ORDER : (K. Sarath, J.) : This writ petition is filed questioning the order passed by the respondent No.3 vide Proceeding R.C.No.1413/2016-WS dated 20.06.2024 in disqualifying the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the respondent No.5-Society in terms of provision of Section 32(3) of the Telangana Cooperative Societies Act,1964 and devolving the powers of the Chairman on Vice-Chairman of the Society until conduct of election to the post of Chairman of the Society as illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel for Sri Girija Shankar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Cooperation and Sri J. Ashvini Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No.6. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.5-Society functioning has been governed by the provisions of the Telangana Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (for short ‘the Act’) read with Bye- Laws of the respondent No.5-Society. The affairs of the said Society have been managed by the Board of Directors consisting of 12 Directors, who were elected among the Members of the Society. Out of the 12 elected Directors, one Director has to be elected as Chairman and another one as Vice-Chairman. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that as per the orders of this Court in W.P. No.21940 of 2020 dated 20.09.2021, elections were conducted on 27.03.2022, 12 candidates were unanimously elected as Directors and among them, the petitioner and the respondent No.6 were elected as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the respondent No.5- Society. While it being so, the respondent No.6 filed W.P.No.29145 of 2023 for disqualification of the petitioner as Chairman of the Society and this Court by order dated 08.04.2024 directed the respondent No.6 herein to file appropriate representation to the respondent No.3 and on receipt of the same, the respondent No.3 shall examine the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order duly affording an opportunity of personal hearing to all the concerned. 5. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner has conducted the Managing Committee meetings every quarterly i.e, every three months and the respondents have not taken into account of every quarter or three months as a unit and passed the impugned order. 5. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner has conducted the Managing Committee meetings every quarterly i.e, every three months and the respondents have not taken into account of every quarter or three months as a unit and passed the impugned order. As per Section 2(c) of the Act, the Co-operative year/ Financial Year means, the period commencing on the 1st day of April of every year and ending with the 31st day of March of the succeeding year and the respondents have to calculate from the 1st April of the year for calculating the three months period as one quarter. Accordingly, the petitioner has conducted meeting every quarter and without considering the same, the respondent No.3 has issued the impugned proceedings and moreover, there is no mention specifically that the three months period will be counted from the date of last meeting as per Section 32(3) of the Act. He further submits that Section 32(3) of the Act has not specified the date and the time to conduct the meeting and as such, it is left to the discretion of the President/Chairman to conduct meetings in every three months and the petitioner has conducted all the meetings of the Managing Committee each and every three months of the cooperate year i.e., 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023. 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondent No.3, without communicating the representation submitted by the respondent No.6, issued show cause notice to the petitioner. The respondent No.3, without giving opportunity of hearing in the enquiry as per the orders of this Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and in spite of the representation of the petitioner on 18.06.2024, passed impugned orders on 20.06.2024 and the same is in violation of principles of natural justice and the impugned order is liable to set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that Section 32(3) of the Act prescribes the duty of the President of the Society to conduct a meeting of the Managing Committee once in every three months. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that Section 32(3) of the Act prescribes the duty of the President of the Society to conduct a meeting of the Managing Committee once in every three months. During Cooperative year 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023, the petitioner has conveyed two general body meetings and five meetings of the Managing Committee within time, whereas the requirement of meetings of the Managing Committee in a year is of four, but one extra meeting of the Managing Committee was conveyed by the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner has rightly conducted all the meetings of the Managing Committee during each and every three months period and there was no delay or failure on the part of the petitioner in convening the said meetings within time and even in the detailed report dated 11.05.2023, the respondent No.4 stated that the petitioner has conveyed required meetings as per Section 32(3) of the Act. He further submits that the respondent No.3 has failed to consider the report dated 11.05.2023, whereby the respondent No.4 specifically stated that the petitioner has conveyed required Managing Committee Meetings of the Society as per Section 32(3) of the Act and the impugned order was passed without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and requested to set aside the impugned order by allowing the writ petition. 8. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions; 1. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd., Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95 2. Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 3. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Limited, (2004)1 SCC 391. 9. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Cooperation submits that as per the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 dated 08.04.2024, the respondent No.3 conducted hearings with parties present on 28.05.2024 and 11.06.2024 and after perusing the records, passed the impugned order of disqualifying the petitioner from the post of Chairman as the petitioner failed to conduct the meetings of the Managing Committee once in three months as contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act. Though the petitioner has received notices dated 07.05.2024 and 28.05.2024 and opportunity was given for personal hearing, he failed to appear before the respondent No.3 on 28.05.2024 and 11.06.2024. Though the petitioner has received notices dated 07.05.2024 and 28.05.2024 and opportunity was given for personal hearing, he failed to appear before the respondent No.3 on 28.05.2024 and 11.06.2024. He submits that the petitioner has convened the Managing Committee meeting on 31.10.2022 and thereafter he failed to convene meeting by 31.01.2023 or followed by one month i.e., 28.02.2023 or by 01.03.2023, but he has conducted the same on 17.03.2023/ 18.03.2023 with a delay of 16 days and as such the provision of Section 32(3) of the Act was applied for disqualification of the petitioner. He further submits that the report of the respondent No.4 is not a binding precedent to the respondent No.3 for passing orders and the respondent No.3 has followed principles of natural justice by giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and passed reasoned orders and he requested to dismiss the writ petition. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 submits that as per the directions of this Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 dated 08.04.2024, the respondent No.6 made a representation dated 29.04.2024 to the respondent No.3, who in turn issued notice to both sides on 07.05.2024 for personal hearing on 28.05.2024, but the petitioner has deliberately failed to appear before the respondent No.3. He submits that the petitioner in his reply dated 10.05.2024 did not raise any objection for not providing a copy of the representation of the respondent No.6 dated 29.04.2024 and the respondent No.3, after taking into consideration of the reply submitted by the petitioner and after following the mandatory procedure as contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act, has passed the impugned order and there is no illegality in the impugned order. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 further submits that the petitioner has not followed the mandatory procedure in conducting the Managing Committee meetings in accordance with Section 32(3) of the Act. He submits that even according to the dates of the Managing Committee meeting held by the petitioner, after the Managing Committee meeting dated 31.10.2022, the next managing committee meeting was held on 17.03.2023 and 18.03.2023 i.e., beyond four months from 31.10.2022, which is contrary to the time stipulated under Section 32(3) of the Act. The Chairman has no discretion in conducting the meetings except in accordance with Section 32(3) of the Act. The Chairman has no discretion in conducting the meetings except in accordance with Section 32(3) of the Act. He submits that pursuant to the orders passed by the respondent No.3, the respondent No.6 has taken charge as Chairman of the respondent No.5-Society on 22.06.2024. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 further submits that the petitioner has alternative efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 76 of the Act against the orders passed under Section 32(3) of the Act and the same was contended by the petitioner in earlier W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and requested to dismiss the Writ Petition. 13. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 has relied on the following judgments; 1. Dipak Babaria Vs. State of Gujarat, (2014) 3 SCC 502 2. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Hyderabad Vs. The Principal rent Controller, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, Un-reported judgment in W.P.No.19230 of 2024 of the High Court for the State of Telangana. 14. After hearing both sides and perusal of the material on record, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petition is filed questioning the impugned order of disqualification of the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the respondent No.5 Society and the said order was passed on the ground that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Section 32(3) of the Act. The petitioner was elected as Chairman of the Society on 27.03.2022 and conducted meetings on 21.04.2022, 23.07.2022 (adjourned for no Quorum), 28.07.2022, 14.09.2022 (adjourned for no Quorum), 15.09.2022, 31.10.2022, 17.03.2023 (adjourned for no Quorum) and 18.03.2023. 