JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. 1. This appeal is at the instance of the defendant in O.S. No. 1203/2013 on the files of the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur. The sole respondent is the plaintiff. The appellant assails decree and judgment in the above suit, which were confirmed in A.S. No. 5/2017 on the files of the Additional District Court, Irinjalakuda. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant on admission and perused the verdicts under challenge. 3. The plaintiff instituted the suit to realise a sum of Rs. 75,000/- along with interest alleged to be borrowed by the defendant from the plaintiff on 10.11.2011, on the strength of a promissory note, allegedly executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The defendant filed written statement. The contention raised by the defendant inter alia was that the defendant never executed any promissory note in favour of the plaintiff. Further contention was that when the defendant borrowed Rs. 50,000/- from the plaintiff to give advance to one M.Sanju in the year 2007, by executing an agreement, defendant signed and delivered blank stamp papers, white papers and cheque to the plaintiff and the plaintiff misused the said papers and fabricated the promissory note. 5. The trial court ventured the matter. On the side of the plaintiff, PW-1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked. DW-1 was examined and Exts.B1 to B5 marked on the side of the defendant. 6. The trial court found, on appreciation of evidence, that the oral evidence of PW-1 is believable to hold that the plaintiff succeeded in proving borrowing of Rs. 75,000/- by the defendant from the plaintiff on 10.11.2011, and the execution of Ext.A1 promissory note by the defendant, where the defendant failed to rebut the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (hereinafter referred to as the N.I. Act for short), on proof of execution of Ext.A1. 7. Accordingly, the suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- along with 6% interest from 10.11.2011. Although appeal preferred, the appellate court also dismissed the appeal and confirmed the finding of the trial court. 8. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant reiterated the contentions in the written statement. According to him, no witness shown in Ext.A1 promissory note and nobody examined to prove the transaction. The same is fatal to the case of the plaintiff. 8. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant reiterated the contentions in the written statement. According to him, no witness shown in Ext.A1 promissory note and nobody examined to prove the transaction. The same is fatal to the case of the plaintiff. He also submitted that no evidence available in this matter to prove the transaction. 9. On perusal of the judgments under challenge, as I have already pointed out, PW-1 given evidence to the effect that the defendant borrowed Rs. 75,000/- from the plaintiff on 10.11.2011 and in repayment of the said sum, Ext.A1 promissory note was executed. He also given evidence that a demand notice was issued on 05.02.2013 and the defendant failed to repay the amount or to send reply, even on accepting the legal notice. Although PW-1 was cross examined, nothing elicited to shake his version. 10. The trial court as well as the appellate court concurrently found that the evidence of PW-1 succinctly established the transaction led to execution of Ext.A1 promissory note and accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit and the appellate court concurred with the said finding. 11. Adverting to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the defendant, the questions arise for consideration are: (1) Does Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 mandate attesting witness to a promissory note? (2) What are the essentials of a promissory note? 12. While answering these questions, reference to Section 4 of the N.I. Act is apposite. Section 4 of the NI Act is as under: “A ‘Promissory Note’ is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.” 13. Scanning Section 4 of the NI Act, the essentials of a promissory note are: (1) It must be an instrument in writing. (2) It must not be bank note or currency note. (3) It must contain an unconditional undertaking. (4) It must be signed by the maker to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument. (2) It must not be bank note or currency note. (3) It must contain an unconditional undertaking. (4) It must be signed by the maker to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument. (5) As per Section 2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act, a promissory note also includes a note promising the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen. 14. The precept of the discussion is that none of the provisions of N.I. Act or the Indian Stamp Act or any other statutory provisions insist an attesting witness to promissory notes and the essentials to complete a promissory note are as summated herein above. At the same time, if somebody sign in the promissory note as an attestor, the same does not efface the character of the document as promissory note. 15. In view of the above discussion, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the defendant mandating attesting witness to a promissory note is found untenable. On evaluation of the materials available, it is held that the trial court rightly evaluated the evidence and decreed the Suit. The appellate court on reappreciation of evidence, rightly dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the concurrent verdicts of the courts below do not require any interference by admitting this second appeal. 16. In fact, in this case, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant failed to raise any substantial question of law, though a simple question was posed, warranting admission of the second appeal. Order XLII Rule 2 provides thus: “2. Power of Court to direct that the appeal be heard on the question formulated by it - At the time of making an order under rule 11 of Order XLI for the hearing of a second appeal, the Court shall formulate the substantial question of law as required by section 100, and in doing so, the Court may direct that the second appeal be heard on the question so formulated and it shall not be open to the appellant to urge any other ground in the appeal without the leave of the Court, given in accordance with the provision of section 100.” 17. Section 100 of the C.P.C. provides that, (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An Appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Proviso says that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. 18. In the decision in Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala and Others, 2020 KHC 6507 : AIR 2020 SC 4321 : 2020 (10) SCALE 168 , the Apex Court held that: The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, whenever a question is framed by the High Court, the High Court will have to show that the question is one of law and not just a question of facts, it also has to show that the question is a substantial question of law. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 , the Apex Court held that: “After the amendment a second appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the question so formulated. However, the respondent at the time of the hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case in the court did not involve any substantial question of law. The proviso to the section acknowledges the powers of the High Court to hear the appeal on a substantial point of law, though not formulated by it with the object of ensuring that no injustice is done to the litigant where such a question was not formulated at the time of admission either by mistake or by inadvertence.” “It has been noticed time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact.” “If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal.” When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh vs. Gobinda Ghose, AIR 2014 SC 152 . Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal can not satisfy the mandate of S. 100 of the CPC. 19. In a latest decision of the Apex Court in Government of Kerala vs. Joseph, [ 2023 (5) KHC 264 : 2023 (5) KLT 74 SC, it was held as under: For an appeal to be maintainable under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’ for brevity) it must fulfill certain well-established requirements. The primary and most important of them all is that the appeal should pose a substantial question of law. The primary and most important of them all is that the appeal should pose a substantial question of law. The sort of question that qualifies this criterion has been time and again reiterated by this Court. We may only refer to Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (3) SCC 179 (three-Judge Bench) wherein this Court observed as follows: 12. The phrase “substantial question of law” as occurring in the amended S.100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law” means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as S.109 of the Code or Art.133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. 20. The legal position is no more res-integra on the point that in order to admit and maintain a second appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. the Court shall formulate substantial question/s of law, and the said procedure is mandatory. Although the phrase ‘substantial question of law’ is not defined in the Code, ‘substantial question of law’ means; of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as S.109 of the Code or Art.133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. As such, second appeal cannot be decided on equitable grounds and the conditions mentioned in Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule 2 of the C.P.C. must be complied to admit and maintain a second appeal. 21. As such, second appeal cannot be decided on equitable grounds and the conditions mentioned in Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule 2 of the C.P.C. must be complied to admit and maintain a second appeal. 21. In view of the above fact, no substantial question of law arises in this matter to be decided by admitting this appeal. 22. In the result, this appeal is found to be meritless and the same is dismissed without being admitted. 23. All interlocutory applications pending in this second appeal, stand dismissed. 24. Registry shall inform this matter to the trial court as well as the appellate court, forthwith.