- Gurmit Singh 5. P.W.-5 :- Saryu Prasad Agarwal 6. P.W.-6 :- Sinder Kaur 7. P.W.-7 :- Harpal Singh 8. P.W.-8 :- Dr. Vikash Kr. Pandey 9. P.W.-9 :- Dr. Bikash Kumar 10. P.W.-1 :- Birendra Agarwal 2. P.W.-2 :- Krishna Mahto 3. P.W.-3 :- Subrat Paul 4. P.W.-4 :- Gurmit Singh 5. P.W.-5 :- Saryu Prasad Agarwal 6. P.W.-6 :- Sinder Kaur 7. P.W.-7 :- Harpal Singh 8. P.W.-8 :- Dr. Vikash Kr. Pandey 9. P.W.-9 :- Dr. Bikash Kumar 10. P.W.-10 :- Prabhu Nath Rai 11. P.W.-11 :- Mr. Sitaram Prasad, I.O. 6. Several documents were exhibited which are:- i. “Ext.-1 :- Signature of Harpal Singh on fardbayan. ii. Ext.-1/1 :- Signature of Dr. Vikash Kr. Pandey in the fardbayan. iii. Ext.-2 :- Signature of Harpal Singh in the inquest report iv. Ext.-3 :- Post Mortem Report. v. Ext.-4 :- Forwarding of case vi. Ext.5 :- Fardbayan vii. Ext.6 :- Inquest report. viii. Ext.A :- Injury report of Satyajeet Singh” 7. After conclusion of the trial, the statements of this appellant and the other accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. They pleaded innocence. 8. The trial court thereafter convicted this appellant and acquitted the other two accused. Being aggrieved by the conviction, this appellant who is the mother-in-law of the deceased has preferred this appeal. 9. When I go through the statement of the witnesses and the prosecution case, I find that there are three sets of witnesses. P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3, P.W.-4 and P.W.-5 are the set of witnesses who are the neighbours of the deceased. P.W.-6 and P.W.-7 are the mother and brother of the deceased. P.W.- 8, P.W.-9, P.W.-10 and P.W.-11 are the official witnesses (P.W.-8 and P.W.9 are the Doctors and P.W.10 and P.W.-11 being the Investigating Officer). 10. After going through the deposition, I find that the first set of witnesses who are the neighbours of the deceased has clearly stated that on hearing scream and commotion, they reached the place of occurrence. They stated that there was no electricity at that point of time. They found the deceased in burnt condition and on query they were told that the deceased was going to the bathroom with the lamp / lantern and accidently she got burnt. This is the consistent statement of P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3, P.W.-4 and P.W.-5. P.W.-1 also stated that he had helped the husband of the deceased to take the deceased to the hospital. P.W.-2 also stated that the accused person had taken the deceased to the hospital. This is the consistent statement of P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3, P.W.-4 and P.W.-5. P.W.-1 also stated that he had helped the husband of the deceased to take the deceased to the hospital. P.W.-2 also stated that the accused person had taken the deceased to the hospital. P.W.-4 & P.W.-5 also stated that it is the neighbours and the in-laws who had taken the deceased to the hospital. All the witnesses denied that the deceased was killed. 11. Now the next set of witness is the paternal relative of the deceased who are P.W.-6, the mother and P.W.-7, the brother of the deceased. 12. P.W.-6, who is the mother of the deceased, in her deposition stated that her daughter was married and was residing in Dhanbad. At para-2, she deposed that her daughter went to the washroom where there was a chimney and she caught fire as a result of which she got burnt. The husband also tried to save her as a result of which he also sustained injury. She became unconscious and was taken to the hospital where she died after eight days. She denied that she had given statement that there was an altercation in the family and the deceased was done to death by this appellant. This witness has been declared hostile. P.W.-7 is the brother of the deceased. He also stated that the deceased died as she caught fire from the lamp when she went to the toilet. Thus, these two witnesses also did not support the prosecution case as narrated by the deceased in the fardbayan. P.W.-8 is the Doctor in whose hospital the deceased was admitted after she sustained burn injury. He stated that he had signed the fardbayan but in para-3 he had stated that it is Dr. Aman Srivastava and Dr. N.K. Choudhary who were the treating Doctors. He admitted that he had not certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. He also stated that though the statement was being given in his presence but the same was not written in his presence. The Doctor stated that a day before, the victim had given a statement. P.W.-9 is the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination upon the deceased. He found the following injuries:- “Rigor mortis present, both upper and lower limbs. Eye partially open. Mouth partially open. The Doctor stated that a day before, the victim had given a statement. P.W.-9 is the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination upon the deceased. He found the following injuries:- “Rigor mortis present, both upper and lower limbs. Eye partially open. Mouth partially open. External injury on the body:- Burn injury about 85% including all over face – front and back of the neck, front and back of the chest both sides. All over abdomen. Both sides of the hands including palm. Both side of the thigh and left side of the leg. On dissection :- Skull – No bone injury Heart right chamber full and left chamber empty. Lungs, liver, spleen and kidney – congested. Stomach empty. Cause of death :- Deep burn injury leading to cardio respiratory failure. Time since death – within 24 hours. He has proved the Post-mortem report which is marked as Ext.3.” 13. Thus, from analysing the evidence of these two Doctors, I find that the deceased died due to burn injuries. The P.W.-8 admits that he has not certified as to whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind to get her statement recorded. He admits that he was not the Doctor who was treating the deceased, and the deceased had earlier given a statement. 