15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the respondent No.3 without communicating the representation filed by the respondent No.6 and without hearing the petitioner has passed the impugned order on 20.06.2023 in violation of the principles of natural justice. But the record reveals that earlier, the respondent No.6 has approached this Court and filed W.P.No.29145 of 2023 questioning the inaction of the official respondents in disqualifying the petitioner herein as Chairman of the Society on failure of conducting the meetings within the mandatory period as contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act. But the record reveals that earlier, the respondent No.6 has approached this Court and filed W.P.No.29145 of 2023 questioning the inaction of the official respondents in disqualifying the petitioner herein as Chairman of the Society on failure of conducting the meetings within the mandatory period as contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act. After hearing both sides, this Court disposed of the said writ petition on 08.04.2024 observing that without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, granted liberty to the respondent No.6 herein to file appropriate representation to the respondent No.3 and on such representation, the respondent No.3 shall examine the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act, within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt a copy of the said order duly affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the all the concerned. 16. In view of the order passed by this Court, the respondent No.6 made a representation to the respondent No.3 on 29.04.2024. Based on the said representation, the respondent No.3 issued notice to the petitioner and the respondent No.6 and summoned them to appear before him on 28.05.2024 vide proceedings RC No.1413/2016-WS dated 07.05.2024. In response to the same, the petitioner has submitted his detailed explanation on 10.05.2024 to the respondent No.3 with regard to conducting of Management Committee Meeting and other issues. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 issued another proceedings in Rc.No.1413/2016-WS dated 28.05.2024 stating that the petitioner has not attended the hearing on 28.05.2024 at 11.30 am to defend his case and further directed the petitioner to appear before the respondent No.3 on 11.06.2024 at 11.30 AM. After receiving the said notice, the petitioner sent an e-mail to the respondent No.3 on 10.06.2024 stating that he will discharge from the hospital on 13.06.2024 and requested four days time to appear either on 15.06.2024 or any other later date without mentioning the details of his illness and the particulars of the hospital where he joined. Subsequently, the petitioner has sent a letter to the respondent No.3 on 18.06.2024 and submitted the copies of writ affidavit, counter affidavit and the order in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and stated that he has submitted the original record of CIEL pertaining to all the Board Meetings and the General Body Meetings in his letter dated 10.05.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner has sent a letter to the respondent No.3 on 18.06.2024 and submitted the copies of writ affidavit, counter affidavit and the order in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and stated that he has submitted the original record of CIEL pertaining to all the Board Meetings and the General Body Meetings in his letter dated 10.05.2024. In the said letter, it was mentioned that he has not received the representation or the complaint made by the respondent No.6 on 29.04.2024 and requested to communicate the same by the next date of hearing. 17. The letter of the petitioner dated 18.06.2024 clearly shows that the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 10.05.2024 and he has not appeared on 28.05.2024 and also on 11.06.2024 and thereafter, as afterthought, the petitioner mentioned in the said letter that he has not received the representation made by the respondent No.6. Basing on that, the petitioner contended before this Court that without communicating the representation of the respondent No.6, the respondent No.3 has passed the impugned order and the same is in violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner has conveniently without asking the representation of the respondent No.6 submitted his detailed explanation on 10.05.2024 and not attended for personal hearing on 28.05.2024 and also on 11.06.2024 and now raised the dispute that he has not received the representation of the respondent No.6 and also not afforded opportunity of personal hearing as per the orders of this Court. The petitioner has given his explanation basing on the earlier round of litigation before this Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023, now the petitioner cannot contend before this Court that there is violation of principles of natural justice and the said contention is not acceptable. 18. The respondent No.6 contended that the petitioner without availing the alternative remedy of appeal, has approached this Court and in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner has specifically urged before this Court that against the orders passed under Section 32(3) of the Act, there is an alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 76 of the Act and the writ petition is liable be dismissed on that ground. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently opposed the contention of the respondent No.6 as the issue raised before this Court is legal interpretation of Section 32(3) of the Act and there is no bar for filing the writ petition and the Hon’ble Supreme Court time and again stated that there is no bar for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. The learned Counsel for both sides has relied on the Judgments for maintainability of instant writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the Judgment in Godrej Sara Lee Limited’s case (cited 1 supra) and in Whirlpool Corporation’s case (cited 2 supra), and the Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 has relied on the Judgment in Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited’s case (cited 5 supra). 