JUDGMENT : Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J. These Letters Patent Appeals have been filed by the State of Jharkhand to challenge the order dated 5th September 2018 passed in W.P.(S) No.921 of 2011 and analogous cases. One of these appeals (LPA No.155 of 2020) arises out of Civil Review No.80 of 2018 which was preferred by the State of Jharkhand against the order passed in WP(S) No.5994 of 2013. The State of Jharkhand has questioned the legality of the directions issued by the writ Court for modifying the policy decision in the Resolution dated 25th April 2018; one of the directions is to regularize the untrained teachers. 2. Briefly stated, the State of Bihar mooted a scheme to establish Project Schools in every Block across the State for imparting education to the children. The policy decision of the State of Bihar in this regard was contained in Circular dated 27th May 1981. Under the scheme, four Project Schools including a Girls High School were to be established in each Block in different phases. In the “first phase”[The period 1981-82 is referred to as “first phase”], 150 Project Schools were established but in the subsequent years the scheme was stalled and no progress for the opening of the Project Schools was made. Later, the State of Bihar decided to select 300 more Schools during the “second phase”[The period 1984-85 is referred to as “second phase”] which were to be taken over as the Project Schools. The State Government selected and notified 75 such schools through letter no.108 dated 12th February 1985 which were to be established with the assistance of the local people and a 3-man Committee was constituted to select the remaining 225 schools. At this stage, this is necessary to indicate that in the first phase1 the Project Schools were established by the State Government and its management and control also remained with the State Government. In the second phase2, the High Schools managed by the local people were identified for being taken over and to be established as the Project Schools. The manner of selection of the schools for establishment of the Project Schools was provided in the letter dated 23rd February 1985 under which the establishment of schools at the Block headquarters was the first and foremost priority. The manner of selection of the schools for establishment of the Project Schools was provided in the letter dated 23rd February 1985 under which the establishment of schools at the Block headquarters was the first and foremost priority. It was further provided that the selection of the school where more than one school was established in the Block shall be based on the date of permission for the establishment and physical resources provided in the school. In the “second phase”, the qualification for appointment of the teacher and the maximum number of teachers in the school were changed and a government letter dated 4th February 1989 was issued in this regard. Under this government letter, one of the conditions for the appointment of a teacher was that he must have been working in the school as of that date and his appointment was made by the Managing Committee before the permission was granted to establish the school. 3. A large number of writ petitions were filed in the Patna High Court to challenge the government letter dated 4th February 1989 and after a long-drawn legal battle the controversy was set at rest by the decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court. In the judgment dated 7th December 1999 delivered in “Project Uchcha Vidyalaya (F.B)”[Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh v. State of Bihar & Ors. : 2000 (1) PLJR 287 ], the Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that the establishment/take-over of the schools was a continuous process under the scheme envisaged by the government and, therefore, the mode and manner of selection of the teachers and criteria applied in the first phase1 shall be applied in the selection made during 1984-85. It was further held that the staffing pattern of the teachers including Headmasters/ Headmistress shall be as prescribed in the government letter dated 12th October 1982 and untrained teachers would also be eligible for appointment. It was further held that the staffing pattern of the teachers including Headmasters/ Headmistress shall be as prescribed in the government letter dated 12th October 1982 and untrained teachers would also be eligible for appointment. Against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, the State of Bihar filed Special Leave Petitions which were disposed of by a judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”[State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh : (2006) 2 SCC 545 ] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not approve the view taken by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court that the State of Bihar could not have changed the qualification criteria for the appointment of the Assistant Teachers and expressly held that the State Government has powers to withdraw or modify a policy decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a direction to constitute a committee to scrutinize the claims of the schools and/or the teaching and non-teaching staffs; pursuant thereto Alam Committee was constituted. 4. Several years after the Alam Committee submitted its report, the respondents herein started filing writ petitions with a host of grievances against their exclusion in the report of Alam Committee. About 227 writ petitions were filed over a period of the next 8 years which were clubbed together and disposed of by a common order dated 5th September 2018. During pendency of the writ petitions, the State of Jharkhand took a policy decision to form a committee to select the trained teachers who were not approved in the report of the Alam Committee. By the Resolution dated 25th April 2018, the State of Jharkhand prescribed guidelines for identifying the teachers who were working in the Project Schools before its establishment and, as regards the qualification of the teachers, it adopted the criteria laid down in the letter dated 4th February 1989. The writ Court reflected on the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 and held that certain portions of the government decision are required to be modified; leaving the host of prayers made in the writ petitions unattended. 5. In the aforementioned batch of writ petitions, the following directions have been issued by the writ Court: “18. In view of the abovementioned facts, the following clarifications/ corrections/ additions are required to be brought in the Notification dated 25.04.2018, by way of bringing appropriate Corrigendum by the State Govt. 5. In the aforementioned batch of writ petitions, the following directions have been issued by the writ Court: “18. In view of the abovementioned facts, the following clarifications/ corrections/ additions are required to be brought in the Notification dated 25.04.2018, by way of bringing appropriate Corrigendum by the State Govt. keeping in view following points:- (i) The untrained teachers have to be absorbed in the regular services though initially in the untrained scale but with a condition to complete their teachers’ training course/B.Ed. course within a stipulated time period to be decided by the Govt. and on successful completion of the said course they may be granted the benefits of trained scale. (ii) The post of ‘other teachers’ (minority language, music, arts, commerce, anyone amongst all on the basis of seniority) has to be accepted as 9th post in the MANAK MANDAL. Further, teachers appointed prior to coming into effect of the letter dated 04.02.1989 and duly appointed by the Managing Committee of the Schools concerned shall be taken care of by giving necessary relaxation as has been done during the absorption of teachers in the 1st phase. (iii) The cases where schools are to be closed, the teachers shall be regularized/absorbed by making adjustments in other Government schools on regular basis. (iv) Such Non-teaching staff, whose cases have been rejected by Alam Committee, on the ground that subsequent Govt. appointees were also deputed/appointed on the same post, their services would be absorbed on the same sanctioned post, and the deputies