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2024 DIGILAW 777 (GUJ)

Bhanabhai Limjibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat

2024-04-05

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Present petition is filed by the original petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the following reliefs. (A) be pleased to allow this petition, (B) be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment/order/award 29-4-2013 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar in Appeal No.281 of 2004: (C) be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by directing the respondents no. 1 and 2 to apply:- (I) the judgment dated 29-7-2003 in Special Civil Application No.10772 of 2003. (II) judgment dated 18-2-2010 in Special Civil Application No.324 of 2010 and other cognate matters. (III) Special Civil Application No.8181 of 1998 dated 6-8-1999. (IV) Oral order dated 28-1-2010 in Letters Patent Appeal No.663 of 2000 to 665 of 2000. In the case of the petitioner and grant the benefit of first higher grade scale (Rs.1400 – 2600) with effect from 1-1-1992 i.e. the date on which the petitioner completed 9 years services on the post of sr clerk and grant all the consequential and incidental benefits including the second higher pay scale by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25-10-1994. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to direct the respondents no.1 and 2 to reconsider the case of petitioner for grant of first higher pay scale (Rs.1400 – 2600) with effect from 1-1-1992 i.e. the date on which the petitioner completed 9 year service on the post of sr clerk and grant all the consequential and incidental benefits including the second higher pay scale and its effect in retirement benefits in light of judicial pronouncements annexed to this petition. (D) be pleased to pass such other and further orders may be deemed just and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice. 2. Facts of the present petition in nutshell are that the petitioner was appointed as senior clerk and was promoted as senior clerk on 01.01.1983 in the District Panchayat, Valsad by way of regular selection. 2. Facts of the present petition in nutshell are that the petitioner was appointed as senior clerk and was promoted as senior clerk on 01.01.1983 in the District Panchayat, Valsad by way of regular selection. The petitioner has completed 9 years continuous service on the post of senior clerk on 31.12.1991 and, therefore, he was entitled to the first higher pay scale of Rs.1400 – 2600 with effect from 01.01.1992, but the same was granted to the petitioner on passing of departmental examination in 1997. That the grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner has completed 9 years on 31.12.1991, whereas, the departmental examination was first time taken in 1994, however, he could not have appeared in the examination. That the petitioner and other employees were given benefit of the higher pay scale by order dated 29.03.1993 (the petitioner is at Sr.No.15). However, without giving any opportunity of hearing the aforesaid benefit was withdrawn by impugned order dated 25.10.1994 and, therefore, the petitioner made several representations. That thereafter the petitioner passed the departmental examination in 1997 and was given the benefit in 1998 and again petitioner made representation which came to be rejected in 2004. Being aggrieved by the decision of the respondent – authority, petitioner preferred Appeal No.281 of 2004 before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal which came to be dismissed. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned order / communication/action on the part of the respondents, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 4. Heard Mr.Hardik Rawal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Ms.Megha Chitaliya, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr.Rutvij Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. Perused the materials placed on record. 5. Mr.Hardik Rawal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petition and has submitted that the impugned order is illegal, unjust and arbitrary. He has submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of jurisdiction without considering the submission and the case of the petitioner is fully covered by the judicial pronouncement and the benefit is given to one set of employees the State should extend the same benefit to other identically situated employees and should not force them to approach the Court again and the present petitioner has superannuated. He has submitted that the petitioner was appointed as senior clerk and, after completion of 9 years, he was entitled to the first higher pay scale of Rs.1400 – 2600 with effect from 01.01.1992. He has submitted that other identically situated employees were granted the benefits of the higher pay scale, however, without giving any opportunity of hearing the aforesaid benefit was withdrawn and, therefore, the petitioner made several representations. He has submitted that thereafter the petitioner passed the departmental examination in 1997. While referring the judgment and orders passed by this Court and the Division Bench of this Court, he has submitted that earlier this Court has decided the similarly situated issue and the issue involved in the present petition is squarely covered by such decisions of this Court. He has submitted that the present petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned order/action deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner may be granted the benefit of first higher pay scale. 6. Per contra, Ms.Megha Chitaliya, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 has vehemently opposed the present petition and has submitted that the petitioner was working as senior clerk at the relevant time had to pass departmental examination for the purpose of promotion and since he had not cleared the same, he was not entitled to the first higher grade scale. She has submitted that the departmental examination was held for the first time in the year 1994, but the petitioner had not appeared in the examination. She has submitted that the petition being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 7. Mr.Rutvij Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has opposed the petition. He has urged that the petition being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 8. This court has considered the facts of the case and materials placed on record and the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. This court has perused the judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. From the record, it appears that the petition is filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order passed by respondent authority whereby the benefit which is extended in favour of the petitioner along with the others for grant of higher pay scale came to be withdrawn and such order was implemented by the respondent – authority without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It also appears that the respondent – authority has sought to implement the said order and thereby recovered the amount which is paid to the petitioner. 9. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner joined the services with respondent No.2 as senior clerk and on completion of nine years, the petitioner was eligible to get the benefits for the higher pay scale and, therefore, the respondents have considered the case and extend the benefits in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 29.03.1993 and he was shown at Sr.No.15 in the order. It appears that though the petitioner was found eligible to get the benefit of the first higher pay scale, but such benefit was extended in favour of the petitioner. It is also an undisputed fact that the said order came to be reviewed by respondent No.2 in light of the Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994. The benefit came to be withdrawn w.e.f. 29.03.1993 and this decision was taken without giving any opportunity to make submission against such order. Therefore, from the record, one thing is abundantly clear that the decision of withdrawal of benefit taken by the respondent No.2 is behind the back of the petitioner and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner and such decision was implemented, which is not proper. 10. It is worthwhile to referred to and relied upon the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner whereby the similar situated issue was decided. The said decisions and relevant paragraphs of such decisions are as under:- 10.1 In the case of Snehlata V. Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and others in Special Civil Application No.324 of 2010 and allied matters dated 18.02.2010, this Court (Hon’ble Mr.Justice D. H. Waghela) while allowing the petitions has held and observed in paragraphs no.6 and 7 as under:- “6. It is clear that the controversy has arisen from requirement of passing the departmental examination meant for the promotion to the post of Child Development Project (Female) Officer. It is undisputed that passing of the departmental examination is sine qua non for grant of higher grade scale. It is also not disputed that such departmental examination was held for the first time in the year 1993 and all the petitioners had become eligible for the first higher grade scale prior to holding of such examination. It is undisputed that passing of the departmental examination is sine qua non for grant of higher grade scale. It is also not disputed that such departmental examination was held for the first time in the year 1993 and all the petitioners had become eligible for the first higher grade scale prior to holding of such examination. The respondents at the relevant time had also granted the benefit of the first higher grade scale counting their nine years service from the date of appointment. Thus, the petitioners were not at fault, but the lapse on the part of respondents in not holding the examinations in time pursuant to the relevant rules caused the problem. The petitioners were rightly granted benefit of the higher grade scale after completion of nine years of service at the relevant time and they cannot be deprived of that benefit for voluntary act of the respondents in not holding the examination before the petitioners became eligible. No opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before retrospectively withdrawing the benefit of higher pay scale given to them. 7. For the above reasons, the petitions are allowed, the impugned orders modifying the higher grade scale to the petitioners and for effecting recovery are set aside and the earlier orders by which the petitioners were granted the first higher grade scales after completion of 9 years in service are restored with direction to grant them the consequent benefits. Monetary benefits due to the petitioner under this order shall be paid to the petitioners within three months from today.” 10.2 This Court (Hon’ble Mr.Justice S. K. Keshote), while deciding the similarly situated issue in Special Civil Application No.8181 of 1998 dated 06.08.1999, has allowed the petition and directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for the benefits of higher pay scale. The said order dated 06.08.1999 came to be challenged by the respondents by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.665 of 2000 before the Division Bench of this Court wherein the Division bench of this Court has passed the following order. “Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned Single Judge has ordered that those employees who have completed 9 years prior to 14.1.1993 the day when the Rules came into force wherein the eligibility of passing the examination was made as condition, should be granted benefit of higher pay scale. “Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned Single Judge has ordered that those employees who have completed 9 years prior to 14.1.1993 the day when the Rules came into force wherein the eligibility of passing the examination was made as condition, should be granted benefit of higher pay scale. Therefore, we do not see any illegality in the order passed by learned Single Judge for the simple reason that the Rules have come into force on 14.1.1993 and they have not been made retrospective. That being the position any person who has acquired rights prior to this date will have to be conferred with those benefits. In that view of the matter, we do not find that any illegality has been committee by learned Single Judge in directing the respondents to grant Higher Pay Scale to those employees of the category which learned Single Judge has prescribed in the judgement. There is no substance in the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed accordingly.” 10.3 Against the subsequent decision of the learned Single Judge, the respondents – State Authorities have preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.211 of 2017 and allied appeals before the Division Bench of this Court wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held and observed in paragraphs no.13 to 21 as under:- “13. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of learned advocates and having gone through the material produced on record, it has emerged from the record that the concerned original petitioners were appointed as Mukhya Sevika who have completed nine years of service before the Rules of 1993 came into force on 14.1.1993. At this stage, it is required to be noted that as per the recruitment rules, for the appointment to the post of Child Development Officer which is made by promotion of a person of proved merit and efficiency from amongst the persons who have worked for not less than seven years as Mukhya Sevika in the integrated Child Development Service Block and Nutrition Programme sponsored by the Government of India or the State Government or by direct selection or by temporary transfer on deputation basis from a suitable officer working in the cadre of Gujarat Development Service Class II of the Panchayat and Rural Housing development or District Social Defence Officer Class II of the Social Defence Department. Thus, post of Child Development Officer is a promotional post of Mukhya Sevika. 14. Thus, post of Child Development Officer is a promotional post of Mukhya Sevika. 14. At this stage, we would like to refer to Clause 3(3) of the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 which provides as under: “3(3) Higher Grade Scale means the scale of pay of the post of next promotion, provided that for the employees on posts having more than one promotional post in different scales of pay their pay of Higher Grade Scale shall be considered the pay of the pay scale of the lowest of the promotional posts. Provided further that in the case where there is no promotional scale, the H.G.S.shall be the Higher Grade Scale corresponding to his existing scale of pay as specified in Schedule (1) annexed to this Government Resolution. Provided further that in case of posts with feeder cadres in different pay scales, instead of promotional scale, the Higher Grade Scales of such posts shall be higher grade scale corresponding to his existing scale of pay as specified in Schedule(1) annexed to this Government Resolution.” 15. Clause 3(7) of Government Resolution dated 2.7.2007 provides as under: “In case of interrupted promotion, if the period of such promotion is taken into account for the purpose of increment, it will be considered for the service of lower cadre for eligibility of Higher Grade Scale provided that such service in higher cadre (on the post of promotion) shall not be considered.” 16. At this stage, it is also required to be noted that the Rules of 1993 have come into force after the date on which the petitioners have completed nine years in the feeder cadre and therefore the respondents could not have insisted on passing of examination to make themselves eligible for the benefits of the higher grade scale. In similar matter decided by learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.324 of 2010 and allied matters, it has been observed by the learned Single Judge in paragraphs 6 and 7 as under: “6. It is clear that the controversy has arisen from requirement of passing the departmental examination meant for the promotion to the post of Child Development Project (Female) Officer. It is undisputed that passing of the departmental examination is sine qua non for grant of higher grade scale. It is clear that the controversy has arisen from requirement of passing the departmental examination meant for the promotion to the post of Child Development Project (Female) Officer. It is undisputed that passing of the departmental examination is sine qua non for grant of higher grade scale. It is also not disputed that such departmental examination was held for the first time in the year 1993 and all the petitioners had become eligible for the first higher grade scale prior to holding of such examination. The respondents at the relevant time had also granted the benefit of the first higher grade scale counting their nine years service from the date of appointment. Thus, the petitioners were not at fault, but the lapse on the part of respondents in not holding the examinations in time pursuant to the relevant rules caused the problem. The petitioners were rightly granted benefit of the higher grade scale after completion of nine years of service at the relevant time and they cannot be deprived of that benefit for voluntary act of the respondents in not holding the examination before the petitioners became eligible. No opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before retrospectively withdrawing the benefit of higher pay scale given to them. 7. For the above reasons, the petitions are allowed, the impugned orders modifying the higher grade scale to the petitioners and for effecting recovery are set aside and the earlier orders by which the petitioners were granted the first higher grade scales after completion of 9 years in service are restored with direction to grant them the consequent benefits. Monetary benefits due to the petitioner under this order shall be paid to the petitioners within three months from today.” 17. It is not in dispute that the appellants have granted the benefit of higher grade scale as per the order passed by this Court in the aforesaid matter. 18. Thus, we are of the view that the original petitioners were not required to pass the departmental examination in pursuance to the Rules of 1993 as they have completed nine years of service before such rules came into force. 19. As observed hereinabove, initially there were four feeder cadre posts to the promotional posts of Child Development Officer and after the recruitment rules of 1989 were framed there is only one feeder cadre post i.e. Mukhya Sevika. 19. As observed hereinabove, initially there were four feeder cadre posts to the promotional posts of Child Development Officer and after the recruitment rules of 1989 were framed there is only one feeder cadre post i.e. Mukhya Sevika. Thus, it is not in dispute that post of Child Development Officer is a promotional post and feeder cadre is Mukhya Sevika. Thus, in view of clause 3(3) of Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994, the original petitioners were eligible to get the higher grade scale of the promotional post which was rightly granted to them. Thus, we are of the view that no mistake was committed by the original respondent-present appellants while granting the benefit of higher grade scale to the petitioners and therefore withdrawal of the same after a period of 13 years is not permissible. It is reported that some of the original petitioners who were appointed during the period between 1976 to 1982 have already retired in the year 2009 and some of the petitioners are getting such benefit since the year 2002. 20. The decision upon which the reliance is placed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdev Singh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case as no mistake was committed by the present appellants while according the benefit of higher grade scale to the concerned petitioners and therefore there is no question of recovery of such amount on the basis of the undertaking given by the concerned petitioners. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge, we are of the view that no error is committed by the learned Single Judge while allowing the petitions. Hence, the present appeals are not required to be entertained and accordingly the same are dismissed. As the appeals are dismissed, civil applications also stand dismissed.” 10.4 This Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice M. R. Shah) has decided similar issue vide order dated 24.03.2009 passed in Special Civil Application No.1314 of 2009. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under:- “9. As the appeals are dismissed, civil applications also stand dismissed.” 10.4 This Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice M. R. Shah) has decided similar issue vide order dated 24.03.2009 passed in Special Civil Application No.1314 of 2009. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under:- “9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the objection raised by the respondent No.3 that while granting the benefit of higher pay scale on completion of 9 years service/seniority prior to the request transfer is not required to be counted is not sustainable in view of the many decisions of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judges of this Court. Even, the controversy in question is now not res integra in view of the the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Vishun Pawar (supra). All the decisions have been considered by this Court in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Naynaben Manubhai Vyas & Others(supra) dated 12.3.2009 in Special Civil Application No. 1446 of 1994 and other allied matters. In spite of the above decisions of this Court, since long the office of the respondent No.3 is raising same and similar objection driving the employee to the Court and to obtain the similar order. If, on a particular point there is a decision of this Court every authority of the State Government is bound to follow the same unless it is upset by the higher forum. The authority has to apply its mind before raising objection and grant the benefit accordingly and shall not compel the employee to obtain similar order from the Court. To raise the objections again and again which are overruled by the Court by decision would not only compelling the employee to incur the expenditure towards the legal proceedings but it will also increase the litigation and burden to the Courts, which are otherwise today heavy burdened due to backlog of cases and Courts are trying their best to get out of the backlog. In the case of (Smt) Dhanlakshmiben Liladhar Suchak (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court as far as back in the year 1992 has observed that the Government should be model employer. The model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee and employees on any technical ground. In the case of (Smt) Dhanlakshmiben Liladhar Suchak (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court as far as back in the year 1992 has observed that the Government should be model employer. The model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee and employees on any technical ground. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee/employees. It is further observed that once it is found that an employee is similarly situated the benefits flowing from a judgment in a case of other similarly situated employee, it should be given to other similarly situated employee and employee should not be driven to the Court for addressing just grievances. Even in the case of Secretary, Labour, Social Welfare & Tribunal Development Department & Anr. (Supra), the Full Bench of this Court in para 9 and 10 has observed and held as under: “9. The legal position regarding the binding nature of judgments delivered by High Courts was clearly explained as far back as 1962 by the Supreme Court. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. V. Collector of Customs, Calcuttam A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1893, Subba Rao. J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Mudholkar J., has explained though A.K. Sarkar J. who was the legal position, the legal position in paragraph 29 of the report as follows: This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art: 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working: otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer, We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority, signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction.” The position was reiterated in Makhan Lal Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2206. It was the context of the law declared by the Supreme Court that the decision laid down to that effect so far as Article 141 of the Constitution was concerned, but what has been observed in paragraph 5 at page 2209 by Grover J. speaking for the Supreme Court has equal application so far as pronouncements by the High Courts are concerned. Grover J. observed at page 2209: “The Judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the writ petition filed at the previous stage as unconstitutional but also laid down in clear and unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments, posts or promotions made in implementation of the communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Article 16. The law so declared by this court was binding on the respondent State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether a majority of the present respondents were parties or not to the previous petition.” It cannot, therefore, be contended by anyone, that since Acharya, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2215 of 1979, was not a party to Special Civil Application No. 806 of 1975, that the law laid down by D.A. Desai, J. in his judgment in that case on August 7, 1975 was not applicable to the case of Acharya. Whether the law is declared by the Supreme Court or whether the law is declared by the High Court, the legal position as regards authorities and tribunals subordinate to the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively is the same as pointed out by Subba Rao J. in East India Commercial Co.s case (supra). 10. In Shri Baradakanta Mishtra V. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2466, the legal position regarding binding nature of the High Court's decision was once again reiterated by the Supreme Court and after quoting the above passage which we have extracted from the judgment of Subba Rao J. in East India Commercial Co. s case (supra) in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, Dwiveid J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed at page 2169: “The conduct of the appellant in following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior court's disobedience to the specific order of a superior court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law.” In Hashmukhlal C. Shah V. State of Gujarat, 19 G.L.R. 378, a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of J.B. Mehta and P.D. Desai JJ. after examining several decisions on the point, observed: “... in a Government which is ruled by laws, there must be complete awareness to carry out faithfully and honestly lawful orders passed by a Court of law after impartial adjudication. Then only will private individuals, organizations and institutions learn to respect the decisions of Court. In absence of such attitude on the part of all concerned, chaotic conditions might arise and the function assigned to the Courts of law under the Constitution might be rendered a futile exercise. “From these four decisions, the following propositions emerges: (1). It is immaterial that in a previous litigation the particular petitioner before the Court was or was not a party, but if law on a particular point has been laid down by the High Court, it must be followed by all authorities and tribunals in the State. (2). The law laid down by the High Court must be followed by all authorities and subordinate tribunals when it has been declared by the highest Court in the State and they cannot ignore it either in initiating proceeding of deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. (3). If in spite of the earlier exposition of law by the High Court having been pointed out and attention being pointedly drawn to that legal position in utter disregard of that position proceedings are initiated, it must be held to be a wilful disregard of the law laid down by the High Court and would amount to civil contempt as defined in section 2(b) of the Contempt Courts Act, 1971.” Thus, even the Division Bench has held that not following the law laid down by the High Court and disregarding the same would amount to Civil Contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the concerned officer, which is accepted, no further order is passed. 10. In view of the above, the action of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and more particularly, respondent No.3 i.e. office of the Local Fund raising the same/ similar objection again and again while considering the grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale is highly deprecated. As such it is not believable that the respondent No.3 was not aware of the decision of this Court. In fact, in the communication from the office of the respondent No.2 there is a reference to the decision of this court , therefore, the submission on behalf of the respondent No.3 that he was not aware of the decision of this Court cannot be accepted. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent No.3 and assurance to this Court that in future respondent No.3 and its Office shall take care and that it was not his intention to disregard and/or disrespect the orders passed by this Court, unconditional apology is accepted. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3, more particularly respondent No.3 and its Officers are warned that as and when not only in the case of grant of higher pay scale but in any other cases as and when it is brought to their knowledge the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and / or this Court in other similar case they will apply their mind and grant the benefit without insisting for individual orders from the Court. All the authorities under the State are bound to consider the decisions of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court even if the decisions are with respect to other similarly situated employees. The same would avoid the further litigation and decrease the burden of the Court and also similarly situated employee may not have to incur expenditure on the legal proceedings. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. The Secretary Legal Department as well as Secretary General Administrative Department are hereby directed to issue necessary circular to all the departments accordingly not to insist for individual order when the controversy is concerned by the decision in other employees case. 11. Now, so far as the present petition is concerned, in view of the statement made by Ms. Calla, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 recorded herein above and that the respondent No.3 is now withdrawing the objection raised by him with respect to grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale to the respective petitioners, on return of case papers of the respective petitioners by the respondent No.2 to the respondent No.3, the respondent No.3 is directed to pass an appropriate order with respect to grant of the benefit of higher grade scale in accordance with the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 of the Finance Department considering the seniority/service of the respective petitioners from the date of their first appointment as an Assistant (Junior Clerk) i.e. inclusive of seniority/service prior to their request transfer within a period of 3 weeks from the date of the receipt of the case papers from the office of the respondent No.2 and pay the arrears within a period of 4 weeks thereafter without fail. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 11. Considering the facts of the present case, it appears that the petitioner was eligible to get the benefit for the higher pay scale and, therefore, the respondents have considered the case and extend the benefits in favour of the petitioner, so it cannot be given retrospective effect of the circular dated 16.08.1994. In view of the above the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment and orders and, therefore, the present petition deserves to be allowed. 12. In view of the above the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment and orders and, therefore, the present petition deserves to be allowed. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and the submissions on behalf of both the parties and the decisions cited at the bar, I am of the opinion that the action on the part of the respondent/s is not just and proper and the petition deserves to be allowed. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the respondents are hereby quashed and set aside and the order of recovery is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to refund such amount to the petitioner and to recalculate all the consequential retiral benefits and paid the same to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of this order along with 6% interest from the date on which the petitioner is entitled till the date of realization. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.