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej Sara Lee Limited’s case (supra 1), at para No.8 held as follows: “8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the High Court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available. The above Judgment squarely apply to the instant case as this writ petition is pertaining to interpretation of Section 32(3) of the Act and in view of the same, the writ petition is maintainable. 21. The above Judgment squarely apply to the instant case as this writ petition is pertaining to interpretation of Section 32(3) of the Act and in view of the same, the writ petition is maintainable. 21. The Judgment of this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited’s case (cited 5 supra) is not apply to the instant case as the facts are different. 22. The Section 32 of the Telangana Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 reads as under; “32. General Meetings and Committee Meetings:- (1) The committee may, at any time, call not less than two general meetings of a society in a cooperative year: Provided that one meeting shall be held in each half year. xxxx 3) It shall be the duty of the President of the society to call the meetings of the committee so that atleast one meeting of the committee is held in every three months. If the President fails to discharge that duty with the result that no meeting is held, within such period of three months or within one month following such period, he shall with effect from the date of expiration of one month aforesaid cease to be the President. The Registrar shall issue orders to that effect: Provided that it shall also be the duty of the President to call such meetings within fifteen days of the date of receipt of requisition in writing in that behalf from any of the requisitionists specified in sub-section (2). xxxx 23. In the above Sub-section (3), it clearly mentioned that the duty of the President of the Society to call the meetings of the committee at least one meeting in every three months otherwise, he shall cease to be the President. But there is no mention about the each quarter or three months to be taken into as a Unit for conducting meetings. 24. The dispute is with regard to the meeting conducted by the petitioner after 31.10.2022 to 17.03.2023/18.03.2023. In the impugned order, the respondent No.3 has stated that the petitioner has failed to conduct the meeting by 31.01.2023 or followed by one month i.e., 28.02.2023 or by 01.03.2023, but he has conducted meeting on 17.03.2023/18.03.2023 with a delay of more than 16 days and as per Section 32(3) of the Act, the petitioner has disqualified for the post of Chairman of the Society. 25. 25. The similar point was considered by this Court in V. Ramachary vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Secretary for Planning, Hyderabad, (1964) 2 An WR 375 and held in para Nos.3 and 5 as under; 3. The law was amended for the first time on 15th January, 1963, namely, section 22(7) [of the Panchayat Samithisand Zilla Parishads Act, which is as follows:— Section 27(7).—“It shall be the duty of the President or the person for the time being exercising the powers and performing the functions of the President to convene the meetings of the Panchayat Samithi so that at least one meeting of the Panchayat Samithi is held in every three months. If the President or such person fails to discharge that duty with the result that no meeting is held within the said period of three months or in the month following such period, he shall, with effect from the date of expiration of the month foresaid, cease to be the President, or as the case may be, cease to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the President, unless such cessation has otherwise occurred before that date, and for a period of one year from such date he shall not be eligible to be elected as President or to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the President: xxx 5. The principal contention of Mr. Y. Sivarama Sastry, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that, the expression “at least one meeting of the Panchayat Samithi is held in every three months” should be construed to mean that any meeting held shall be deemed to have been held for three calendar months. His contention is that, the meeting which was held on 11th January, 1963 should be deemed to have been held for three months ending the month of March, 1963. On this basis, he argues that the next meeting could be held within three months from the month of February, and if this period is thus calculated and one month grace which is allowed under sub-section (7) of section 22 is taken into account, the petitioner has not incurred any disqualification. The same argument is put in another way that although the amendment came into force on 15th January, 1963, 1 should compute the period on the abovesaid lines from 1st January, 1963. I am unable to accept this contention. The same argument is put in another way that although the amendment came into force on 15th January, 1963, 1 should compute the period on the abovesaid lines from 1st January, 1963. I am unable to accept this contention. It is now a fairly settled rule of law that the ordinary and normal meaning should be given to a provision of law without straining the language or doing any violence to it. If we apply this principle of construction to sub-section (7) of section 22, it leaves no one in doubt that the expression “so that at least one meeting of the Panchayat Samithi is held in every three months” has to be understood to mean that computation of three months would begin from the date of the last meeting. If this construction is correct, as I understand it to be, then in this case we have to calculate from nth January, 1963, as the last meeting was held on that date. That date cannot, however, be taken as the basic date obviously because on that date there was no obligation on the part of the President to convene any meeting at least once in three months. Such obligation was, for the first