JUDGMENT : Both writ petitions have been filed impugning the order passed in Ext.P13 dated 25.10.2012 by the Appellate Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 (for short, ‘Gratuity Act’) read with Rule 18(1) of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules 1972 (for short, ‘Gratuity Rules’). 2. The 1st respondent/employee in W.P.(C) No.1993/2013 [the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6381/2013] commenced his service with the petitioner/Bank on 13.05.1974 and was superannuated on 31.03.2011 after rendering service for 37 years 8 months and 19 days, which included temporary service. 2.1 The grievance of the respondent/employee before the Controlling Authority was that he was drawing personal pay of Rs.1,050/- (excluding a portion of the House Rent Allowance frozen). Out of this Rs.800/- was reckoned as wages under Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act. Fixed Personal Pay was paid at Rs.190/- with effect from 01.07.1983 after reaching maximum scale and his stagnation in lieu of two increments, the frozen Dearness Allowance of Rs.60/- and HRA on the date of wage revision. The amount of Rs.975/- and Rs.1,594/-, paid as Special Compensatory Allowance and Special Balancing Allowance towards difference of pay suffered by the employees of the employer/Bank in comparison with other banks on pay revision, were not reckoned as wages. A sum of Rs.3,500/- was also paid as a Special Allowance to all the Senior Special Assistant employees who had completed 30 years of service for a few hours of extra work, which was not introduced as overtime and was paid on all the days, including holidays/leave. 3. The Controlling Authority held that the Fixed Personal Allowance, Special Balancing Allowance, and Special Compensatory Allowance would be ‘other allowances’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act and the said components could not be included as part of wages for the payment of gratuity. It was also said that certain components of wages, other than the Basic Pay and Dearness Allowance, were also included as part of ‘wages’ by virtue of Bipartite Settlement which provided for including those components for the purpose of calculation of superannuation benefits though they could be termed as ‘other allowances’, which would come within the scope of sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, the benefits could not be expected to be extended to the employee beyond what was agreed to by the Federation and the Bank Management under various Bipartite Agreements. 4. Therefore, the benefits could not be expected to be extended to the employee beyond what was agreed to by the Federation and the Bank Management under various Bipartite Agreements. 4. The Appellate Authority held that the four allowances come under the ambit of ‘any other allowance’ and cannot be reckoned for the purpose of payment of gratuity. However, in respect of the Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/- paid to the Senior Special Assistant was held to be a component of ‘wages’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act. Therefore, the direction was issued to the petitioner herein to pay the balance gratuity of Rs.3,500/- for 38 years but restricted to the maximum gratuity of Rs.10 lakhs. It was also said that the Management had already paid Rs.9,34,056/- towards gratuity, and the respondent would be entitled to a balance gratuity of Rs.65,944/- with simple interest at the rate of 10% with effect from 01.04.2011 till it is paid. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has stated that the Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/- is ‘other allowances’ paid to the Senior Special Assistant and would not come within the definition of ‘wages’ under Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act. He further submitted that the Bipartite Settlement [Ext.P7] dated 22.07.2003 is binding on the parties. The petitioner was a member of the Union who entered into the signed agreement dated 22.07.2003. It was agreed that the Special Compensatory Allowance would not undergo any revision on the revision of pay scales or allowances and would not rank for DA, CCA, HRA and superannuation benefits. Even in the Memorandum of Settlement dated 27.04.2010, it was agreed that the Special Pay, Graduation Pay and Professional Qualification Pay shall not rank for superannuation benefits. 5.1 The Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/- payable to the Senior Special Assistant was in the nature of Overtime Allowance/Other Allowance. This Overtime Allowance/Other Allowance is specifically excluded from the definition of ‘wages’ under Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act. The words “any other allowance” mentioned in the second part of the definition of ‘wages’ under Section 2(s) intended to exclude all other allowances which are not specifically named in the definition of the term ‘wages’ for the purposes of computing the gratuity. The words “any other allowance” mentioned in the second part of the definition of ‘wages’ under Section 2(s) intended to exclude all other allowances which are not specifically named in the definition of the term ‘wages’ for the purposes of computing the gratuity. 5.2 It is further submitted that the impugned order of the Appellate Authority for payment of gratuity on Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/- to the respondent/employee is against the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Act and it was rightly excluded by the Controlling Authority and, therefore, the impugned order is set aside. 6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/employee has submitted that ‘any other allowance’ has to be read in ejusdem generis with the preceding words ‘bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages’. He, therefore, submits that the Fixed Personal Allowance, Special Compensatory Allowance, Special Balancing Allowance and Special Allowance are the components of ‘wages’ as they are not akin to ‘bonus, commission, house rent allowance and overtime allowance’ and they would form part of the ‘wages’ under Section 2(s) for the purposes of reckoning the gratuity to be payable to the employee. He has further submitted that the order passed by the Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are to be set aside and direction be issued for calculating the gratuity taking into account the Fixed Personal Allowance, Special Balancing Allowance and Special Compensatory Allowance as the component of wages and not only the Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/-. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent/employee has further submitted that the Bipartite Agreement cannot be entered into against the statute. Therefore, even if it is provided in the Settlement Agreement that a particular allowance would not be reckoned for the purposes of retirement benefits that would not be binding, as the provisions of the Statute override any agreement arrived at between the parties. No agreement can override the provisions of a statute. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both parties and perused the record. 9. No agreement can override the provisions of a statute. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both parties and perused the record. 9. Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act defines ‘wages’ as: “2(s) "wages" means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment and which are paid or are payable to him in cash and includes dearness allowance but does not include any bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages and any other allowance." 9.1 The definition of ‘wages’ as provided under Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act has an inclusive part and an exclusive part. The inclusive part would describe ‘wages’ to include all emoluments earned by an employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment including Dearness Allowance. However, it specifically excludes any ‘bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages and any other allowances’. Thus, bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages and any other allowances would not be reckoned as part of ‘wages’ for the purposes of the computation of gratuity. ‘Any other allowances’ has a wide connotation. Therefore, even if an allowance is part of the emolument earned by an employee as per the terms and conditions of his employment, except in the case of Dearness Allowance, it would not form part of ‘wages’ for the purposes of computation of gratuity under the Gratuity Act. Bonus, commission, house rent allowance, and overtime wages are specifically excluded from the definition of ‘wages’, and further, ‘any other allowance’ is also excluded from the definition of ‘wages’. The four allowances i.e., Fixed Personal Allowance, Special Balancing Allowance, Special Compensatory Allowance and Special Allowance, were the bone of contention before the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority. 10. The Gratuity Act is a piece of social welfare legislation and deals with the payment of gratuity, which is a kind of retirement benefit like pension, provident fund, etc. Gratuity, in its etymological sense, is a gift, especially for the services rendered or a return for favours received. For the wage-earning population, security of income when the worker becomes old or infirm is of consequential importance. The provisions contained in the Act are in the nature of socialsecurity measures like employment insurance, provident fund and pension. Gratuity, in its etymological sense, is a gift, especially for the services rendered or a return for favours received. For the wage-earning population, security of income when the worker becomes old or infirm is of consequential importance. The provisions contained in the Act are in the nature of socialsecurity measures like employment insurance, provident fund and pension. The main purpose and concept of gratuity is to help the workman after retirement, whether retirement is a result of rules of superannuation, physical disablement or impairment of vital parts of the body. The expression ‘gratuity’ itself suggests that it is a gratuitous payment given to an employee on discharge, superannuation or death. Gratuity is an amount paid unconnected with any consideration and not resting upon it and has to be considered as something given freely, voluntarily or without recompense. It is a sort of financial assistance to tide over post-retiral hardship and inconveniences, as has been held in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v. Administrative Officer, (2004) 1 SCC 755 . 11. The Appellate Authority has held that except for the Special Allowance, which is Rs.3,500/-, given to every Senior Special Assistant on completion of 30 years of service, other allowances are only in the nature of ‘other allowances’. The principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ would not be applicable as these are special allowances given to the employee by the employer which are not part of the Dearness Allowance and ‘wages’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act. 11.1 It may also be noted that some allowances, though they would be in the nature of ‘any other allowances’ such as ‘Professional Qualification Allowance’, were agreed to be included in the computation of gratuity by virtue of Bipartite Settlement/Award. 12. Section 14 of the Gratuity Act has an overriding effect which provides that the provisions of the Act or any Rule made thereunder shall have an effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act. The settlement entered into by the Workman and the Management under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in respect of matters which are subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act on which the parties have reached an agreement. The settlement entered into by the Workman and the Management under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in respect of matters which are subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act on which the parties have reached an agreement. The workman, therefore, may give away certain rights by entering into an agreement with the employer, and such an agreement would not fall foul of the provisions of the Gratuity Act. Further, the respondent has not challenged the provisions of the agreement. Having taken the benefit under the Bipartite Settlement/Award, it would not be open to a workman/employee to turn around and say that the agreement would not be binding on him because some part of the agreement falls foul of the provisions of the Gratuity Act, which has overriding effect under Section 14 of the Gratuity Act. 13. The Latin expression “ejusdem generis”, which means “of the same kind or nature”, is a principle of construction, meaning that when general words in a statutory text are accompanied by restricted words, the meaning of the general words is taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of the restricted words. The maxim is made applicable unless a contrary indication/intention of the legislature is gathered. This is a facet of the principle ‘noscitur a sociis’. The Latin maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’ contemplates that a statutory term be recognized by its associated words. The Latin word ‘sociis’ means “society”. Therefore, the general words are juxtaposed with specific words and the general words cannot be read in isolation. The doctrine of ‘noscitur a sociis’ is broader than the maxim ‘ejusdem generis’. 