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2024 DIGILAW 77 (JHR)

Dilip Singh, s/o Sri Keshri Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2024-01-19

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

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JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J. The writ petitioner has challenged the order dated 20th September 2021 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2237 of 2015. This was the second writ petition filed by the appellant to challenge the eviction notice dated 24th July 2014 requiring him to vacate Zarina villa within twenty-four hours. 2. The writ petition has been dismissed primarily on the ground of suppression of material facts. The property in dispute is a leasehold property within Plot Nos.428 and 678 in Holding No.176 of village Sarley (Thana No.159) in the district of Hazaribagh. This property is a Khas Mahal Estate spread over 1.35 acres which was given to Mrs. Zarina Hamid through an indenture of lease for a fixed period. Mrs. Zarina Hamid died issueless and her brother Sabir Ali came in possession of the subject-property. After his death, the subject-property devolved to his legal heirs Fazle Ali, Shaukat Ali and Asma Khatoon. The respondents have pleaded that Shaukat Ali and Asma Khatoon left for the United States of America and the subject-property came under the overall control of Fazle Ali. Over the time, the lease for the subject-property was renewed for a further period of 30 years from 1st April 1978 to 31st March 2008. Before expiry of the lease period, Fazle Ali entered into an agreement with the appellant on 9th October 2002 for the sale of 0.36 acres of the subject-property with dilapidated structures standing thereon for a consideration amount of Rs.5,61,000/-. According to the appellant, he entered Zarina villa with the consent of Fazle Ali who developed ill-intention and refused to execute the sale deed and therefore he was constrained to institute Title Suit No. 65 of 2004 for specific performance of the agreement dated 9th October 2002. Later on, the appellant and Fazle Ali settled their dispute and a joint compromise petition was filed in the said suit. Based on the joint compromise petition, a compromise decree was passed on 23rd November 2005 and Title Suit No.65 of 2004 was disposed of in the following terms: “3. Later on, the appellant and Fazle Ali settled their dispute and a joint compromise petition was filed in the said suit. Based on the joint compromise petition, a compromise decree was passed on 23rd November 2005 and Title Suit No.65 of 2004 was disposed of in the following terms: “3. After receiving notice the defendant appeared and filed a joint compromise petition stating therein that a good relation has been restored between the parties on the intervention of their well-wishers and both the parties have been compromised the suit on following terms:- i. That a sum of Rs.3,53,000/- is payable by the plaintiff to the defendant and out of which a sum of Rs.82,000/- has been paid today by the plaintiff to the defendant and remaining Rs.2,76,000/- shall be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant within 30-4-2006 or on the date of execution of sale whichever is earlier. ii. That the defendant has handed over to the plaintiff an application duly signed by him to the plaintiff through which the defendant seeks permission of the Khas Mahal authority to transfer the suit premises to the plaintiff. iii. That as already and otherwise agreed the plaintiff shall pursue the application for permission before Khas Mahal authorities and whenever required by the plaintiff the defendant shall extends his co-operation and support in pursuing the said application. iv. That all expenses in pursuing the said application including all deposits to be made under Khas Mahal circular, shall be incurred by the plaintiff. v. That all expenses for final conveyance of sale including for stamp duty and registration shall be incurred by the plaintiff. 4. It is also stated in the compromise petition that the said compromise has been effected without any threat, fear or inducement between the parties and failure on part of the plaintiff to make payment as stipulated in Clause 3(i) of the aforesaid condition render this compromise inoperative and ineffective and the party shall free to take recourse to legal remedies. FINDINGS 5. Since good relationship has been restored between both the parties and they have compromised the suit, no issue has been framed and both the parties i.e. plaintiff and defendant have been examined on the basis of compromise petition and both have stated in same voice that a decree should be passed in favour of the plaintiff as per the condition mentioned in the compromise petition.” 