JUDGMENT : Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J. 1. Since this batch of writ petitions share similar facts and common questions of law, they have been heard together and are being decided vide this common order. 2. For reference, relevant facts from the file of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4606/2024: Krishna Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. are being taken note of. 3. The petitioner was licence holder to operate a Country Liquor and IMFL/Beer Composite Retail Off Vend i.e. Shop No.1 for Ward No.82-85, Jaipur Municipal Corporation (Greater), Jaipur for the Excise Year 2023-24, i.e., the financial year from 01.04.2023 till 31.03.2024 as per the provisions of the Liquor and Temperance Policy 2022-23 and 2023-24. Life of the licence came to an end on 31.03.2024. Under their new Excise and Temperance Policy 2024-25, the respondents have offered the existing licence holders an option for renewal on fulfillment of certain terms and conditions as detailed in its clause 2. The option was to be exercised within a period of 15 days from the date of its issuance, i.e., 01.02.2024, subject to deposition of the renewal fee and other dues, i.e., security amount, advance annual guarantee amount, and yearly licence fee as per the schedule provided thereunder. Since, the petitioner was not interested in renewal of the licence, she did not exercise the option. So left out shops were put to auction; but, despite conducting the auction 4 times, about 4,000 vends remained unsettled. In these circumstances, the respondents issued the impugned order dated 13.03.2024 whereunder, the existing licence holders like the petitioner whose term of licence was expiring on 31.03.2024, are compelled to continue with the vend for a further period of 3 months, i.e., 01.04.2024 to 30.06.2024 as per the terms and conditions provided under the Excise Policy 2024-2025. It is alleged that this unilateral extension of the licence period is impermissible under the law. It is further alleged that the order impugned dated 13.03.2024 has been passed on application of the Model Code of Conduct (for brevity, “the MCC”) under an order dated 02.01.2024 issued by the Election Commission of India; however, it does not put an absolute embargo on the process of auction for issuance of the liquor licence. It is further alleged that the order impugned dated 13.03.2024 has been passed on application of the Model Code of Conduct (for brevity, “the MCC”) under an order dated 02.01.2024 issued by the Election Commission of India; however, it does not put an absolute embargo on the process of auction for issuance of the liquor licence. It is also averred that vide instruction dated 06.02.2023 issued in tune with the Excise and Temperance Policy for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24, Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (for brevity, “the RTDC”), Rajasthan State Beverages Corporation Limited (for brevity, “the RSBCL”) and Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills (for brevity, “the RSGSM”) have been given the liberty to operate licenced vends on licence fee system without insistence of any minimum lifting of liquor and the annual guarantee of revenue, which could be adopted for the current excise year as well. It is, therefore, prayed that the order dated 13.03.2024 be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to refund the refundable deposits including the security amount and balance advance annual guarantee. 4. The respondents in their reply submitted that as per Clause-II (21)(c) of the MCC, no liquor vend is allowed to be put to auction during its operation even if the process has started. It is stated that upon finding that upto 21.03.2024, i.e., after four rounds of auction, out of total 7665 shops, 4178 shops remained unsettled, closure whereof during the applicability of the MCC may have devastating effect, such as; an increase in the menace of illicit liquor, illegal import from other States, huge revenue loss, the State Government took a conscious decision to grant 3 months extension to all the 4178 licensees whose licence was coming to an end on 31.03.2024. It is averred that the order dated 13.03.2024 is by way of an interim arrangement policy issued to further the object of the existing excise policy 2024-25. It is denied that the order amounts to unilateral extension of the contract inasmuch as the petitioner has signed the counter agreement on 01.04.2021 to abide by the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 (for brevity, “the Act of 1950”), the rules framed thereunder and the departmental directions issued from time to time. It is denied that the order amounts to unilateral extension of the contract inasmuch as the petitioner has signed the counter agreement on 01.04.2021 to abide by the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 (for brevity, “the Act of 1950”), the rules framed thereunder and the departmental directions issued from time to time. It is further stated that the RSGSM is primarily engaged into production of Country Liquor and RML, and being a bulk supplier of these products, it cannot hold 4178 shops for retail purpose. It is also averred that the RSBCL is also a Government Company dealing with the bulk sale of liquor to licence holders. Dismissal of the writ petition is, therefore, prayed for. 5. Reiterating the submissions made in the memo of writ petition, Shri R.B. Mathur-learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that unilateral extension of the contract for a period of 3 months after its expiry vide order impugned dated 13.03.2024 is bad in law. Elaborating his submission, he contended that Section 31 of the Act of 1950 provides for form and conditions of licence etc. including that every licence granted under the Act shall be for the period as State Government may prescribe by rules either generally or in the case of particular licence, as the State Government may direct. Inviting attention of this Court towards the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 (for brevity, “the Rules of 1956”), Shri Mathur submits that the term of one year is provided for the category of licence issued to the petitioners by the respondents for the financial year 2023-24 which has come to an end on 31.03.2024 and in view thereof, its unilateral extension beyond 31.03.2024 by the respondents is not sustainable in the eye of law. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that under the extant excise policy dated 01.02.2024, the existing licence holders for the financial year 2023-24 were given an option of renewal for the financial year 2024-25 which was to be exercised within a period of 15 days from the date of issuance of the policy; but, the petitioners did not opt for it and in the garb of implementation of the MCC by the Election Commission of India, their right of option cannot be curtailed. Shri Mathur contends that even otherwise, the petitioners cannot be compelled to continue with the excise licence, term whereof has already expired against their wishes that too on the new conditions prejudicial to their rights and interests. Referring to the conditions contained in the order dated 13.03.2024, he submits that the extension has been granted on the enhanced annual guarantee amount as also the annual licence fee prescribed for the financial year 2024-25. Shri Mathur submits that the unilateral extension of the licence period amounts to violation of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties and is hit by Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for brevity, “the Act of 1872”). 6. Learned Senior Counsel- Shri Mathur further submitted that the order impugned dated 13.03.2024 has been issued in the garb of imposition of the MCC by the Election Commission of India on account of the parliamentary election-2024; but, the MCC does not put an absolute embargo upon right of the State Government to put the liquor vends to fresh auction during its operation. Drawing attention of this Court towards clause II(21)(c) of the MCC, the learned Senior Counsel submits that it permits fresh auction of the liquor vends with the prior permission of the Election Commission of India. Shri Mathur contends that instruction issued by the Election Commission of India specifically states that only when the extant excise law of the State enables the Government to make an interim arrangement for lifting of the liquor vends, such an arrangement can be made, whereas, no such provision exists either under the Act of 1950 or under the Rules of 1956. 7. Lastly, Shri Mathur submitted that the respondents while unilaterally extending the licence after its expiry, failed to consider that clause 2.13 of the Excise and Temperance Policy 2024-25 enables the Government to give the unsettled shops to the Government entities like RTDC, RSBCL and RSGSM and if the State is so concerned with the loss of excise revenue during the operation of the MCC, it could have adopted such mode. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order dated 13.03.2024 be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be directed to refund the refundable deposits. 8. Shri Mathur, in support of his submissions, relies upon the following judgments : 1. CWP No.5573 or 2014 (O & M): Karambir Nain Vs. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order dated 13.03.2024 be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be directed to refund the refundable deposits. 8. Shri Mathur, in support of his submissions, relies upon the following judgments : 1. CWP No.5573 or 2014 (O & M): Karambir Nain Vs. The State of Haryana and Others decided on 11.07.2014 which was affirmed in SLP(C) No. 32734/2014 dated 05.03.2020; 2. Delhi Development Authority Vs. Joint Action Committee, 2008 (2) SCC 672 . 9. Per contra, Shri Bharat Vyas, learned Sr. Counsel and Additional Advocate General, defending the order dated 13.03.2024, submits that it partakes the characteristic of a policy decision of the State Government and the scope of judicial intervention in the policy decision being very narrow and limited, warrants no interference by this Court. He submitted that in the wake of the MCC, the auction procedure could not be completed for the liquor vends and upto 21.03.2024, out of total 7665 shops, only 3448 shops could be settled leaving 4178 shops unsettled closure whereof, during the period of the MCC is bound to have devastating effect leading to an increase in its illegal import from other States which may be a big concern during the election period. Shri Vyas submitted the loss of revenue on account of almost 55% of the total liquor vends remaining unsettled was also one of the compelling reasons for taking a conscious decision by the State Government to extend the period of the existing licence holders whose interests have also been taken care of in the order dated 13.03.2024 inasmuch as it provides that if the subject shop fetches the annual guarantee, on being put to auction/allotment after expiry of the extended period, lesser than the prescribed annual guarantee amount, corresponding amount would be reduced from the annual guarantee amount leviable from the existing licence holders for the extended period, i.e., the period from 01.04.2024 to 30.06.2024. He submits that under clause 2 of the order, a further concession has been given to charge 1/4th of the annual licence fee in 3 equal monthly installments or after lifting the minimum guarantee supply. He submits that the excise policy 2024-25 is inherently ingrained in the order dated 13.03.2024 which has been issued to meet an extraordinary situation only as an interim measure. He submits that the excise policy 2024-25 is inherently ingrained in the order dated 13.03.2024 which has been issued to meet an extraordinary situation only as an interim measure. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the excise contract being statutory in nature, the petitioners are bound by its terms and conditions. Referring to the agreement dated 01.04.2021 executed in between the petitioners and the State Government for the financial year 2021-22, he submits that the petitioners have executed a counter-agreement to abide by the terms of the licence, the provisions of the Act of 1950, the rules framed thereunder as also the directions issued by the Department from time to time. Shri Vyas submits that it is also so stipulated in clause 1 of the agreement which further provides vide its clause 14 that the Excise and Temperance Policy for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24, the departmental orders/circulars and the directions issued by the State Government/Department from time to time thereunder would be final. He, therefore, submits that the petitioners cannot be permitted to turn around and raise the grievance against the order dated 13.03.2024 issued by the State Government in accordance with the terms of the agreement executed between the parties. 10. Shri Vyas, referring to and relying upon the provisions of Rule 73(c) and (d) of the Rules of 1956, would submit that a licence for retail liquor sale may be granted for a period exceeding one year or for any part of the financial year. 11. Countering the submission of learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners that the MCC enables the State Government to seek prior permission of the Election Commission of India for carrying out auction of the licence vends even during its currency, Shri Vyas submitted that the Excise Department is not expected to enter into any such exercise when whole of the State machinery is preoccupied in the election process which is the paramount consideration in a democratic set up of Government. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have no right to raise their voice against the order dated 13.03.2024 in view of the well settled legal principle that right to trade in liquor is not a fundamental right and the State is empowered to impose reasonable restrictions on a person dealing in liquor trade. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have no right to raise their voice against the order dated 13.03.2024 in view of the well settled legal principle that right to trade in liquor is not a fundamental right and the State is empowered to impose reasonable restrictions on a person dealing in liquor trade. He submits that such obligation also flows from the contract entered into between the parties as also from the statute. He, therefore, prays that the writ petitions be dismissed. 13. Shri Bharat Vyas relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions : 1. Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 : 2. Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC 1 ; 3. State of Punjab and Anr. Vs. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. and Anr., (2004) 11 SCC 26 ; 4. Andhra Sugars Limited Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 599 ; 5. State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. M/s Sri Chamundeswari Sugar Ltd., (2008) 7 SCC 469 . 14. Heard. Considered. 15. Indisputably, term of the excise licence granted to the petitioners and the agreements executed in between the parties for operating the liquor vend have expired on 31.03.2024 by efflux of time. In view thereof, the moot question for consideration for this Court is whether the State alone is empowered to extend its term that too on the terms and conditions as per the new Excise and Temperance Policy 2024-25. Shri Bharat Vyas has submitted that this right of extension flows from the statutory provisions as also from the terms of the contract which is statutory in nature. 16. To better appreciate the aforesaid submission, it would be beneficial to examine broadly the provisions of the Act of 1950 and the Rules of 1956 dealing with the retail sale of liquor. 17. Under the Act of 1950, liquor is an excisable item and Section 20 provides that sale of the excisable article without a licence is prohibited. Section 21 provides inter alia that no excisable article shall be sold, otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted in this behalf. Section 24 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions of Section 31, the Excise Commissioner may order the grant to any person of a licence for the exclusive privilege- (1) ……….. Section 24 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions of Section 31, the Excise Commissioner may order the grant to any person of a licence for the exclusive privilege- (1) ……….. (2) of selling by wholesale or by retail, or (3) ……...... 18. Section 31 provides that every licence, permit or pass granted under this Act, shall be granted- (a) ……….. (b) ………... (c) …………… (d) …………... (e) for such periods as the State Government may prescribe by rules either generally or for any class of licenses, permits or passes or as the State Government may direct for any particular licence, permit or pass.” 19. Rule 57 of the Rules of 1956 provides that retail licences may be granted either (1) by auction or, (2) on commission basis or, (3) on guarantee system. Chapter VII of the Rules lays down the procedure for award of licences through auction. Chapter VII-A provides the procedure for issuance of licence under the guarantee system. Chapter VII-B speaks of issuance of licence on payment for exclusive privilege. 20. Rule 68 lays down, inter alia, the term for certain licences including the licence for retail vend which is one year. For ready reference, Rule 73 whereupon, a heavy reliance has been placed upon by the learned Additional Advocate General, is quoted hereinunder : "73. Period of licence for retail sales - (1) Except otherwise provided Licence for the retail sale of excisable articles shall ordinarily be granted for one year corresponding to the financial year of the Government subject to the following exceptions- (a) A licence granted during the course of the financial year shall expire at the mid-night of the last day of the financial year. (b) Licence granted for particular occasion shall be valid only for that occasion, (deleted by GSR 88 No.F-11(76)FD/Ex/2003 dated 3.2.2010). (c) Licences for the retail sale of country liquor, foreign liquor and Hemp drugs may be granted for a period exceeding one year by or with special sanction of the Excise Commissioner and. (d) Licence for the retail sale of country liquor may be granted for any part of the financial year by or with the sanction of the Excise Commissioner. (2) Licences for the wholesale manufacture or supply of liquor may be granted for a period not exceeding five years." 