JUDGMENT : KRISHNA RAO, J. 1. In all the above mentioned applications, the defendants have filed similar application against the plaintiffs, thus all the applications are taken up together for consideration. The plaintiffs have filed six different suits against the defendants praying for the following reliefs: “(a) Decree for recovery of khas possession of the “Said Unit” more particularly described in the schedule below in its entirety by evicting the defendant there from or any person/persons claiming through them. (b) A decree for Rs. 22,000/- Only outstanding rent calculating from August 2014 to May, 2016 together with Interest. (c) A decree for damages amounting Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) as fully stated in paragraph no 13 herein. (d) A decree for mesne profit @ Rs. 5,000/- per diem for the period starting from 1st June, 2016 till the recovery of khas possession of the suit property or such mesne profit as may be decided by this Hon’ble Court in terms of the order 20 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code. (e) Injunction. (f) Receiver. (g) Cost. (h) Any other relief or reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled to.” 2. The defendants have filed their respective applications praying for following reliefs: (a) The suit being C.S. No. 189 of 2016 be dismissed and/or in the alternative, the plaint in C.S. No. 189 of 2016 be rejected. (b) An Order be passed recalling and/or vacating and/or setting aside the orders dated September 4, 2017 and September 13, 2017 passed by this Hon’ble Court in G.A. No. 2935 of 2017 and in G.A No. 3034 of 2017 respectively arising out of and/or in connection with C.S. No. 189 of 2016. (c) An Interim Order be passed all stay of all further proceedings in/or connection with the and/or arising out of C.S. No. 189 of 2016 pending herein with the present application. (d) Stay. (e) Interim and/or Ad-interim orders in terms of the above prayer. (f) Costs. (g) Such other orders as may be deemed fit. 3. The property being Premises No. 1, Wood Street, Kolkata-700016 belongs to the plaintiffs’ deities and the said property is being controlled and managed by their Shebiat Sri Monoj Lal Seal in accordance with the terms of settlement dated 7th May, 1982, passed in Suit No. 262 of 1965 by this Court. 3. The property being Premises No. 1, Wood Street, Kolkata-700016 belongs to the plaintiffs’ deities and the said property is being controlled and managed by their Shebiat Sri Monoj Lal Seal in accordance with the terms of settlement dated 7th May, 1982, passed in Suit No. 262 of 1965 by this Court. By two registered deeds of lease dated 14th June, 1989, the plaintiffs as lessors let out the said premises to Allen Park Properties Private Limited at a monthly rent of Rs. 575/-. The Allen Park Properties Limited by way of registered Deed of Sub-Lease dated 8th June, 1995 sub let with the possession a portion of the said premises to the defendants. In the meantime, on 10th July, 2001, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 came into effect and the Allen Park Properties Limited became a tenant under the plaintiffs. 4. As per the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the defendants became trespassers as the Allen Park Properties Private Limited have sublet the premises to the defendant without written consent of the plaintiffs in terms of Section 26 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The Allen Park Properties Private Limited had committed breaches of the covenants contemplated in the lease and failed to make payment of the rent for which the plaintiffs have determined the lease and initiated a suit being Ejectment Suit No. 55 of 2008 before the Learned Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta and the said suit was decreed ex-parte in favour of the plaintiffs. 5. The Plaintiffs have filed an application for execution of the decree dated 22nd December, 2011 and the Allen Park Properties Private Limited has filed an application for setting aside ex-parte decree. In the said proceeding some of the sub-lessees have filed an application for declaring the ex-parte decree as null and void. During the pendency of the said applications, the plaintiffs, Allen Park Properties Private Limited and the sub-leases have resolved their disputes and differences with respect to the premises by entering into a terms of settlement dated 14th August, 2011 and a compromise decree was passed on 4th September, 2014. As per the terms and settlement dated 14th August, 2014, the defendants became tenants of the plaintiffs with respect to their respective premises and the monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 1,000/- under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. 6. As per the terms and settlement dated 14th August, 2014, the defendants became tenants of the plaintiffs with respect to their respective premises and the monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 1,000/- under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. 6. The defendants failed to pay the monthly rent as well as proportionate share of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Tax and maintenance charges of the tenanted premises and the defendants have also wrongfully parted with the possession of its tenancy to a third party without prior consent in writing from the plaintiffs and have also made unauthorized alterations and additions in the premises without the permission of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have issued notices terminating the tenancy but the defendants failed to vacate the premises, accordingly, the plaintiffs have filed the suit. 7. On receipt of writ of summons, the defendants have entered appearances in their respective suits and have filed written statement admitting that the defendants are the tenants under The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. As the defendants have not taken any steps under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the plaintiffs have filed an application under Section 7(3) of The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 for striking off defense of the defendants and by an order dated 4th September, 2017, this Court had allowed the application filed by the plaintiffs by striking out the defence of the defendants. The defendants have also filed an application for recalling of the order dated 4th September, 2017 but this Court had dismissed the said recalling application. The defendants have also filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but by an order dated 18th July, 2018, this Court dismissed the said application. Now again the defendants have filed the present application. 8. The defendants says that while dismissing the application filed by the defendants for recalling of the order dated 4th September, 2017, this Court has not adjudicated with regard to the grounds canvassed in support of the said application. Now again the defendants have filed the present application. 8. The defendants says that while dismissing the application filed by the defendants for recalling of the order dated 4th September, 2017, this Court has not adjudicated with regard to the grounds canvassed in support of the said application. The defendants says that the facts were not brought to the notice of this Court that in response to the notice under Section 6(4) of The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the defendants have offered the arrears of outstanding by way of cheques for the period for which the rent was said to be in default. 9. The defendants says that the suit itself is not maintainable under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. They say that if the plaint and the documents referred to read conjunctively, the tenancy in question will fall outside the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and needs to be governed under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The defendants further say that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was issued. 