3. The respondent no.5 set up a stand that the compromise decree was rendered infructuous on account of a failure on the part of the appellant to pay Rs.2.76 lakhs to him within 30th April 2006. On the other hand, the appellant set up a different story and filed a second suit for specific performance vide Title Suit No.27 of 2013 seeking execution of the deed of conveyance under the agreement to sale dated 9th October 2002. But before that, a notice was issued to the appellant from the Office of the Deputy Commissioner at Hazaribagh requiring him to produce the documents to justify his occupation of Zarina villa. According to the respondents, the appellant did not produce any material before the Khas Mahal authority and therefore a direction was issued by the Deputy Commissioner to evict the appellant from Zarina villa. On 2nd January 2013, the Additional Collector therefore wrote to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar) to get the premises vacated and the said officer by an order dated 19th January 2013 deputed the Circle Officer to get the premises vacated from the appellant. Therefore, the appellant filed an application in Title Suit No.27 of 2013 for restraining the State authorities from dispossessing him from the subject-property which was dismissed by an order dated 23rd July 2013 and Misc. Case Appeal No.8 of 2013 filed by the appellant to challenge the said order was also dismissed on 9th May 2014. The order passed in Misc. Case Appeal No.8 of 2013 was challenged by the appellant by filling WP(C) No. 2800 of 2014. In the meantime, the appellant had laid a challenge to the notice dated 24th July 2014 in WP(C) No. 4690 of 2013. 4. WP(C) No. 4690 of 2013 was dismissed as withdrawn by the order dated 16th April 2015. This order specifically records no objection of the respondent no. 4 (respondent no.5 herein) if permission to withdraw the writ petition is granted by the Court. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the appellant to file a fresh writ petition. W.P.(C) No. 4690 of 2013 has been dismissed as withdrawn in the following terms: “In view of the changed situation, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. W.P.(C) No. 4690 of 2013 has been dismissed as withdrawn in the following terms: “In view of the changed situation, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent no.4 submits that the respondent no.4 would have no objection if the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the writ petition. Prayer to withdraw the writ petition is accorded. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh writ petition. It would be open to the petitioner to raise all the pleas which have been raised in the present writ petition.” 5. However, the second writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed on the ground that the appellant suppressed the vital facts from the Court as regards the other proceedings instituted by him. W.P.(C) No. 2237 of 2015 was dismissed observing as under: “After considering the rival submissions of the parties, looking into facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that a large number of litigations in the form of title suit with respect to Khas mahal land without impleading State as a party have been initiated, initially to justify wrong deed of agreement entered into between the parties i.e. petitioner and respondent no. 5 with respect to khasmahal land, which is admittedly a Government land and to get a government land illegally, Title Suit No. 65/2004 has been instituted, which ended into compromise without impleading the State as a party, who is admittedly owner of the land on the ground that no relief has been sought for against the State is not acceptable to this Court as argued by the learned counsel of the respondent no. 5 as because in the said Title Suit No. 65/2004, which was suit for specific performance of contract with relief sought for with respect to decree for specific performance of contract in favour of plaintiff and defendant be directed to execute the final deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff within time specified in the decree, failing which the court on behalf of defendant would execute and present the same for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Hazaribagh with respect to land belonging to the State of Jharkhand. After such decree on the basis of compromise, Title Execution Case No. 27/2014 was filed, which was dismissed on 04.07.2015, but these documents have deliberately not been brought on record for the reasons best known to the petitioner. However, subsequent Title Suit No. 27/2013 has been filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for injunction, but the injunction was not granted by the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Hazaribag on 23.07.2013. Against the said order, writ petitioner has preferred Misc. Appeal No. 08/2013 before the Principal District Judge, Hazaribag, which was also dismissed in terms of order dated 09.05.2014. Thereafter, writ petition vide W.P.(C) No. 4690/2013 has been preferred by the petitioner, which was dismissed as withdrawn in terms of order dated 16.04.2015 and against the said orders, writ petition was filed before this Court vide W.P. (C) No. 2800/2014, which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 06.08.2015. Another writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner vide W.P. (C) No. 6035/2014, which was also dismissed in terms of order dated 17.04.2015. Thereafter, the present writ petition has been filed. Records of W.P.