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2024 DIGILAW 798 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Gujarat Rajya Pachhat Varqa Chhatralaya Karmachari Maha

2024-04-08

BIREN VAISHNAV, PRANAV TRIVEDI

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JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. The State is in appeal challenging the CAV Judgment dated 29.07.2022 of the learned Single Judge. In a petition filed by the Gujarat Rajya Pachhat Varga Chhatralaya Karmachari Mahamandal wherein the original petitioners – respondents herein had prayed for a declaration that the members of the petitioner – Union are entitled to receive the pay scale as per Government Resolution dated 31.08.2000, the Court, gave the following directions: “38. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The members of the petitioner- Union are entitled to get pay scale or at- least minimum pay scale equivalent to the similarly situated employees of Ashram Shalas or hostels getting 100% grant from the State Government. 39. The respondents are directed to fix the same pay scale of similarly situated persons of Ashram Shalas and Hostels getting 100% grant-in-aid for the respective post held by the employees of Hostels getting 90% grant instead of fix pay. Respondent - State authorities are directed to release adequate amount so as to meet with the responsibility of making such payment. Such exercise shall be completed within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of this order.” 2. Briefly stated the facts indicate that it was the case of the petitioner Union that their members are working as Wardens, Assistant Wardens, Cooks, Assistant Cooks and Watchman in the Hostels and Ashramshalas. The hostels are run by NGOs for backward classes having 90% grant from the Government and the members are receiving an honorarium where similarly situated employees of hostels run through receipt of 100% grant from State are getting pay scales prescribed by the State Government. Even when engaged by Ashramshalas, it is their case that having an identical procedure for appointment, qualification and duties in both cases and there being commonality of work and nature of duties of the members of the petitioner – Union with that of employees in Government Institutions, the petitioners are entitled to ‘equal pay of equal work’. 3. The learned Single Judge after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Jagjit Singh and others reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 held thus:- “36. 3. The learned Single Judge after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Jagjit Singh and others reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 held thus:- “36. Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, decided by a five-Judge Constitution Bench: Needless to mention, that the main proposition canvassed in the instant judgment, pertained to regularization of government servants, based on the employees having rendered long years of service, as temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or on ad-hoc basis. It is, however relevant to mention, that the Constitution Bench did examine the question of wages, which such employees were entitled to draw. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, a reference was made to civil appeal nos. 3595- 612 of 1999, wherein, the respondent-employees were temporarily engaged on daily-wages in the Commercial Taxes Department. As they had rendered service for more than 10 years, they claimed permanent employment in the department. They also claimed benefits as were extended to regular employees of their cadre, including wages (equal to their salary and allowances) with effect from the dates from which they were appointed. Even though the administrative tribunal had rejected their claim, by returning a finding, that they had not made out a case for payment of wages, equal to those engaged on regular basis, the High Court held that they were entitled to wages, equal to the salary of regular employees of their cadre, with effect from the date from which they were appointed. The direction issued by the High Court resulted in payment of higher wages retrospectively, for a period of 10 and more years. It would also be relevant to mention, that in passing the above direction, the High Court had relied on the decision rendered by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily-Wage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka. The Constitution Bench, having noticed the contentions of the rival parties, on the subject of wages payable to daily-wagers, recorded its conclusions as under:- “55. In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the direction for payment from the dates of engagement. We find that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that these employees be paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged or appointed. It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the State when the very question before the High Court in the case was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal work so called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal to the salary that is being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily-wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in C.A. Nos. 3595- 3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them.” We have extracted the aforesaid paragraph, so as not to make any inference on our own, but to project the determination rendered by the Constitution Bench, as was expressed by the Bench. We have no hesitation in concluding, that the Constitution Bench consciously distinguished the issue of pay parity, from the issue of absorption/regularization in service. It was held, that on the issue of pay parity, the High Court ought to have directed, that the daily-wage workers be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of their cadre. The Constitution Bench expressed the view, that the concept of equality would not be applicable to the issue of absorption/regularization in service. And conversely, on the subject of pay parity, it was unambiguously held, that daily-wage earners should be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade (without any allowances). 