Atibir Industries Co. Ltd. v. Shree Ganesh Roadlines
2024-04-12
SHAMPA SARKAR
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Shampa Sarkar, J. 1. The revisional application arises out of an order dated December 08, 2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Haldia, in connection with Money Suit No.06 of 2022. 2. By the order impugned, the learned court exercised power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by recalling the order dated March 29, 2023, and restoring the suit. The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution at the instance of the plaintiff/opposite party. The learned court held that the Money Suit had been filed for a money claim of Rs.68,68,746.61/-. On an assurance given by the defendants/petitioners that they would repay all the dues, the plaintiff withdrew the suit for non-prosecution. 3. The plaintiff was examined by the learned trial court before the order dismissing the suit for non-prosecution had been passed. Subsequently, on or about 19th April, 2023, an application was filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for recall of the order dated March 29, 2023 and for restoration of the suit. The ground taken was that a meeting was held between the parties on April 04, 2023, but the defendants denied to pay off the dues of the plaintiff. On the other hand, the defendants threatened the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiff claimed to have acted in good faith and wanted to resolve the problem. Thus, the plaintiff was persuaded to withdraw the suit. The subsequent mala fide action of the defendants compelled the plaintiff to file an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for recalling of the order of the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution. 5. The learned court was of the view that in such backdrop of the case, justice would be sub served if the application was allowed and the order of dismissal of the suit on the ground of non-prosecution was recalled. The learned court observed that the plaintiff would not deliberately withdraw his suit, unless there was some talk of compromise or assurance of the payment by the defendants. The application dated March 29, 2023, on the basis of which the suit was withdrawn and dismissed for non-prosecution, clearly recorded that there were talks of settlement and there was no necessity to proceed with the suit. 6.
The application dated March 29, 2023, on the basis of which the suit was withdrawn and dismissed for non-prosecution, clearly recorded that there were talks of settlement and there was no necessity to proceed with the suit. 6. Accordingly, when the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and not on any merit, the learned court held that the inherent power should be exercised by recalling the order of dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution. 7. Mr. Krishnendu Goopta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that filing of a fresh suit on the self-same cause of action was barred. Thus, question of restoring the Money Suit would not arise. The suit was withdrawn as not pressed without any liberty to file afresh on the selfsame cause of action. Thus, the inherent power of the court could not be exercised to negate the applicability of Order 23 Rule 1 sub-Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned court could not have exercised power by invoking inherent jurisdiction to restore the said suit for further consideration and adjudication. 8. In the facts of the case, it appears that the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution when the plaintiff prayed for withdrawal of the suit. Such prayer was made in view of the talks of settlement and an oral assurance of compromise between the parties. The suit was at the initial stage when the application for withdrawal was filed. The learned court, upon examining PW1/plaintiff dismissed the suit for non-prosecution. The application for withdrawal clearly indicated that the said step was taken by the plaintiff in view of the assurance given by the defendants that the money claimed by the plaintiff to be due and payable, would be paid by the defendants. The plaintiff and the defendants held a meeting on April 04, 2023, and the defendant withdraw from such assurance. On the other hand, the plaintiff was also threatened. Immediately, the plaintiff came back to the court and filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for recalling of the order by which the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution. 9. The bona fide of the plaintiff is available from his conduct. Within twenty days from the order of dismissal, the plaintiff approached the court and prayed for recalling of the order. 10. The suit was withdrawn in view of an oral assurance of settlement.
9. The bona fide of the plaintiff is available from his conduct. Within twenty days from the order of dismissal, the plaintiff approached the court and prayed for recalling of the order. 10. The suit was withdrawn in view of an oral assurance of settlement. The suit had not proceeded to a stage where rights have been created in favour of the defendants. No such pleading is available. The suit was withdrawn without seeking any permission to file a fresh suit on self-same cause of action. Thus, if the suit was not restored to its original number, grave injustice would have been caused to the plaintiff. The court had rightly exercised inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to restore the suit. 11. Reference is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jet Ply Wood Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs. Madhukar Nowlakha and Others, reported in AIR 2006 SC 1260 . The Hon’ble Apex Court held that inherent power to recall an order was vested in a court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By invoking such power, the court could restore the suit. 12. In the absence of a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting an application seeking recall of an order of dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution on talks of compromise, the provision of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be resorted to in the interest of justice. The relevant paragraphs are quoted below:- “20. Mr Singhvi urged that while dismissing the application filed by Shri Biswarup Banerjee and others recalling the order dated 4-2-2005 the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in his order dated 11-3-2005 had referred to and relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rameswar Sarkar v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1986 Cal 19 : (1985) 2 CHN 482 ] in support of his order that when through mistake a plaintiff withdraws his suit, the court is not powerless to set aside such order of dismissal in exercise of inherent powers even if no leave to file a fresh suit had been prayed for. 21. Mr Singhvi urged that the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court and impugned in these appeals did not call for any interference by this Court. 22.
