JUDGMENT : (R. Raghunandan Rao, J.) 1. Heard Sri A. Syam Sundar Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri Mahadeva Kanthrigala learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and learned G.P. for Revenue appearing for respondents 2 to 5. 2. The appellants herein are respondents 5 to 8 in W.P. No. 25983 of 2023. Appellants 3 and 4 along with Smt. A. Krishnamma, who is the mother of appellants 1 and 2 had filed O.S. No. 45 of 1999 before the Senior Civil Judge, Madanapalle against the 1st respondent herein and other persons for partition of certain lands on the ground that the said lands were joint family property in which the appellants 3 and 4 and Smt. A. Krishnamma have a share. On contest, a preliminary decree was passed allotting 1/5th share to Smt. A. Krishnamma and 1/5th share to appellants 3 and 4 herein while allotting 3/5th share to the 1st respondent herein. 3. Aggrieved by this preliminary decree, the 1st respondent had filed A.S. No. 05 of 2010 on the file of VII Additional District Judge, Madanapalle, Chittoor District, which eventually came to be dismissed. Against the said order of dismissal, the 1st respondent preferred S.A. No. 144 of 2016, on the file of this Court. By an order dated 23.08.2017, this Court had granted stay of passing of final decree while allowing all other proceedings to go on. This second appeal is still pending consideration before this Court. 4. After the death of Smt. A. Krishnamma, the appellants herein moved a representation before the 5th respondent-Tahsildar, on 20.05.2023, to mutate their names in the revenue records as per the preliminary decree obtained by the appellants. The 1st respondent is said to have filed objections to the said representation, but the 5th respondent-Tahsildar without considering the said objections and without issuing notice had opened a file bearing Roc. No. A/195/2023 and had passed proceedings of mutation in Roc.A/300/2023, dated 08.09.2023. 5. Aggrieved by the said mutation proceedings, the 1st respondent had approached this Court by way of W.P. No. 25983 of 2023 for setting aside the orders of mutation passed by the 5th respondent-Tahsildar. 6. The case of the 1st respondent, before the learned Single Judge was twofold. No. A/195/2023 and had passed proceedings of mutation in Roc.A/300/2023, dated 08.09.2023. 5. Aggrieved by the said mutation proceedings, the 1st respondent had approached this Court by way of W.P. No. 25983 of 2023 for setting aside the orders of mutation passed by the 5th respondent-Tahsildar. 6. The case of the 1st respondent, before the learned Single Judge was twofold. Firstly, the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court could not have been implemented by virtue of the order of stay granted by this court on 23.08.2017 in S.A. No. 144 of 2016. Secondly, the mutation proceedings could have been initiated, under Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short 'the ROR Act') only if acquisition of rights was by way of a decree of a Court. In the present case, there is no decree of the Court as a preliminary decree cannot be treated as a decree under the provisions of the ROR Act or under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, had held that the proceedings of mutation in the present case, could have been conducted only in the cases of acquisition of rights by the appellants herein by a decree of Court and that a preliminary decree cannot be treated as a decree mentioned in Section 24 of the ROR Act. The learned Single Judge came to the aforesaid conclusion on noticing Section 2(2) of C.P.C., and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna and Ors., 2009 INSC 1062 : (2009) 9 SCC 689 and Ganduri Koteshwaramma and Anr., vs. Chakri Yandadi 2011 INSC 757 : (2011) 9 SCC 788 . 7. On the basis of the above findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the proceedings of the 5th respondent-Tahsildar dated 08.09.2023 with a consequential direction to the 5th respondent-Tahsildar to restore the name of the 1st respondent in respect of the lands mentioned in Roc.A/300/2023 dated 08.09.2023. 8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have moved this court by way of the present writ appeal. 9. 8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have moved this court by way of the present writ appeal. 9. Sri A. Syam Sundar Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that Section 2(2) of C.P.C., defines a decree to include a preliminary decree and as such the finding of the learned single Judge that a preliminary decree cannot be treated as a decree for the purpose of Section 4 of the ROR Act, cannot be accepted. He would further submit that the stay granted by this Court in the S.A. No. 144 of 2016 was only a stay against passing of a final decree while permitting all other proceedings to go on. This would mean that the order issued by this Court, would not amount to a stay on the preliminary decree. 10. Sri Mahadeva Kanthirigala, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, while supporting the judgment of the learned Single Judge, submitted that the manner in which the mutation proceedings have been carried out would show that the 5th respondent-Tahsildar had not merely mutated revenue entries in the record but had actually conducted a final decree process of dividing the land by metes and bounds and creating sub-divisions, which were allotted to each of the parties to the litigation in S.A. No. 144 of 2016. Consideration of the court: 11. The issues that arise before this Court, in the light of the above submissions made by both sides, are- 1. Whether "decree of a Court" set out in Section 4 of the ROR Act would include a preliminary decree? 2. In the event of a preliminary decree meeting the requirements of a "decree", whether the 5th respondent-Tahsildar could have carried out mutation by sub-dividing the land and allotting various sub-divisions to different parties in S.A. No. 144 of 2016? 