JUDGMENT : Pregnancy is a sacred time when a mother and her child are born; but it extends far beyond that. The journey from pregnancy to motherhood is something every new mother cherishes. 2. Birth is a sacred rite of passage, that marks the beginning of a new life - and for the mother, it is also a new - life as a parent. It is a powerful and transformative experience, which connects the mother to the cycles of nature and the phenomenon of creation. The act of giving birth is not only physical but also emotional and spiritual, requiring fortitude and self awareness on a new level. It is a momentous occasion celebrated and honoured in most of the cultures - if not all cultures - around the world. 3. In India, maternity leave and benefits are regulated under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for short). The Act is intended to support women during the birth of their child, as also to protect and safeguard their livelihood and interest, giving them time to nurture their newborns, while taking care of themselves. 4. The provision for a maternity leave is one of the most important welfare measures in this regard and its purpose is to give new mothers adequate time to give birth, recover, care for, and bond with their new baby, before they return to work. 5. The Constitution of India, through Article 42, recognises the need to make provisions for “securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief”. 6. Historically, child birth and upbringing of children has been used as a justification for limiting the role of a woman to the home and to stop her from pursuing employment. Pregnancy, being an active choice of the woman, cannot operate to make her incapable of working and this is where the provisions in the ‘Act’ come to play. For working women, who may not have the familial, emotional or economic support, in terms of caregiving; also for women who choose to be the primary caregivers of the child in the first few months, pregnancy and childbirth often would become a barrier to enter work. 7. For working women, who may not have the familial, emotional or economic support, in terms of caregiving; also for women who choose to be the primary caregivers of the child in the first few months, pregnancy and childbirth often would become a barrier to enter work. 7. Tragically in the past, many a time, women have been forced to choose between working and child caring; and it is with the objective to prevent such, that maternity benefit provisions have been enacted in the Labour Laws of our country. 8. In 1919, when the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was constituted, its member States recognised maternity as a ‘social responsibility’ of the society at large and the need to draft provisions to protect working women in their maternity functions. 9. While maternity protection is a collective responsibility, it also brings both individuals and collective benefits. Such protection has been linked to a number of positive outcomes for the mother, for her child, for the economy and for the communities at large. 10. Maternity protection is now recognised as a human right; as an essential component of gender equality; requisite for improvement of the health of mother and child; to play an important role in economic growth and poverty reduction; and is part and parcel of the work agenda, as defined by the United Nations. 11. Of all rights of a woman, the greatest perhaps, is to be a mother; but sometimes, or most of the time, initial motherhood is a very trying period, especially for a working woman. 12. From the afore preface, one would surely gather that this judgment deals with a woman and her right to maternity benefits, which issues have become projected in the specific facts of this case which is detailed below. 13. The petitioner impugns Ext.P8 order, which is the Appellate Order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, modifying Ext.P6 issued earlier by the Assistant Labour Officer, acting as a Competent Authority under the provisions of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 ('the Act' for short). 14. 13. The petitioner impugns Ext.P8 order, which is the Appellate Order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, modifying Ext.P6 issued earlier by the Assistant Labour Officer, acting as a Competent Authority under the provisions of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 ('the Act' for short). 14. It is the specific case of the petitioner, as argued by his learned counsel – Sri.K.A.Hazan that she is entitled to 26 weeks of maternity benefit and that this could not have been curtailed in any manner - which factum has been fully recognized by the Assistant Labour Officer in Ext.P6; but that, when appeal was preferred by the 2nd respondent before the Appellate Authority, namely the Deputy Labour Commissioner, he has issued Ext.P8 in a cursory manner, holding that she is not entitled to the above benefit, but only to a period of 62 days - being which was surviving in the service contract she had entered into with the 2nd respondent. The learned counsel argued that the petitioner was in continuous service, under different contracts renewed on annual basis, for nearly 7 years; and that it is only because she became pregnant, that the 2nd respondent refused to renew the contract thereafter; and hence, that the factum of there being only 62 days left in the existing contract would be irrelevant, going by the affirmative declarations of the Honourable Supreme Court in the various binding precedents, particularly Dr.Kavita Yadav v. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department & Ors [Civil Appeal No.5010/2023. 15. Sri.K.A.Hassan then argued that the treatments meted out to his client by the employer ought to have been seen by the authorities to be a settled form of discrimination because denying her employment solely due to pregnancy can be nothing more than that. He further asserted that the denial of maternity benefits to a deserving woman and new mother is unethical as well as illegal since it undermines gender equality; and from an ethical standpoint, a lack of respect for the contributions and rights of women at the workplace. He then prayed that Ext.P8 be set aside and the directions in Ext.P6 be sustained. 16. He then prayed that Ext.P8 be set aside and the directions in Ext.P6 be sustained. 16. Smt.C.S.Sheeja – learned Senior Government Pleader, in response, explained that the Deputy Labour Commissioner had no other option but to issue Ext.P8 because, it is expressly admitted that the petitioner had her contract available only for 62 days more, after she became pregnant; and hence, her claim for the full period of maternity benefit would be untenable. She, however, conceded that, in normal cases, the declarations in Dr.Kavita Yadav (supra) would come to play and that a lady would be entitled to her full maternity benefit; but that this is incapacitated in this case for afore reason. She thus affirmed that the Deputy Labour Commissioner is without error; and then offered, an alternative submission, that, if for any reason, this Court is not inclined to accept this argument, then it may be left to said Authority to cause a reconsideration. 17. The endorsements on the files of this case establish that service of summons to 2nd respondent has been completed validly. However, they have chosen not to be present in person, or to be represented through counsel; thus constraining me to dispose of this matter in their absence. 18. I must say upfront that I am not, prima facie, in favour with the afore submissions of the learned senior Government Pleader because, normally, when dealing with matters relating to Maternity Benefit, what is relevant is not the period of contract, but the entitlement of the woman in question. Maternity benefit is not one that can be denied unreasonably since, the woman takes the burden of giving birth, thus being entitled to full support from the system and society, as I have said supra. 19. In the case at hand, pertinently, the only reason offered by the Statutory Authority is that petitioner's contract survived only for another 62 days; but he did not take into account her specific contention that, had she not become pregnant, her contract would have been extended, as it was done admittedly in the past 7 years. 20. I do not propose to say anything further; but am certain that the matter will require to be reconsidered by the Appellate Authority, after hearing both sides. 21. 20. I do not propose to say anything further; but am certain that the matter will require to be reconsidered by the Appellate Authority, after hearing both sides. 21. I choose to say nothing further at this stage but there can be little contest in this century that no woman can be penalized for the choice to be a mother; but on the contrary, it will only behove any civilized society to rise in support and offer every benefit that is due to her. The petitioner's allegation that she has been discriminated by the employer solely because she became pregnant of course now remains as an uncorroborated assertion, but is one, which ought to seize the attention of the Competent Authority while deciding matters of such tenuous nature. In the afore circumstances, adverting to Dr.Kavita Yadav (supra), I allow this Writ Petition and set aside Ext.P8 appeal; consequently directing the 5th respondent, who is the statutory Appellate Authority to reconsider Exdt.P7 appeal, after affording an opportunity of hearing to both sides; thus culminating in an appropriate fresh order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.