21. (d) Licence for the retail sale of country liquor may be granted for any part of the financial year by or with the sanction of the Excise Commissioner. (2) Licences for the wholesale manufacture or supply of liquor may be granted for a period not exceeding five years." 21. From the conspectus of the provisions of the Act of 1950 and the Rules framed thereunder dealing with the issuance of licence for retail sale of liquor, this Court finds that the liquor can be sold in retail only under a valid licence granted thereunder and there exists no provision for its grant by extension after its expiry by efflux of time. 22. Reliance placed by Shri Vyas-learned Additional Advocate General upon the provisions of Rule 73(1)(c) and (d) of the Rules of 1956 is of no assistance to him. Clause (c) provides that a licence may be granted for a period exceeding one year. However, in the present case, vide order impugned dated 13.03.2024, the term of the licence already expired is sought to be extended, which can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be granting of a licence for a period exceeding one year. Similarly, sub-rule (d) of Rule 73 provides that the licence for retail sale of country liquor may be granted for any part of the financial year. This is also not the situation here. The petitioners have not been granted licence for a part of the financial year following any of the procedures laid down either under Chapter VII or, under VII-A and VII-B of the Rules, 1956. This position gets clearer if this provision is kept in juxtaposition with the provisions contained under Rule 66 of the Rules of 1956 which provide for issuance of a licence for any part of the financial year in the contingencies stipulated therein such as its cancellation or suspension. In view thereof, this court is not convinced that the statutory provisions contained in the Act of 1950 and/or the Rules of of 1956 authorised the State Government to extend the term of the subject licences after their expiry by efflux of time. 23. Similarly, the submission made by learned Additional Advocate General that the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 01.04.2021 enabled the State Government to extend the tenure of the excise licence after its expiry, does not find favour with the Court. 23. Similarly, the submission made by learned Additional Advocate General that the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 01.04.2021 enabled the State Government to extend the tenure of the excise licence after its expiry, does not find favour with the Court. The counter agreement signed by the petitioners simply says that they are bound by the conditions stipulated in the licence, the provisions contained in the Act of 1950 and the Rules framed thereunder, the terms and conditions appended alongwith the application form as also the departmental directions issued from time to time. Similar recital is contained in clause-1 of the agreement. Clause 14.6 of the agreement further lays down that the provisions of the excise and temperance policy 2022-23, 2023-24, the departmental circulars/orders issued thereunder as also the orders/directions issued by the State Government/Department with regard to liquor shops shall be final. This Court is at loss to comprehend as to how the aforesaid stipulations in the agreement empowered the State-one of the parties to it, to extend unilaterally its term after its expiry by effflux of time. Obviously, the parties to the agreement have to abide by its terms and conditions. The petitioners were also under an obligation to ensure compliance of the terms and conditions attached with the licence and the directions/orders issued by the State Government as also by the Department from time to time; but, with a caveat. This obligation commensurated with the life of the excise licence and subject to the same being just, fair and within the legal framework. In the instant cases, as already held, vide order impugned dated 13.03.2024 the petitioners have been asked to operate the retail vends after expiry of the period of agreement/licence by efflux of time and the learned Additional Advocate General has failed to point out any such condition in the agreement which compels the licence holders to abide by the unilateral extension of its term after its expiry that too on the terms and conditions prejudicial to their rights and interests. 24. There is another important aspect of the matter. The order impugned dated 13.3.2024 speaks of extension of life of the excise licence expired on 31.3.2024 till 30.6.2024. 