JUDGMENT : THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH Ext.P4 order passed by the Additional Munsiff Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram (for short, 'the trial court') is under challenge in this original petition. 2. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs, and the 1st respondent herein is the defendant in O.S.No.545/1998 on the file of the trial court. The suit was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The plaintiffs claim that the plaint schedule property belongs to them and is in their possession. In the written statement and the additional written statement, the defendants raised rival title and possession over the plaint schedule property. It was contended that, he purchased a larger extent of property from persons who had been allotted plots as per the final decree in a suit for partition; that he obtained possession over the property in execution of that final decree by delivery through court and that the plaint schedule property was a part of the property delivered over to him in execution of the decree. 3. The parties went on trial. After the oral evidence on the side of the plaintiffs was over, the defendant was examined on commission as DW1. He filed proof-affidavit in lieu of chief-examination before the commissioner and marked Exts.B1 to B14. The counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the marking of the documents tendered as Exts.B2, B8, B9 and B10. The objections were recorded by the commissioner, and they were reserved to be decided by the court at the stage of hearing as contemplated under the proviso to Rule 4 of Order XVIII of CPC. It is evident from Ext.P3 testimony of DW1. 4. Ext.B2 is a delivery kychit given by Amin in the execution of the final decree mentioned above. Exts.B8 to B10 are the photostat copies of the land revenue receipts in respect of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs objected to the marking of Ext.B2 on the ground that it is a report submitted by an Amin to the court in another suit in which they were not parties, and it cannot be proved without examining the author of that document. To be precise, the objection was to the mode of proof of Ext.B2. The objection to the marking of Exts.B8, B9 and B10 was that the documents are photocopies and cannot be admitted in evidence at all. The objection was to the admissibility of the documents. To be precise, the objection was to the mode of proof of Ext.B2. The objection to the marking of Exts.B8, B9 and B10 was that the documents are photocopies and cannot be admitted in evidence at all. The objection was to the admissibility of the documents. The trial court heard both sides as to the objections raised by the plaintiffs over Exts.B2, B8, B9 and B10. Thereafter, it passed Ext.P4 order accepting the objection made by the plaintiffs against Exts. B8 to B10 and over-ruling the objection against Ext.B2. It is challenging the said order; this original petition has been preferred. 5. The 1st respondent died during the pendency of this Original Petition. The additional respondents 2 to 6 were impleaded as his legal heirs. 6. I have heard Sri.V.Suresh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri.M.Gopikrishnan Nambiar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the trial court passed Ext.P4 order as if deciding the entire suit and failed to comprehend the scope of the question that arose before it at that stage. The learned counsel further submitted that the facts stated in Ext.B2 document or the truth of contents therein cannot be proved by mere production of certified copy of the said document without the author being examined. The objection under the proviso to Rule 4 of Order XVIII of CPC regarding the proof and admissibility of the objected document can be taken up for consideration by the court only after the evidence is completed, submitted the counsel. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents supported the findings in the impugned order. It was urged that Ext. B2 being the certified copy of a public document, the Court was obliged to consider the truth of the contents thereof as being prima facie established. Reliance was placed on Appaiya v. Andimuthu alias Thangapandi and others ( AIR 2023 SC 4810 ) 8. The trial court extensively dealt with the relevancy, admissibility, mode of proof and even evidentiary value of Ext.B2. Ultimately, it was held that the contents in Ext.B2 document can be accepted in proving the possession of the defendant with respect to the property covered by the said document without examining Amin, who prepared the same. The trial court extensively dealt with the relevancy, admissibility, mode of proof and even evidentiary value of Ext.B2. Ultimately, it was held that the contents in Ext.B2 document can be accepted in proving the possession of the defendant with respect to the property covered by the said document without examining Amin, who prepared the same. At the outset, I must say that it was too premature for the trial Court to arrive at such a finding at the stage of considering the objection raised by the counsel for the plaintiffs regarding the admissibility of Ext.B2 as provided under the proviso to Order XVIII Rule 4(1) of CPC. Ideally, such an objection could be taken up for consideration by the court only after the evidence is completed. 9. The trial court was of the view that, since Ext.B2 is a certified copy of a public document, the contents stated therein stand automatically proved by mere production of the same. The learned counsel for the defendant also made submissions in the same line before me. 10. Under the Law of Evidence, it is necessary that the contents of the documents are required to be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. Chapter V of the Evidence Act deals with documentary evidence. Section 61 thereof lays down that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. As per Section 62, primary evidence means the documents itself produced for the inspection of the court. Section 63 categorized five kinds of secondary evidence. Section 64 lays down that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned in the following Sections. To put it briefly, the general rule is that secondary evidence is not admissible until the non -production of primary evidence is satisfactorily proved. However, Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 65 carves out an exception to the extent that when the original document is a public document or when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act, or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence, secondary evidence is admissible even though the original document is still in existence and available. Section 74 of the Act defines what ‘public documents’ are. Section 74 of the Act defines what ‘public documents’ are. Section 76 of the Act deals with the issuance of certified copies of public documents, Section 77 deals with the proof of public documents by production of certified copies and Section 79 deals with presumption as to the genuineness of certified copies. 11. Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act, when read together, show that the contents of a document must primarily be proved by the production of the document itself for the inspection of the Court. The Act requires, first, the production of the original document. If the original document is not available, secondary evidence can be given. Under Section 65 (e), secondary evidence may be given when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74 and only a certified copy of the public document is admissible. Section 77 provides that certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents. Thus, the contents of a document, be it private or public, may be proved by the production of primary or secondary evidence, as the case may be, for the inspection of the court. A conjoint reading of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act clearly shows that the only difference that the Act made between public and private documents was in regard to the form of secondary evidence which is admissible, viz., a certified copy, and in regard to the presumption of the genuineness of the certified copy; in all other respects, no distinction was drawn by the Act between public and private documents (Om Prakash Berlia and Another v. Unit Trust of India and Others, AIR 1983 Bom. 1 ) 12. Section 61 speaks of proof of contents of documents, both private and public, by primary or secondary evidence. Section 77 speaks of proof of contents of the public documents by production of certified copies. There is a difference between ‘proof of contents of a document’ and ‘proof of the truth of the contents of a document’. The expression ‘contents of documents’ is not defined in the Evidence Act. ‘Document’, as per Section 3 thereof, means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. The expression ‘contents of documents’ is not defined in the Evidence Act. ‘Document’, as per Section 3 thereof, means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. As per the illustrations, a writing is a document; words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents; a map or plan is a document; an inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document; a caricature is a document, etc. A document may, thus, contain several ‘things’, such as writing, figures, marks, print, inscription, etc. It may also contain various other things than mere writing. ‘Fact’, as per Section 3 of the Evidence Act, means and includes any ‘thing’ which is capable of being perceived by the senses. That a man said certain words is a fact; that a man heard or saw something is a fact; that a person did something is also a fact since all such things can be perceived by the senses. Section 59 of the Evidence Act lays down how a ‘fact’ can be proved. It says that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. Therefore, all the things as may be contained in the ‘document’, as defined under S.3, constitute ‘contents of a document’. That a document contains a particular writing; that it contains a typewritten matter or a particular handwriting, a writing in ink, an erasure, interpolation, painting, fold, etc., constitute ‘contents of documents.’ If, on perusal or inspection of a document, it is found to contain a writing, figures, marks, print, inscription, signature, painting and date, those things are its contents because all those things contained in the document are visible on an inspection of the document by the Court. However, if a ‘fact’ which falls under Section 3 is written in a document, such ‘fact’ incorporated in the document can be treated only as a 'statement of fact' relating to such ‘fact’. Such a 'statement of fact' may be treated as one of the ‘contents of the document’, but the ‘fact’ written in the document as such will not constitute ‘contents of the document. Such a 'statement of fact' may be treated as one of the ‘contents of the document’, but the ‘fact’ written in the document as such will not constitute ‘contents of the document. This is for the reason that on an inspection of the document by the Court, the Court can only see that the document contains a 'statement of fact' referring to a ‘fact’ but, it cannot see or perceive by any sense, truth or existence of the said ‘fact’ written in the document. Thus, there is a clear distinction between the ‘contents of documents’ and the ‘facts’ stated in the document or the truth of the contents of the document. (Suresh v. Tobin, 2013 (1) KLT 293 ). 13. The expression ‘contents of document’ in Sections 61 and 77 must only mean what the document states and not the truth of what the document states. The ‘facts’ stated in the contents of the document or truth of the contents of the document will not stand proved by the mere production of the document for the inspection of the court. Where the party tendering the document finds it necessary to prove the truth of its contents, that is, the truth of what it states, he must do so in the manner he would prove a relevant fact. By virtue of S.59 of the Evidence Act, such facts have to be proved by oral evidence of the person who can vouch for the truth of the facts. This is generally done by calling the author of the document (Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhidanand Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1949 ). If such direct oral evidence is adduced to prove such fact, any 'statement of facts' contained in a document relating to such fact can be relied upon to corroborate or contradict such oral evidence, as a former statement. But, in the absence of oral evidence, the mere production of a document which contains a narration of a past event will not suffice to prove the facts stated therein, in the light of Section 59 read with Section 61 and Section 62 of the Evidence Act. Of course, if no direct oral evidence is available to prove a fact, circumstantial evidence can be adduced. Of course, if no direct oral evidence is available to prove a fact, circumstantial evidence can be adduced. Such circumstances sought to be proved may also constitute ‘facts’ as defined in Section 3, and such facts have to be proved by oral evidence, as per Section 59 of the Evidence Act [Suresh (supra)]. 