21. Mr Singhvi urged that the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court and impugned in these appeals did not call for any interference by this Court. 22. Mr Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 1 in the second set of appeals while adopting Mr Singhvi's submission, added that since the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court had acted within his jurisdiction to do justice between the parties, the same did not warrant any interference by this Court. Mr Sorabjee submitted that this was not a case of the Court having acted without jurisdiction but having acted in the exercise of its inherent powers to do justice between the parties. 23. As indicated hereinbefore, the only point which falls for our consideration in these appeals is whether the trial court was entitled in law to recall the order by which it had allowed the plaintiff to withdraw his suit. 24. From the order of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 9th Court at Alipore, it is clear that he had had no intention of granting any leave for filing of a fresh suit on the same cause of action while allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his suit. That does not, however, mean that by passing such an order the learned court divested itself of its inherent power to recall its said order, which fact is also evident from the order itself which indicates that the court did not find any scope to exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the order passed by it earlier. In the circumstances set out in the order of 24-9-2004, the learned trial court felt that no case had been made out to recall the order which had been made at the instance of the plaintiff himself. It was, therefore, not a question of lack of jurisdiction but the conscious decision of the court not to exercise such jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff. 25. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in his order dated 4-2-2005 though the language used by him is not entirely convincing.
It was, therefore, not a question of lack of jurisdiction but the conscious decision of the court not to exercise such jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff. 25. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in his order dated 4-2-2005 though the language used by him is not entirely convincing. However, the position was clarified by the learned Judge in his subsequent order dated 14-3-2005 in which reference has been made to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rameswar Sarkar [ AIR 1986 Cal 19 : (1985) 2 CHN 482 ] which, in our view, correctly explains the law with regard to the inherent powers of the Court to do justice between the parties. There is no doubt in our minds that in the absence of a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure providing for the filing of an application for recalling of an order permitting withdrawal of a suit, the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code can be resorted to in the interest of justice. The principle is well established that when the Code of Civil Procedure is silent regarding a procedural aspect, the inherent power of the court can come to its aid to act ex debito justitiae for doing real and substantial justice between the parties. This Court had occasion to observe in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth, AIR 1962 SC 527 as follows : “It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them.” 26. Based on the aforesaid principle, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in almost identical circumstances in Rameswar Sarkar case [ AIR 1986 Cal 19 : (1985) 2 CHN 482 ] , allowed the application for withdrawal of the suit in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon holding that when through mistake the plaintiff had withdrawn the suit, the court would not be powerless to set aside the order permitting withdrawal of the suit.” 13.
In the decision of Rameswar Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 1985 SCC Online Cal 139, a similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court:- “13. On the other hand, it has been held by Oldfield, J. of the Madras High Court in Lakshman Pillai v. Appalwar Alwar Ayyangar, AIR 1923 Mad 246, that on general principles there does not seem to be any reason why withdrawal of a withdrawal should not be recognised, if there is no question of undue prejudice to any other party to the proceeding. 14. The scope of S. 151 is very wide. Where there is no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing any remedy, S. 151 will apply. O. 23, R. 1 provides withdrawal of a suit with or without liberty to file a fresh suit. There is no provision for getting an order passed on withdrawal application set aside or praying for withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of the suit. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the Court is not powerless to allow withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of a suit in exercise of its inherent power in a proper and suitable case. In a Bench decision of this Court in Manik Mahato v. Gangapada Mahato, (1977) 81 Cal WN 950, it has been held that the Court has always jurisdiction to entertain and consider an application under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is primarily directed for recall of an order passed earlier. Further, it has been held that notwithstanding that an appeal lies against an order rejecting a plaint, an application under S. 151 is maintainable as such an appeal would be of no avail to the plaintiffs as there would be no material before the Appellate Court to go by. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of Lort-Williams, J. in Bhagat Singh v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney, AIR 1941 Cal 670. It has been observed by his Lordship that the Code is not exhaustive; there are cases which are not provided for in it, and the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done.
It has been observed by his Lordship that the Code is not exhaustive; there are cases which are not provided for in it, and the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done. Further, it has been held that the law cannot make express provisions against all inconveniences, and the Court has, therefore, in many cases where the circumstances warrant it, and the necessities of the case require it, to act upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act ex debito justitiae and to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists. 15. It will now be profitable to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 . The Supreme Court observed as follows: “It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them.” Thereafter, with regard to S. 151 of the Code, the Supreme Court observed as follows; “The section itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it.” In Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commr. of Income-tax, New Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 1348 , it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the Courts have power, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition, to pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court, and to hold otherwise would result in quite a number of cases in gross miscarriage of justice. 16.
16. In the instant case, according to the plaintiff he could not realise the seriousness of the prejudice that would be suffered by him if the suit was withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit. It has been already noticed that the plaintiff has paid the maximum court-fee of Rs. 10,000/-. It is true that the Court has passed an order dismissing the suit for non-prosecution on the application of the plaintiff but in our opinion, that would be no ground to refuse to do justice. If through mistake the plaintiff has withdrawn the suit, the Court, in our view, will not be powerless to set aside the order of dismissal of the suit and allow the withdrawal of the application for withdrawal of the suit in exercise of its inherent power. Most respectfully we beg to differ from the view that the Court has no jurisdiction to allow withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of a suit in exercise of its inherent power as recognised under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, made clear that there must be some justifiable reasons for allowing withdrawal of the application for withdrawal of the suit.” 14. Admittedly, the suit was withdrawn on the basis of talks of settlement without liberty to file afresh, as the plaintiff had the bona fide intention to settle the dispute. The withdrawal of the suit may have been a bona fide mistake or wrong advice or honest intention of the plaintiff to settle the dispute. Under such circumstances, the court was not powerless to restore the suit to do complete justice. 15. Under such circumstances, the learned court had rightly exercised its inherent power and recalled the order by which the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution by restoring the suit. 16. The order impugned is justified and upheld. 17. The revisional application is dismissed. 18. There shall no order as to cost. 19. Parties are to act on the basis of the sever copy of this order.