would be adjusted / repatriated to their original cadre. (v) The Alam Committee’s report will not come into the way of absorption of employees, if such cases have been rejected by Alam Committee on the principles contrary to the directions of Hon’ble Patna High Court (FB) passed in Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh (Supra.), confirmed by Hon’ble Apex Court and against the principles as being laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the paragraph-17, as also against the directions of the Coordinate Benches of this Hon’ble Court in other writ petitions in individual cases. (vi) All female category teachers and teachers belonging to Harijan, Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe candidates, who are untrained, shall be absorbed. (vii) In some of the writ petitions there is impugned order of rejection of their candidature for absorption. (vi) All female category teachers and teachers belonging to Harijan, Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe candidates, who are untrained, shall be absorbed. (vii) In some of the writ petitions there is impugned order of rejection of their candidature for absorption. It is made clear that in all such cases fresh consideration in light of direction given hereinabove shall be made, without being prejudiced or influenced by the earlier order of impugned rejection.” 6. The first ground of challenge laid by the State of Jharkhand is that the writ Court cannot rewrite the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 by adding some stipulations that shall fall in the realm of the executive powers of the Government of Jharkhand. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General laid specific stress on paragraph no.91 of the reported judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”4 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is essentially a government function to decide the educational qualification of the teaching staff. It is submitted that the direction of the writ Court to regularize the untrained teachers would run contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”4, inasmuch as, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not approve the finding of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court that the letter no.142 dated 4th February 1989 which prescribed the qualification for the Assistant Teachers was arbitrary and discriminatory. The learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that the Government of Jharkhand took a policy decision to fix the cut-off date for possessing the minimum qualification as on 30th September 2007 and, that, fixing of this cut-off date has a valid and reasonable basis and the writ Court could not have exercised its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to fix a different cut-off date. According to the State of Jharkhand, the report of Alam Committee was submitted on 30th September 2007 and this date has been fixed as cut-off date for acquiring the training qualification. The learned Additional Advocate-General pointed out that the sanctioned strength of teachers as per the letter no.705 dated 12th October 1982 which was approved by this Court in “Rabindra Kumar”[Rabindra Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Ors. The learned Additional Advocate-General pointed out that the sanctioned strength of teachers as per the letter no.705 dated 12th October 1982 which was approved by this Court in “Rabindra Kumar”[Rabindra Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Ors. : 1998 (3) PLJR 54 ] has been adopted in the Resolution No.1272 dated 25th April 2018 and the writ Court committed a serious error in law in overlooking a binding decision of this Court and created an additional post of the Assistant Teacher in the Manak Mandal by exercising a power that is not traceable under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, Mr. Santosh Kumar, the learned counsel who appeared for the respondent Englesh Dubey in LPA No.491/2019 submitted that the respondent was seeking regularization of his service on parity with three other untrained teachers who were absorbed as regular teachers in the same school vide government order dated 17th August 2016. On behalf of the other respondents, the learned counsel submitted that the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 contains stipulations that are manifestly unjust and incongruent to reason and, therefore, the writ Court was constrained to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to remedy the injustice perpetuated to the teachers like Englesh Dubey. 7. The learned counsel referred to “S.N. Mukherjee”[S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India : (1990) 4 SCC 594 ]; “L. Chandra Kumar”[L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India : (1997) 3 SCC 261 ]; “Tantia Construction (P) Ltd.”[Union of India v. Tantia Construction (P) Ltd. : (2011) 5 SCC 697 ] and “Rojer Mathew”[Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. : (2020) 6 SCC 1 ] to persuade this Court not to interfere with the writ Court’s order, having regard to the wide powers and constitutional duty of the writ Court to uphold and enforce the rule of law. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the writ Court pronounced the judgment which is intended to give benefit to all similarly situated persons and when such a pronouncement is made the objection as to delay and laches on the part of the aggrieved person does not survive. 8. The State of Jharkhand being the employer is empowered to decide minimum educational qualification, cut-off date, and to sanction the post of teachers in the Project Schools. 8. The State of Jharkhand being the employer is empowered to decide minimum educational qualification, cut-off date, and to sanction the post of teachers in the Project Schools. Under the Resolution dated 25th April 2018, nine posts in each Project School are sanctioned and the graduate teachers who obtained training qualification by 30th September 2007 shall be eligible. This is also the decision of the State of Jharkhand that some of the Rajiv Gandhi Project Girls School/Project Girls School in the districts of Pakur, Sahebganj and Ranchi shall be closed. Similarly, a decision was taken by the State of Jharkhand not to approve the services of teaching and non-teaching staffs in certain schools in the districts of Giridih, Godda, Gumla and Hazaribagh. Through this government decision, other detailed guidelines have also been issued for approving of the services of the Assistant Teachers who were appointed by the Managing Committee. In our opinion, the policy decision taken by the State of Jharkhand laying down certain criteria to regularize the Assistant Teachers cannot be faulted merely because a few persons do not fit the criteria in the Resolution dated 25th April 2018. In the matters of appointment, regularization in service, etc. there can be varied opinions but the writ Court is not expected to sit as an appellate authority thereon and examine the government’s decision in this regard. The writ Court could interfere only if the scheme framed by the state is found capricious or not informed by reasons or arbitrary and founded on mere ipse dixit. 9. The Resolution dated 25th April 2018 refers to the government decision contained in memo no. 1646 dated 27th June 2011 for examining the legal issues which may arise in regularization of the Assistant Teachers appointed on or before 4th February 1989 and those who were working from 1st January 1989. For examining such legal and other incidental issues pursuant to the Cabinet decision dated 27th June 2011, several committees were constituted by the State Government and one of such committees was headed by the Director of the Secondary Education. This committee comprising of five members submitted its report dated 9th October 2017 which prescribed the conditions for regularization of the Assistant Teachers who were not selected by the Alam Committee. This committee comprising of five members submitted its report dated 9th October 2017 which prescribed the conditions for regularization of the Assistant Teachers who were not selected by the Alam Committee. The government decision dated 25th April 2018 also refers to several orders of this Court and in particular the order dated 30th August 2017 passed by the writ Court in WP(S) No. 921 of 2011 and analogous cases. It further appears that the State of Jharkhand referred the report dated 9th October 2017 submitted by the Director of Secondary Education for the opinion of the Law Department and, thereafter, the matter was placed before the Cabinet on 18th April 2018. Quite evidently, the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 was a policy decision of the State of Jharkhand. 