12. Section 4 and 5 of the ROR Act, read as follows: 4. 2. In the event of a preliminary decree meeting the requirements of a "decree", whether the 5th respondent-Tahsildar could have carried out mutation by sub-dividing the land and allotting various sub-divisions to different parties in S.A. No. 144 of 2016? 12. Section 4 and 5 of the ROR Act, read as follows: 4. Acquisition of Rights to be intimated: (1) Any person acquiring by succession, survivorship, in heritance, partition, Government patta, decree of a court or otherwise any right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee, occupant or tenant of a land and any person acquiring any right as occupant of a land by any other method shall intimate in writing his acquisition of such right, to the Mandal Revenue Officer within 40[thirty days] from the date of such acquisition, and the said Mandal Revenue Officer shall give or send a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such intimation to the person making it: Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other persons, having charge of his property shall intimate the fact of such acquisition to the Mandal Revenue Officer. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908, every registering Officer appointed under the Act and registering a document relating to a transaction in land, such as sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise shall intimate the Mandal Revenue Officer of the Mandal in which the property situate of such transaction electronically by transferring the data to electronically maintained Record of Rights by the Tahasildar. Explanation-I: The right mentioned above shall include a mortgage without possession and a right determined by civil court. Explanation-II: A person in whose favour a mortgage is discharged or extinguished, or a lease is determined, acquires a right within the meaning of this section. (3). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections(1) and (2), the Revenue Officer responsible for preparation of Village Records shall intimate to Tahsildar the acquisition of rights land by any person in his interdiction within fifteen (15) days from the date of knowledge in the format as may be prescribed. 5. (3). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections(1) and (2), the Revenue Officer responsible for preparation of Village Records shall intimate to Tahsildar the acquisition of rights land by any person in his interdiction within fifteen (15) days from the date of knowledge in the format as may be prescribed. 5. Amendment (and up-dating of record of rights)-(1) On receipt of intimation of the fact of acquisition of any right referred to in section 4, the Mandal Revenue Officer shall determine as to whether, and if so in what manner, the record of rights may be amended in consequence thereof and shall carry out the amendment in the record of rights in accordance with such determination: Provided that no order refusing to make an amendment in accordance with the intimation shall be passed unless the person making such intimation has been given an opportunity of making his representation in that behalf. Provided further that when the registration is approved by the Registering Officer, the name of the claimant shall be mutated in lieu of name of the executants on real time basis provisional in electronically maintained data duly assigning notional subdivision number as may be prescribed pending enquiry by the Tahsildar: Provided also that the provisional mutation shall be confirmed by the Tahsildar electronically by following due procedure under sub-section (3) within thirty days of the registration. The aggrieved person may file an appeal to the Revenue Division Officer within a period of fifteen days from the date of order of the Tahsildar and decision of the appellate authority thereon shall subject to the provisions of section 9 be, final. (2) Where the recording authority has reason to believe that an acquisition of any right of a description to which section 4 applies has taken place and of which an intimation has not been made to him under that section and where he considers that an amendment has to be effected in the record of rights, the recording authority shall carry out the said amendment in the record of rights. (3) The Mandal Revenue Officer shall, before carrying out any amendment in the record of rights under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) issue a notice in writing to all persons whose names are entered in the record of rights and who are interested in or affected by the amendment and to any other persons whom he has reason to believe to be interested therein or affected thereby to show cause within the period specified therein as to why the amendment should not be carried out. A copy of the amendment and the notice aforesaid shall also be published in such manner as may be prescribed. The recording authority shall consider every objection made in that behalf and after making such enquiry as may be prescribed pass such order in relation thereto as he deems fit. (4) Every order passed under this section shall be communicated to the persons concerned. (5) Against every order of the recording authority either making an amendment in the record of rights or refusing to make such an amendment, an appeal shall lie to such authority as may be prescribed, within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the said order and the decision of the appellate authority thereon shall, subject to the provisions of section 9, be final. (6) The Mandal revenue Officer shall have the power to correct clerical errors, if any, in the Pass Books." 