10. The defendants say that in a suit under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the rigors of non compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 would never come into play and would not be operational. The defendants say that this Court while passing order dated 18th July, 2018 held that the application is premature and the same could not be decided without taking evidence. The defendants says that in the order dated 18th July, 2018, this Court has not decided the issue of maintainability of the suit. In support of the submissions, the defendants relied upon the following judgments : (i) B.L. Sreedhar and Others vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 355 (ii) Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 460 (iii) Martin and Harris Ltd. vs. VIth Additional District Judge and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 732 (iv) Krishan Lal vs. State of J&K, (1994) 4 SCC 422 (v) K. Arumuga Velaiah vs. P.R. Ramasamy and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 757 11. The plaintiff says that during the continuance of lease dated 14th June, 1989, on 9th July, 2001, The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 came into force in respect of the suit premises. The plaintiff says that during the continuance of lease dated 14th June, 1989, on 9th July, 2001, The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 came into force in respect of the suit premises. The plaintiff relied upon Section 3(c) of The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 which specifically runs as under Exemption: “Section 3(c) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 specifically runs as under Exemption: Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to (C) any tenancy where the lease with due consent of the tenant has been registered under the Registration Act, 1908, after the commencement of this Act, and the fact of such consent has been recorded in the instrument so registered: [Clause (c) substituted by W.B. Act 14 of 2002, w.e.f. 10.7.2001, which was earlier as under: (c) any tenancy where the lease has been registered under the Registration Act, 1908, before or after the commencement of this Act].” 12. Plaintiff says that as per the amendment of 2001 of The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 expressed that the intention of the legislature was to include all the lease which has been registered before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 tenancy under the statue if the rent is not more than 10,000/- for commercial purpose and Rs. 6,500/- for residential premesies. The plaintiff says that by the operation of law, the Allen Park Properties Private Limited become the statutory tenant of the plaintiff under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the defendants have become a trespasser having no right over the suit premises as the defendants have not complied with the provisions of Section 26(2) of the said Act by giving notice to the plaintiffs within two (2) years from the date of commencement of the Act of 1997. 13. The plaintiffs say that as the defendants have not taken any steps by filing an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and thus the plaintiff has filed an application under Section 7(3) of the said Act for striking out the defence of the defendants and this Court allowed the application filed by the plaintiff and the defendants have not challenged the said order. Though the defendants have filed an application for recalling of the said order but the same was also dismissed. 14. Though the defendants have filed an application for recalling of the said order but the same was also dismissed. 14. The plaintiff says that in the application filed by the defendants for recalling of the order dated 4th September, 2017, in the said application in paragraph 18, the defendants have admitted that the defendants are direct tenant under the plaintiff. The plaintiff further draws the attention of this Court to the application filed by the defendants for recalling the earlier order at paragraph 26, the defendants have admitted that since passing the order dated 4th September, 2017, the defendants have filed an application under Section 7(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, on 4th September, 2017 itself and the said application is still pending. From the said averments, the defendants have admitted that they are the tenants under the plaintiffs. 15. The plaintiffs say that earlier also the defendants have also filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but the same was dismissed and the defendants have not challenged the said order. The plaintiff says that the defendants have filed their written statement in the suit but in the written statement, the defendants have nowhere have taken any stand that the suit is not maintainable or the suit is barred by any law. In support of the submissions, the plaintiff has relied upon the following judgments: (i) Waman Shriniwas Kini vs. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 (ii) Universal Petrochemicals Ltd. vs. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, AIR 2001 Cal 102 (iii) Pannalal Rudra and Another vs. Birendra alias Bireswar Sana, AIR 1960 Cal 201 (iv) Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta and Others, (1980) 1 SCC 185 (v) Anthony vs. K.C. Ittoop and Sons and Others, (2000) 6 SCC 394 16. Terms and settlement entered between the parties dated 14th August, 2014 reads as follows: “Now This Agreement Records The Mutually Agreed Terms And Conditions Of The Final And Binding Settlement Between The Parties Hereto as follows: 1. The Sub-Lessees mentioned in Annexure ‘B’ hereto are parties to this settlement and are accordingly executing this Memorandum of Settlement. 2. In view of the settlement, the said decree dated 22nd December, 2011 passed in the said Ejectment Suit no. The Sub-Lessees mentioned in Annexure ‘B’ hereto are parties to this settlement and are accordingly executing this Memorandum of Settlement. 2. In view of the settlement, the said decree dated 22nd December, 2011 passed in the said Ejectment Suit no. 55 of 2008-E shall by consent of all the parties be recalled and/or set aside and shall be substituted by passing a decree in terms of this Memorandum of Settlement which shall be deemed to form part of such decree. The parties agree that no effect shall be given to or steps taken under the said decree dated 22 December, 2011 under any circumstance. 3. The parties executing this Memorandum agree, declare and confirm that the registered Deeds mentioned in Annexure ‘A’ shall subsist till 31” January, 2048 and all the Agreements, Deeds of Sub-Lease and other documents executed and/or registered by the Judgment Debtor from time to time in favour of the Sub-Lessees mentioned in Annexure ‘B’ shall remain valid, subsisting and binding till the entire respective terms thereof. The Decree Holders confirm having received and accepted payment of all outstanding rents relating to the period upto 31” July, 2014 directly from the Sub-Lessees. 4. Instead of the rent being payable by the Judgment Debtor to the Decree Holders In terms of the documents mentioned in Annexure ‘A’ hereto, each Sub-Lessee shall directly to the Decree Holders a sum of Rs. 1000/- per month per flat (including car parking spaces and private terrace/roof, if any) from 1st August, 2014 till 31st January, 2048 as rent provided however that such rent shall stand increased by 10 per cent at the directly to the Decree Holders a sum of Rs. 1000/- per month per flat (including car parking spaces and private terrace/roof, if any) from August, 2014 till 31” January, 2048 as rent provided however that such rent shall stand increased by 10 per cent at the end of every five years during the tenure of the said Lease. The Judgment Debtor consents to such direct payment by the Sub-Lessees to the Decree Holders. 