10. The law is too well-settled that it is not within the domain of the Courts to embark upon an inquiry as to whether a particular policy decision is wise and workable or there could have been a more logical and fairer decision. In “R. Krishnamurthy”[Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy: (2015) 2 SCC 796 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction shall not transgress into the field of policy decision. This is a trite law that the writ Court shall not interfere with the policy decision of the executive unless the policy is found arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair. The perversity in the policy and malafide in taking a particular policy decision can also render the policy unconstitutional but the writ Court could not have presumed any such ground in the present case to interfere with the Resolution dated 25th April 2018. The writ Court by issuing a direction to relax the minimum qualification, cut-off date, sanction strength of the teachers, etc. with a further direction to amend the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 transgressed the limits of judicial review. 11. In “Premium Granites” [Premium Granites v. State of T.N.: (1994) 2 SCC 691] the Hon’ble Supreme Court elucidated the powers of the writ Court to interfere with the policy decision, as under: “54. It is not the domain of the court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public policy can be evolved. It is not the domain of the court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public policy can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may be. The court is called upon to consider the validity of a public policy only when a challenge is made that such policy decision infringes fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India or any other statutory right. …” 12. The issue was once again debated in “Narmada Bachao Andolan”[Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India : (2000) 10 SCC 664 ] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed, as under: “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution….” 13. The directions issued by the writ Court under paragraph no.18(ii) for granting certain relaxations to the teachers who were appointed before 4th February 1989 are seriously flawed in law. The writ Court seems to have completely misinterpreted the judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)” wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Circular dated 4th February 1989 was valid and the State of Bihar was justified in deviating from the previous circulars particularly the Circular dated 27th May 1981. The judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidyalaya (F.B)” proceeded on the premise that the untrained teachers had a right to seek appointment and the State Government could not have changed the qualification criteria. This view of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court was not approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is easily demonstrable from a reading of paragraph nos. 90 and 91 of the judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”. This view of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court was not approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is easily demonstrable from a reading of paragraph nos. 90 and 91 of the judgment in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”. In fact, the whole basis of the directions issued in the present case under paragraph no.18 of the writ Court’s order is founded on a misconstruction of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There is no binding precedent of this Court which the State of Jharkhand has ignored. This is also not correct to say that the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 was framed contrary to the law laid down therein. 14. In “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)” the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “75. Even if there is no dispute as regards number of schools, in view of the stand taken by the State and particularly in view of the fact that it appears from the records that recognition of the school, if any, had wrongly been granted to some schools where buildings were also not completed or the process of selection was also not over, it may be necessary for the State to have a further look in the matter. 76. It is furthermore necessary to scrutinise as to whether the teaching and non-teaching staff appointed for the said purpose fulfil the criteria in terms of the policy decision of the State or not. Their qualifications laid down under other relevant statutes for the purpose of obtaining permission must also be scrutinised. 77. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the principle of equitable estoppel would apply against the State of Bihar. It is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised. The right of the State to raise a question as regards its actions being invalid under the constitutional scheme of India is now well recognised. If by reason of a constitutional provision, its action cannot be supported or the State intends to withdraw or modify a policy decision, no exception thereto can be taken. The right of the State to raise a question as regards its actions being invalid under the constitutional scheme of India is now well recognised. If by reason of a constitutional provision, its action cannot be supported or the State intends to withdraw or modify a policy decision, no exception thereto can be taken. It is, however, one thing to say that such an action is required to be judged having regard to the fundamental rights of a citizen but it is another thing to say that by applying the rule of estoppel, the State would not be permitted to raise the said question at all. So far as the impugned circular dated 18-2-1989 is concerned, the State has, in our opinion, a right to support the validity thereof in terms of the constitutional framework. 78. Having said so, we must observe that the ultimate decision must be left in the hands of the State. In view of the Cabinet decision dated 25-1-2000, 300 schools are said to have been recognised. We have, however, our doubts as to whether all correct facts have been placed before the Cabinet or not, particularly in view of the fact that many of the schools which were established in Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana are now in the State of Jharkhand. We have pondered over the matter but we are not very sure as to whether apart from the schools which had been identified by the three-man committee and admittedly recognised by the State, any final decision had been taken as regards recognition or otherwise of the remaining schools by the appropriate authority. 79. For the said purpose, we are of the opinion that a committee should be constituted for the said purpose. 80. The Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar is, therefore, requested to constitute a committee comprising two officers and one educationist of repute and/or a retired judicial officer. In the event a judicial officer is appointed as a member of the committee, he would be the chairman thereof. Remuneration of the judicial officers and/or the educationist shall be determined by mutual agreement. 81. The Chief Secretary is hereby requested to place at the disposal of the committee the requisite staff, which may be required by the committee, from amongst the staff of one or the other department of the State. 82. Remuneration of the judicial officers and/or the educationist shall be determined by mutual agreement. 81. The Chief Secretary is hereby requested to place at the disposal of the committee the requisite staff, which may be required by the committee, from amongst the staff of one or the other department of the State. 