JUDGMENT : Sri. George Poonthottam, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Smt. Nisha George, appearing for the petitioners, vehemently argued that the rejection of the nominations of his clients is for reasons that are contrary to Ext.P1 notification. 2. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that, while the rejection of nominations of petitioners 1 and 2 is on the ground that they could not have offered their candidature without having obtained a loan from the Society, going by its Bye-laws; as far as petitioners 3 and 4 are concerned, the finding that they are in arrears of loans is also incorrect. He contended that, as far as petitioner No.3 is concerned, admittedly, going by the rejection, she has been shown to be in arrears only from July, 2024; and that it is manifest that she has not been issued with a notice as required under the Statutory Scheme. He thus prayed that his clients be allowed to participate in the Elections, for which, their nominations be ordered to be accepted. 3. Sri. C.M. Nazar – learned Standing Counsel for the State Cooperative Election Commission (‘Election Commission’, for short), however, submitted that the rejection of the candidature of petitioner No.4 is irreproachable because, he is facing an Award issued in an Arbitration proceeding, which still remains unhonoured. He submitted that, therefore, the factum of him being in arrears is implicit and does not require to be specifically proved. 4. As regards petitioner No.3, Sri. C.M. Nazar conceded that the arrears shown are for the month July, 2024; and that no notice appear to have been issued to him, but argued that, in spite of this, her rejection is valid because she is admittedly in arrears. 5. Coming to petitioners 1 and 2, Sri. C.M. Nazar argued that Ext.P1 notification clearly says that the constituencies for the election are as per the Bye-laws; and pointed out to Ext.P6, wherein, every seat is, in fact, reserved because, out of the 13 available, eight are to be filled up from those who have taken loans from the Society; one from those who have deposited money with it; three from among women; and one from among SC/ST candidates. He argued that, therefore, when petitioners 1 and 2 are not either depositors, or have taken loans, they could not have made their nominations. 6. Sri. He argued that, therefore, when petitioners 1 and 2 are not either depositors, or have taken loans, they could not have made their nominations. 6. Sri. P.U. Shailajan – learned Standing Counsel for the respondent – Society, adopted the afore submissions of Sri. C.M. Nazar. 7. Sri. George Poonthottam – learned Senior Counsel, however, in reply to the afore, submitted that, in Ext.P1 notification, seven seats are reserved for ‘general’, without any other qualification being shown. He argued that, therefore, the afore submissions of Sri. C.M. Nazar would be counter-productive because, if this Court is to hold that every seat is reserved for particular kinds of candidates, then Ext.P1 itself would have to be seen to be in error, since it provides for seven ‘General’ Seats, along with one which is reserved for a person in the General Quota but below 40 years. 8. Sri. George Poonthottam then argued that, such restriction, in any case, even assuming to be acceptable, would be untenable in view of the judgment of this Court in Chandran K.M. v. State Election Commission [ 2019 (4) KHC 308 ]; and he also relied upon Section 13A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, to argue that no part of the Bye-law of the Society can go against the Statutory requirements and prescriptions. 9. This Court is fully aware that, normally, when it comes to rejection of nominations, interference is extremely reluctant. This is because, once the election processes starts, even the rejection of nominations will have to be dealt with as per the Statutory provisions; and the only exception that can be drawn is where it is so perverse, that it would render it virtually null and void. 10. As far as the 4th petitioner is concerned, this Court cannot come to his aid because, admittedly, there is an Arbitration Award against him; and hence, the question whether he had been issued notice or otherwise, prior to his disqualification, would be irrelevant. 11. As regards the 3rd petitioner, since the Election Commission also admits that her rejection has been ordered on the basis of alleged arrears for the month July, 2024, it is evident that not even a single notice has been issued to her, intimating her of the same, particularly because she says that she is only a surety. 