5. The Judgment Debtor has agreed not to exercize its right of further renewal of lease and the Decree Holders have agreed to grant separate direct leases in favour of each of the Sub-Lessees for the period commencing from 1” February, 2048 till 31” January, 2078 against payment of one time premium of Rs. 5. The Judgment Debtor has agreed not to exercize its right of further renewal of lease and the Decree Holders have agreed to grant separate direct leases in favour of each of the Sub-Lessees for the period commencing from 1” February, 2048 till 31” January, 2078 against payment of one time premium of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only) per flat (including car parking spaces and private terrace/roof, if any) and monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- per flat for the said period of 30 years provided however that such rent shall stand increased by 10 per cent at the end of every five years during the tenure of the said Lease. The Decree Holders and the Sub-Lessees are executing their aforesaid respective Deeds of Lease simultaneously with this Memorandum of Settlement. 6. It has been irrevocably agreed that each Sub-Lessee shall have the right to obtain a renewal and/or extension and/or fresh lease in respect of his/her/its/their flat for a further period of 30 years commencing from 1” February 2078 to 31” January, 2108 on the same terms and conditions as the Deed of Lease for the period commencing from 1” February, 2048 provided however that the amount of premium and monthly rent shall be increased. In case the parties are unable to mutually agree to increase in premium and monthly rent by 31 March, 2078 then determination of the same shall be referred to an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three Arbitrators, one of whom shall be appointed by Decree Holders, another shall be appointed by the concerned Lessee and third Arbitrator shall be appointed by the other two Arbitrators. Such arbitration for increase in premium and monthly rent shall be held in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 as amended from time to time and/or such other arbitration law that may be applicable at the relevant time in substitution or replacement of the above Act. Till such determination by the Arbitral Tribunal, payment of rent shall be made to the Decree Holders at the same rate as payable immediately prior to 1” February, 2048 with an increment of 50 per cent. The Decree Holders agree and undertake to execute and register when required a formal Deed of Lease relating to the period of the aforesaid renewal/extension/fresh lease. 7. The Decree Holders agree and undertake to execute and register when required a formal Deed of Lease relating to the period of the aforesaid renewal/extension/fresh lease. 7. The parties agree that all existing and future leases and sub-leases in favour of the Lessees and/or the Sub-Lessees, including those executed pursuant to this Settlement, shall be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as modified from time to time and shall not be governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 under any circumstances, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, 8. This Memorandum of Settlement as also the decree to be passed on the basis hereof shall be binding also on the heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors, successors-in-office, successors-in-interest, assigns and transferees of all parties. 9. All disputes between the parties have been finally settled in the manner mentioned herein and save as stated herein, neither party shall have any other claim or demand against each other. 10. All parties shall sign, affirm, submit and file all necessary pleadings and documents including joint petition of compromise and petitions of withdrawal in all pending legal proceedings between any of the parties hereto and/or relating in any manner to the said premises and shall file a copy of this Terms of Settlement therewith and get such legal proceedings disposed of on the basis of this Terms of Settlement which shall form part of the decree/order of disposal thereof. 11. The parties have agreed to bear and pay their respective costs. Dated this 14th day of August, 2014.” 17. In the case of B.L. Shreedhar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “19. Estoppel, then, may itself be the foundation of a right as against the person estopped, and indeed, if it were not so, it is difficult to see what protection the principle of estoppel can afford to the person by whom it may be invoked or what disability it can create in the person against whom it operates in cases affecting rights. Where rights are involved, estoppel may with equal justification be described both as a rule of evidence and as a rule creating or defeating rights. Where rights are involved, estoppel may with equal justification be described both as a rule of evidence and as a rule creating or defeating rights. It would be useful to refer in this connection to the case of Depuru Veeraraghava Reddi vs. Depuru Kamalamma where Vishwanatha Sastri, J. observed: (AIR p. 405, Para 7) “Estoppel though a branch of the law of evidence is also capable of being viewed as a substantive rule of law insofar as it helps to create or defeat rights which would not exist and be taken away but for that doctrine.......” 20. Of course, an estoppel cannot have the effect of conferring upon a person a legal status expressly denied to him by a statute. But where such is not the case a right may be claimed as having come into existence on the basis of estoppel and it is capable of being enforced or defended as against the person precluded from denying it.” In the case of Rajendra Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “6. It has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar vs. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner that: (SCC p. 748, Para 22) “The writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred.” At the same time, it was observed that the licensees are not precluded from seeking to enforce the statutory provisions governing the contract. It must, however, be remembered that we are dealing with parties to a contract, which is a business transaction, no doubt governed by statutory provisions. [Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner vs. Issac Peter, (1994) 4 SCC 104 ] While examining complaints of violation of statutory rules and conditions, it must be remembered that violation of each and every provision does not furnish a ground for the court to interfere. The provision may be a directory one or a mandatory one. In the case of directory provisions, substantial compliance would be enough. Unless it is established that violation of a directory provision has resulted in loss and/or prejudice to the party, no interference is warranted. Even in the case of violation of a mandatory provision, interference does not follow as a matter of course. In the case of directory provisions, substantial compliance would be enough. Unless it is established that violation of a directory provision has resulted in loss and/or prejudice to the party, no interference is warranted. Even in the case of violation of a mandatory provision, interference does not follow as a matter of course. A mandatory provision conceived in the interest of a party can be waived by that party, whereas a mandatory provision conceived in the interest of the public cannot be waived by him. In other words, wherever a complaint of violation of a mandatory provision is made, the court should enquire - in whose interest is the provision conceived. If it is not conceived in the interest of the public, question of waiver and/or acquiescence may arise - subject, of course, to the pleadings of the parties. This aspect has been dealt with elaborately by this Court in State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma and Krishan Lal vs. State of