82. In the event it is found that teachers have been appointed on ad hoc basis, the Vidayalaya Sewa Board shall be directed to make regular recruitment strictly in accordance with law. 83. All the Regional Deputy Directors of Education concerned must also submit their reports in respect of the Project Schools within four weeks from the date before the committee. 84. The committee shall also deal with all such individual cases of the appellants, as has been directed in para 35 of the judgment of the High Court. 85. All the educational institutions claiming recognition or having any other claims would file their representations together with all supporting documents within three weeks from date. In their applications, the institutions must also give details of the students admitted in each class yearwise. 86. Although from the records, it appears that about 300 schools laid their claims having been recognised which is also evident from the decision of the Cabinet, we are of the opinion that the question as to how many schools fulfil the criteria laid down by the State Government in terms of its policy decision must be considered afresh. 87. As the constitution of the committee may take some time, such claims may be filed in the office of the Education Secretary, who would open an appropriate cell in this behalf. The committee upon scrutinising the claims of the institutions and/or the teaching and non-teaching staff would submit a report before the Chief Secretary within three months. 88. The Chief Secretary is requested to place the said report together with his comments thereupon before the appropriate authority in terms of the Rules of Executive Business and it is expected that the said authority of the Government of Bihar shall take appropriate decision thereupon within four months from date. 89. We would appreciate it if the State Government takes suitable action against those who may be found responsible for commission of irregularities and/or illegalities in the process of implementation of the government scheme in accordance with law. 90. 89. We would appreciate it if the State Government takes suitable action against those who may be found responsible for commission of irregularities and/or illegalities in the process of implementation of the government scheme in accordance with law. 90. As regards minimum age of the teaching and non-teaching staff, indisputably the same should be 18 years. 91. So far as educational qualification of the teaching staff is concerned, we are of the opinion that having regard to the fact that a limited number of teachers were to be appointed with a view to accomplish a constitutional goal of spreading literacy in the villages, particularly amongst girls, the standard adopted in Zila schools or government schools constituted in urban areas may not be insisted upon, as was observed by the High Court, but keeping in view the fact that it is essentially a government function, the question as to whether some teachers having BT training or training in Physical Education would be allowed to continue in the said Project Schools or not is left to the State, wherefor a decision in accordance with law may be taken. 92. These appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 15. The direction for regularization of the untrained teachers with a condition that they shall obtain the Teacher's Training/B.Ed. degree within a stipulated period is contrary to the provisions of the Bihar Nationalized Secondary Schools (Service Condition) Rules, 1983 and the pronouncement in “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”. This is a mandatory condition under the Bihar Nationalized Secondary Schools (Service Condition) Rules, 1983 that a person seeking appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher must possess the Teacher’s Training/B.Ed. degree at the time of his appointment. There is no provision under the aforesaid Rules to permit a candidate to acquire this qualification after he is appointed as an Assistant Teacher. There is also no power vested in any authority to relax this qualification which is a mandatory educational qualification for appointment to the post of the Assistant Teacher. 16. The so-called clarification by the writ Court that 9th post in the Manak Mandal shall fall under the category “other teachers” which would include a teacher for minority language, music, arts, commerce, etc. is also equally unsustainable. 16. The so-called clarification by the writ Court that 9th post in the Manak Mandal shall fall under the category “other teachers” which would include a teacher for minority language, music, arts, commerce, etc. is also equally unsustainable. In “Rabindra Kumar”5 the Patna High Court held that there shall be only nine posts in the Manak Mandal which would include the Headmaster/Headmistress. However, the writ Court has created 9th post of the teacher in the Project Schools by directing the Secretary of the Department of School Education and Literacy to issue a corrigendum in this regard. In “Rabindra Kumar”5 the Patna High Court has held as under: “17. Admittedly, on the basis of staffing pattern, the State Government has sanctioned nine posts of teachers including Head Master/Mistress for first phase Project schools of 1981-82. This will be evident from letter no. 705 dated 12th October, 1982, wherein it has been stipulated that five teachers to be appointed in a school having three classes and nine teachers in a school having four classes similarly, nine post of teacher including Head Master/Mistress have been sanctioned for third phase school of 1988-89, on the basis of the same staffing pattern, which will be evident from letter nos. 1003 and 1004, both dated 26th August 1988. It is also accepted by the counsel for the State that while the schools were running under Private Managing Committee, permission to establish schools and their approval were granted on the basis of total strength of teachers which was nine in number, including Head Master/Mistress which was the basis on which the Private Managing Committee made appointments.” 17. This is also quite strange that the writ Court has issued a direction for absorption of the Assistant Teachers even if the Alam Committee did not approve the same. In the Alam Committee report, several schools were found closed and some schools were said to have been merged with other existing schools. The report further disclosed that many Assistant Teachers left the school and joined another school. The State of Jharkhand has pleaded that the Project Girls High School Angara was found closed. In the Alam Committee report, several schools were found closed and some schools were said to have been merged with other existing schools. The report further disclosed that many Assistant Teachers left the school and joined another school. The State of Jharkhand has pleaded that the Project Girls High School Angara was found closed. It is further pleaded that the respondents are untrained teachers who claimed that they were working in the Project Girls High School at (i) Tamar in the district of Ranchi; (ii) Potka and Musabani in the district of East Singhbhum; (iii) Sonuwa in the district of West Singhbhum; (iv) Gopikander and Raneshwar in the district of Dumka; (v) Bhandaria in the district of Garhwa, and; (vi) Tarhasi, Lesliganj and Panki in the district of Palamau. The State of Jharkhand has taken a specific stand that these teachers do not possess the minimum qualification for appointment and are not entitled for a consideration for regularization. 