(C) No. 4690/2013 and W.P. (C) No. 6035/2014 have been tagged with the present writ petition in view of the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 28.07.2021, as such, this Court has occasion to see the entire records of those writ petitions. From perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the State in W.P. (C) No. 4690/2013, it appears that the averment made in the counter affidavit has not been refuted or replied by the Writ Petitioner, as such, it seems that the proceeding has been initiated and thereafter, the petitioner has been noticed, but petitioner did not bother to appear before the court below and thus, eviction order was passed without mentioning the said proceeding in the notice dated 24.07.2014 passed by Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribag is not causing any prejudice to such litigants, who are filing one after another litigation by suppressing one fact or another, as such, in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha (Supra), the writ petition is fit to be dismissed as the petitioner has not come up before this Court with clean hands even in filing this fourth writ petition in succession. Accordingly, this writ petition, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.” 6. This is no more res integra that a second writ petition is maintainable for the same cause of action. The only limitation in law is that the withdrawal of the petition was with a permission to file a second petition for the same relief. Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where a Court is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. In a writ proceeding, a similar rule akin to Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is applied. If a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is considered on merits and dismissed the decision thus pronounced would bind the parties and a second writ petition shall not lie. However, if the writ petition is not dismissed on merits but because of some laches of the party or alternative remedy available to the party or was dismissed as withdrawn then a second writ petition may or may not be barred and a decision in this regard can be taken having regard to the relief claimed, proceeding before the writ Court to the extent that whether a counter-affidavit was filed by the respondents and the matters of like nature. No doubt the notice dated 24th July 2014 was challenged by the appellant in the second writ petition but, at the same time, he has also challenged the action of the respondent in putting a lock in the premises after forcibly evicting him. No doubt the notice dated 24th July 2014 was challenged by the appellant in the second writ petition but, at the same time, he has also challenged the action of the respondent in putting a lock in the premises after forcibly evicting him. The appellant approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 2237 of 2015 with the following prayer: “That this application is directed against the notice dated 24th July 2014 issued by the respondent no.3 by reasons of which the petitioner was directed to vacate the suit premises within the period of 24 hours and also for issuance of an appropriate writ/writs commanding upon the respondents to restore the possession of the suit premises in favour of the petitioner forthwith by removing the lock which was put by state authorities on 25.7.2014.” 7. To claim the aforementioned relief, the appellant made the following statements in WP(C) No. 2237 of 2015: “36. That the petitioner states that during the pendency of the earlier writ application, being WP(C) No. 4690/2013, and also during the pendency of the I.A. No. 3816/2014 whereby the petitioner challenges notice dated 24.7.2014, one Sri Anant Kumar, Executive Magistrate, Sadar Hazaribagh came to the suit premises along with the police force on 25.7.2014 at 1 a.m and forcibly get the petitioner and all the family members of the petitioner ousted from the portion of the suit premises and also put a sea on the gate of the house. 37. That the petitioner states that no proceeding whatsoever has ever been initiated by the respondents for eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises. 38. That the petitioner states that the office of the respondent no.3 without giving the petitioner any opportunity of hearing and to defend his case in a highly arbitrary and illegal manner issued notice dated 24.7.2013 directing the petitioner to vacate the suit premises within 24 hours. 39. That the petitioner states that admittedly the respondent no. 5 is the lessee of the suit premises and in case the lessee has violated any of the terms of the lease the Khas Mahal Authorities are entitled for taking steps against the lessee by evicting him from the leasehold area by cancellation of lease. 40. That the petitioner states that in the present case, since the respondents care in league with the respondent no. 5, they with connivance of respondent no. 40. That the petitioner states that in the present case, since the respondents care in league with the respondent no. 5, they with connivance of respondent no. 5 has arbitrarily and unilaterally evicted the petitioner and his family from the suit premises without initiating any proceeding whatsoever either against the lessee or against the petitioner. 