14. P.W.-10 is the Investigating Officer. He stated that he was posted at Sudamdih Police Station. He received fardbayan of Ishmit Kaur and he was given the charge to investigate. He went to the place of occurrence and saw the room where allegedly the deceased was burnt by this appellant, but he states in his evidence that the door of the room was locked. 15. From his evidence, I find that he has not entered the room to investigate. He stated that he has recorded the restatement of the victim who supported the prosecution case. He submitted the charge sheet. He also stated that he had recorded the statement of the other witnesses who supported the prosecution case also. 16. P.W.-11 Sitaram Prasad is also a Police official who stated that he was posted in Chas Police Station and on 13.01.2008 at 02:00 P.M., brother of the deceased came and asked him to record the fardbayan of the girl. This witness then accompanied him and got the fardbayan recorded. 16. P.W.-11 Sitaram Prasad is also a Police official who stated that he was posted in Chas Police Station and on 13.01.2008 at 02:00 P.M., brother of the deceased came and asked him to record the fardbayan of the girl. This witness then accompanied him and got the fardbayan recorded. In cross-examination, he stated that the brother of the deceased was accompanied by 10 to 12 persons and this witness had told him that on 12.01.2008 he had already recorded a statement of the deceased which was duly signed by him also. He also stated that in that statement which was recorded on 12.01.2008, the deceased had never alleged that she was burnt by the accused, rather, she stated that she caught fire accidentally from the lamp. This witness also stated that the brother of the deceased did not accept the said fardbayan and forced this witness to accompany him and insisted that the fardbayan be again recorded in his presence. He also stated that the deceased was forced by them to give the statement and on being forced, the deceased started giving her statement which was recorded by him. 17. From the impugned judgment, I find that this appellant has been convicted solely on the basis of the fardbayan of the deceased which was taken to be the dying declaration, as none of the witness including the mother and brother of the deceased supported the prosecution case. 18. It is well settled that conviction can be based solely on the basis of dying declaration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Chopra & Anr. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2020) 11 SCC 489 , in para-21.8 has held that if on careful scrutiny the Court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also find it coherent and consistent, there is no impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration. 19. So far as dying declaration is concerned, the same should be voluntarily and reliable. The person who is making the said declaration should be in a fit state of mind. A dying declaration should be consistent and there should not be any inconsistency. The statement which is to be treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances. The person who is making the said declaration should be in a fit state of mind. A dying declaration should be consistent and there should not be any inconsistency. The statement which is to be treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances. In presence of inconsistencies, medical fitness of a person making such declaration at the relevant time assumes importance along with other factors, such as possibility of tutoring by the relatives. The aforesaid principles have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhishek Sharma Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1358 (para-12) and in the case of Ravi Kumar @ Kutti Ravi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2006) 9 SCC 240 . 20. Further in the case of Madan @ Madhu Patekar Vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 13 SCC 464 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a dying declaration can be a basis of conviction even without any corroboration if the same inspires confidence that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and was not tutored or not prompted. 21. In the case of Jai Karan Vs. State of (N.C.T. Delhi), reported in (1999) 8 SCC 161 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at para-10 held as hereunder: “10. A dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable. While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premiss that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. It is this premiss which is considered strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and be cross-examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by others and the court on a strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable, there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like any other piece of evidence — neither extra strong nor weak — and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable. [Padmaben Shamalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [ (1991) 1 SCC 744 (para 8) : 1991 SCC (Cri) 275] (para 8).]” 22. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I now proceed to deal with the issue as to whether the fardbayan of Ishmit Kaur, can be treated to be a dying declaration or not. The fardbayan of Ishmit Kaur narrates that she was burnt by this appellant. She was brought to the hospital where after eight days she died. The Doctor (P.W.-8) is admittedly not the Doctor who was treating the deceased when she was injured, as he categorically stated that it is Dr. Aman Srivastava and Dr. N.K. Choudhary, who were the treating Doctors. 