24. There is another important aspect of the matter. The order impugned dated 13.3.2024 speaks of extension of life of the excise licence expired on 31.3.2024 till 30.6.2024. It is trite law that extension of a contract can be on the same terms and conditions that too only if the parties agree to it and if its terms and conditions are changed, it amounts to creation of a new contract. Under the Act of 1872, free consent of the parties to the contract is one of the essential pre-requisite for its validity. Indisputably, in the present case, the agreement between the parties for the year 2023-24 has come to an end on 31.3.2024 by efflux of time and the order dated 13.3.2024 tantamounts to imposition of new contractual obligations upon the petitioners without their consent; rather, against it. In view thereof, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the order dated 13.3.2024 creates no enforceable contract in the eye of law and is non-est. 25. The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the case of Karambir Nain (supra), dealing with a case wherein, during the validity period of the excise licence, the State changed its terms unilaterally on account of an order passed by the Court in a public interest litigation relating to liquor vends on the National Highways, held as under : “22. From the above, it emerges that the petitioner in terms of the excise policy is entitled to claim equality in the grant of exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. The arbitrary action of the State even in liquor licence matters is amenable to challenge. Further, once an agreement is reduced to writing, it shall be binding on the parties to the agreement and no party has any right to relieve itself of its contractual obligations unilaterally. Still further, the action of the State in altering, modifying or withdrawing any contractual obligation unilaterally would entitle the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 23. Examining the factual matrix herein, it may be noticed that as per excise policy, the State had formulated Excise policy for the years 2013-14 and 2014-15. The unit of allotment of retail liquor outlets of country liquor and IMFL was to be group-wise. 23. Examining the factual matrix herein, it may be noticed that as per excise policy, the State had formulated Excise policy for the years 2013-14 and 2014-15. The unit of allotment of retail liquor outlets of country liquor and IMFL was to be group-wise. A group would comprise of a maximum number of three contiguously located retail outlets of either country liquor or IMFL. The petitioners had bid for the groups of liquor vends and accordingly composite licence was issued by the State. The licence fee had been determined for the entire group as a unit. In CWP No.25777 of 2012 decided on 18.3.2014, it has been directed that no liquor vend shall be permitted to be opened on the National or State Highway with effect from 1.4.2014. In such a situation, the petitioners have been asked to close down or shift retail liquor vends on the National or State Highway being affected vends but required to continue with the other vends of the group which do not fall on National or State Highway. There is alteration in the terms of the licence. Alteration cannot be enforced unless both the parties agree to it. The terms of licence are, although statutory in nature, cannot be unilaterally changed by the State in between the licence period, without either seeking consent of the licensees or without giving opportunity to the licensee to repudiate the contract. The licence fee for all the three vends was single and there was no vend-wise bifurcation of the licence fee. The method of calculation of licence fee adopted by the State upon the quota of each vend cannot be imposed unilaterally on the liquor vends without their consent. None of these clauses or eventuality had been provided in the excise policy for the year 2013-14 and 2014-15. No provision under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 or the Haryana Liquor Licence Rules, 1970 had been shown which empowered the State to change the terms of the licence during the currency of the licence or change the location of the vends. The State cannot be permitted to change the rules of the game announced at the time of Excise policy unilaterally. The State cannot be permitted to change the rules of the game announced at the time of Excise policy unilaterally. Moreover, the State is in the present situation because of its own doing as would be apparent from the following observations of the Division Bench in Safe Arrive's case (supra):- "The problem was aggravated on account of the fact that the State of Haryana came up with the Policy for two years for the first time when the lis was already pending before this Court and we were of the view that the endeavour was to avoid the possible rigors of the orders which may be passed in these proceedings, especially as the State of Haryana had been taking time on more than one occasion to file response. We were, thus, influenced by the fact that the Liquor Policy for the State of Haryana purported to be for a period of two years and taking cue from what was stated by the State of Punjab, we were willing to give concession also to the State of Haryana till 31.3.2014 so that a new regime came into play with effect from 1.4.2014. As noticed above, the endeavour of the State of Haryana to challenge the said direction passed by this Court before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has not been successful.' 24. It is concluded that wherever a composite liquor licence has been issued relating to liquor vends on National or State Highway alongwith liquor vends in rural area, the State shall not be entitled to enforce clause 2B of the amended policy against such licencees without their consent. As a consequence, such licencees shall not be obliged to continue with the vends in rural area against their express affirmative response. The State shall be entitled to recover the licence fee from such licencees till 31.3.2014. However, it is clarified that wherever, such licencees had operated vends in the rural area from 1.4.2014, they shall not be entitled to any benefit under this order as their continuance would amount to implied consent on their part to operate the unaffected vends located there.” 26. In the aforesaid case, thus, it was held that licensees are not obliged to continue with the vends on the terms and conditions altered unilaterally even during the licence period. In the aforesaid case, thus, it was held that licensees are not obliged to continue with the vends on the terms and conditions altered unilaterally even during the licence period. The SLP No.32734/2014 preferred thereagainst also came to be dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 5.3.2020. 