41. That the petitioner states that all illegal action taken by the respondents are during the pendency of the earlier writ application. It is relevant to stated that the notice which is under challenge in this application was also challenged by way amendment in the earlier writ application and the action of the respondents for evicting the petitioner from the suit premises was also challenged in I.A application in the earlier writ petition. 42. That the petitioner states that a Bench of this Court although allowed I.A No. 3816/2014 whereby the impugned notice was challenged but I.A No. 3840/2014 was dismissed by order dated 5.11.2014. 43. That the petitioner states that inadvertently the petitioner has filed another writ application being WP(C) No. 6035/2014. The said writ application was withdrawn vide order dated 17.4.2015. 44. That the petitioner states that since Khas Mahal Authorities did not take any action against the respondent no. 5 for cancellation of his lease in case of violation of terms of lease, the respondent authorities in highly illegal and arbitrary manner without initiating any proceeding has evicted the petitioner and his family members from the suit remises. It is as such expedient for the ends of justice to direct the respondent authorities to restore the possession of the suit premises in favour of the petitioner. 45. That the petitioner has moved this Hon’ble Court in WP(C) No. 4690/2013 which was permitted to be withdrawn vide order dated 16.4.2014 with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. The Hon’ble Court further gave liberty to the petitioner raised all the pleas which have been raised in the said application.” 8. From the above, it is quite demonstrable that all necessary facts were pleaded before the writ Court and there was no suppression of material facts by the appellant. The orders refusing injunction in Title Suit No. 27 of 2013 and the dismissal of Misc. Appeal No. 08 of 2013 were brought to the notice of the writ Court. From the above, it is quite demonstrable that all necessary facts were pleaded before the writ Court and there was no suppression of material facts by the appellant. The orders refusing injunction in Title Suit No. 27 of 2013 and the dismissal of Misc. Appeal No. 08 of 2013 were brought to the notice of the writ Court. A fact shall fall under the category of “material fact” only if such a fact would have a material bearing for the grant or denial of the relief. Therefore, it must be demonstrated that there was suppression of such a material fact which was necessary for adjudicating the prayer made in the writ petition. In “Arunima Baruah”,[Arunima Baruah v. Union of India: (2007) 6 SCC 120 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.” 9. The writ Court did not address the plea of the appellant against illegal State action. This is the stand taken by the State of Jharkhand that Zarina villa was under illegal occupation of the appellant. According to the respondents, a notice in this connection was given to the appellant on 7th September 2012 but he did not appear before the Additional Collector at Hazaribagh. Constrained, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order for eviction of the appellant from Zarina villa and this decision was communicated to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar), Hazaribagh through a letter dated 2nd January 2013 issued by the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh. 10. Constrained, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order for eviction of the appellant from Zarina villa and this decision was communicated to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar), Hazaribagh through a letter dated 2nd January 2013 issued by the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh. 10. The notice dated 7th September 2012 issued by Additional Collector, Hazaribagh to the appellant by which he was directed to appear along with relevant documents reads as under: English Translation: Office of Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh Khas Mahal Prakoshth Memo No. 343..../Kha. Ma. Hazaribagh, Dated: 07/09/2012 To, Sri Dilip Singh, Village Sarle, Hazaribagh. It has been reported by the Halka Karmachari / Kanoongo, Khas Mahal Cell that you are residing in the main building, Zarina Villa located on 1.26 acres of land in village Sarle, Thana No. 159, Building Lease Holding No. 176, Plot No. 428/678 under Hazaribagh Khas Mahal. In the course of enquiry, you have stated that you are residing in the said building on the basis of an agreement, but you have not provided copy of the agreement. Therefore, you are hereby called upon to appear in person or through your pleader along with all the relevant documents on 21/9/11 at 11:30 am before the undersigned and answer as to in what capacity you are residing in the afore-said building. Sd/- Additional Collector, Hazaribagh 07.09.12 11. There was no proceeding before the Deputy Commissioner under any statutory provision for evicting the appellant from the subject-property. However, the Deputy Commissioner formed an opinion in ex-parte proceeding against the appellant that he was in illegal possession of Zarina villa. The decision of the Deputy Commissioner was communicated by the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh vide letter dated 2nd January 2013 to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hazaribagh with a decision