J&K on the basis of a large number of decisions on the subject. Though the said decisions were rendered with reference to the statutory rules and statutory provisions (besides the principles of natural justice) governing the disciplinary enquiries involving government servants and employees of statutory corporations, the principles adumbrated therein are of general application. It is necessary to keep these considerations in mind while deciding whether any interference is called for by the court - whether under Article 226 or in a suit. The function of the court is not a mechanical one. It is always a considered course of action.” In the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for public benefit and could not be waived. It is, of course, true that it is enacted to cover a class of tenants who are sitting tenants and whose premises are subsequently purchased by landlords who seek to evict the sitting tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement as envisaged by Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, still the protection available to such tenants as found in the proviso would give the tenants concerned a locus poenitentiae to avail of it or not. It is easy to visualise that proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act would be between the landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other. These proceedings are not of any public nature. Nor any public interest is involved therein. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed and call for adjudication by the prescribed authority. The ground raised by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) would be personal to him and similarly the defence taken by the tenant would also be personal to him. Six months’ breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. In this connection we may profitably refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Krishan Lal vs. State of J&K wherein Hansaria, J., speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges has made the pertinent observations concerning the question of waiver of a mandatory provision providing for issuance of notice to the parties sought to be proceeded against by the person giving the notice, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report as under: (SCC p. 430) “16.........As to when violation of a mandatory provision makes an order a nullity has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court as well as of courts beyond the seven seas. This apart, there are views of reputed text writers. Let us start from our own one-time Highest Court, which used to be Privy Council. This question came up for examination by that body in Vellayan Chettiar vs. Govt. of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197 : 74 IA 223, in which while accepting that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory, which was the view taken in Bhagchand Dagadusa vs. Secy. This question came up for examination by that body in Vellayan Chettiar vs. Govt. of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197 : 74 IA 223, in which while accepting that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory, which was the view taken in Bhagchand Dagadusa vs. Secy. of State for India-in-Council, (1927) 54 IA 338, it was held that even if a notice under Section 80 be defective, the same would not per se render the suit requiring issuance of such a notice as a precondition for instituting the same as bad in the eye of law, as such a defect can be waived. This view was taken by pointing out that the protection provided by Section 80 is a protection given to the person concerned and if in a particular case that person does not require the protection he can lawfully waive his right. A distinction was made in this regard where the benefit conferred was to serve ‘an important purpose’, in which case there would not be waiver, (see paragraph 14). 17. This point had come up for examination by this Court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai vs. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300 : (1964) 6 SCR 1001 and a question was posed in paragraph 7 whether an act done in breach of a mandatory provision is per force a nullity. This Court referred to what was stated in this regard by Mookherjee, J. in Ashutosh Sikdar vs. Behari Lal Kirtania, ILR 35 Cal. 61 : 11 CWN 1011, ILR at p. 72 and some other decisions of the Calcutta High Court along with one of the Patna High Court and it was held that if a judgment-debtor, despite having received notice of proclamation of sale, did not object to the non-compliance of the required provision, he must be deemed to have waived his right conferred by that provision. It was observed that a mandatory provision can be waived if the same be aimed to safeguard the interest of an individual and has not been conceived in the public interest.” Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months’ notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection on the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. On the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant, for reasons best known to it, consciously and being alive to the clear factual situation that the suit was filed on that ground prior to the expiry of six months’ notice, did not think it fit to pursue that point any further and on the contrary joined issues on merits expecting a favourable decision in the suit and having lost therein and got an adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on the ground of maintainability of the suit while filing an appeal and argued the appeal only on merits and only as an afterthought at the stage of writ petition in the High Court such a contention was sought to be taken up for the first time for consideration. On the facts of the present case, therefore, it must be held that the appellant had waived that contention about the suit being premature having been filed before the expiry of six months from the date of the suit notice. In the case of Krishan Lal (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “26. Let it now be seen whether the requirement of giving copy of the proceeding of the inquiry mandated by Section 17(5) of the Act is one which is for the benefit of the individual concerned or serves a public purpose. If it be former, it is apparent, in view of the aforesaid legal position, that the same can be waived; if it be latter, it cannot be. Though Shri Mehta has urged that this requirement serves a public purpose, we do not agree. According to us, the requirement is for the benefit of the person concerned which is to enable him to know as to what had taken place during the course of the proceedings so that he is better situated to show his cause as to why the proposed penalty should not be imposed. Such a requirement cannot be said to be relatable to public policy or one concerned with public interest, or to serve a public purpose.” In the case of Waman Shriniwas Kini (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “13. The plea of waiver was taken for the first time in this Court in arguments. Such a requirement cannot be said to be relatable to public policy or one concerned with public interest, or to serve a public purpose.” In the case of Waman Shriniwas Kini (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “13. The plea of waiver was taken for the first time in this Court in arguments. Waiver is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. This plea was neither raised nor considered by the courts below and therefore ought not to be allowed to be taken at this stage of the proceedings. But it was argued on behalf of the appellant that according to the law of India the duty of a pleader is to set up the facts upon which he relied and not any legal inference to be drawn from them and as he had set up all the circumstances from which the plea of waiver could be inferred he should be allowed to raise and argue it at this stage even