JUDGMENT : 1. The special appeal arises out of an order passed by the writ court on 18.1.2024 disposing of the appellant's Writ-A No. 24667 of 2017. Services of the petitioner-appellant have been terminated by the management and the order was sent to District Basic Education Officer for his approval. Learned Single Judge has noticed that no decision has been taken on decision of management and this aspect is not even clarified in the personal affidavit of the officer. A direction has accordingly been issued to the District Basic Education Officer to take a decision regarding grant of approval to the order of termination within a period of two weeks.. In default, the petitioner has been held entitled to salary for the period he has actually worked, subject to verification. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the statutory scheme has been completely overlooked by the learned Single Judge and facts have not been examined in correct perspective. 3. It is undisputed that the appellant was a Class-IV employee in the Mahajan Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya Salempur, Deoria. This Institution is duly recognized and the provisions of the Payment of Salaries Act, 1978 are applicable upon it. The services of the appellant were approved and he was working. The management apparently objected to the working of the appellant and consequently the appellant filed Writ A No. 7588 of 2016, which came to be disposed of on 19.2.2016 vide following order:- "It is stated that petitioner is a Class-IV employee, working in the institution, but the Management for the reasons unknown, is not permitting him to incorporate signature in the attendance register, and on such count, the salary of petitioner alongwith two other employees has been stopped since the year 2013. It is contended that subsequently payment of salary to other two persons has been restored, but petitioner continues to be victimized. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Management of the institution is acting in an arbitrary manner, and the authorities are not examining the petitioner's grievance. Notices on behalf of respondent nos.1 and 2 have been accepted by learned Standing Counsel, whereas Sri S.K. Gupta has accepted notices on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4. Considering the nature of order proposed to be passed today, notices need not be issued to the respondent no. Notices on behalf of respondent nos.1 and 2 have been accepted by learned Standing Counsel, whereas Sri S.K. Gupta has accepted notices on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4. Considering the nature of order proposed to be passed today, notices need not be issued to the respondent no. 5, as it would further delay the disposal of cause, and the writ petition is being disposed of, at this stage, itself. Considering the facts and circumstances, as have been noticed above, it would be appropriate to direct the respondent no.4 to examine the grievance of petitioner, noticed above, in accordance with law, by means of a reasoned speaking order to be passed after affording an opportunity of hearing in the matter to respondent no.5, within a period of three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. All consequential action shall be taken, accordingly. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petition stands disposed of." 4. The appellant accordingly represented before the District Basic Education Officer that he be allowed to continue in the employment of the Institution and be paid salary. Since, no orders were passed by the District Basic Education Officer, a Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6230 of 2016 was field, in which further time was granted to the District Basic Education Officer to comply with the order of the Writ Court. It is pursuant to this direction that the District Basic Education Officer has passed the order impugned in the writ filed before the learned Single Judge. This order is dated 31.3.2017. In the discussion part of this order it is recorded that the Block Education Officer has submitted a report on 21.7.2014, as per which the appellant was not attending to his duties and his signatures were not available in the attendance register. The Management also informed that with effect from 1.7.2013 the appellant was not working. The Committee of Management thus placed the appellant under suspension on 9.4.2014. It is then recorded by the District Basic Education Officer that on 10.4.2014 i.e. the very next day of passing of the order of suspension, the services of appellant were terminated and papers were forwarded for grant of approval to the District Basic Education Officer. The District Basic Education Officer has recorded in his order that appropriate decision relating to grant of approval would be taken later. The District Basic Education Officer has recorded in his order that appropriate decision relating to grant of approval would be taken later. However, claim of payment of salary to the appellant has been rejected. Aggrieved by this order dated 31.3.2017, the appellant filed Writ-A No. 24667 of 2017, which has been disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide order under challenge. 5. We have heard Shri Prabhakar Awasthi for the appellant, Shri K.N. Mishra for the Committee of Management and learned State Counsel representing respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 6. Upon hearing the counsel for the parties, it transpires that Institution is a duly recognized Junior High School and the service conditions of the Class-II and Class-IV employees in the Institution would be governed by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment And Conditions Of Service Of Ministerial Staff And Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 1984. Rule 21 would be attracted in the facts of the present case, which is reproduced hereinafter:- "21-Termination of Service-No clerk or group 'D' employee of a recognized school may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer:- Provided that, in the case of schools established and administered by minority referred to in clause 1 of the Article 30 of the Constitution, such an order shall not require the approval of District Basic Education Officer, but shall be reported to him." 7. Rule 21 clearly mandates that a Group 'D' employee cannot be terminated except with the prior approval, in writing of the District Basic Education Officer. 8. In the facts of the case, it is apparent that the appellant had approached this Court with the grievance that the Committee of Management is not permitting him to incorporate his signatures on the attendance register and he is not being permitted to work. It was this grievance of the appellant which was directed to be considered by the District Basic Education Officer. The District Basic Education Officer, however has proceeded on a tangent and has mechanically rejected the claim of the appellant for payment of salary on the ground that the appellant's services have already terminated by the Managing Committee. It was this grievance of the appellant which was directed to be considered by the District Basic Education Officer. The District Basic Education Officer, however has proceeded on a tangent and has mechanically rejected the claim of the appellant for payment of salary on the ground that the appellant's services have already terminated by the Managing Committee. The District Basic Education Officer in the self same order has recorded that appropriate decision would be taken later with regard to grant of approval to the order of termination. It is thus admitted in the order of the officer that no prior approval was accorded, in writing, by the competent authority and consequently the termination order would be in clear derogation of Rule 21 of the applicable Rules. 