to get the premises vacated. The letter dated 2nd January 2013 which is extracted below reads as under: English Translation: Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh Khas Mahal Prakoshth (Cell) Letter No.05/Kha.Ma. From, Additional Collector, Hazaribagh. To, The Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh. Hazaribagh, dated 02/01/2013 Subject:- Regarding illegal occupation of 'Zarina Villa' built on the lease land of Khas Mahal. Reference:- Your letter number 1016/Go. dated 25.05.2012 and letter number 111/Vi. dated 12.10.2011 issued by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh. From, Additional Collector, Hazaribagh. To, The Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh. Hazaribagh, dated 02/01/2013 Subject:- Regarding illegal occupation of 'Zarina Villa' built on the lease land of Khas Mahal. Reference:- Your letter number 1016/Go. dated 25.05.2012 and letter number 111/Vi. dated 12.10.2011 issued by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh. In the light of the relevant letter on the above-noted subject, the enquiry of the case related to illegal occupation of the building "Zarina Villa" located on 1.26 acres of land in Village-Sarle, Building lease Ho. No. 176, Plot No. 428/678 under Hazaribagh Khas Mahal Cell was got conducted by the Halka Karmachari/Kanoongo, Khas Mahal Cell. A photocopy of the report submitted by the Halka Karmachari/Kanoongo, Khas Mahal Cell is attached. Lease of 1.26 acres of land situated in Village-Sarle, Building lease Ho. No. 176, Plot No. 428/678 under Hazaribagh Khas Mahal Cell was renewed in the name of Sri Faizal Ali and others till 31.03.2008 and the records/proposal for renewal for the next 30 years with the recommendation of the Commissioner has been sent to the Revenue and Land Reforms Department. The main building “Zarina Villa” situated on the said land has been illegally occupied by Sri Dilip Singh and others. The Deputy Commissioner has ordered to free the said building from illegal occupation. Therefore, in view of the above and as per the order of the Deputy Commissioner, an order has been given to free the main building “Zarina Villa” located on the land in question from illegal occupation. Therefore, in view of the above context and as per the order of the Deputy Commissioner, necessary action may be taken to free the main building “Zarina Villa” situated on the land in question from the illegal occupation. Enclosure: As above Yours faithfully Sd/- 02/01/2013 Additional Collector, Hazaribagh 12. On a plain reading of the notice dated 7th September 2012, it would appear that the respondents were well aware of the stand taken by the appellant that he had possession of Zarina villa under an agreement. This is an admitted position that an application for renewal for a further period of 30 years w.e.f. 1st April 2008 to 31st March 2038 was made and a proposal for renewal of the lease has been forwarded to the Revenue and Land Reforms Department. This is an admitted position that an application for renewal for a further period of 30 years w.e.f. 1st April 2008 to 31st March 2038 was made and a proposal for renewal of the lease has been forwarded to the Revenue and Land Reforms Department. In the letter dated 2nd January 2013, the Additional Collector mentioned that Khas Mahal lease of the subject-property was renewed on 31st March 2008 in favor of Fazle Ali and others and the records for further renewal for 30 years with a recommendation of the Commissioner were already transmitted to the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms. The State of Jharkhand has pleaded that Memo dated 23rd May 2013 was issued to the lessee to deposit the amount of Salami but he failed to deposit the said amount and, therefore, the indenture of lease was not executed. The legality or illegality of possession of a person can be decided in a suit instituted in the civil Court or a proceeding instituted under a statutory provision and not otherwise. This is therefore quite strange that the Deputy Commissioner would record that the appellant was in illegal possession of Zarina villa. 13. The word “Khas Mahal” refers to Government Estates which were under the direct management of the British Government. The recorded history of Khas Mahal indicates that the Britishers made several settlements in the city which were given on lease to the government servants, doctors, landlords, politicians etc. for building houses. Some were given rights of perpetual lease which continued from generation to generation but in most of the cases Khas Mahal lease was for a fixed period ranging from 30 years to 99 years with an option of renewal to the allottee. The Bihar Government Estate Khas Mahal Manual deals with the principle, policy and procedure for the management of Khas Mahal; the terms and conditions of the lease; the nature of permissible users and prohibitions and; the consequences of breach and resumption thereof. Rule 17 of the Khas Mahal Manual provides that a reasonable right of renewal in case of building leases should be allowed and the term should not ordinarily be less than 30 years. Rule 17 of the Khas Mahal Manual provides that a reasonable right of renewal in case of building leases should be allowed and the term should not ordinarily be less than 30 years. Rule 21 provides that the resumption of leasehold property should be only for public purposes and the power of resumption shall only be exercised if the land is required for public purpose, and the power of resumption shall not be exercised without the sanction of the government obtained through the Board of Revenue. 