18. In our opinion, the writ Court issued a very unusual direction to ignore the findings of the Alam Committee. There is a group of teachers who fall under a separate category of “closed schools”. The Alam Committee examined the records of the Project Girls High School at Taljhari in the district of Sahebganj, the Project Girls High School at Amrapara and the Rajiv Gandhi Project Girls School at Maheshpur both in the district of Pakur and the Project Girls High School Angara at Ranchi and gave specific reasons for not approving the appointment of the teaching and non-teaching staff in these schools. The records of the Project Girls School at Taljhari produced before the Alam Committee did not reveal the government order by which the Indira Gandhi Girls High School at Harinkol was selected for establishing the Project Girls High School at Taljhari. The Alam Committee rendered an opinion that this school was not selected by 3-man Committee and the proposed Indira Gandhi Girls High School at Harinkol was a self-proclaimed Project Girls High School. The Project Girls High School at Amrapara had no infrastructure and there was no facility for drinking water and toilet. The Alam Committee rendered an opinion that this school was not selected by 3-man Committee and the proposed Indira Gandhi Girls High School at Harinkol was a self-proclaimed Project Girls High School. The Project Girls High School at Amrapara had no infrastructure and there was no facility for drinking water and toilet. The Alam Committee found that in 7 years between 1997 to 2003 not a single student could qualify in the matriculation examination and in the other years the number of students who passed the matriculation examination ranged between 1 to 12; 102 students were enrolled in the year 2006. The Alam Committee found that there were 7 teachers and one Headmaster shown as appointed in the said school but Satender Kumar Jha, Abdul Gaffar, Giridhari Das and Rajendra Prasad Shukla who are the respondents in this batch of Letters Patent Appeals are untrained teachers. Similarly, the Rajiv Gandhi Project Girls High School at Maheshpur was also not selected by 3-man Committee. The school building was incomplete and comprised only four rooms. There was no other facility such as library, laboratory, drinking water and toilet. This was also revealed from the records that only 3 students had succeeded in qualifying the matriculation examination. The Project Girls High School at Angara was said to be running in a building constructed in the year 1988 and there were only 14 students enrolled in the year 2006. The Alam Committee expressed its apprehension that the so-called appointment made before 15th May 1985 was suspicious. The Project Girls High School at Bishunpur in the district of Gumla was also found closed. There are a few schools such as the Project Girls High School at Sunderpahari in the district of Godda which fall under the category of merged school. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General has submitted that some of the writ petitioners were found involved in criminal cases, some had already left the school and the others were appointed beyond the sanctioned strength or were lacking in essential qualifications. And, there are untrained teachers who have claimed working in the Project Girls High School or Project Saraswati Girls High School both at Patan in the district of Palamau. 19. And, there are untrained teachers who have claimed working in the Project Girls High School or Project Saraswati Girls High School both at Patan in the district of Palamau. 19. The respondents referred to several decisions of this Court to challenge the conditions in the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 on the ground that those decisions of the Court have attained finality and are binding on the State of Jharkhand. Before the writ Court, the respondents referred to the judgments in “Project Uchcha Vidyalaya (F.B)”, “Project Uchcha Vidya (S.C)”, “Sukhdeo Gope”[WP(S) No 5161 of 2009 titled “Sukhdeo Gope v. State of Jharkhand”], “Om Prakash Gope”[WP(S) No. 5658 of 2009 titled “Om Prakash Gope v. State of Jharkhand”], “Lakhpat Yadav”[WP(S) No. 4219 of 2011 titled “Lakhpat Yadav v. State of Jharkhand and others”], “Sarju Prasad Gupta”[WP(S) No. 3833 of 2014 titled “Sarju Prasad Gupta v. State of Jharkhand”], “Kumud Kumari Srivastavav”[Kumud Kumari Srivastava v. State of Bihar : 1995 (2) PLJR 215 ] and “Sarbani Bose”[Sarbani Bose v. State of Jharkhand : 2006 (3) JLJR 480 ]. 20. In the present proceeding, the respondents referred to the orders passed in “Dinesh Pd. Singh”[WP(S) No. 393 of 2010 titled “Dinesh Pd. Singh”], “Umesh Kr. Sharma”[WP(S) No. 6038 of 2010 titled “Umesh Kr. Sharma”], “Ram Prasad Sao”[WP(S) No. 5928 of 2011 titled “Ram Prasad Sao], “Sukhdeo Gope”[WP(S) No. 5161 of 2009 titled “Sukhdeo Gope”], “Arbind Pathak”[WP(S) No. 2048 of 2010 titled “Arbind Pathak”], “Rajendra Kr. Samad”[WP(S) No. 5177 of 2011 titled “Rajendra Kr. Singh”[WP(S) No. 393 of 2010 titled “Dinesh Pd. Singh”], “Umesh Kr. Sharma”[WP(S) No. 6038 of 2010 titled “Umesh Kr. Sharma”], “Ram Prasad Sao”[WP(S) No. 5928 of 2011 titled “Ram Prasad Sao], “Sukhdeo Gope”[WP(S) No. 5161 of 2009 titled “Sukhdeo Gope”], “Arbind Pathak”[WP(S) No. 2048 of 2010 titled “Arbind Pathak”], “Rajendra Kr. Samad”[WP(S) No. 5177 of 2011 titled “Rajendra Kr. Samad”], “Abhilasha Jha”[WP(S) No. 7220 of 2011 titled “Abhilasha Jha”], “Smt. Swarn Lata”[WP(S) No. 6561 of 2013 titled “Smt. Swarn Lata”], “Shambhu Lal”[WP(S) No. 6051 of 2013 titled “Shambhu Lal”], “Chhunku Sarangi”[WP(S) No. 2142 of 2014 titled “Chhunku Sarangi”], “Arun Kumar”[WP(S) No. 7741 of 2012 titled “Arun Kumar”], “Sidheswar Leyangi”[WP(S) No. 5505 of 2009 titled “Sidheswar Leyangi”], “Niranjan Pradhan”[WP(S) No. 1116 of 2010 titled “Niranjan Pradhan”], “Lakhpat Yadav”[WP(S) No. 4219 of 2011 titled “Lakhpat Yadav”], “Surendra Sharma”[WP(S) No. 4221 of 2011 titled “Surendra Sharma”], “Sarju Prasad Gupta”[WP(S) 3833 of 2014 titled “Sarju Prasad Gupta”], “Shuru Mai Munda”[WP(S) No. 5453 of 2009 titled “Shuru Mai Munda”], “Jagori Sonar”[WP(S) No. 7634 of 2011 titled “Jagori Sonar”], “Renu Ganguly”[WP(S) No. 7660 of 2011 titled “Rinu Ganguly”], “Bajal Kumar Marandi”[WP(S) No. 1637 of 2012 titled “Bajal Kumar Marandi”], “Bal Mohan Prasad”[WP(S) No. 921 of 2011 titled “Bal Mohan Prasad”], “Smt. Deomani”[WP(S) No. 5994 of 2013 titled “Smt. Deomani”] and “Tapti Mishra”[Civil Review No. 72 of 2018 titled “Tapti Mishra”]. 21. Aristotle said that the habit of lightly changing the laws is evil. In the recent times, Lord Evershed, M.R.[Brownsea Haven Properties Ltd. v. Poole Corpn. : (1958) 1 All ER 205] once said that there is well-established authority for the view that a decision of long-standing based on which many persons over time have arranged their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by superior Court not strictly bound itself by the decision. A principle of law settled by the decisions of the Court attains a binding character and should be followed by the Courts in similar cases. In “Krishena Kumar”[Krishena Kumar v. Union of India : (1990) 4 SCC 207 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a principle of law laid down by the Court should be adhered to and applied to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. In “Shanker Raju”[Shanker Raju v. Union of India : (2011) 2 SCC 132 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. In “Shanker Raju”[Shanker Raju v. Union of India : (2011) 2 SCC 132 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment, which has held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled. The doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled”. Lord Coke aptly described this in his classic English version as “those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace”. The underlying logic of this doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible. This has been aptly pointed out by Chandrachud, C.J. in Waman Rao v. Union of India [ (1981) 2 SCC 362 ] thus: (SCC p. 393, para 40) “40. … for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of long standing should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.” 22. The persons affected by decisions of the Court shall indeed have a reasonable expectation that the previous decisions of the Court rendered in identical facts shall be adhered to. The issue pertains to judicial discipline and proprietary which requires that the decision of a co-ordinate Bench is followed by the other Courts and not lightly disregarded. This is necessary for continuity, certainty and predictivity in the administration of justice. The issue pertains to judicial discipline and proprietary which requires that the decision of a co-ordinate Bench is followed by the other Courts and not lightly disregarded. This is necessary for continuity, certainty and predictivity in the administration of justice. In “Hari Singh”[Hari Singh v. State of Haryana : (1993) 3 SCC 114 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in a judicial system the Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction must have consistent opinions in respect of an identical set of facts or on question of law. In “Hari Singh” the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “10. It is true that in the system of justice which is being administered by the courts, one of the basic principles which has to be kept in view, is that courts of coordinate jurisdiction, should have consistent opinions in respect of an identical set of facts or on a question of law. If courts express different opinions on the identical sets of facts or question of law while exercising the same jurisdiction, then instead of achieving harmony in the judicial system, it will lead to judicial anarchy...” 