though it had not been raised at any previous stage not even in the statement of case filed in this Court and he relied upon Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lal Firm vs. Madho Prasad, AIR 1943 PC 147 . Assuming that to be so and proceeding on the facts found in this case the plea of waiver cannot be raised because as a result of giving effect to that plea the Court would be enforcing an illegal agreement and thus contravene the statutory provisions of Section 15 based on public policy and produce the very result which the statute prohibits and makes illegal. In Surajmull Nargoremull vs. Triton Insurance Co. (1924) LR 52 IA 126 Lord Sumner said: “No Court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset: Nixon vs. Albion Marine Insurance Co. (1867) LR 2 Ex 338. The enactment is prohibitory. It is not confined to affording a party a protection of which he may avail himself or not as he pleases. (1867) LR 2 Ex 338. The enactment is prohibitory. It is not confined to affording a party a protection of which he may avail himself or not as he pleases. It is not framed solely for the protection of the revenue and to be enforced solely at the instance of the revenue officials, nor is the prohibition limited to cases for which a penalty is exigible.” In the instant case the question is not merely of waiver of statutory rights enacted for the benefit of an individual but whether the Court would aid the appellant in enforcing a term of the agreement which Section 15 of the Act declares to be illegal by enforcing the contract the consequence will be the enforcement of an illegality and infraction of a statutory provision which cannot be condoned by any conduct or agreement of parties. Dhanukudhari Singh vs. Nathima Sahu, (1907) II CWN 848. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 92 at p. 1068 the law as to waiver is stated as follows: “.......a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favoured, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals......” In Bowmakers Ltd. vs. Barnet Instruments Ltd. (1945) I KB 65, the same rule was laid down. Mulla in his Contract Act at p. 198 has stated the law as to waiver of an illegality as follows: “Agreements which seek to waive an illegality are void on grounds of public policy. Whenever an illegality appears, whether from the evidence given by one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. A stipulation of the strongest form to waive the objection would be tainted with the vice of the original contract and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys.” This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the law and is supported by high authority. Field, J. in Oscanyan vs. Winchester Arms Company quoted with approval the observation of Swayne, J. in Hall v. Coppell: “The principle is indispensable to the purity of its administration. It will not enforce what it has forbidden and denounced. The maxim Ex dolo malo non oritur actio, is limited by no such qualification. The proposition to the contrary strikes us as hardly worthy of serious refutation. It will not enforce what it has forbidden and denounced. The maxim Ex dolo malo non oritur actio, is limited by no such qualification. The proposition to the contrary strikes us as hardly worthy of serious refutation. Wherever the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can neutralise its effect. A stipulation in the most solemn form, to waive the objection, would be tainted with the vice of the original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys.” Waiver is the abandonment of a right which normally everybody is at liberty to waive. A waiver is nothing unless it amounts to a release. It signifies nothing more than an intention not to insist upon the right. It may be deduced from acquiescence or may be implied. Chitty on Contract 21st Ed. p. 381: Stackhouse vs. Barnston, (1805) 10 Ves 453 : 32 ER 921. But an agreement to waive an illegality is void on grounds of public policy and would be unenforceable. 14. In Mytton vs. Gilbert Ashurst, J. said: “Besides, there is still further reason why the trustees should not be estopped; for this is a public Act of Parliament, and the Courts are bound to take notice that the trustees under this Act had no power to mortgage the tollhouses. This deed therefore cannot operate in direct opposition to an Act of Parliament, which negatives the estoppel.” 15. Vaughan Williams, L.J. in Norwich Corporation v. Norwich Electric Tramways Company said: “The case is not like that of a provision in an agreement which is for the benefit of one of the parties and which he may waive. This is a provision in an Act of Parliament, which, though to some extent it may be for the benefit of the parties to the difference, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of the public also.” In that case there was a provision made by the legislature that disputes mentioned in the section of the Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by the Board of Trade and it was contended that though not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver of a statutory provision inserted in public interest. Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable.” In the case of Universal Petrochemicals Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “44. Here it is nobody’s case that the forum selection clause is contrary to public policy. But the question is whether such a clause will override the express provision of Section 31(4) of the Act. The answer has to be in the negative as it is well settled as a principle of law that act of parties cannot defeat the intention of the legislature. 50. This Court, with great respect to the learned Judge, cannot accept the aforesaid proposition. The proposition that a contract between the parties will prevail over an overriding statutory provision is contrary to basic norms of jurisprudence. A statutory provision is the sovereign will of the legislature and the same binds every one and certainly the parties who are coming under it unless the provision is made subject to contract or the law is repealed or declared unconstitutional by a competent court. If the proposition laid down in Ganpatrai (supra) is follwed the same will lead to disastrous consequences. Any two individuals would be allowed to contract out of a statutory liability. It is well settled that there can be no contract which could defeat the provision of any law. This is one of the important facets of Section 23 of the Contract Act. So this Court, with respect to the learned Judge, holds that the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge is opposed to all cardinal principles of construction. Therefore, this court is of the view that the decision in Ganpatrai (supra) case was not correct and it was wrongly decided and this court is unable to follow the same.” In the present case, the defendants relied upon Clause 7 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 14th August, 2014 wherein the parties have agreed that all existing leases, future leases and subleases pursuant to this Settlement shall be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as modified from time to time and shall not be governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 under any circumstances. The plaintiff has filed the suit against the defendants for violation of Sections 6(1)(a),(b) and (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. Before filing of the suit, the plaintiff had served notice upon the defendants on 17th March, 2016 and in the said notice, the plaintiff has categorically mentioned that “Please treat this notice under Section 6(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as amended up to date.” The said notice was duly served upon the defendants and the defendants have sent reply by refusing to vacate possession but the defendants have not raised objection that the notice under the provision of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is not applicable. The defendants have also filed written statement in the suit and in the written statement also the defendant have also not pleaded the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and barred by any law. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have filed an application under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the said application was duly contested by the defendants and in the said application also the defendants have not taken the plea that the application is not maintainable. Prior to filing of the present application, the defendants have filed an application for recalling of the order 4th dated September, 2017 and in the said application, the defendants have admitted that the defendants are tenants under the plaintiff. On the other hand, on the same day i.e. 4th September, 2017, the defendants have filed an application under Section 7(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the same is still pending for hearing. 18. In the case of Universal Petrochemicals Limited (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that it is well settled as a principle of law that act of the parties cannot defeat the intention of the legislature. The proposition that a contract between the parties will prevail over and overriding statutory provision is contrary to basic norms of jurisprudence. It is settled that there can be no contract which could defeat the provision of any law. In view of the above, this Court unable to accept the contentions raised by the defendants with regard to waiver and estoppel against the plaintiff. 19. In the case of K. Arumuga Velaiah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 35. It is settled that there can be no contract which could defeat the provision of any law. In view of the above, this Court unable to accept the contentions raised by the defendants with regard to waiver and estoppel against the plaintiff. 19. In the case of K. Arumuga Velaiah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 35. After reviewing several judgments of this Court, the Privy Council and other High Courts, this Court in Para 20 indicated the following propositions: [Kale vs. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 , SCC p. 130] “20...........We would, therefore return the reference with a statement of the following general propositions: *** *** *** (1) A family arrangement can be made orally. (2) If made orally, there being no document, no question of registration arises. (3) If though it could have been made orally, it was in fact reduced to the form of a “document” registration (when the value is Rs. 100 and upwards) is necessary. (4) Whether the terms have been “reduced to the form of a document” is a question of fact in each case to be determined upon a consideration of the nature and phraseology of the writing and the circumstances in which and the purpose with which it was written. (5) If the terms were not “reduced to the form of a document” registration was not necessary (even though the value is Rs. 100 or upwards); and, while the writing cannot be used as a piece of evidence for what it may be worth, e.g. as corroborative of other evidence or as an admission of the transaction or as showing or explaining conduct. (6) If the terms were “reduced to the form of a document” and, though the value was Rs. 100 or upwards, it was not registered, the absence of registration makes the document inadmissible in evidence and is fatal to proof of the arrangement embodied in the document.” 45. Having regard to the aforesaid provisions of law it can be safely concluded that the said award was a mere arrangement to divide the properties in future by metes and bounds as distinguished from an actual deed of partition under which there is not only a severance of status but also division of joint family properties by metes and bounds in specific properties. Hence it was exempted from registration under Section 17(2)(v) of the Act. Hence it was exempted from registration under Section 17(2)(v) of the Act. A document of partition which provides for effectuating a division of properties in future would be exempt from registration under Section 17(2)(v). The test in such a case is whether the document itself creates an interest in a specific immovable property or merely creates a right to obtain another document of title. If a document does not by itself create a right or interest in immovable property, but merely creates a right to obtain another document, which will, when executed create a right in the person claiming relief, the former document does not require registration and is accordingly admissible in evidence vide Rajangam Ayyar vs. Rajangam Ayyar.” In the case of Pannalal Rudra and Another (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “13. If the present solenama is regarded as a document which falls within clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 17, then it would not require compulsory registration. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as a lease which also includes an agreement for a lease by virtue of clause (7) of section 2 of the Registration Act then it would not be exempted from compulsory registration. Mr. Sinha appearing on behalf of the defendant respondent contended that according to the terms of the solenama the lands for which rent has been claimed in the present suit would enure to the khas possession of the appellants unless the defendant respondent took settlement thereof at a rent of Rs. 55/- per year on paying a selami of Rs. 102/- within the period fixed in the compromise. Having regard to these terms of the solenama, Mr. Sinha submitted that the document was in effect and substance, if not in terms, an agreement for a lease. In support of his contention Mr. Sinha relied on two cases one of which is reported in Rajani Kanta Banerjee vs. Raj Kumari Dasi, 31 C.W.N. 1099(2). In that case a suit for recovery of khas possession was brought in respect of some lands. That suit was settled by a solenama and the effect of the solenama was that the defendant’s father admitted the right of the plain tiff to get possession of these lands but it was agreed that the defendant’s father should be a tenant to the plaintiff at a certain rent permanently. That suit was settled by a solenama and the effect of the solenama was that the defendant’s father admitted the right of the plain tiff to get possession of these lands but it was agreed that the defendant’s father should be a tenant to the plaintiff at a certain rent permanently. It was held upon a construction of the solenama that it was a lease and it required compulsory registration and it would not fall within clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act. The other case cited by Mr. Sinha on behalf of the defendant respondent is reported in Nagendra Chandra Nag vs. Puma Chandra Gupta, AIR 1935 Cal. 261(3). In that case also it was held that a solenama filed under similar circumstances was a lease and as such it was compulsorily registrable. The solenama with which I am concerned in the present case is quite similar to the solenama which came up for the consideration of the learned Judges in the above mentioned two cases. That being so, I am of opinion that the solenama created a lease or to be more precise, the solenama embodied an agreement to lease, and as such it specifically fell within clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and was not, therefore protected, from compulsory registration by clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the above Act. Mr. Pal appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that there is one distinguishing feature in the present case and that feature is that before the solenama in question was filed the land was in the possession of the defendant. He argued that under the terms of the solenama no lease was created, but only a declaration of a certain right was made in