27. Similarly, in the case of Delhi Development Authority, N.D. & Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while quashing the policy decision of the Delhi Development Authority to levy a surcharge of 20% on the price worked out as per old formula, held as under : “66. The stand taken by DDA itself is that the relationship between the parties arises out of the contract. The terms and conditions therefor were, therefore, required to be complied with by both the parties. Terms and conditions of the contract can indisputably be altered or modified. They cannot, however, be done unilaterally unless there exists any provision either in contract itself or in law. Novation of contract in terms of Section 60 of the Contract Act must precede the contract-making process. The parties thereto must be ad idem so far as the terms and conditions are concerned. If DDA, a contracting party, intended to alter or modify the terms of contract, it was obligatory on its part to bring the same to the notice of the allottee. Having not done so, it, relying on or on the basis of the purported office orders which are not backed by any statute, new terms of contract could (sic not be) thrust upon the other party to the contract. The said purported policy is, therefore, not beyond the pale of judicial review. In fact, being in the realm of contract, it cannot be stated to be a policy decision as such.” 28. The cases in hand are situated on a much better footing than the aforesaid cases inasmuch herein, there is no subsisting contract between the parties and the order impugned dated 13.3.2024 endeavors to create new contractual obligations unilaterally to which the parties are not ad idem. Therefore, in the backdrop of the aforesaid precedential law also, the order dated 13.3.2024 is not sustainable in the eye of law. 29. Therefore, in the backdrop of the aforesaid precedential law also, the order dated 13.3.2024 is not sustainable in the eye of law. 29. Submission of learned Additional Advocate General that the subject agreement being statutory in nature, it is binding on the parties and the petitioners cannot turn around to deny the obligations created vide order dated 13.3.2024, has no legs to stand. Firstly, there is no subsisting contract between the parties post 31.3.2024. Secondly, when inquired by this Court as to why the agreement between the parties is being reckoned as statutory in nature, Shri Vyas submitted that since the State Government has parted, under the agreement, with its exclusive monopoly to deal in liquor trade, it is statutory in nature. However, this Court is not satisfied that this fact is sufficient to reckon the subject agreement as the statutory agreement. Which contract can be construed as the statutory contract has succinctly been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court of India in the case of India Thermal Power Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 379 , as under : “11.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Merely because a contract is entered into in exercise of an enabling power conferred by a statute that by itself cannot render the contract a statutory contract. If entering into a contract containing the prescribed terms and conditions is a must under the statute then that contract becomes a statutory contract. If a contract incorporate certain terms and conditions in it which are statutory then the said contract to that extent is statutory. A contract may contain certain other terms and conditions which may not be of a statutory character and which have been incorporated therein as a result of mutual agreement between the parties. Therefore, the PPAs can be regarded as statutory only to the extent that they contain provisions regarding determination of tariff and other statutory requirements of Section 43-A(2). Opening and maintaining of an Escrow Account or an Escrow Agreement are not the statutory requirements and, therefore, merely because PPAs contemplate maintaining Escrow Accounts that obligation cannot be regarded as statutory.” 30. The learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out no such terms and conditions in the subject agreement on account of which it can be said to be the statutory contract. The learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out no such terms and conditions in the subject agreement on account of which it can be said to be the statutory contract. Even otherwise, as already held, even if had the subject agreement been statutory in nature, it would not have cured the illegality attached with the order dated 13.3.2024 as discussed hereinabove. 31. Reliance placed by Shri Bharat Vyas on the judgement in the case of Andhra Sugars Ltd. (supra) to canvass that the agreement being statutory in nature, is binding upon the petitioners, is misplaced. In this case, the validity of Section 21 of the Andhra Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961 was under challenge which provided for levy of tax on purchase of sugarcane by or on behalf of petitioners, i.e., sugar factories from the cane growers being ultra vires to the powers of the legislature under Entry No.54 List-II Schedule-7 of the Constitution inasmuch to constitute “purchase of goods” within this entry, there must be an agreement for purchase of goods and passing of property therein whereas, there was absence of any such agreement of purchase and sale between the parties. 32. In was appreciated by the Apex Court that the Rule 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules 1951 framed under the Act provides that a canegrower or a canegrower's co-operative society may within 14 days of the order declaring an area as the factory zone or such extended time as may be fixed by the Cane Commissioner, offer in Form No. 2 to supply cane grown in that area to the occupier of the factory and such occupier of the factory within 14 days of the receipt of the offer shall enter into an agreement in Form No. 3 or Form No. 4 with the canegrower or the canegrower's co-operative society as the case may be for the purchase of the cane offered. Form No. 3 is the statutory form of agreement with a canegrower. By the agreement in Form No. 3 the occupier of the factory agrees to buy and the canegrower agrees to sell during the crushing season certain sugarcane crop grown in the area at the minimum price notified by the Government from time to time upon the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. 