14. Rules 17 and 21 of the Bihar Government Estates (Khas Mahal) Manual, 1953 are extracted below: 17. Non agricultural and building leases. - The purpose of leases for other than strictly agricultural purposes shall be carefully stated, so as to make it clear, whenever possible, that the local Tenancy Act does not apply. In the case of building leases, however, a reasonable right of renewal should be allowed, subject to such terms as may be approved on behalf of Government. The term should not ordinarily be less than 30 years. In sanctioning leases regard should always be had to the salutary principle that, as far as possible, leases should be made to fall in at about the same date, for convenience of re-settlement. Special forms of lease have been prescribed for certain areas (vide Appendix-A) which should invariably be followed in those areas. Elsewhere the general form as given in Appendix A (1) should be used, subject to such modification as may be approved in each case or class of cases by the Commissioner, who should refer freely for the orders of the State Government in cases of doubt. All these leases should be registered formally. Except where a tenant has a permanent right in the tenancy clause 12 of the standard form of lease should always be considered with the greatest care in each case, and should be omitted or modified, when necessary, under orders of the Commissioner. 21. Resumption should be for public purposes only. All these leases should be registered formally. Except where a tenant has a permanent right in the tenancy clause 12 of the standard form of lease should always be considered with the greatest care in each case, and should be omitted or modified, when necessary, under orders of the Commissioner. 21. Resumption should be for public purposes only. - When a tenant holds land from Government under a lease containing a clause which authorises the lessor to resume possession of the whole or part of the lands of the tenancy this power of resumption shall only be exercised if the land is required for a public purpose, and the power of resumption shall not be exercised without the sanction of Government obtained through the Board of Revenue. If such land be required for the use of persons other than Government, e.g. for a local body, it should ordinarily be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and not under the power of resumption given by the lease. Note. - All draft notifications under the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, for the acquisition of any land which is held from Government on a lease, containing a clause authorising resumption by the lessor, should be submitted to Government through the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. 15. In “Bhola Ram Chaudhary”,[Bhola Ram Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.: 1989 PLJR 920 ] the Patna High Court held that a Khas Mahal not being a Zamindari cannot vest in the State of Bihar and the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 did not affect Khas Mahal leases in any manner whatsoever. The Court further held that there cannot be a complete ban on transfer and the interest of a leaseholder may be transferred with the written permission of the Deputy Commissioner. In “Deba Jyoti Dutt”,[Deba Jyoti Dutt v. State of Bihar: 1988 PLJR 440 ] the Patna High Court held that the right of renewal conferred upon a lessee is a very valuable right and the renewal of lease is to be granted almost automatically unless it is found that the lessee is guilty of a violation of the conditions of the lease or any other provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual. 16. The appellant has pleaded that he paid Rs. 2 lacs to the respondent no. 16. The appellant has pleaded that he paid Rs. 2 lacs to the respondent no. 5 in part-payment of the balance consideration amount. He has also brought on record the application filed by the respondent no. 5 to the Deputy Commissioner on 23rd November 2005 for transfer of the lease in his favor. The compromise decree records that the respondent no. 5 handed over the application duly signed by him for seeking permission of the Khas Mahal authority to transfer the subject-property in favor of the appellant. The appellant further pleaded that he deposited Rs. 1.5 lacs in the Nazarat of the civil Court as payment of the balance consideration amount. These facts clearly indicate that the appellant had a basis to put forth a defence justify his occupation of Zarina villa and, that, he was not a fugitive intruder/occupier of the subject-property. However, the appellant was forcibly evicted on 25th July 2014 after serving a notice to him on 24th July 2014. The contents of this letter amply demonstrate that there was no order of any Court to evict the appellant and, that too, by use of force. 