37. State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, decided by a three-Judge bench: A large number of civil appeals were collectively disposed of by a common order. In all these appeals, the respondents were daily-wagers, who were appointed as Ledger Clerks, Ledger Keepers, Pump Operators, Mali-cum- Chowkidar, Fitters, Petrol Men, Surveyors, etc. All of them claimed the minimum wages payable under the pay-scale extended to regular Class-IV employees. The above relief was claimed with effect from the date of their initial appointment. In all these appeals, the respondents were daily-wagers, who were appointed as Ledger Clerks, Ledger Keepers, Pump Operators, Mali-cum- Chowkidar, Fitters, Petrol Men, Surveyors, etc. All of them claimed the minimum wages payable under the pay-scale extended to regular Class-IV employees. The above relief was claimed with effect from the date of their initial appointment. It would be relevant to mention, that while the appeals disposed of by the common order were pending before this Court, all the respondents were regularized. From the date of their regularization, they were in any case, being paid salary in the scales applicable to regular Class-IV employees. The limited question which came up for adjudication before this Court in the matters was, whether the directions issued by the High Court to pay the minimum wage in the scale payable to Class-IV employees to the respondents, from the date of their filing the respective petition before the High Court, was required to be interfered with. While adjudicating upon the aforesaid issue, this Court made the following observations:- “19. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77 , State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123 , Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 , Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by the competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.” Having made the above observations, the judgments rendered by the High Court were set aside, and the matters were remanded back to the High Court, to examine each case in order to determine whether the respondents were discharging the same duties and responsibilities, as the employees with whom they claimed parity. In sum and substance therefore, this Court acceded to the proposition that daily-wagers who were rendering the same duties and responsibilities as regular employees, would be entitled to the minimum wage in the pay-scale payable to regular employees. It is only because the said factual determination had not been rendered by the High Court, the matter was remanded back, for a fresh adjudication on the above limited issue.” 4. Ms.Manisha Lavkumar learned Additional Advocate General appearing with Mr.Siddharth Rami would submit through a pictorial chart that there are two departments at the helm namely the Social Justice and Empowerment Department and the Tribal Development Department. The hostels/chhatralayas run by NGO under the approval of the respective Directors of Scheduled Caste Welfare, Developing Caste Welfare, Tribal Development Department respectively receive grant to the extent of 90% of the honorarium whereas the Ashramshalas get 100% grant-in- aid. These hostels offer only lodging and boarding and are run by NGOs whereas the Wardens in Ashramshalas are getting regular pay scales in the 7th pay commission as they are teachers duly qualified who additionally on a vocational basis offer services as wardens. There is no post of Assistant Wardens on the establishment. As far as Cooks/Assistant Cooks/ Watchmen are concerned, they are all posts which, after 30.11.2006, are filled by outsourcing. There is no post of Assistant Wardens on the establishment. As far as Cooks/Assistant Cooks/ Watchmen are concerned, they are all posts which, after 30.11.2006, are filled by outsourcing. She would therefore submit that the members of the petitioner union who are engaged through NGOs and/or outsourced cannot claim a benefit of equal pay for equal work. 5. Mr.Shalin Mehta learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr.Hasit Dave learned advocate for the respondent would submit that admittedly when the procedure of their entry in service and the nature of duties were identical, the learned Single Judge, committed no error in giving the directions as set out in the earlier part of this order. 6. The chart submitted by Ms.Manisha Lavkumar learned Additional Advocate General disputes this contention and seeks to demonstrate the material difference in the manner of appointment, nature of duties, sensitiveness of the functions of wardens working in grant-in-aid Ashramshalas (which are schools having additional lodging and boarding facilities), observation homes, institutions for differently- abled. 7. Having heard learned Additional Advocate General Ms.Manisha Lavkumar for the State and Mr.Shalin Mehta learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, it cannot be disputed that the learned Single Judge, considering the facts and the law opined that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not a debatable issue in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Jagjit Singh and others (supra). The learned Single Judge held that on comparison of the appointment procedure, qualifications and duties between the employees of hostels run by NGOs getting 100% grant and the employees of hostels run by NGOs getting 90% grant, it emerges that all the three aspects are common in both cases for all the posts. 7.1 The learned Single Judge observed as under: “30. In view of above ratio laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court for applying the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, in the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that members of the petitioner- Union who are discharging duties as Warden (Gruhpati), Assistant Warden, Cook, Assistant Cook, Watchman etc. are appointed following the same procedure, having the same qualification and discharging the same duties as that of similarly situated persons in Ashram Shalas or hostels which are getting 100% grant from the State Government. 31. are appointed following the same procedure, having the same qualification and discharging the same duties as that of similarly situated persons in Ashram Shalas or hostels which are getting 100% grant from the State Government. 