23. The maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere” which means “to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled” was evolved in the public interest to establish uniformity and certainty in the legal system. The guiding principle behind stare decisis is that a decision of the Court which has been followed by the Court and acted upon should not be disturbed even by the appellate or revisional Courts. However, this is also well-settled that the previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrongs may result. In “Maktul”[Maktul v. Mst. Manbhari : AIR 1958 SC 918 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicated that the doctrine of stare decisis is not imperative or inflexible and to what extent it is to be applied must be determined by the Court in each case. “Sakshi”[Sakshi v. Union of India : (2004) 5 SCC 518 ] reaffirms that the doctrine of stare decisis gives certainty to law and guides the people to mold their affairs in the future. In “Sakshi”[Quinn v. Leathem : 1901 AC 495] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “23. Stare decisis is a well-known doctrine in legal jurisprudence. “Sakshi”[Sakshi v. Union of India : (2004) 5 SCC 518 ] reaffirms that the doctrine of stare decisis gives certainty to law and guides the people to mold their affairs in the future. In “Sakshi”[Quinn v. Leathem : 1901 AC 495] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “23. Stare decisis is a well-known doctrine in legal jurisprudence. The doctrine of stare decisis, meaning to stand by decided cases, rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed should be fixed, definite and known, and that, when the law is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction authorised to construe it, such declaration, in absence of palpable mistake or error, is itself evidence of the law until changed by competent authority. It requires that rules of law when clearly announced and established by a court of last resort should not be lightly disregarded and set aside but should be adhered to and followed. What it precludes is that where a principle of law has become established by a series of decisions, it is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It is a wholesome doctrine which gives certainty to law and guides the people to mould their affairs in future.” 24. We have gone through the decisions referred by the respondents to lay a foundation for parity in the appointment. The writ Court in the aforementioned cases passed the orders of “representation-disposal” and nothing more. However, the writ Court held that the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 being in conflict with previous decisions of this Court required modification. Earl of Halsbury L.C said in “Quinn”48 that a case is only an authority for what it decides. The law declared has to be construed as a principle of law that emanates from the judgment or on an interpretation of a law or judgment upon which the case was decided. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that a decision that is not found on reasons or proceeds on consideration of an issue contrary to well-settled principles of law cannot be deemed to be a law that would have a binding effect. In “Synthetics and Chemical Ltd.”[State of U.P v. Synthetics and Chemical Ltd. : (1991) 4 SCC 139 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a conclusion without reference to relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation. In “Synthetics and Chemical Ltd.”[State of U.P v. Synthetics and Chemical Ltd. : (1991) 4 SCC 139 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a conclusion without reference to relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation. In “Satish Kumar Gupta”[Satish Kumar Gupta v. State of Haryana : (2017) 4 SCC 760 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again reminded that a case which was decided without any consideration as regards the principles of law cannot be treated as a precedent. In “Dhanwanti Devi”[Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi : (1996) 6 SCC 44 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment does not constitute a precedent and the only thing in the decision which binds the parties is the principle upon which the case is decided. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. In “Palitana Sugar Mills”[Bhav Nagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills : (2003) 2 SCC 111 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a little difference in facts or some additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a judgment. No doubt a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. In “Md. Iliyas”[State of Orissa v. Md. Iliyas : (2006) 1 SCC 275 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “12. When the allegation is of cheating or deceiving, whether the alleged act is wilful or not depends upon the circumstances of the case concerned and there cannot be any straitjacket formula. The High Court unfortunately did not discuss the factual aspects and by merely placing reliance on an earlier decision of the Court held that prerequisite conditions were absent. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi.) A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem the Earl of Halsbury, L.C. observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.” 25. The respondents have set up a case that the State of Jharkhand by regularizing Dinesh Pd Singh, Ram Pd. Sah, Sukheo Gope, Arbind Pathak, Sudama Pd., Sitaram, Dinanath Ram, Sukra Nayak, Arun Kumar, Chhunku Sarangi, Rajendra Kumar, Saryu Pd. Gupta, Deopujan Sharma, Bajel Kr. The respondents have set up a case that the State of Jharkhand by regularizing Dinesh Pd Singh, Ram Pd. Sah, Sukheo Gope, Arbind Pathak, Sudama Pd., Sitaram, Dinanath Ram, Sukra Nayak, Arun Kumar, Chhunku Sarangi, Rajendra Kumar, Saryu Pd. Gupta, Deopujan Sharma, Bajel Kr. Mrandi, Jagori Sonar, Raghunath Sahu, Pushpavati Tiwari, Shaktidhar Pradhan, Indrajit Pd., Sameri Hansda, H.S. Bagha, Maheshwar Prasad and Tapti Mishra acted in consonance with the Circular dated 12th October 1982 and regularized these teachers who do not have the training qualification. 26. The respondents have produced copies of the orders dated 14th June 2011, 12th September 2012, 22nd December 2013, 3rd June 2013, 20th June 2013, 11th September 2014, 12th February 2015, 2nd February 2016, 11th April 2016, 14th June 2016, 17th August 2016, 28th October 2016, 5th October 2016, 9th December 2015, 1st March 2017, 22nd March 2017, 17th March 2017, 24th March 2017, 24th June 2008, 5th February 2018 and 13th February 2020. 27. The High Courts are constituted not only the Courts of law but also the Courts of equity. However, at the same time, the High Court is required to consider all aspects including the public good at large. In “Roshanlal Kuthalia”[Roshanlal Kuthalia & Ors. v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi : (1975) 4 SCC 628 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that equity is the moral dimension of law. In “Charles K. Skaria”[Charles K. Skaria & Ors. v. Dr. C. Mathew & Ors. : (1980) 2 SCC 752 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that equity shall overpower technicality where human justice is at stake. In “S.S Bola”[S.S Bola & Ors. v. B.D. Sardana & Ors. : (1997) 8 SCC 522 ]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that equity steps in where the law has left yawning gaps. In “A.P. State Financial Corpn.”