11. As regards the 3rd petitioner, since the Election Commission also admits that her rejection has been ordered on the basis of alleged arrears for the month July, 2024, it is evident that not even a single notice has been issued to her, intimating her of the same, particularly because she says that she is only a surety. The petitioner, therefore, in this case has been wrongly denied her right; and I do not think that such an action by the Election Commission could be protected, merely because the election processes have begun. 12. Coming to petitioners 1 and 2, the Returning Officer has not rejected their application because there is any disqualification, but allegedly because they do not enjoy to the qualification as stipulated in the Bye-laws of the Society. 13. The copy of the Bye-laws is available as Ext.P6, wherein, it indicates that, out of the 13 seats, eight will have to be reserved for those who have taken loans; one for a person who has made deposit; three for women; and one for SC/ST. It is, therefore, ineluctable that, if the Bye-laws are to be accepted, then there is no ‘general’ seat at all and that every one of them is reserved, one way or another. 14. However, when one turns to Ext.P1, it is evident that the Election Commission has issued the said notification, declaring seven seats to be ‘general’; two to be reserved for women; one for SC/ST and one each for persons in the ‘general’ category, who is below 40 years; one in the women category who is below 40 years; and one who is a depositor who has deposited a minimum of Rs.25,000/-. Though the notification says that the constituencies have been fixed as per the bye laws, one can never fathom how they say that eight among the thirteen seats are ‘general’, when they now say that all of them are reserved. 15. It is here that the declarations of this Court in Chandran K.M.(Supra) would come to play because, this Court has already held that any provision of the byelaws which runs contrary to the statutory requirements in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules thereunder (‘Act’ and ‘Rules’ for short), would obtain no forensic legs to stand on; and this is made more manifest with the interdiction of Section 13A of the ‘Act’. 16. 16. Viewed in that perspective, this Court is then guided by Damodaran v. Joint Registrar [ 1989 (1) KLT 858 ] and Ravi v. Kottayam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. [ 1993 (1) KLT 644 ], both of which declare the law affirmatively, and which has stood the test of time, that when nominations are rejected wholly for want of competence, jurisdiction, or for reasons that cannot appeal to common sense and to the constitutional requirements, it can be interfered by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without requiring the petitioners to wait for the elections to be over and to then invoke alternative remedies. 17. In the case at hand, petitioners 1 and 2 are facing disqualification, along with petitioner No.3, for reasons that manifest to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme, as also in a manner militating against the requirements of the inviolable tenets of democratic elections in a Co-operative Society. 18. As I have already said above, as far as the 3rd petitioner is concerned, her nomination could not have been rejected because she was not even issued with a notice prior to her having been declared as being a defaulter; and, in fact, even to a pointed question from this Court, Sri. C.M. Nazar – learned Standing Counsel for the Election Commission was unable to assert anything to the contrary. 19. Coming to petitioner Nos.1 and 2, they have both applied under the notification, which provides for eight vacancies in the ‘General’ Quota. If the Election Commission feels that such a declaration in the election notification was wrong, their remedy is not to disqualify people on the ground of they having not availed loans, but to cancel the notification and make it in tune with the bye laws. However, even while doing so, they will certainly require to be governed by the declarations in Chandran K.M.(Supra), which does not appear to be even adverted to in this case. In the afore circumstances, I am certain that petitioners 1, 2 and 3 are entitled to succeed; while no relief can be given to the 4th among them. Resultantly, being guided by Damodaran (Supra) and Ravi (Supra) and for the singular reason that the rejections now made in the nominations of petitioners 1, 2 and 3 cannot appeal to law, I allow this writ petition and set aside Exts.P6, P7 and P8, but confirming Ext.P9. Resultantly, being guided by Damodaran (Supra) and Ravi (Supra) and for the singular reason that the rejections now made in the nominations of petitioners 1, 2 and 3 cannot appeal to law, I allow this writ petition and set aside Exts.P6, P7 and P8, but confirming Ext.P9. All consequences resultant to the afore declarations will flow.