33. By the agreement in Form No. 3 the occupier of the factory agrees to buy and the canegrower agrees to sell during the crushing season certain sugarcane crop grown in the area at the minimum price notified by the Government from time to time upon the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. 33. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia, as under : “xxxxxxxxxxx Now, under Act No. 45 of 1981 and the Rules framed under it, the canegrower in the factory zone is free to make or not to make an offer of sale of cane to the occupier of the factory. But if he makes an offer, the occupier of the factory is bound to accept it. The resulting agreement is recorded in writing and is signed by the parties. The consent of the occupier of the factory to the agreement is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. His consent is free as defined in S. 14 of the Indian Contract Act though he is obliged by law to enter into the agreement. The compulsion of law is not coercion as defined in Sec.15 of the Act. In spite of the compulsion, the agreement is neither void nor voidable. In the eye of the law, the agreement is freely made. The parties are competent to contract. The agreement is made for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and is not void under any provisions of law. The agreements are enforceable by law and are contracts of sale of sugarcane as defined in S. 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. The purchases of sugarcane under the agreement can be taxed by the State legislature under Entry 54, List II.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx One of the objects of Act No. 45 of 1961 is to regulate the purchase of sugarcane by the factory owners from the canegrowers. The canegrowers scattered in the villages had no real bargaining power. The factory owners or their combines enjoyed a near monopoly of buying and could dictate their own terms. The canegrowers scattered in the villages had no real bargaining power. The factory owners or their combines enjoyed a near monopoly of buying and could dictate their own terms. In this unequal contest between the canegrowers and the factory owners, the law stepped in and compelled the factory to enter into contracts of purchase of cane offered by the canegrowers on prescribed terms and conditions.xxxxxxxxxxxxx” “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Under Act No. 45 of 1961, a canegrower makes an offer to the occupier of the factory directly and the latter accepts the offer. The parties then make and sign an agreement in writing. There is thus a direct privity of contract between the parties. The contract is a contract of sale and purchase of cane, though the buyer is obliged to give his assent under compulsion of a statute. The State Legislature is competent to tax purchases of canes made under such a contract.xxxxxxxxx” 34. From the aforesaid observations, it is apparent that there was a privity of contract in between the factory owners and the cane growers though the buyers were obliged to give their consent under compulsion of Statute. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that it was to create level playing field for the cane growers who were scattered in the villages having no real bargaining power whereas, the factory owners enjoy a monopoly of buying and could dictate terms. However, as already held, no such situation obtains in the instant cases. No statutory provision compels the petitioners to abide by the unilateral creation of new contractual obligation vide order impugned dated 13.3.2024. 35. In the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra), the question involved was levy of purchase tax on which of the three prices; the 'minimum statutory price' fixed by the Government of India in exercise of its power under clause (3) of the Sugarcane Control (Order), 1996, the price fixed by the Government of Karnataka payable to sugarcane growers by the sugar factories as 'State Advised Price' or the price paid by the sugar factories to the sugarcane growers under the agreement entered in between them. After appreciating and analysing the statutory provisions, it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the highest amongst the three prices is the price on the basis of which the purchase tax is leviable. After appreciating and analysing the statutory provisions, it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the highest amongst the three prices is the price on the basis of which the purchase tax is leviable. In this case, the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar vs. Union of India, ( 1982 (2) SCC 150 ) was also referred wherein, it was held that in order to protect the sugarcane growers who are not in a position to negotiate, the Government can prescribe terms in a contract which the occupiers of the sugar factories have to enter into. It was further held that the proposition is now beyond the pale of controversy that the State can impose a restriction in the interest of general public on the right of a party to contract where in its opinion, the contracting parties are unable to negotiate on the footing of equality whereas, in the cases in hand, one of the parties to the contract is the mighty State Government which, with scant respect to the rights of the petitioners, have endeavoured to thrust upon them new cumbersome contractual obligations unilaterally. 