ORDER : This writ petition is filed to quash Charge Memo dated 31.03.2011 and the proceedings dated 23.09.2017 and declare the same as contrary to the Rule 9(2)(b)(I) & (II) of the A.P.Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (for short, ‘the Rules 1980’). 2. Heard Sri P.Amrender, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Transport appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2. 3. The brief facts leading to filing of the present writ petition are that petitioner was directly recruited and appointed as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in January, 1984 and was allotted to Zone-VI of the united State of Andhra Pradesh and was promoted as Motor Vehicles Inspector (MVI) on 11.02.1999 and retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2012. While so, when the petitioner was working as MVI at RTA Check-post, Zaheerabad, a surprise check was conducted by the ACB officials on the intervening night of 27/28.08.2009 and found that the petitioner along with one private person, by name, Mohd. Haneef, indulging corrupt practices and collecting bribes and further petitioner could not render full and true account of the cash of Rs.40,770/- found in his possession at the time of surprise check; that petitioner was asked to submit factual report and accordingly, he had submitted factual report on 06.05.2010. Thereafter, petitioner was issued charge memo dated 24.06.2010 proposing to hold an inquiry against the petitioner and the petitioner was also served with Annexures -I, II, III & IV. 4. It is contended that on the date of retirement, petitioner was served with proceedings R.No.1044/C3/2008-8, dated 22.11.2011 stating that his retirement is subject to the condition that the retirement shall be without prejudice to the action to be taken in the ACB case pending against him in R.No.2297/V3/ 2011. After retirement, petitioner submitted representation dated 18.06.2012 to the respondent authorities to furnish copies of the alleged ACB cases. However, respondents did not furnish the documents sought by the petitioner. Petitioner once again made representation to the Transport Commissioner on 07.12.2013 requesting to furnish charge memo i.e., R.No.2297/V3/V2/2011. Thereafter, the Transport Commissioner furnished the charge memo No.2297/V3/2011 dated 31.03.2011 on 04.01.2017, to which petitioner submitted a detailed representation on 21.01.2017 stating that he retired from service on 31.05.2012 and the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 was communicated for the first time on 04.01.2017 i.e., after more than four years from the date of his retirement. Thereafter, the Transport Commissioner furnished the charge memo No.2297/V3/2011 dated 31.03.2011 on 04.01.2017, to which petitioner submitted a detailed representation on 21.01.2017 stating that he retired from service on 31.05.2012 and the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 was communicated for the first time on 04.01.2017 i.e., after more than four years from the date of his retirement. Petitioner submitted representations dated 21.01.2017 and 06.02.2017 requesting the respondents to drop the proceedings. However, there was no response. The respondent No.1 vide Memo dated 22.02.2017 requested the 2nd respondent to furnish his remarks on the representation of the petitioner. However, the 2nd respondent had issued proceedings vide R.No.2297/V3/V2/2011, dated 23.09.2017 appointing the 3rd respondent as Enquiry Officer and directed him to complete the enquiry within two months from the date of receipt of the order without reference to the Memo dated 22.02.2017. Therefore, aggrieved by the communication of the respondents, the present writ petition is filed. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner had contended that charge memo dated 31.03.2011 issued to the petitioner relate back to the event that has taken place in 2010. Petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2012 and the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 was first communicated to the petitioner on 04.01.2017, which is beyond four years after his retirement. It is further contended that Rule 9(2)(b) of the Rules, 1980, specifically prohibits any authority against the State Government to proceed against retired employee and the charge memo relates to the event, which took place more than 4 years back. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has specifically referred to Rule 9(2)(b) [Rule 9. Right of Government to withhold or withdraw pension :- (2) (a) xxx (b) The Departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment: ] of the Rules, 1980, under which there is a specific prohibition on the 2nd respondent to proceed against retired employee after four long years. 7. It is further contended that after long gap of seven years, petitioner is now being forced to participate in the enquiry and entire proceedings of the respondents suffer from lack of jurisdiction, that despite repeated requests of the petitioner, respondents have not furnished a copy of the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 and the same was communicated to the petitioner for the first time only on 04.01.2017. Therefore, at this stage, petitioner cannot be subject to unnecessary humiliation and he cannot be subject to participate in the enquiry. 8. In support of his contention that inordinate delay in initiating departmental enquiry cannot be permitted and therefore, the same has to be quashed, learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the following decisions: i) State of A.P., vs. N.Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 ; ii) P.V.Mahadevan v. MD, T.N.Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 9. Learned Government Pleader for respondents had contended that while petitioner was working as MVI at Zaheerabad Check-post, had involved in irregularity and demanding and accepting bribes from the crew of the transport vehicles, which are passing through the said check-post. The officials of the ACB have conducted surprise check on the intervening night of 28/29.04.2010 and found unaccounted money in possession of the petitioner. He further contended that petitioner was aware of the charge memo pending against him and in the pension papers forwarded by the RTO, Nalgonda, it was clearly mentioned that there is an ACB case pending against him and therefore, petitioner was accorded permission to retire from service without prejudice to the action to be taken in the ACB case pending against him in R.No.2297/V3/V2/2011 and any other disciplinary cases pending/contemplated against him. That petitioner was granted provisional pension vide proceedings dated 01.03.2013. Further, petitioner did not approach the respondent authorities with regard non-receipt of charge memo in ACB case in R.No.2297/V3/V2/2011. It is specifically contended that charge memo was communicated to the petitioner vide office endorsement No.4208, dated 10.01.2013, which was mentioned in Letter dated 08.11.2017 of the Deputy Transport Commissioner. 10. It is further contended that Memo dated 08.11.2013 was communicated to the petitioner vide endorsement No.3164/A1/2013, dated 16.11.2013 and obtained acknowledgment of the petitioner. However, said copy was not placed on record. It is further contended that petitioner was involved in another case in R.No.31513151/V3/V2/2009 while working in Transport Checkpost at Zaheerabad. It is finally contended that there are no merits in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 11. It is a specific contention of the petitioner that he has not received copy of the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 and whereas, respondents contended that charge memo was served on the petitioner on 10.01.2013. Therefore, the crucial issue for consideration is whether the charge memo was communicated to the petitioner or not. 11. It is a specific contention of the petitioner that he has not received copy of the charge memo dated 31.03.2011 and whereas, respondents contended that charge memo was served on the petitioner on 10.01.2013. Therefore, the crucial issue for consideration is whether the charge memo was communicated to the petitioner or not. It is relevant to refer memo dated 08.11.2013 of Transport Commissioner of A.P., wherein it was mentioned that surprise check was conducted by the officials of ACB on the intervening night of 28/29.04.2010 at RTA check-post at Zaheeabad and ?.,charges were framed against the petitioner herein as well as one Malleshwar, Transport Constable vide charge memo dated 31.03.2011. The RTO, Nalgonda was requested to send a dated acknowledgment or explanation if any submitted by the petitioner. However, it appears that no document evidencing service of charge memo on the petitioner has been communicated to the Transport Commissioner. Therefore, the contention of the respondents that charge memo was served on the petitioner on 10.01.2013 is not evidenced by any document and respondents failed to place any material to that effect. Therefore, in the absence of proof of service of charge memo and acknowledgement by the petitioner, it has to be held that charge memo dated 31.03.2011 was not communicated to the petitioner on 10.01.2013 as has been contended by the respondents. 12. Learned counsel for petitioner next contended that disciplinary proceedings are liable to be set aside. He further contended that appointment of 3rd respondent as Inquiry Officer by the 2nd respondent on 23.09.2017 is contrary to Rule 9(2)(b) of the Rules, 1980 and admittedly, the Inquiry Officer was appointed after four years seven months from the date of retirement of the petitioner. 13. Learned counsel further contended that as per G.O.Ms.No.679 General Administration (Services-C) Department dated 01.11.2008, disciplinary proceedings pending against an employee have to be completed expeditiously and further instructions were also issued for expeditious completion of the inquiries and the same shall be completed within a period of three months in case of simple cases and six months in case of complicated cases. 14. Learned Government Pleader for respondents would submit that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are not applicable to the facts of present case as those judgments are rendered in different facts, circumstances. 15. In N.Radhakishan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “19. 14. Learned Government Pleader for respondents would submit that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are not applicable to the facts of present case as those judgments are rendered in different facts, circumstances. 15. In N.Radhakishan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 20. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti- Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularising the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any enquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under the 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the enquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Enquiry Officers who had been appointed one after the other had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that the respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the enquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996. The Tribunal rightly did not quash these two latter memos.” 