favour of the defendant respondent although that right was, by the consent of the parties, inferior to the right claimed by the defendant respondent. It was, therefore, submitted by Mr. Pal that the creation of this right by the solenama brings it within the scope of clause (b) of section 17(1) of the Registration Act. In my opinion this contention of Mr. Pal cannot be accepted. The terms of the solenama are quite clear. It was, therefore, submitted by Mr. Pal that the creation of this right by the solenama brings it within the scope of clause (b) of section 17(1) of the Registration Act. In my opinion this contention of Mr. Pal cannot be accepted. The terms of the solenama are quite clear. Whatever right the defendant respondent might have claimed in the disputed lands was given up by the solenama and he took or agreed to take a lease of the disputed lands on payment of a selami and after fixation of a rent. Such a solenama specifically falls within clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act and so according to the rules of construction of statutes it should be held that the solenama and the compromise decree passed on the basis of that solenama would be governed by clause (d) and not by clause (b) of section 17(1) of the Registration Act although the compromise decree in a wider sense may fall within the category of documents mentioned in clause (b) - vide [E.S. Kasim Marakkayer vs. P.R.M.K. Muhammad Abdul Rahiman Marakkayar, AIR 1944 Mad. 273 (4) and Sumatibai Waman Kirtikar vs. Ananti Balkrishna Shirgaonkar, AIR 1949 Bom. 402(5)]. 14. From the foregoing observations it would be clear that the solenama in question is really a document by which the plaintiffs appellants agreed to give lease of the disputed property to the defendant respondent. 15. That being so the compromise decree was compulsorily registrable if the plaintiffs appellants intended to make use of this document for the purpose of claiming rent from the defendant respondent at the rate stipulated in it. As the document was not registered it is not admissible in evidence for the purpose for which the appellants wanted to utilise it in the present suit. If that document is excluded from my consideration then there is no other evidence on the record to show what is the rate of rent of the disputed holding. The courts below were justified in passing a decree at the rate admitted by the defendant respondent.” In the case of Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “10. The courts below were justified in passing a decree at the rate admitted by the defendant respondent.” In the case of Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “10. If, as it clearly transpires from the facts of this case, the appellant was a tenant on the date on which the second lease, which is found to be void, was to commence what would be the nature of possession of the appellant during the period of 5 years, the period sought to be reserved under the second lease and on the expiration of such period? If the appellant was put into possession for the first time under a void lease the appellant could have protected its possession under Section 53-A. But it must be made distinctly clear that the appellant was in possession on the date on which the second lease now found void was to commence. Would this attempt inchoate or stillbom of entering into a fresh contractual tenancy make any difference in the position of the appellant and the nature of his possession? If the second lease is void or inchoate or ineffective or stillbom it is not at all effective. If it is not effective it does not impinge upon the nature of the appellant’s possession which was that of a tenant. In other words, the appellant continued to remain in possession of the demised premises as tenant because there was no impact of the lease which is found to be void. It must be made distinctly clear that the appellant was not put in possession under the lease which turns out to be void. In such a situation even during the period of 5 years for which the second lease was to be created the appellant continued to be in possession as tenant and this is evidenced by the further fact that rent was accepted from the appellant by Respondents 1 and 2. There is nothing to show that the rent was accepted from month to month by Respondents 1 and 2 under the second lease and not what was determined by the Court in Rent Fixation Case 114/53 wherein the parties had filed a consent pracipe by which the parties invited the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent of the premises at Rs. 500 p.m. and Rs. 500 for use of the machinery, furniture and fixtures, in all Rs. 500 p.m. and Rs. 500 for use of the machinery, furniture and fixtures, in all Rs. 1000 p.m. In this connection, attention was drawn to Receipt Ext. 10 issued by Respondents 1 and 2 on January 1, 1960 in which it is stated that the amount is accepted as per terms of consent decree (solenama), but it could not be overlooked that this amount was determined by consent of parties in the case initiated by the appellant before the Rent Controller for fixation of standard rent. If thus the appellant was already in possession as a tenant of the premises, an unsuccessful attempt to create a fresh lease would not change the nature of his possession as from a tenant to one in part performance under a void lease. The appellant continues to be in possession as tenant and no cloud is created over its title to remain in possession as tenant merely because the appellant and Respondents 1 and 2 attempted to enter into a fresh lease which did not become effective. 16. In this case it is unquestionably established that at the commencement of the lease which turns out to be void i.e. on March 1, 1955 appellant was a tenant of the premises and that on its application standard rent in respect of the demised premises was determined and the same was accepted as the rent to be paid under the second lease. Payment has in fact been made and it would be twisting the language to hold that the payment was not made as rent but under the terms of the second lease. In view of the statutory enactment of the equitable principle of part performance as found in Section 53-A, the equity recognised in Welsh v. Lonsdale may not be attracted. Payment has in fact been made and it would be twisting the language to hold that the payment was not made as rent but under the terms of the second lease. In view of the statutory enactment of the equitable principle of part performance as found in Section 53-A, the equity recognised in Welsh v. Lonsdale may not be attracted. However, it would not be correct to hold that a tenant who was in possession of the demised premises as tenant and who negotiated a fresh agreement of lease with the landlord for a period exceeding one year which, in order to be legal, must be by a registered instrument and which turns out to be void for want of registration, would alter his position from one as tenant at the commencement of such void lease and would render him a licensee continuing in possession under the terms of a lease being void and, therefore, ineffective and that he ceases to be a tenant and could be forcibly removed at the end of the period which was reserved under the void lease. Such an incomplete and ineffective attempt at creating a fresh lease would have no impact on a tenant who was in possession as tenant at the commencement of such a void lease and he would continue to be the tenant because Section 53-A would not be attracted as he is not put in possession in part performance of an agreement of lease not registered and that it would be unwise to hold that the payment of the standard rent fixed by the Rent Controller having jurisdiction could be by any process of construction treated as payment under such an agreement of lease. Therefore, it would appear that the appellant company was a tenant during the period 1948-53 and on the expiry of the contractual tenancy on August 