17. The order dated 21st July 2014, by which the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hazaribagh appointed Anant Kumar, Executive Magistrate to evict the premises, is extracted as under: English Translation: Office of the Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh (Confidential Section) Order Pursuant to application submitted by Sri Faizal Ali Khan, Zarina Villa, Hazaribagh, situated in Village-Sarle, building lease Ho. No. 176, Plot No. 428, 678 measuring area 1.26 acres under Khas Mahal having main building named “Zarina Villa” which has been illegally occupied by Sri Dilip Singh and others, as directed Sri Anant Kumar, Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh, Mob. No. 9430703014 is deputed as Magistrate along with the armed force for removing the illegal occupation within a period of one week. The Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh is requested to depute adequate number of armed force/Lathi force/women force along with the police officers for the execution of the same. Sd/- Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh Memo No. 994/Go. Hazaribagh dated 21st July, 2014 Copy to:- The Deputy Commissioner/Superintendent of Police/Additional Collector for information. Copy to:- The Deputy Superintendent of Police, H.Q.-1, Hazaribagh for information and necessary action. Copy to:- Sri Anant Kumar, Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh/the Officer-in-charge, Sadar, Hazaribagh for information and compliance. Sd/- Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh 18. Sd/- Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh Memo No. 994/Go. Hazaribagh dated 21st July, 2014 Copy to:- The Deputy Commissioner/Superintendent of Police/Additional Collector for information. Copy to:- The Deputy Superintendent of Police, H.Q.-1, Hazaribagh for information and necessary action. Copy to:- Sri Anant Kumar, Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh/the Officer-in-charge, Sadar, Hazaribagh for information and compliance. Sd/- Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh 18. The order contained in the notice dated 24th July 2014 by which the appellant was directed to vacate the premises within 24 hours is also equally unsustainable. The appellant was not a fugitive intruder and a 24-hour notice to vacate the subject premises cannot be upheld in law. The said letter is extracted as under: English Translation: In the Court of Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh Memo No. …/Nya. Hazaribagh, dated …./July, 2014 To, Sri Dilip Singh & Ors. Zarina Villa, Hazaribagh Sub:- Regarding freeing Zarina Villa situated in Village-Sarle from illegal occupation. With reference to above subject, it is to say that you have illegally occupied main building (Zarina Villa) situated in Khas Mahal under Village-Sarle having building lease Ho. No.-176, Plot No. 428, 678 measuring area 1.26 acres, therefore, you are hereby directed to vacate it within 24 hours failing which it would be vacated forcefully as per order of the Sub-Division Officer. Sd/- Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh Memo No.-60/Go., Hazaribagh, dated 24th July, 2014 Copy forwarded to the Sub-Division Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh for information. Sd/-24/07/14 Executive Magistrate, Sadar, Hazaribagh 19. The expression due process of law when used to question ejectment from settled possession the stated expression would mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a Court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua true owner. In “Puran Singh”,[Puran Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab: (1975) 4 SCC 518 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicated the following yardsticks as a working rule for determining the attributes of settled possession of a person: “(i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; (ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case; (iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must acquiesced to by the true owner; and (iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner, has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession.” 20. It is quite strange that the respondents particularly the respondent no.5 did not disclose the date on which the appellant allegedly forcibly entered “Zarina villa”. In the present proceeding also the respondent no.5 has not denied execution of the agreement to sale dated 9th October 2002. On the contrary, he has set up a plea that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No.65 of 2004 became ineffective on the failure of the appellant to perform his part of the compromise. However, the orders passed on 21st July 2014 by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar) and the order dated 24th July 2014 passed by the Executive Magistrate (Sadar) record that the appellant was an illegal occupant and he was required to vacate the subject-property within 24 hours failing which he shall be evicted forcefully. A finding based on no evidence is an error of law apparent on record which can be corrected by the writ Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The error committed by the respondents is manifest on the face of the record. The assumption by the respondent-authorities while assuming that the appellant is in illegal possession of the subject-property