13.1 ‘Ejusdem Generis’, in fact, is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’, as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 44. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that ‘noscitur a sociis’ is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear that these rules of construction can be usefully applied. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear that these rules of construction can be usefully applied. 13.2 Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is relevant and is extracted hereunder: “9. It is, however, contended that, in construing the definition, we must adopt the rule of construction noscuntur a sociis. This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases (Vol. XIV, p. 207): "Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscuntur a sociis the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim Ejusdem Generis." In fact the latter maxim "is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscuntur a sociis". The argument is that certain essential features or attributes are invariably associated with the words "business and trade" as understood in the popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition though their normal import may be much wider. We are not impressed by this argument. It must be borne in mind that noscuntur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service. As has been observed by Earl of Halsbury, L.C., in Corporation of Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Co. Ltd. in dealing with the wider words used in Section 6 of Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Act, 1854, "the words 'free from all expenses whatever in connection with the said tramways' appear to me to be so wide in their application that I should have thought it impossible to qualify or cut them down by their being associated with other words on the principle of their being ejusdem generis with the previous words enumerated". If the object and scope of the statute are considered there would be no difficulty in holding that the relevant words of wide import have been deliberately used by the legislature in defining "industry" in Section 2(j). The object of the Act was to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and the extent and scope of its provisions would be realised if we bear in mind the definition of "industrial dispute" given by Section 2 (k), of "wages" by Section 2(rr), "workman" by Section 2(s), and of "employer" by Section 2(g). Besides, the definition of public utility service prescribed by Section 2(m) is very significant. One has merely to glance at the six categories of public utility service mentioned by Section 2(m) to realise that the rule of construction on which the appellant relies is inapplicable in interpreting the definition prescribed by Section 2(j). 14. The basic rule of interpretation of a Statute is that no words or expression used in any Statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. No provision in the Statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. The provision must be read in the context in which it is used. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a Statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. If the words are clear and there is no ambiguity or obscurity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for interpretation than the plain language conveying the intention of the legislation. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a Statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. If the words are clear and there is no ambiguity or obscurity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for interpretation than the plain language conveying the intention of the legislation. 15. The maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ is applicable when particular words pertaining to a clause, category or genus are followed by general words. In such cases, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. The rule ‘ejusdem generis’ is applied to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words. However, it has to be applied where there is no indication of different legislative intent in employing the general words than the specific words. The maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ cannot be applied unless there is a genus constituted or a category disclosed. If the specified preceding words do not constitute a genus but constitute a description of a genus, the maxim has no application in interpreting the provision. If there is no indication in the enactment to restrict the meaning attached to the words of general import, then the Courts have to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. 15.1 The Supreme Court, while explaining the maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ in the case of Grasim Industries Limited v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297 in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 held as under: “10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner "we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by d construction make up deficiencies which are left there". In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests , Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India.) 11. It was urged by learned counsel for the assessee that the legislature could have, if it had really so intended, couched Note 1(a) in a different manner i.e. all "articles of Chapter 68" instead of the present expression used. Merely because the provision could have been differently worded, does not in any way affect the meaning of the expression used as it is clear and unambiguous. In Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn. Merely because the provision could have been differently worded, does not in any way affect the meaning of the expression used as it is clear and unambiguous. In Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn. following observations (at SCR p. 836) in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. CITS were noted: (SCC p.284, para 9) “As pointed out by Gwyer, C.J. in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, FCR at p. 134 none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all a ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it." 12. In the background of what has been urged by the assessee it has to be further seen whether the principles of ejusdem generis have application. The rule is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words. In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified, The rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. The rule applies only when (1) the statute enumerates the specific words, (2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category, (3) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration, (4) the general terms follow the enumeration, and (5) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. If the subjects of enumeration belong to a broad-based genus, as also to a narrower genus there is no principle that the general words should be confined to the narrower genus. In interpreting Section 30 of the United d Towns Electrical Company Act, 1902 which reads "the company shall be liable for water rates on all lands and buildings owned by it in the aforesaid towns, but otherwise the company shall be exempt from taxation", the Privy Council rejected the contention that the word "taxation" should be considered ejusdem generis with "water rate". It was held that there is no room for application of the principle in the absence of any mention of a genus, since the mention of a single species, for example, of water rates, does not constitute a genus. (See: United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Newfoundland) The rule cannot be applied unless there is a genus constituted or a category disclosed. If the preceding words do not constitute mere specifications of a genus but constitute description of a complete genus, the rule has no application. The rule has to be applied with care and caution. This is not an inviolable rule of law, but it is only permissible inference, in the absence of any indication to the contrary. Where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. The following enunciation in Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.), at pp. 181-82 succinctly states the principle: "The modern tendency of the law, it was said, (by Asquith, J. in Allen v. Emmerson) is 'to attenuate the application of the rule of ejusdem generis'. To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, (Hood-Barrs v. IRC) but the mention of a single species does not constitute a genus. (Per Lord Thankerton in United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Newfoundland.) 'Unless you can find a category,' said Farwell, L.J., (in Tillmanns and Co. v. S.S. Knutsford 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine,' and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association with other words. For instance, where a local Act required that 'theatres and other places of public entertainment' should be licensed, the question arose whether a 'funfair' for which no fee was charged for admission was within the Act. For instance, where a local Act required that 'theatres and other places of public entertainment' should be licensed, the question arose whether a 'funfair' for which no fee was charged for admission was within the Act. It was held to be so, and that the ejusdem generis rule did not apply to confine the words 'other places' to places of the same kind as theatres. So the insertion of such words as 'or things of whatever description' would exclude the rule. (Attorney-General v. Leicester Corpn.) In N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corpn. Lord Simon, L.C. referred to a definition of 'workman' as any person who has entered into a works under a contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour, clerical work 'or otherwise' and said: 'The use of the words "or otherwise" does not bring into play the ejusdem generis principle: for "manual labour" and "clerical work" do not belong to a single limited genus' and Lord Wright in the same case said: 'The ejusdem generis rule is often useful or convenient, but it is merely a rule of construction, not a rule of law. In the present case it is entirely inapt. It presupposes a "genus" but here the only "genus" is "a contract with an employer"." 16. The phrase ‘any other allowance’ used in Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act is of wide meaning and import, which would mean that any other allowances not only the bonus, commission, house rent allowance and overtime wages could not form part of the wages for reckoning the gratuity. The intention of the legislature is clear that the gratuity would be paid on all emoluments earned by an employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment inclusive of Dearness Allowance. However, the bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages and ‘other allowance’ would not be reckoned for the purposes of computing the gratuity to be paid to an employee. The legislature’s intention is clear that except for the Dearness allowance, ‘other allowances’ would not be reckoned for the purposes of computing the gratuity. When the intention of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, the maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ cannot be applied to give a restrictive meaning to ‘other allowance’. The legislature’s intention is clear that except for the Dearness allowance, ‘other allowances’ would not be reckoned for the purposes of computing the gratuity. When the intention of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, the maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ cannot be applied to give a restrictive meaning to ‘other allowance’. 16.1 Therefore, I do not agree with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/employee that the ‘other allowance’ should be given restrictive meaning, and if an allowance is not in the nature of a bonus, commission, house rent allowance and overtime wages, it is to be reckoned for the purposes of gratuity. The maxim ‘ejusdem generis’ has no application as the intention and language employed in Section 2(s) of the Gratuity Act is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the three allowances, i.e., Fixed Personal Allowance, Special Balancing Allowance and Special Compensatory Allowance, are ‘other allowances’ and have rightly been not found to be reckoned for the purpose of gratuity to be paid to the employee. 16.2 With respect to Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/-, on completion of 30 years of service in the Bank, it becomes part of the emolument as every employee who puts in 30 years of service would be entitled to Special Allowance. It becomes part of the wages on completion of 30 years by the employee. Therefore, the Appellate Authority has rightly held that the gratuity on Special Allowance of Rs.3,500/- has to be paid to the Senior Special Assistant as it would form part of the wages to be included in the computation of gratuity. Thus, both the writ petitions are dismissed. The order passed by the Appellate Authority is upheld.