14. The production of certified copies under the provisions of Section 63 is a means of leading secondary evidence. Secondary evidence can, obviously, be led only of what the document states, not as to whether what the document states is true. Under Section 65 (e), secondary evidence may be given when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74 and only a certified copy of the public document is admissible. Secondary evidence of a public document so led only proves what the document states, no more. In other words, he who seeks to prove a public document is relieved of the obligation to produce the original. He can produce instead a certified copy. All other requirements he must still comply with. [Om Prakash Berlia (supra)]. All that a certified copy does is that it authenticates the genuineness of the copy. The Court presumes that the original document had the same contents as the copy. It certainly does not prove the disputed facts or the truth of the contents of the document. 15. Let me now turn to the decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. In Appaiya (supra), the Supreme Court recently held that a certified copy of a sale deed, being a public document, would be admissible in evidence for proving the contents of the original document. That was a case where the High Court took the view that a certified copy was inadmissible in evidence owing to failure to produce the original. Referring to various provisions of the Evidence Act and the Registration Act, the Supreme Court reversed the said finding of the High Court and held that a certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of its original document. The Supreme Court observed that the document in question, being a certified copy of a public document, need not have been proved by calling a witness. The Supreme Court observed that the document in question, being a certified copy of a public document, need not have been proved by calling a witness. No question arose before the Supreme Court whether the truth of the contents of a public document would stand proved by mere production of the certified copy. 16. Although secondary evidence is admissible of a public document by way of its certified copy, the party who produced it is not relieved of his obligation to prove the facts stated therein or the truth of its contents. A certified copy of a public document can be admitted as secondary evidence to prove only what the document states. The truth of what the document states must be separately established. There is no presumption that all facts stated in a public document are true or that they exist. If the existence or truth of the facts stated in a document, public or private, is disputed, it is to be proved by the oral evidence of the person who has perceived those facts by senses and who can vouch for the truth of those facts. Truth or existence of facts stated in the document cannot be proved by mere production or marking of the document, especially if such facts are disputed and are in issue. Even if a person admits the execution of a document, he can still dispute the correctness of its contents, or the truth of the facts stated therein. Mere admission of the execution of a document may prove that such a document is executed, but that will not further prove that the facts stated therein are true. It shall not be legal for the court to rely solely upon the recitals in the document as substantive evidence to decide whether disputed facts exist, proved or not. It is well settled that neither the mere admission of a document in evidence amounts to its proof nor the mere marking of a document as exhibit dispenses with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. [Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010) 4 SCC 491 ]. 17. The definite case of the plaintiffs is that Ext.B2 document relates to a suit in which they were not parties and thus not binding on them. The contents in Ext.B2 are not at all admitted by the plaintiffs. [Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010) 4 SCC 491 ]. 17. The definite case of the plaintiffs is that Ext.B2 document relates to a suit in which they were not parties and thus not binding on them. The contents in Ext.B2 are not at all admitted by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not parties to Ext.B2 proceedings. Thus, the disputed facts that exist in Ext.B2 cannot be proved by the mere production of the said document. By mere production of Ext. B2 document, all that may be proved is that the document contains a ‘statement of fact’ that delivery was effected, but whether such delivery was actually made or not will not be proved by such production or marking. When the facts stated in a document or the truth of contents in a document are disputed, they must be proved by examining the person who issued that document. The fact that there was actual delivery of possession has to be proved by oral evidence, going by Section 3 and Section 59 read with Section 61 and Section 62 of the Evidence Act. Hence, the finding of the trial court in the impugned order that the contents of Ext.B2 can be considered by the court in proving the possession of the defendant with respect to the property delivered through Ext.B2 kychit cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the said finding is set aside. The proof of Ext.B2 document shall be independently considered by the trial court along with other evidence on record after the evidence is completed. The original petition is disposed of as above.