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2024 DIGILAW 780 (SC)

Dinesh Dutt v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2024-08-12

PRASANNA B.VARALE, VIKRAM NATH

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ORDER : 1. The challenge in the present appeal is to the order dated 29.12.2021 in Crl. Petition No.692/2019 whereby the High Court of Himachal Pradesh has dismissed the application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as, “CrPC”), for quashing FIR no. 27/19 dated 03.03.2019 under Section 336 of Indian Penal Code 1860 (hereinafter referred to as, “IPC”) and final report under section 173 CrPC. 2. The factual background is that an FIR Crime No. 27/19 was registered on 03.03.2019 at the instance of one Smt. Meena w/o Sh. Babu Ram. It was alleged in the FIR that on 03.03.2019 at about 10:30 PM the complainant witnessed a loud blast from an electricity pole located about 100 meters away from her house, where she saw the appellant herein hanging on that pole being electrocuted. It was further alleged that this incident happened because of the carelessness of some person from the concerned electricity department by resuming electricity supply from behind. On the said FIR, a chargesheet came to be filed under Section 336 of IPC. The appellant herein is the man who incurred injuries from the electricity pole, as he was working in the Electricity Department. It is the same appellant that has sustained the injuries, that is the accused in the said criminal proceedings. 3. Aggrieved by the said chargesheet, the appellant approached the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC praying to quash the entire proceedings arising out of FIR no. 27/19 of Kandaghat Police Station, Solan, H.P. 4. The High Court vide order dated 29.12.2021 dismissed the said Criminal Petition and declined to interfere with the criminal proceedings based on the reasoning that all the issues raised by the appellant can be and should be raised by him before the Trial Court rather than raising them directly before the High Court in the first instance via petition under Section 482 of CrPC. Accordingly, the High Court ordered the proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC to be closed with liberty to the appellant to raise all the issues before the Trial Court. 5. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High Court, refusing to quash the criminal proceedings, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 6. The Ld. Accordingly, the High Court ordered the proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC to be closed with liberty to the appellant to raise all the issues before the Trial Court. 5. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High Court, refusing to quash the criminal proceedings, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 6. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court has erred in law by dismissing the petition as necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 336 of IPC i.e., it must and ought to be shown that the accused committed the act rashly and negligently, endangering to the life of the public, are not made out in the FIR. Moreover, the appellant was doing his job as assigned to him by the Electricity Department officials and it is due to the negligence of the Electricity Department that the appellant had to incur severe body burns and injuries. 7. It is further submitted that the allegations in the complaint must have a reasonable nexus with the result caused. However, in this case only the appellant incurred injuries resulting from the sudden turning on of the electricity by the officials, and no other person was endangered. 8. It is further submitted that the High Court has erred in law by not exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process against the appellant in the interest of justice as there is absolutely no evidence on record to constitute an offence under Section 336 Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the appellant. 9. It is further submitted that the High Court has not appreciated the law laid down in Varala Bharath Kumar v. The State Of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No. 1565/2017; Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 1263-67 of 2019; Criminal 10 Appeal No 122/ 2022, Veena Mittal v. State of UP & Ors. 10. Per contra the Ld. counsels appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1 & 3 have vehemently opposed the present appeal. 11. Heard Ld. counsels appearing on both sides and perused the relevant documents placed on record. 12. The questions which are posed for consideration before this Court are whether the ingredients of offence under Section 336 of IPC are made out against the appellant and whether the High Court has rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. 13. 11. Heard Ld. counsels appearing on both sides and perused the relevant documents placed on record. 12. The questions which are posed for consideration before this Court are whether the ingredients of offence under Section 336 of IPC are made out against the appellant and whether the High Court has rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. 