36. The heavy reliance placed on the MCC by the learned Additional Advocate General to support the order dated 13.3.2024 is of no help to him. A perusal of the MCC reflects that it does not put an absolute embargo on the State Government to conduct auction of the liquor vends even during its validity. Clause II (21) (c) of MCC in no uncertain terms permits fresh auction of the liquor vends with the prior permission of the Election Commission of India. Reasons furnished by Shri Vyas for not resorting to the aforesaid exercise do not merit acceptance. His contention that it also enables the State Government to take such interim measures as provided under the extant excise law is misconceived inasmuch as it has already been held by this Court that there is no provision either under the Act of 1950 or under the Rules of 1956 empowering the State Government to extend the term of licence/agreement after its expiry by efflux of time that too on new terms and conditions which virtually amounts to creation of a new contract. His second submission in this regard that on account of engagement of the entire State machinery in the Parliamentary Election-2024, it was not feasible for it to continue with the auction process with prior permission of the Election Commission of India, does not convince this Court; firstly, for the reasons that while providing for such a provision in the MCC, it cannot be assumed that the Election Commission of India was not aware of the aspect of the deployment of the State machinery in the election process and secondly, except making a bald averment that it is not so feasible, no concrete data has been submitted by the State in support thereof. 37. Further, the reason furnished by the State not to resort to clause 2.13 of the Excise and Temperance Policy-2024-25 which enables the State Government to give the unsettled shops to the Government entities like RTDC, RSOCL and RSGSM, is totally unsatisfactory. It has not been denied by the State that in the previous years, the unsettled liquor vends were given to these entities for retail sale of the liquor. Moreover, although, in its reply, the State has come out with a plea that even after the fourth round of auction, 4178 retails shops could not be settled; but, during the course of arguments, Shri Bharat Vyas was fair enough to admit that only 200 odd liquor vends comprising mostly of the petitioners before this Court have remained unsettled. In view of this meager number, the aforesaid government entities could always have been asked upon to take charge of the unsettled shops which would have catered to all the concerns of the State Government in issuing the order impugned dated 13.3.2024 in the wake of MCC. 38. Contention of Shri Bharat Vyas, learned AAG that it is not permissible for the petitioners to raise any grievance against the order dated 31.3.2024 inasmuch as right to trade in liquor is not a fundamental right and the State Government can always put reasonable restrictions in it, requires not much deliberation inasmuch, there cannot be any two views against the proposition that not to carry on trade in liquor especially, it not being an essential commodity, in absence of any statutory or contractual obligation/compulsion is the fundamental right of the petitioners which is impinged upon vide order dated 13.3.2024. For this reason also, the order dated 13.3.2024 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 39. The judgement of the Constitution Bench in the case of State of Punjab & Anr. (supra) does not come to rescue of the respondents wherein, validity of levy of tax on import of potable liquor manufactured in other States was under challenge. It was held that conduct of the respondent licensees in an attempt to wriggle out of his contractual obligations cannot be countenanced having fully exploited the advantage flowing from the contract to the exclusion of the others and having reaped rich commercial benefits from that activity by challenging, inter alia, any particular condition of that contract/licence. However, these observations were made as the levy of import tax was contemplated under the terms of the contract; whereas, in the present cases, the facts are not identical. As already held, the terms of the agreement executed between the parties did not entitle the State Government to unilaterally extend its term after expiry by efflux of time that too with new terms and conditions onerous to the licence holders. 40. This Court is in respectful agreement with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Tata Cellular (supra) and Vivek Narayan Sharma (supra) relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General to canvass his submission that scope of judicial review in policy matters; specially and specifically in economic matters, is very narrow and limited. However, the same has no applicability in the cases in hand for the reasons; firstly, this Court is not convinced that the order impugned dated 13.3.2024 falls within the mischief of “policy decision”; rather, it is an administrative order issued allegedly to meet an exigency created on account of MCC. The policy decision is a decision laying down broad guidelines to govern the affairs in long term based thereon beyond running day to day affairs and the order dated 13.3.2024 fails to meet this criteria. Secondly, even assuming it to be a policy decision, it is not sacrosanct and beyond the reach of judicial review and deserves to be quashed and set aside for the reasons expressed hereinabove. 41. In view of aforesaid discussion, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. 42. Resultantly, the writ petitions are allowed. The order impugned dated 13.3.2024 is quashed and set aside. 41. In view of aforesaid discussion, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. 42. Resultantly, the writ petitions are allowed. The order impugned dated 13.3.2024 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to refund the refundable dues to the petitioners within a period of four weeks from today failing which it shall carry an interest @ 6% per annum from today. 43. Office to place a copy of this judgement in each connected file.