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2024 DIGILAW 790 (JHR)

Narendra Kumar Pandey v. State of Jharkhand through its Home Secretary

2024-09-05

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State and learned counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos.9 to 20. 2. The prayer in the writ petition is made for direction upon the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 to take appropriate steps against the respondent Nos.9 to 20 restraining them from interfering with the lands appertaining to Plot No. 754A having an area of 0.08 Acres and Plot No.756 having an area of 0.42 acres under Khata No.1 and Plot No.865/1367 having an area of 1.92 decimals under Khata No.184, Mouza – Kajaru Kalan within Pandu Police Station measuring total area of 2.42 acres, the land in question and to ensure safe enjoyment of the right of the petitioners as declared by competent court of law and to provide police protection to the petitioners for unfettered enjoyment over the said property in any manner and within a specified period. Further prayer is made for direction upon the respondents to demolish part of the illegal construction raised on a portion of the lands in question by the private respondents in violation of the decree of permanent injunction against the private respondents or their ancestors by the competent court of law. 3. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that Binod Kumar Pandey and Anil Kumar Pandey both son of late Radhikesh Pandey, were in possession of the lands in question on the basis of inheritance from their ancestors who got the same in Partition Suit No.8 of 1928. After vesting of Jamindari Interest, they got rent assessed for the said land on the basis of their peaceful possession and return in ‘K-Form’ was submitted. The ancestors of Binod Kumar Pandey and Anil Kumar Pandey had already settled in village – Churmari in the district of Satna in the State of Madhya Pradesh. He further submits that Binod Kumar Pandey and Anil Kumar Pandey executed a registered Deed of Gift dated 03.01.1994 in favour of Narendra Kumar Pandey, Satyendra Narayan Pandey, Jitendra Kumar Pandey all sons of Sidhi Nath Pandey and Anand Kumar Pandey, son of Dharm Dev Pandey and they are in possession of 2.42 acres of land appertaining of plots as disclosed in the prayer portion of the writ petition. He then submits that the name of the above donees were mutated by an order dated 02.06.1994 passed by the Circle Officer, Bishrampur in Mutation Case No.78 of 1994-95 and they were paying the rent to the State of Bihar and now to the State of Jharkhand. He submits that in recent survey records of right has been prepared in the name of the petitioners. According to him, the Civil Suit for declaring their indefeasible right and title over the said lands acquired by them on the basis of a registered deed of gift against Manangu Ram and Others which was registered as Title Suit No.122 of 1996 and by judgment dated 31.05.1997, the Munsif, Palamau at Medni Nagar, decreed the aforesaid Title Suit No.122 of 1996 declaring the right, title and interest of the petitioners over the said land and also confirmed possession of the petitioners. He submits that in the said suit, the permanent injunction was passed against the private respondents. He submits a decree was sealed and signed on 07.06.1997. He submits against the said judgment, the respondents have preferred Original Misc. Case No.15 of 1997 invoking provisions of order-IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was dismissed on 21.02.1998. He further submits that again a Misc. Petition under order-IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 20.12.2001 by the original defendant vide Misc. Case No.12 of 2001 which was also dismissed on 22.03.2003. In this background, he submits the dismissal of two petitions clearly suggests that permanent injunction has attained finality and in spite of that the private respondents are interfering with the right, title interest of the petitioners and for that the petitioners have already moved before the competent authority of the district in spite of that no action has been taken by way of Annexure-10, 11 and 12. He further draws the attention of the Court to paragraph No.2 of the judgment passed by this Court in Cr.M.P. No.221 of 2004 and Cr.M.P. No.2168 of 2021 and submits that in false allegation, the criminal cases are being instituted against the petitioners and out of them two of the criminal proceedings have been quashed by this Court. He further draws the attention of the Court to paragraph No.2 of the judgment passed by this Court in Cr.M.P. No.221 of 2004 and Cr.M.P. No.2168 of 2021 and submits that in false allegation, the criminal cases are being instituted against the petitioners and out of them two of the criminal proceedings have been quashed by this Court. He submits that maliciously the private respondents are harassing the petitioners and in spite of the decree passed by the competent court, the district administration is not helping the petitioners, as such the proper direction may kindly be issued. To buttress this argument, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied in the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Murlidharan and Others versus Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar and Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 501 and he refers to paragraph No.17 of the said judgment which stipulates as under: 17. A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. 4. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. 4. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that once a decree is there and it is not being executed, the High Court can pass appropriate order under writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in view of that appropriate order may kindly be passed. 5. On the same line, Mr. Tewari further relied in the case of Uma Devi versus State of Bihar and Others reported in 2007 (3) East Cr C 18 (Pat) : 2007 (2) PLJR 475. 6. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that the High Court has issued the direction to execute the deed. He further relied in the case of Prithwi Chand Gupta versus State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 2008 (3) East Cr C 10 (Pat). 7. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that a person whose right to property has finally been decided by a Court of law is entitled to its unfettered enjoyment and the District Administration is obliged to ensure it’s enjoyment and in view of that he submits that this Court is competent to pass appropriate order in view of the dispute in question and the District Administration of Palamau may kindly be directed to provide police protection. 