[A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills : (1994) 2 SCC 647 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that: “Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law”. However, the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction if the grant of relief would defeat the interest of justice. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills : (1994) 2 SCC 647 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that: “Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law”. However, the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction if the grant of relief would defeat the interest of justice. In “Prabhu”[ State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu : (1994) 2 SCC 481 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that: “It is the responsibility of the High Court as custodian of the Constitution to maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refusing to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good.” Even assuming that the above-named Assistant Teachers lacked essential qualifications for appointment, the writ Court could not have applied parity in the appointment of the respondents because Article 14 of the Constitution carries with it a positive concept and it cannot be invoked for perpetuating illegality. This is a matter of record that the Assistant Teachers who approached the writ Court were appointed between 2nd January 1981 [WP(S) No. 5474 of 2017 corresponding to LPA No. 698 of 2019] to 7th December 1999 [WP(S) No.921 of 2011 corresponding to LPA No. 138 of 2019] and a large number of them were appointed during 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. 28. This is axiomatic that there is no concept of negative equality envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution even if an individual or a group of individuals are benefitted on account of an order passed by the executive, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court seeking a similar relief. A wrong decision in favor of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits based on such a decision. In “Basawaraj”[Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer : (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if some benefit was granted inadvertently or by mistake such an order does not confer any legal right on the others to get the same relief. In “Basawaraj”59 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. In “Basawaraj”59 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab.)” 29. In “Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd.” the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the concept of equal treatment presupposes existence of similar legal foothold and does not countenance repetition of wrong action. In “Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd.”[Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal : (2007) 11 SCC 641 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “28. This Court in Union of India v. International Trading Co. has held that two wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right but could be perpetuating another wrong and in such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 cannot be pressed into service in such cases. It would not be setting a wrong right but could be perpetuating another wrong and in such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 cannot be pressed into service in such cases. But the concept of equal treatment presupposes existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring wrongs on a par. The affected parties have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative quality. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above matter, the submission of the appellant has no force. In case, some of the persons have been granted permits wrongly, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the wrong done by the Government.” 30. In our opinion, this is not in the larger public interest that a teacher who could not obtain the training qualification for quarter a century is provided another opportunity to obtain a degree by extending cut-off date more than a decade after the Alam Committee Report was submitted. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. The object of prescribing qualification is to select a suitable person in order to maintain excellence and standard of teaching. In “Pramod Kumar”[Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission : (2008) 7 SCC 153 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person lacking the eligibility cannot approach the Court for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced in the Court. A plea has been put forth on behalf of the respondents that some time may be prescribed for attaining the training qualification as validity of appointment of untrained teachers is recognized under the Letter dated 4th February 1989. In our opinion, appointing a person who lacks eligibility for the post would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. A writ petition with such a prayer was not maintainable and the respondents could not have approached the Court for such a relief as they do not have a right in law to seek appointment. In our opinion, appointing a person who lacks eligibility for the post would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. A writ petition with such a prayer was not maintainable and the respondents could not have approached the Court for such a relief as they do not have a right in law to seek appointment. In “Umadevi (3)”[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) : (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] and “Official Liquidator”[Official Liquidator v. Dayanand : (2008) 10 SCC 1 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that long years of continuous service even without break would not justify the claim for regularization. The powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary and are exercised in furtherance of justice, equity and good conscience. The writ Court is therefore duty bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself as to whether the decision/order under challenge warrants interference of the Court. 31. Some of the respondents are claiming that they have valid training qualification obtained prior to 1st July 1995. In “Bhagirathi Prasad Dey”[Civil Appeal No.3693 of 2020 dated 17th November 2020 titled “Bhagirathi Prasad Dey v. State of Jharkhand”] the Assistant Teacher who was appointed in the Project Girls High School at Kharsawan by the Managing Committee of the school had obtained a degree in Senior Teacher’s Training from Sister Nivedita College at Kolkata. As Mr. Bhagirathi Prasad Dey was awarded the said degree before the NCTE Act, 1993 coming into effect from 1st July 1995 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the certificate issued by Sister Nivedita College was a valid degree. Now this issue is settled by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that shall be followed by the State of Jharkhand. However, the genuineness of the training degree and the schools/institutes which issued such degree must remain open to scrutiny and any general declaration cannot be made in this regard. 32. The respondents are seeking regularization also on the basis of the Resolution dated 22nd November 2023 to regularize the services of untrained teachers belonging to SC/ST and Women categories. In this context, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that the respondents in LPA Nos. 32. The respondents are seeking regularization also on the basis of the Resolution dated 22nd November 2023 to regularize the services of untrained teachers belonging to SC/ST and Women categories. In this context, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that the respondents in LPA Nos. 430 of 2019, 473 of 2019, 540 of 2019, 541 of 2019, 592 of 2019, 641 of 2019, 654 of 2019, 705 of 2019, 711 of 2019, 784 of 2019, 840 of 2019, 867 of 2019, 921 of 2019, 24 of 2020, 51 of 2020, 79 of 2020, 131 of 2020, 346 of 2019, 134 of 2020, 155 of 2020 and the respondent nos.1 and 2 in LPA No. 40 of 2020 shall be considered for regularization in terms of the Resolution dated 22nd November 2023, if otherwise found eligible for appointment as Assistant Teacher. These Letters Patent Appeals were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11th December 2023. 