13. The learned Single Judge held that any person, who acquires a right in any land, by virtue of any of the causes set out in Section 4(1) of the Act, could approach the Tahsildar for recognition of that right, in the revenue records, by mutation of the said records, under Section 5 of the Act. 14. The learned Single Judge held that creation of a right in any person, by the decree of a Court, would be sufficient to initiate action under Section 4 and 5 of the Act. However, the learned Single Judge held that the term "decree" would not include preliminary decree, in as much as, the said preliminary decree does not finally dispose of the case and that the preliminary decree by itself would not determine all the shares of the parties finally. 15. However, the learned Single Judge held that the term "decree" would not include preliminary decree, in as much as, the said preliminary decree does not finally dispose of the case and that the preliminary decree by itself would not determine all the shares of the parties finally. 15. The learned Single Judge, while interpreting the scope of the term "Decree" in section 4 (1) of the Act, had relied upon the definition of "decree" set out in Section 2(2) of C.P.C., as the term was not defined in the Act. 16. The definition of "decree" defined under Section 2(2) of C.P.C., reads as follows: 2(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.-A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final; 17. The requirements for any order or adjudication to be treated as a "decree" under Section 2(2) of C.P.C., are as follows: a) It must be a formal expression of adjudication; b) It must conclusively determine the rights of the parties; c) The said determination could be in relation to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; d) The decree can be a preliminary or a final decree; e) The Adjudication against which an appeal can be filed, as if it is an appeal from an order, under C.P.C., is excluded from the purview of a "decree". 18. The additional feature in the definition is the explanation added to Section 2 (2) of C.P.C. This explanation states that a "decree" is a preliminary decree where further proceedings have to be taken in a suit for final disposal and that where a decree disposes of a case finally, it would be a final decree. 18. The additional feature in the definition is the explanation added to Section 2 (2) of C.P.C. This explanation states that a "decree" is a preliminary decree where further proceedings have to be taken in a suit for final disposal and that where a decree disposes of a case finally, it would be a final decree. The explanation also says that a decree could be part preliminary and part final decree. 19. One of the features of a decree is that it should be a conclusive adjudication of all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. This means that a conclusive adjudication of one or more controversies in the suit, though not adjudication of all the controversies, would also amount to a decree under Section 2(2) of C.P.C. 20. In a suit for partition, the normal controversies that are determined, by way of a preliminary decree, are: the question whether there are any properties which are amenable to partition; Whether any or all the parties in the suit are entitled to a share in the property, which requires to be partitioned and the quantum of share of each of the parties who are entitled to a share in the property that requires to be partitioned etc. 21. Though the above issues are generally determined in a preliminary decree, subsequent events or facts, which were not before the Court, can also be looked into for varying the preliminary decree. For example, if a person, who is entitled to a share in the property comes to the Court after the preliminary decree is passed, the Court would change the ratio of shares allotted to the parties in the preliminary decree, subject to the required conditions being fulfilled. Where one of the parties passes away, after the preliminary decree has been passed, the Court would implead the legal heirs of such a party and apportion the share of the deceased party between the legal heirs etc. To that extent it could be said that the preliminary decree, as to the ratio of shares, cannot be treated as final, until a final decree dividing the property by metes and bounds and allotting respective individual plots, so divided to the parties, is completed. 22. To that extent it could be said that the preliminary decree, as to the ratio of shares, cannot be treated as final, until a final decree dividing the property by metes and bounds and allotting respective individual plots, so divided to the parties, is completed. 22. A constitution bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, 1967 INSC 61 : (1967) 3 SCR 153 : (1968) 2 SCJ 155 : AIR 1967 SC 1470 went into this question and held as follows: "6. The next contention is that there cannot be two preliminary decrees and therefore when the trial court varied the shares as indicated in the preliminary decree of August 1, 1942 there was no fresh preliminary decree passed by the trial court. It is not disputed that in a partition suit the court has jurisdiction to amend the shares suitably even if the preliminary decree has been passed if some member of the family to whom an allotment was made in the preliminary decree dies thereafter : (see Parshuram v. Hirabai, AIR 1957 Bom 59 ]). So the trial court was justified in amending the shares on the deaths of Sohan Lal and Smt Gulab Bai. The only question then is whether this amendment amounted to a fresh decree. The Allahabad High Court in Bharat Indo v. Yakub Hassan, (1913) ILR 35 All 159] the Oudh Chief Court in Kedernath v. Pattu Lal, (1945) ILR 20 Luck 557 and the Punjab High Court in Joti Parshad v. Ganeshi Lal, AIR 1961 Punj 120 seem to take the view that there can be only one preliminary decree and one final decree thereafter. The Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts seem to take the view that there can be more than one preliminary decree: (see Kasi v. V. Ramanathan Chettiar, (1947) II Mad LJ 523, Raja Peary Mohan v. Manohar, (1923) 27 Cal WN 989, and Parshuram v. Hirabai, AIR 1957 Bom 59 . 