23. When I go through the fardbayan, I find that the Doctor (P.W.8) had put his signature on the fardbayan but has not certified as to whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a statement. Even while depositing he states that the deceased was narrating in his presence but nothing was written in his presence. 24. Now, another important witness is P.W.-11 who is Police Officer who had recorded the fardbayan. His statement is of utmost importance. He stated that it is the brother of the deceased who came along with 10 to 12 person and took him to get the statement of the deceased recorded. 24. Now, another important witness is P.W.-11 who is Police Officer who had recorded the fardbayan. His statement is of utmost importance. He stated that it is the brother of the deceased who came along with 10 to 12 person and took him to get the statement of the deceased recorded. He also stated that he was pressurized and the deceased was also pressurized to give her statement which is the fardbayan and which implicates this appellant. The evidence of this witness clearly suggests that the fardbayan which was recorded on the statement of the deceased was not a voluntary statement. I come to the aforesaid conclusion because from the evidence of this witness and also from the Doctor, it is clear that this was not her first statement. This witness had clearly stated that a day before, he had already recorded the statement of the deceased who in that statement had not implicated this appellant and had rather stated that the burn was accidental which was from the lamp. The Doctor (P.W.-8) also stated that a day before she had given a statement. This clearly suggests that the deceased was forced to change her original statement. Further from the evidence of these witnesses, it is clear that at the time of recording the fardbayan, the brother of the deceased was present and at his instance, the same was recorded. This also suggests application of pressure from external sources for giving the statement which forms the basis of the F.I.R. and is treated to be the dying declaration. 25. Now, considering the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as noted above, I am of the opinion that this statement of the victim cannot take the form of a dying declaration as there was tutoring, application of pressure and was not voluntary. The voluntary statement of the deceased was the statement which was recorded earlier, as narrated by P.W.-11 who stated that the lady had earlier stated before him that she had got burnt from the lamp. 26. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight in this case is that whether the fardbayan which is treated to be a dying declaration is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. or not. From the evidence of P.W.-11 and the Doctor (P.W.-8), it has been well established that the fardbayan is not the first statement of the victim. 26. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight in this case is that whether the fardbayan which is treated to be a dying declaration is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. or not. From the evidence of P.W.-11 and the Doctor (P.W.-8), it has been well established that the fardbayan is not the first statement of the victim. The victim, a day before got her statement recorded wherein she had stated that she had sustained burn injury from lamp. The police officer (P.W.-11) had stated that he had got the statement recorded and had signed the same. Surprisingly the prosecution has withheld the aforesaid statement and has not brought the same before the trial court. In view of the aforesaid evidence which has been brought before us, the fardbayan is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. In view of the law laid down and what has been held above, I hold that the statement of the victim which is the fardbayan cannot be treated to be the dying declaration of the deceased and the same is also hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. 27. Now, when I have already held that the said statement is not a dying declaration and is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C., there has to be some corroborative evidence to implicate this appellant. As observed earlier, there is not even a single witness, including the mother and brother of the deceased, who had stated that it is this appellant who has burnt the deceased. All the witnesses stated that the deceased got burn from the lamp. The Investigating Officer did not even enter or visited the room where as per the prosecution the deceased was burnt by this appellant, as the room was locked. It was necessary for the Investigating Officer to inspect the room, to find out whether there is any evidence of burn in the said room but surprisingly the said room was not inspected. 28. Considering what has been discussed above, I find no evidence to implicate this appellant and connect her with the offence of burning the deceased. 29. Thus, I find merit in this appeal. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 24.01.2011 and order of sentence dated 01.02.2011, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. III, Dhanbad, in Sessions Trial No.199 of 2008, G.R. No.163 of 2008 cannot be sustained and thus, is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. 29. Thus, I find merit in this appeal. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 24.01.2011 and order of sentence dated 01.02.2011, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. III, Dhanbad, in Sessions Trial No.199 of 2008, G.R. No.163 of 2008 cannot be sustained and thus, is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. Accordingly, the instant Criminal Appeal stands allowed. 30. Since the appellant is on bail, she is discharged of the liabilities of the bail bond so are the bailers. 31. Trial Court Record be transmitted back to the Court concerned. 32. Pending I.A. if any, stands disposed of.