33. Lastly, the prayers made in the writ petitions were different and such writ petitions could not have been disposed of by a common order. In several writ petitions, a prayer for recognizing their services has been made by the Assistant Teachers. Whereas, some of the teachers are also seeking consequential reliefs including the monetary benefits w.e.f. 1st January 1989 in terms of the government notification dated 9th February 2011. The learned counsels appearing for the respondents submitted that there are three distinct categories of the Assistant Teachers viz (i) whose training certificate was not recognized by the NCTE (ii) untrained teachers belonging to SC, ST, and Woman categories and (iii) untrained teachers of the second phase2 schools who are eligible in terms of the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court. There is also a fourth category of teachers who are said to be working in the “closed schools”. There is also a fourth category of teachers who are said to be working in the “closed schools”. Just to indicate that the prayers in the writ petitions were varied and wide ranging, we shall reproduce the prayers made in WP(S) No. 921 of 2011 which read as under: i) For quashing the order issued vide Memo No.4174 dated 09th September 2010 under the signature of Respondent No.3 wherein and whereunder the claim of the petitioners regarding recognition of their services has been refused on the strength of a committee which is extra-legal and contrary to the decision of the Apex Court passed on the issue involved in the present writ petition and upon which respondent has acted and further they have completely misconstrued the order of Hon’ble High Court as well as Supreme Court wherein it has been clearly directed to give the same treatment to the petitioners who are employees of the project school of the year 1984-85 similar to the project school of the year 1981-82 and further out of 300 schools, 89 schools are in the territory of the State of Jharkhand and they have been given different treatment than to the schools falling in the territory of Bihar and this amounts to hostile discrimination as well as contrary to the mandate of Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000; ii) For direction upon Respondent No.5 the State of Bihar to forward the recommendation of the three men committee constituted as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court and also the criteria adopted by the Respondent No.3 for recognizing the services of the employees of the Project School of the year 1984-85; iii) Directing the respondents to recognize the services of persons working on different posts in project Girls High School including the present petitioners and further to absorb them to their respective posts and to pay their salaries with effect from 1.1.1989 up-to-date, as school has been taken over under the scheme and the case of the petitioners are fully covered by the decision of Full Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Patna, reported in 2000 (1) PLJR 287 ; v) For initiating proceeding against the concerned authorities of the State of Jharkhand for alleged disobedience of order passed by Full Bench reported in 2000 (1) PLJR 287 as the impugned order is contrary to observations/directions made by the Full Bench the Hon’ble High Court and approved by the Apex Court. 34. The State of Jharkhand has taken a stand that no challenge was laid before the writ Court to the Resolution dated 25th April 2018. However, on verification of the records, we gathered that in WP(S) Nos.7403 of 2012, 4881 of 2017 and 921 of 2011 interlocutory applications were filed to challenge the Resolution dated 25th April 2018 but no order was passed thereon. On the contrary, the writ Court had expressed its satisfaction when the government decision was produced in the Court that every aspect of the matter was considered in the government decision. The writ Court was also conscious of the fact that the government decision dated 25th April 2018 is a policy decision of the State of Jharkhand. In the order dated 26th April 2018, the writ Court recorded that the government decision dated 25th April 2018 was in tune with the judgment of the Court and the previous decisions of the government. The order dated 26th April 2018 passed in W.P.(S) No. 921 of 2011 and batch cases reads as under: “The matter relates to recognition of the services of teaching and non-teaching staff of the Project Girls High School. On 09.04.2018, this Court had directed the Secretary, who is present in the Court, to take a final decision regarding services of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Project Girls High School. Today, when the matter was taken up, Mr. Jai Prakash, Addl. Advocate General comes with an affidavit annexing the decision taken by the State Govt. on the service conditions of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Project Girls High School in view of the earlier orders passed by this Court and in view of specific direction given on 12.03.2018. After going through the affidavit and the policy decision of the State Govt. dated 25.04.2018, which has been passed and approved by the Cabinet, and as per the notification of the State Government, by the Orders of her Excellency, the Governor of the Jharkhand the Secretary of the Department has issued the present notification dated 25.04.2018 which is a policy decision of the State Government. dated 25.04.2018, which has been passed and approved by the Cabinet, and as per the notification of the State Government, by the Orders of her Excellency, the Governor of the Jharkhand the Secretary of the Department has issued the present notification dated 25.04.2018 which is a policy decision of the State Government. After going through the policy decision, this Court is of the considered view that after due consideration and taking into account the orders passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Full Bench decision of the Hon'ble Patna High Court and the report of the Alam Committee and also the several orders of this Court passed by the learned Single Judge each and every aspect of the matter has been discussed. However, since affidavit has been filed today only, learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for some time to file rejoinder to the affidavit filed by the respondents. The Addl. Advocate General is directed to serve a copy of the affidavit to each and every Counsels appearing in the individual case. Since pleadings are complete, put up this case on 16.05.2018.” 35. However, the writ Court proceeded to hear the challenge laid to the government resolution on 5th September 2018 without allowing the State of Jharkhand to put forth its stand; the judgment was reserved on the same day. Quite naturally, there is not much reference in the writ Court’s order about the stand taken and arguments advanced on behalf of the State of Jharkhand. It is well-settled a proposition in law that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and the writ Court exercises this power in furtherance of justice, equity and good conscience and not otherwise. In a catena of judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicated that the writ Court is bound to take into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances in the case and, for that purpose, the writ Court must examine (i) whether there is sufficient pleadings for seeking the relief; (ii) whether the relief sought is barred by limitation or any law; and (iii) whether the writ petitioner seeks a remedy in the realm of private law or public law domain. However, in the present case, the writ Court acted in the breach of natural justice and the State of Jharkhand was taken by surprise as it had no inkling of the proposed proceedings before the writ Court. The writ Court also transgressed the limits of judicial review and issued directions for modifying the policy decision of the State of Jharkhand. 36. For the forgoing reasons, writ Court’s order dated 5th September 2018 passed in W.P.(S) No. 921 of 2011 and analogous cases is set aside and, consequently, these Letters Patent Appeals are allowed. 37. Pending I.As are accordingly disposed of.