does not pertain to any error in appreciation of documentary evidence or an error in drawing inferences or omission to draw inferences which can be corrected only by a Court sitting as a Court of Appeal; the writ Court shall have powers in such situations. The powers of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are exercised to examine the legality, irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the statutory authority or State instrumentality. The powers of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are exercised to examine the legality, irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the statutory authority or State instrumentality. Therefore, the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution may issue a prerogative writ upon its satisfaction that there has been a denial of justice. 21. This is no longer in the realm of doubt that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be infringed by the State authority without following the due course in law and for the enforcement of this Constitutional right the aggrieved party can resort to Article 226 of the Constitution of India for an appropriate writ, order or direction. This also evinces no doubt that the aggrieved party can move the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even with an apprehension of infringement of his right to life and personal liberty. In “S.M.D Kiran Pasha”,[S.M.D Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 328 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty can be enforced at pre-violation stage, that is to say, where such right is threatened or its violation seems eminent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that in cases of post-violation of the right also a petition under Article 226 and Article 32 of the Constitution of India shall be maintainable. 22. This is fundamental in law that a person even in unauthorized possession of an immovable property cannot be dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law; except in a case of fugitive possession. Sir John Edge,[Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy: AIR 1924 PC 144 ] held that it is not permissible in India that the persons should take forcible possession of the property rather they should obtain possession through a Court of law, if entitled to. In “Yar Mohd.”,[Yar Mohd. v. Lakshmi Das: AIR 1959 All 1 ], a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that any person cannot take the law in his own hands and dispossess another person who is in actual possession, without having recourse to a Court of Law. In “Yar Mohd.”,[Yar Mohd. v. Lakshmi Das: AIR 1959 All 1 ], a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that any person cannot take the law in his own hands and dispossess another person who is in actual possession, without having recourse to a Court of Law. The Courts in India have consistently applied Loft’s maxim possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis which means that “he that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right”. The writ Court shall not decide a disputed question of title but the peaceful possession of a person must be protected from forcible dispossession without having regard to the origin of his possession. The law in India does not permit even a lessor to use force to throw out the lessee. In “Munshi Ram”,[Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn.: AIR 1968 SC 702 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and, in such a case, unless the lessee is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. About quarter a century thereafter, in “Krishna Ram Mahale”,[Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao: (1989) 4 SCC 131 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. 23. The action of the State authorities in forcibly evicting the appellant from Zarina villa was illegal. The transfer of Khas Mahal leasehold rights is permissible in law and the appellant is claiming a right through an agreement to sale dated 9th October 2002 which is not annulled by a Court of law. The compromise decree dated 23rd November 2005 was not challenged by the respondent no. 5 and the Khas Mahal authority has also not taken any action against the respondent no. 5 or refused extension of the lease or cancelled the lease if already granted in favor of the respondent no. 5. The compromise decree dated 23rd November 2005 was not challenged by the respondent no. 5 and the Khas Mahal authority has also not taken any action against the respondent no. 5 or refused extension of the lease or cancelled the lease if already granted in favor of the respondent no. 5. Therefore, the use of police force to evict the appellant from Zarina villa cannot be countenanced in law and the notice dated 24th July 2014 is held illegal. To this extent, the writ petition is allowed. However, we are not inclined to pass an order for restoration of possession of the appellant over Zarina villa. The appellant has approached the civil Court where he may work out his remedy. Moreover, the writ Court has no powers to order specific performance of an agreement to sale. 24. In the result, this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. I agree, (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)