13. The High Court while dismissing the Criminal Petition has observed as under: “4. This Court is of the considered view that the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked by a party at the throw of the hat when there is a procedure which stands prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code which has to be adhered to after lodging of the FIR. This Court can safely take note of the fact that very rarely does an accused admit that he is guilty of the offences alleged against him. This Court is also aware of the well settled principle of law that ordinarily in criminal jurisprudence, until the accused is held guilty, he is presumed to be innocent. Yet, after lodging of the FIR, the investigating agency has to carry out the investigation and thereafter challan has to be filed or a closure report has to be presented before the appropriate Court of law whereupon the Court has to take a call as to how the matter has to be further proceeded with. In case, the High Courts start interfering with this procedure by invoking Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code at any and every stage, without permitting the Trial Courts to exercise the jurisdiction, which stands conferred upon them and also the duty which stands enshrined upon them, then, the entire machinery of the trial Courts, is likely to collapse, because, as has been observed hereinabove also, then in that eventuality, every accused would approach this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure asking for quashing of the FIR as well as subsequent criminal proceedings. The Court is not discarding the contention of the petitioner that he is innocent, however this Court is observing that at the first instance all these issues can be and should be raised by the petitioner before the learned Trial Court and this Court has no reason to believe that learned Trial Court will not look into the issues which are being raised by the petitioner in the present petition and take a appropriate call on the matter. The contention of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that in case this High Court does not interferes under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then, the provisions of this Section will become otiose, is completely mis-conceived because the provisions of Section 482 which are contained in the Criminal Procedure Code are meant to prevent the abuse of process of law and the Court exercises these powers where its judicial conscious is satisfied that in case it does not interferes under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, then, same would indeed amount to abuse of process of law. In the given facts of this case, this Court is of the view that no case for interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made out and it is purposely that this Court is not referring to the factual matrix involved in this petition so as not to prejudice the case of the petitioner.” 14. On a bare perusal of the FIR and chargesheet, it is clear that the appellant is the person who had climbed the electricity pole to repair the electricity line, therefore, he cannot also be in a position to start the electricity supply as the same was done from a different location altogether. It is also seen that it is due to the negligence of some other official, who was operating the electricity supply, and had turned on the electricity supply while the appellant was repairing the line, that the appellant has been electrocuted and suffered injuries. Therefore, the question of the appellant being negligent does not arise. Thus, this Court is of the view that in the present case the basic ingredients of offence under Section 336 of IPC i.e., it must be shown that the accused committed the act rashly and negligently, endangering to the life of the public, are not made out against the appellant. Thus, this Court is of the view that in the present case the basic ingredients of offence under Section 336 of IPC i.e., it must be shown that the accused committed the act rashly and negligently, endangering to the life of the public, are not made out against the appellant. Moreover, the FIR was registered against an unknown person and not against the appellant, rather it can be seen that the complaint was registered out of concern for the appellant as he was the person who suffered injuries due to the negligence of some other person. 15. It is alleged that the High Court has wrongly dismissed the petition. Therefore, at this stage it becomes pertinent to discuss the scope of section 482 of the CrPC in the ambit of quashing of criminal proceedings. 16. This Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down the parameters within which it is permissible to quash proceedings. This Court has held that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae. This Court held inter alia as follows: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) CrPC except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) CrPC. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) CrPC. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 17. The High Court had observed that interference by them by invoking Section 482 of the CrPC at any and every stage, without permitting the Trial Court to exercise jurisdiction, is likely to result in the entire machinery of the Trial Courts collapsing. The High Court in our considered opinion has acted beyond the purview of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC as discussed above. The High Court, while making such observations, has failed to appreciate the contents of the FIR and chargesheet which if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the appellant. Moreover, the High Court has failed to appreciate that the allegations made in the FIR do not provide sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused as he himself is the victim who has suffered injury due to the negligence of another official. 18. Moreover, the High Court has failed to appreciate that the allegations made in the FIR do not provide sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused as he himself is the victim who has suffered injury due to the negligence of another official. 18. In view of the above discussion and after applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and the High Court has committed an error in failing to exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC. 19. In view of the above reasons, the present appeal is allowed and accordingly the impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. Consequently, FIR No. 27/2019 and the chargesheet filed thereupon are quashed. 20. Pending applications(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.