31. Therefore, the members of the petitioner-Union are also entitled to get the same pay scale as being paid to the similarly situated persons. Supreme Court Secretariat (supra), in the case Personal the Apex decision of Haryana Stafi Court of the Civil Association held that the assertion made at the behest of the Personal Assistant that they were discharging similar duties and responsibilities Assistant in Central factually incorrect as Personal Secretariat and there was no comparison made of the nature of duties and responsibilities or about the qualifications prescribed for recruitment for both the posts. Whereas in the facts of the present case, on comparison of the appointment procedure, qualification and duties between the employees of hostels run by NGOs getting 100% grant and the employees of hostels run by NGOs getting 90% grant, it emerges that all the three aspects are common in both cases for all the posts.” 7.2 The directions that followed and which we have reproduced earlier, therefore are based on the case of Jagjit Singh and others (supra) in light of the undisputed facts. 7.3 During the course of hearing over a period, the President of the Mahamandal filed an additional affidavit which reads as under: “1. The opponent above-named most respectfully submits that the State has preferred the aforestated Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and order dtd 29-7-2022, passed by the Ld Honble Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court. 2. The Opponent states and submits that pursuant to various hearings and deliberations on the issue, they are ready and willing to accept the “minimum of the pay scale” under the impugned judgment and order dated 29-7-2022 and do not claim equal pay for equal work, or any parity in pay, with the employees of Government hostels and Ashramshalas. 3. Accordingly the undersigned President of the Opponent Association on behalf of all our members, after detailed discussions with them are ready and willing to accept the “minimum of the pay scales” as applicable today to similar situated employees in the State government, against the respective posts with applicable arrears. 3. Accordingly the undersigned President of the Opponent Association on behalf of all our members, after detailed discussions with them are ready and willing to accept the “minimum of the pay scales” as applicable today to similar situated employees in the State government, against the respective posts with applicable arrears. This will be without prejudice to all our legal rights and contentions, as available to us, in case the State seeks to continue this litigation any further.” 8. In light of the controversy involved and both parties having argued, we are inclined to pass the following order: 8.1 There can be no dispute that the facts of the case indicate that the parameters set out for grant of the benefit of ‘minimum of pay scales’ in the case of Jagjit Singh and others (supra) is applicable to the wardens of the respondent- Mahamandal. 8.2 As far as Wardens are concerned, the members of the respondent-Union working on such posts shall be entitled to the minimum of pay-scale of a Class-III post. 8.3 As it has been pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General that there is no post with the designation of Assistant Warden, the members of the respondent union working as Assistant Wardens be extended the benefit of the minimum of a pay scale available to a category/class of post not being a Class-III or a Class-IV post but to the minimum of a pay scale of an intermediary post. 8.4 The Cooks/Assistant Cooks and Watchmen who are members of the association shall be entitled to the minimum current wages available to Cooks/Assistant Cooks and watchmen engaged by outsourcing by the State. 8.5 The petitioners/respondents herein, we are informed, have filed an application before the learned Single Judge with the following prayers: “(A) Your Lordships be pleased to admit and allow the present application. (B) Your Lordships be pleased to direct and fix the benefits conferred under the judgment & order dated 29-7-2022, w.e.f. the date of filing of the petition i.e. from the year 2006, and/or from any other appropriate date, as deemed fit and proper by this Honble Court.” 8.6 Looking to the financial burden that will entail the exchequer in extending the benefits of minimum of pay-scale and/or minimum wage, we need to fix an appropriate cut-off date for granting the benefits as aforesaid. We observe that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is dated 29.7.2022. The cut-off date, reasonably, can be 01.08.2022, the date from which the benefits of the minimum of pay scale or minimum wage, whichever applicable, can be granted to the members of the respondent herein. 8.7 Accordingly, we direct the appellant State to extend the benefits of minimum of pay scales and/or minimum wages as set out herein above to the members of the Union working in the respective cadres. Such benefits shall be available with effect from 01.08.2022. 8.8 The State shall endeavor to extend these benefits together with arrears w.e.f. 01.08.2022 in actual terms within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 8.9 Learned counsel for the respondent Shri Shalin Mehta states that the Misc. Civil Applications filed for the prayers herein above shall be treated to have been withdrawn. The parties respondent/applicant undertakes to withdraw the same forthwith. 8.10 However, in the event the State Government proposes to challenge the captioned order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the concession given by the petitioner of not pressing the MCA would stand withdrawn and it would be open for the petitioners to revive the Misc. Civil Application being Misc. Civil Application No.1 of 2022. 8.11 It is also submitted by the original writ petitioners that by virtue of that date prescribed by the Hon’ble Court, 43 number of retired petitioners, details of which have been handed over to the counsel for the appellants would stand to receive nothing. In that view of the matter, it would meet the ends of justice if such 43 petitioners alone who have been adjudicating the issues since 2006 would be granted 2 years of arrears despite the fact of they having retired during the pendency of the captioned appeal. It is clarified that other than the 43 retired petitioners, none else would be entitled to such arrears. It is also clarified that this order shall apply only to those who have approached this court through the Union and would not be applicable in the case of any other persons. 9. Appeal is accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid directions. In view of the disposal of the main appeal, Civil Application for stay will also not survive and hence, the same is also disposed of.