7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. 7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. We have already said that it is not disputed that in partition suits the court can do so even after the preliminary decree is passed. It would in our opinion be convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. If this is done, there is a clear determination of the rights of parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty in holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the court. So far therefore as partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the court can and should do so; and if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the court deciding that dispute and making variation in shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. We should however like to point out that what we are saying must be confined to partition suits, for we are not concerned in the present appeal with other kinds of suits in which also preliminary and final decrees are passed. There is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree in such circumstances and we do not see why we should rule out a second preliminary decree in such circumstances only on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate such a possibility. There is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree in such circumstances and we do not see why we should rule out a second preliminary decree in such circumstances only on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate such a possibility. In any case if two views are possible and obviously this is so because the High Courts have differed on the question - we would prefer the view taken by the High Courts which hold that a second preliminary decree can be passed, particularly in partition suits where parties have died after the preliminary decree and shares specified in the preliminary decree have to be adjusted. We see no reason why in such a case if there is dispute, it should not be decided by the court which passed the preliminary decree, for it must not be forgotten that the suit is not over till the final decree is passed and the court has jurisdiction to decide all disputes that may arise after the preliminary decree, particularly in a partition suit due to deaths of some of the parties. Whether there can be more than one final decree does not arise in the present appeal and on that we express no opinion. We therefore hold that in the circumstances of this case it was open to the court to draw up a fresh preliminary decree as two of the parties had died after the preliminary decree and before the final decree was passed. Further as there was dispute between the surviving parties as to devolution of the shares of the parties who were dead and that dispute was decided by the trial court in the present case and thereafter the preliminary decree already passed was amended, the decision amounted to a decree and was liable to appeal. We therefore agree with the view taken by the High Court that in such circumstances a second preliminary decree can be passed in partition suits by which the shares allotted in the preliminary decree already passed can be amended and if there is dispute between surviving parties in that behalf and that dispute is decided the decision amounts to a decree. We should however like to make it clear that this can only be done so long as the final decree has not been passed. We should however like to make it clear that this can only be done so long as the final decree has not been passed. We therefore reject this contention of the appellant." 23. While there is possibility that determination of some of the controversies in the suit, in a preliminary decree, cannot be treated as final until a final decree is passed, it must be held that there are certain controversies which attain finality and can be altered only by way of an appeal and not otherwise. For example, the question of whether certain properties or all the properties mentioned in the plaint are required to be partitioned among the parties; whether a party to the suit has a share in the property, though quantum of such shares may be subject to further variations or controversies, which are decided finally in a preliminary decree. In such circumstances, it would have to be held that even a preliminary decree would answer the description of a decree as defined in Section 2(2) of C.P.C., and would consequently answer the description of a "decree" under Section 4 of the Act. 24. A 4 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy, 1962 INSC 353 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 616 : AIR 1963 SC 992 : (1963) 2 SCJ 577 had, while considering the question of whether a preliminary decree decides anything finally had held as follows: 5. The new provision makes it clear that the law is and has always been that upon the father's insolvency his disposing power over the interest of his undivided sons in the joint family property vests in the Official Receiver and that consequently the latter has a right to sell that interest. The provision is thus declaratory of the law and was intended to apply to all cases except those covered by the two provisos. We are concerned here only with the first proviso. This proviso excepts from the operation of the Act a transaction such as a sale by an Official Receiver which has been the subject of a final decision by a competent court. The short question, therefore, is whether the preliminary decree for partition passed in this case which was affirmed finally in second appeal by the High Court of Madras can be regarded as a final decision. The competence of the court is not in question here. The short question, therefore, is whether the preliminary decree for partition passed in this case which was affirmed finally in second appeal by the High Court of Madras can be regarded as a final decision. The competence of the court is not in question here. What is, however, contended is that in a partition suit the only decision which can be said to be a final decision is the final decree passed in the case and that since final decree proceedings were still going on when the Amending Act came into force the first proviso was not available to the appellants. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that since the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by the court before a preliminary decree is passed that decree must, insofar as rights adjudicated upon are concerned, be deemed to be a final decision. The word decision even in its popular sense means a concluded opinion (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edn. Vol. I, p. 743.) Where, therefore, the decision is embodied in the judgment which is followed by a decree finality must naturally attach itself to it in the sense that it is no longer open to question by either party except in an appeal, review or revision petition as provided for by law. The High Court has, however, observed: "The mere declaration of the rights of the plaintiff by the preliminary decree, would, in our opinion not amount to a final decision for it is well known that even if a preliminary decree is passed either in a mortgage suit or in a partition suit, there are certain contingencies in which such a preliminary decree can be modified or amended and therefore would not become final." It is not clear from the judgment what the contingencies referred to by the High Court are in which a preliminary decree can be modified or amended unless what the learned Judges meant was modified or amended in appeal or in review or in revision or in exceptional circumstances by resorting to the powers conferred by Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If that is what the High Court meant then every decree passed by a court including decrees passed in cases which do not contemplate making of a preliminary decree are liable to be "modified and amended". If that is what the High Court meant then every decree passed by a court including decrees passed in cases which do not contemplate making of a preliminary decree are liable to be "modified and amended". Therefore, if the reason given by the High Court is accepted it would mean that no finality attaches to decree at all. That is not the law. A decision is said to be final when, so far as the court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree - the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree. 25. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree. 25. Another aspect that needs to be looked at, while considering the above issue, is the fact that purchasers or persons interested in a property, though the Courts have consistently held that mere entries into the revenue records do not confer title or ownership over any property, normally look at the revenue records to ascertain the persons who are shown as owners or possessors of the property in the revenue records. Inclusion of names of persons, who have been declared to have a share in the property, by virtue of a preliminary decree would only promote transparency in the revenue records. 26. On the second issue of the manner in which the mutation had been carried out, we are in respectful agreement with the views of the learned Single Judge that the revenue authorities cannot step into the shoes of the Court and effectively create a final decree even before such a proceeding is issued by the Court. A perusal of the order impugned before the learned Single Judge would show that the 5th respondent-Tahsildar had sub-divided the land and created sub-divisions in the revenue records, after which each of the parties were allotted certain sub-division numbers and the land in those sub-divisions were shown to be owned and possessed by such persons. This allocation of land and creating sub-divisions in the revenue records would effectively amount to separation of the property by metes and bounds. Such a course of action is not permissible. 27. The only option available to the 5th respondent-Tahsildar, was to have simply included the names of all the parties, who have held a share or interest in the said land, in the preliminary decree. In view of the fact that the quantum of shares could always change, till the passing of the final decree, the 5th respondent-Tahsildar could only have included the names without assigning any share to any of the parties who were found to have a right or share in the property, in the preliminary decree. 28. In the circumstances, this writ appeal is allowed by modifying the order of the learned Single Judge, in the following terms: 1. 28. In the circumstances, this writ appeal is allowed by modifying the order of the learned Single Judge, in the following terms: 1. The order of mutation dated 08.09.2023 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the 5th respondent-Tahsildar. 2. The 5th respondent-Tahsildar, after hearing both sides, shall take an appropriate decision, within six weeks of receipt of this order. In the event of the 5th respondent-Tahsildar deciding to make an entry in the revenue records, in favour of such parties, the 5th respondent-Tahsildar shall not indicate any quantum of share or enter the names of such parties by creating any sub-division in the said revenue record but shall only include the name of the parties as persons who have a right and share in the property in question. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.