16. In P.V.Mahadevan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer. 12. We, therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge memo issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No costs.” 17. In D.Srinivas v. Govt. of A.P., Transport, Roads and Buildings (Vig.I) Dept., and others, 2013 (4) ALT 1 (DB), the Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of A.P., held as under: “18. Coming to the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the charge relates to the year 1998 and no steps were taken immediately on the subject-matter of the charge. Only pursuant to the complaint lodged against the Executive Engineer (Electrical) alone before the Upa-Lokayuktha, A.P., and basing on the ex parte preliminary enquiry report, proceedings were initiated which were later dropped. Thereafter, regular departmental enquiry is conducted and on one ground or the other the enquiry officers were changed, which is admitted in the counter-affidavit, stating that delay is only on account of administrative reasons. Having regard to the nature of charge and the plea of delay, we are of the considered view that there is abnormal and unexplained delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in completing the enquiry and imposing punishment. Having regard to the nature of charge and the plea of delay, we are of the considered view that there is abnormal and unexplained delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in completing the enquiry and imposing punishment. Such an action is contrary to the judgments referred above apart from the executive instructions issued by the Government itself. Even for the said reason, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 02.12.2011 passed in O.A. No. 8278 of 2011 and, further, order dated 04.12.2012 passed in Rev. M.A. No. 3802 of 2011, by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, is set aside. Consequently, the final order imposing punishment on the petitioner vide G.O. Rt. No. 734, Transport, Roads & Buildings (Vig.I) Department dated 28.07.2011 is quashed and it is held that the petitioner is entitled to all the consequential benefits. No order as to costs.” 18. In State of Telangana and others vs. L.Galanna and another, 2016 (4) ALD 320 (DB), the Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of A.P., held as under: “4. On a careful consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that in the absence of any explanation whatsoever offered by the petitioners for their failure to conclude disciplinary proceedings for a decade, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the abovementioned cases was rightly applied by the Tribunal in quashing the disciplinary proceedings.” 19. From the catena of judgments referred to above, it is clear that continuation of disciplinary proceedings for long time without any justification or reason would result in grave injustice, mental agony and distress to the employee and in a given case, the disciplinary proceedings can be quashed depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 20. Further, as per G.O.Ms.No.679, G.A. (Ser-C) Department, dated 01.11.2008, the Government directed that the disciplinary cases initiated against the Government employees shall be completed as expeditiously as possible i.e., a normal time of 3 months and 6 months is allowed in simple and complicated cases, respectively. In case of abnormal delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings, action shall be initiated against concerned inquiring authority. 21. In case of abnormal delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings, action shall be initiated against concerned inquiring authority. 21. In the present case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated vide charge memo dated 31.03.2011 and Inquiry Officer was appointed on 23.09.2017, which is more than six years after issuance of charge memo. Admittedly, petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2012 and it is specific case of the petitioner that charge memo was not served on him and was served on him only on 04.01.2017 for the first time that too after repeated requests. 22. From the record, it appears that no further action has been taken against the petitioner pursuant to the charge memo dated 31.03.2011. Learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 and 2 represented that Enquiry Officer appointed on 23.09.2017 had retired without conducting any inquiry and, therefore, another Enquiry Officer was appointed in the year 2019. He also retired from service without conducting any inquiry, which shows that inquiry has not been completed till date though the charge memo was issued on 31.03.2011. 23. In the light of above discussion, facts and legal precedents, continuation of disciplinary proceedings/enquiry against the petitioner since 31.03.2011 without there being any progress except appointing enquiry officer on 23.09.2017 about six years after issuance of charge memo, is gross abuse and would lead to grave injustice, harassment, mental agony to the petitioner and also amounts to condemnation of the person and therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be set aside/ quashed. 24. Accordingly, Writ Petition is allowed and respondents are directed to accord notional seniority to the petitioner from the date he was due and eligible, together with all monetary and consequential benefits. There shall be no order as to costs. 25. Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.