9. We are at a loss to understand as to how the District Basic Education Officer could reject the claim of the appellant when it is admitted to the officer concerned that no prior approval was obtained by the Managing Committee before terminating the services of the appellant. Rule 21 has neither been noticed by the District Basic Education Officer nor the attention of learned Single Judge appears to have been invited to it. We further find from the order of District Basic Education Officer that on 9.4.2014 a decision was taken to proceed departmentally against the appellant. On the very next day i.e. 10.4.2014 the appellant has been terminated from service. It is, therefore, apparent that no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted in the matter by the Managing Committee of the Institution, and therefore, the order of termination otherwise could not have been sustained. 10. We may note that when the writ petition was earlier placed for hearing on 4.7.2017, the learned Single Judge had passed the following orders:- "The petitioner is a Class-IV employee working in a recogised institution, namely, Mahajan Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Salempur, Deoria. He was prevented from signing the attendance register and his salary was also stopped since 2013. Later, the salaries of two other employees were released, however, in respect of the petitioner's grievance no decision was taken by the Committee of Management. Aggrieved by the said highhandedness of the respondents, the petitioner instituted a writ petition, being Writ-A No. 7588 of 2016 (Vijay Prakash Verma v. State of U.P. and others) for redressal of his grievance. Later, the salaries of two other employees were released, however, in respect of the petitioner's grievance no decision was taken by the Committee of Management. Aggrieved by the said highhandedness of the respondents, the petitioner instituted a writ petition, being Writ-A No. 7588 of 2016 (Vijay Prakash Verma v. State of U.P. and others) for redressal of his grievance. In the said writ petition this Court issued a direction to the District Basic Education Officer to decide the matter within three months. The said order was passed by this Court on 19th February, 2016. It is stated that the said order was served upon the District Basic Education Officer but he did not comply with the same. Hence, the petitioner was compelled to file Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6230 of 2016, wherein on 20th March, 2017 this Court has ordered as under: "Despite the order dated 06.02.2017, neither the counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 1 has put in appearance nor has the opposite party no. 1 complied with the order nor is he present in the Court. Issue bailable warrant to opposite party no. 1 through the CJM, Deoria." It is stated that after the aforesaid order, the District Basic Education Officer has passed the impugned order dated 31st March, 2017, whereunder he has again not decided the matter and has observed that he has received the documents from the Committee of Management in respect of suspension order of the petitioner on 21st July, 2014 and the subsequent decision of the Committee of Management dismissing the services of the petitioner and the order shall be passed by him later on. Sri K. Ajit, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the conduct of the District Basic Education Officer clearly indicates that his orders are infected by malafide and still he is sitting over the matter in spite of the positive direction of this Court in its order dated 19th February, 2016 to pass the order within three months. He further submits that the impugned order is just an eye-wash and the District Basic Education Officer has not taken any decision and the petitioner, who is a poor Class-IV employee, is without salary since 2013. In view of the above, the conduct of the District Basic Education Officer needs examination. He further submits that the impugned order is just an eye-wash and the District Basic Education Officer has not taken any decision and the petitioner, who is a poor Class-IV employee, is without salary since 2013. In view of the above, the conduct of the District Basic Education Officer needs examination. Accordingly, the District Basic Education Officer, Deoria is directed to file his personal affidavit on or before 14th July, 2017. In case the affidavit is not filed, he shall be personally present in the Court along with the record on the next date. Put up this case on 14th July, 2017 in the additional cause list." 11. It is thereafter that the District Basic Education Offer has filed his personal affidavit. The only explanation offered by the officer in his personal affidavit is that the officer has recently joined. In para 6 of the affidavit, it is clearly admitted that no approval has been granted to the termination of petitioner-appellant. The fact that prior approval has not been obtained before terminating the services of the petitioner is therefore admitted on record. Once that be so, the termination order itself would be illegal for non compliance of the mandatory procedure stipulated in Rule 21 of the Rules of 1984. The order passed by the District Basic Education Officer rejecting the claim of salary of the appellant for such purpose cannot be sustained. The termination order dated 10.7.2014 would be equally bad for such reason. 12. The view taken by learned Single Judge in calling upon the District Basic Education Officer to take a decision in the matter relating to grant of approval also cannot be sustained, as the law mandates requirement of a prior approval, which cannot be cured by any subsequent approval to be obtained from the officer concerned. The judgment of learned Single, dated 18.1.2024, thus cannot be sustained. 13. Consequently, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by learned Single Judge dated 18.1.2024 in Writ-A No. 24667 of 2017 is set aside. The order passed by the District Basic Education Officer dated 31.3.2017 is also quashed. The appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith. It shall however be open for the employer to conduct an enquiry against the appellant for the alleged absence from work within a period of four months from today. The order passed by the District Basic Education Officer dated 31.3.2017 is also quashed. The appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith. It shall however be open for the employer to conduct an enquiry against the appellant for the alleged absence from work within a period of four months from today. The appellant's contention that he was actually presented from work shall be examined, as per law. It shall also be open to the Management to place the appellant under suspension for the purposes of holding of the enquiry. The subsistence allowance as well as arrears in that regard would be paid to the appellant within a period of six weeks from today. The decision taken by the Committee of Management upon conclusion of such enquiry, would determine the entitlement of the appellant to arrears of salary etc. subject to appropriate approval of District Basic Education Offer in terms of Rule 21, if so required.