31, 1953 it became a statutory tenant. A person remaining in occupation of premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. In other words, he acquires the status of irremovability [see Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. case. Statutory tenant being a person who enjoys the status of irremovability, would enjoy the protection of the statute until he is evicted from the premises under the enabling provisions of the statute. In other words, he acquires the status of irremovability [see Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. case. Statutory tenant being a person who enjoys the status of irremovability, would enjoy the protection of the statute until he is evicted from the premises under the enabling provisions of the statute. A statutory tenancy would, therefore, come to an end on either the surrender of premises by such a tenant or if a decree of eviction is passed against him [See Hiralal Vallabhram vs. Kastorbhai Lalbhai]. As the period reserved under the first lease expired on August 31, 1953 and thereafter the tenant continued in possession, it became a statutory tenant under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. If thereafter an ineffective attempt was made to enter into a fresh contract of tenancy the status of the appellant as tenant did not undergo any change and it continued to be the tenant of the premises and the statutory tenancy would come to an end if it surrenders possession or is evicted by due process of law. 17. If the appellant thus continued to be a tenant it could not be forcibly evicted. If the premises enjoyed the protection of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which was in force on February 29, 1960 when according to Respondents 1 and 2 the period reserved under the void lease expired, Respondents 1 and 2 cannot, ignoring the provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction law and merely treating the appellant as licensee or trespasser, ignoring its status of irremovability, take over forcible possession. In such circumstances the appellant as tenant would be entitled to protect its possession unless evicted in due course of law and in order to protect its possession it can legitimately sue, there being no bar in law, for a declaration of its status as tenant and for an injunction either prohibitory or mandatory, as the case may be. The High Court really missed the core problem and with respect misled itself into invoking the provisions of Section 53-A which the learned Counsel appearing for the present appellant declined to invoke in its favour and came to an unsustainable conclusion that under the consent decree the parties agreed that the old tenancy would be wiped out and a new tenancy would be created for a period of 5 years expiring in February, 1960. A stillborn attempt not clothed with legal formality cannot destroy the existing status. The second lease never came into existence for want of registration and more particularly the appellant was not put in possession under the purported second lease which turns out to be void. The paradoxical approach manifested in the approach is that if a valid lease had come into existence, on the expiry of it the appellant tenant would have continued in possession under the protection of the relevant Rent Restriction Act. However, if such an attempt at creating a fresh lease was ineffective or infructuous, how can such an inchoate exercise destroy the existing rights which the High Court held to have been destroyed ignoring the very existence of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956? The High Court was further in error in holding that if on the expiry of the agreed period of lease there was a covenant for not getting any renewal of the lease the tenant would be a trespasser, wholly overlooking the legal position as affirmatively established that on the expiry of the contractual tenancy the tenant continues as a statutory tenant except where he surrenders possession or is evicted under the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act.” In the case of Anthony (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “16. Taking a different view would be contrary to the reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease though the document which they executed had not gone into the processes of registration. That lacuna had affected the validity of the document, but what had happened between the parties in respect of the property became a reality. Non-registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One is that no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned. Nonetheless the presumption that a lease not exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains un-rebutted. 19. Non-registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One is that no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned. Nonetheless the presumption that a lease not exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains un-rebutted. 19. In Biswabani (P) Ltd. vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta a two-Judge Bench of this Court found that though a second lease deed executed between the parties (on the expiry of the period mentioned in the first lease deed) is void for want of registration, the tenant would continue to be protected under the relevant Rent Control Act because on the expiry of the period of first lease the tenant had acquired the right of a statutory tenant. 20. None of the observations made in the above decision is in conflict with the view expressed by us above. The appellant occupied the building as a tenant and he paid rent to the landlord and continued as such. Hence with the coming into force of the Rent Act he became a statutory tenant whose eviction can be considered only when an application is moved in that behalf before the Rent Control Court concerned. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The suit filed by the respondent will stand dismissed without prejudice to the right of the respondent to move under the provision of the Rent Act.” In the instant case, there is mandatory requirement of the lease agreement between the parties but admittedly has not done, thus the question of the exemption of Section 3(c) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 cannot be availed by the defendants. The defendants have admittedly filed an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 to take benefit of the same and the said application is still pending for adjudication and thus the defendants cannot file the present application on the second time. The defendants have not availed the benefit of the provisions of Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 by filing of an application before the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 7(3) of the said Act. The defendants have not availed the benefit of the provisions of Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 by filing of an application before the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 7(3) of the said Act. The defendants are the statutory tenants of the suit premises and they cannot be evicted without the due process of law by initiating proceeding under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and accordingly, the plaintiff has initiated proceeding for the eviction of the defendants after issuance of notice to the defendants. 20. Considering the above facts and circumstances, this court finds that the applications filed by the defendants have no merit, accordingly, the same are dismissed. 21. G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 189 of 2016, G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 190 of 2016, G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 191 of 2016, G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 192 of 2016, G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 193 of 2016 and G.A. No. 7 of 2023 in C.S. 194 of 2016 are accordingly dismissed.