8. Per contra, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.9 to 20 oppose the prayer on the ground that the decree is already there in favour of the petitioners and if it is not being implemented, the petitioners are required to move before that Court for execution. He draws the attention of the Court to Article 136 of the Limitation Act and submits that so far the permanent injunction is concerned, there is no limitation of execution and for other decree, there is limitation of 12 years of execution and in view of that the petitioners are required to move before that Court. He further submits that the private respondents are in possession and that specific statement is made in paragraph No.13 of counter affidavit. He further submits that the private respondents are in possession and that specific statement is made in paragraph No.13 of counter affidavit. He further draws the attention of the Court that the land in question is in possession of the petitioners in view of the registered sale deed Nos.751, 752, 753 and 754 registered on 16th February, 1995 respectively and he submits that the rent receipt is also issued in favour of the private respondents with regard to the land in question and the Register-II in the name of the private respondents is also brought in the counter affidavit. He submits that if such a fact is there, the High Court may not exercise his power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further submits that the suit was defective and in the suit the prayer was not made of handing over the possession in favour of the petitioners and the decree is only passed of permanent injunction wherein the private respondents are in possession. He further submits that the said permanent decree was ex-parte. He relied in the case of Prabhakara Adiga versus Gowri and Others reported in (2017) 4 SCC 97 and he refers to paragraph No.25 of the said judgment which has been held as under:- 25. In our considered opinion the right which had been adjudicated in the suit in the present matter and the findings which have been recorded as basis for grant of injunction as to the disputed property which is heritable and partible would enure not only to the benefit of the legal heir of decree-holders but also would bind the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. It is apparent from section 50 CPC that when a judgment- debtor dies before the decree has been satisfied, it can be executed against legal representatives. Section 50 is not confined to a particular kind of decree. Decree for injunction can also be executed against legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” is limited to certain class of cases as indicated by this Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (supra) and when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would not normally abate and can be enforced by LRs. of decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. The maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” is limited to certain class of cases as indicated by this Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (supra) and when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would not normally abate and can be enforced by LRs. of decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. It would be against the public policy to ask the decree-holder to litigate once over again against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor when the cause and injunction survives. No doubt, it is true that a decree for injunction normally does not run with the land. In the absence of statutory provisions, it cannot be enforced. However, in view of the specific provisions contained in section 50 CPC, such a decree can be executed against legal representatives. 9. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that even if the permanent injunction and decree is there that can be executed through the Court which has passed the said decree by way of execution case. He submits in view of that the said petition is fit to be dismissed. He further submits that so far judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the case of P.R. Murlidharan and Others (supra) is concerned that is distinguishable in the light of observation made in paragraph No.12, 13 and 17. He submits that the facts of the present case are disputed one and in view of that this Court may not exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Mr. Tewari in reply of Mr. Sharma submits that the fact is not correct, petitioners are in possession and the mutation in favour of the respondents has already been turned down by Annexure-17 and 17/1. 11. In view of the above, learned counsel appearing for the State submits that a counter affidavit has been filed wherein paragraph No.4 and 12 it is disclosed that the dispute in question is civil in nature and for that the petitioner is having the alternative remedy. He submits in view of that the District Administration is not able to execute the said decree in absence of any order of a competent court who has passed the judgment or decree. 12. He submits in view of that the District Administration is not able to execute the said decree in absence of any order of a competent court who has passed the judgment or decree. 12. In view of the above submission of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and finds that admittedly there are dispute between the petitioners and respondent Nos.9 to 20. A title suit being Original Title Suit No.122 of 1996 was instituted by the petitioners and in the judgment/decree was passed ex-parte against the private respondents of permanent injunction and the private respondents were restrained to go in the land in question. Two miscellaneous cases have been filed by the private respondents have been rejected by order dated 21.02.1998 and 22.03.2003. It is further admitted position that in two Cr.M.Ps. the criminal cases instituted against the petitioners have been quashed by this Court by judgment dated 10.01.2006 and 27.06.2022 respectively. Thus, it is crystal clear that there is dispute between both the sides with regard to the property and for that the case and counter case are going on. It is admitted position that the decree of permanent injunction is there in favour of the petitioners in light of the judgment dated 31.05.1997. Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides limitation with regard to the decree of other nature for the period of 12 years, however, for permanent injunction there is no limitation of execution of the said decree. 13. Heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the case of P.R. Murlidharan and Others (supra) and in the same judgment in paragraph No.11, it was observed as under:- The question is a contentious one. Construction of the said trust and the rights and obligations thereunder were in question. The first respondent filed a suit in that behalf. The said suit was dismissed. In terms of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure another suit would not be maintainable at his instance. We have noticed herein before that another suit being O.S. No. 30 of 2002 is pending in the court of the Munsif. The High Court, despite noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court. We have noticed herein before that another suit being O.S. No. 30 of 2002 is pending in the court of the Munsif. The High Court, despite noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court. It, as noticed hereinbefore, determined the contentious issues which were required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 14. Further coming to the facts of the present case what has been discussed here-in-above, it is crystal clear that there is serious dispute between the parties, there is no judgment with regard to handing over the physical possession of either of the parties and only decree is there of permanent injunction against the private respondents and the question remains that when such a disputed fact is there whether the High Court can pass the order relying on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Murlidharan and Others (supra), the answer is simply no in view of the fact that can be decided by the executing court as the decree of permanent injunction is already there in favour of the petitioners. The reference may be made to the case of Moran M. Baselios Marthoma Mathews II and Others versus State of Kerala and Others reported in (2007) 6 SCC 517 wherein paragraph No.12, 13 and 15 which has been observed as under:- 12. Such might have been the contentions of the appellants before the High Court or before us in the special leave petitions, but we have no doubt in our mind that such disputed questions in regard to title of the properties or the right of one group against the other in respect of the management of such a large number of Churches could not have been the subject matter for determination by a Writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the garb of grant of police protection to one or the other appellants. 13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that despite the fact that the appellants had insisted upon before the High Court for issuance of a writ or in the nature of mandamus upon the State or its officers for the purpose of grant of police protection as this Court has exercised its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it can and should go into that question as well, viz. as to whether the writ petitioner itself could have been entertained or not, particularly, when the appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. 15. For the reasons stated hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in going into the disputed questions of title as also the disputed questions in regard to the rights of a particular group to manage the Churches, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, particularly, when such questions are pending consideration before competent Civil Courts. We, therefore, are of the opinion that any observation made by the High Court should not influence the Courts concerned in arriving at their independent decisions and in respect thereof, all contentions of the parties shall remain open. 15. In view of the above factual matrix and legal precedents, the relief sought by the petitioners even assuming that there was a decree of a Civil Court as laid down in the case of P.R. Murlidharan and Others (supra), it is for the parties to execute such a decree in the manner known to law. The argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners of passing appropriate order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the effect that only this Court can direct the District Administration for police protection sound attractive but this Court is not inclined to accept the same and this Court is unable to see of the matter, it is for the parties to approach the Civil Court including the execution of its order. 16. In view of the above, the judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the case of P.R. Murlidharan’s case (cited supra) is distinguishable. 17. In the case of Prithwi Chand Gupta (supra) relied by Mr. Tewari, the High Court interfered as there was already execution decree in favour of the petitioners in the case in hand, the execution decree is still not there and the petitioner is required to move for execution of the sale decree before the competent court. 18. In the case of Uma Devi versus the State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) relied by Mr. Tewari, the District Administration has conceded that they will take steps for execution of the decree and in that background that order has been passed. 19. 18. In the case of Uma Devi versus the State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) relied by Mr. Tewari, the District Administration has conceded that they will take steps for execution of the decree and in that background that order has been passed. 19. In the case of Prabhakar Adiga (supra) relied by learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has clearly held that applying the principle of maxim ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’ that is required to be executed through the execution case that case is helping the private respondents. 20. If the person against whom such a decree is passed causes further obstructions that can be brought to the notice of the Civil Court and the Civil Court has got every power to issue direction to the police to afford protection in executing the decree. There may be cases in which a person obtains a decree for declaration and injunction. In such cases, the petitioners cannot be allowed to contain that the petitioner not in a possession of the property but where exactly the dividing line of property from the neighbouring property is an issue which can be decided only by a competent court, so even if a person obtains decree declaring his title and possession no police protection can be a granted to him to put up the boundary of that decree civil property without the dividing line fixed by the competent court first even if there is an order of injunction restraining a party from entering into the property, this Court shall not invoke the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India of the police protection, the party obtains such decree can approach the civil court for enforcement of that decree. The statutory power given to the Court is required to be followed. 21. The High Court is not an executing Court, there is no hard and fast rule that once a writ petition is entertained, counter affidavit has been called upon thereafter it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy, it all depends on the facts of each case. The High Court cannot encourage this kind of practice of filing writ petition, when equally alternative remedy is available under the provisions of the CPC. 22. The High Court cannot encourage this kind of practice of filing writ petition, when equally alternative remedy is available under the provisions of the CPC. 22. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, no case of interference is made out, as such this writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to move before the competent court who had passed the decree of permanent injunction and for execution of the said decree.