time, cast upon him on 15th January, 1963. The computation in this case, therefore, will have to be made not from 11th January 1963, but from 15th January, 1963. In either case, it makes a little difference as far as the result is concerned. The petitioner, therefore, ought to have convened a meeting in three months either from 11th January, 1963 or from 15th January, 1963 when the amended provision came into force. When the next meeting was held admittedly on 21st May 1963, calculated in any one of the two ways, it was admittedly held beyond the prescribed period of three months. Even if the grace period of one month allowed by the subsection (7) is calculated, the meeting ought to have been held on or before 15th May, 1963. When once the President failed to hold the meeting as above, by virtue of sub-section (7) of section 22 of the Act he automatically incurs the disqualification. It is not necessary for any officer to pass any order declaring that he is disqualified. When once the President failed to hold the meeting as above, by virtue of sub-section (7) of section 22 of the Act he automatically incurs the disqualification. It is not necessary for any officer to pass any order declaring that he is disqualified. If he has failed to hold the meeting as directed under section 22(7), that provision of law comes immediately into operation and the President gets disqualified automatically. I am not, therefore, prepared to accept the argument that the meeting held on 1 ith January, 1963 should be deemed to have been held for the first quarter of the year, and for the purposes of calculating the period for holding’ the second meeting the computation should be made from February, 1963. There is no warrant or any justification for such calculation. The argument that month means English calendar month, or calender month means the number of days fixed in a particular month, does not assist in any way the petitioner in supporting his contention. The contention that “once in every three months” should mean three months according to the English calendar commencing from first of every month for the purposes of section 22(7) cannot thus be accepted. Whatever may be the date of the last meeting, the period of three months will have to be counted from that date. I find no difficulty in computing the period in this manner. There is no justification in either relating it back to the first of the month or postpone it to the first of the next month in order to compute the period. This argument is not supported by any authority or provision of law. If this, argument is accepted, it would produce extraordinary results, which would defeat the very purpose of the amendment. xxxxxx The true construction, therefore, would be to hold that the President is now under a statutory obligation to convene the next meeting within three months from the date of the last meeting. He may, however, hold the meeting during the period of these three months on any day he likes. But he certainly cannot transgress the limit of three months laid down under section 22(7) of the Act. Any interpretation which extends the period beyond three months obviously cannot be accepted as correct. The contention of the learned Advocate, if accepted, would produce only that result. But he certainly cannot transgress the limit of three months laid down under section 22(7) of the Act. Any interpretation which extends the period beyond three months obviously cannot be accepted as correct. The contention of the learned Advocate, if accepted, would produce only that result. I am, therefore, satisfied that by holding the meeting on 21st May, 1963, the petitioner had failed to discharge the duty put on him under section 22(7) of the Act. He has thus immediately incurred the disqualification on 15th May, 1963 because that was the last date which was allowed to him to hold the said meeting under the amended provision. The order of the Collector, therefore, would only mean that the petitioner would discontinue to hold the post of the President, because that is the result of the law and not the result of the Collector's order. 26. The case of V. Ramachary’s (cited 6 supra) is similar to the instant case and the provisions of Section 32(3) of the Telangana Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 and Section 27(7) of the Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959 are similar. In the above Judgment, this Court held that ‘once in every three months’ should mean three months according to the English calendar commencing from first of every month cannot be accepted. Whatever may be the date of the last meeting, the period of three months will have to be counted from that date and held that the President is under a statutory obligation to convene the next meeting within three months from the date of the last meeting. 27. In the instant case, the petitoner being Chairman of the Society has conducted Managing Committee meeting on 31.10.2022 and thereafter conducted meeting on 17.03.2023/18.03.2023 i.e., after more than 4 months 16 days. As per Section 32(3) of the Act, the duty of the President of the Society has to conduct one meeting of the committee in every three months. But the petitoner has not conducted any meeting from 31.10.2022 to 17.03.2023/18.03.2023. In view of the same, the finding given by this Court in V. Ramachary’s case (cited 6 supra) squarely apply to the instant case and the petitoner has not complied with the provisions of Section 32(3) of the Act for conducting the Managing Committee Meeting and he has to conduct meeting within three months from the last date of earlier meeting. In view of the same, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.3 is valid. 28. The other contention of the petitioner is that the respondent No.3 has failed to consider the report of the Respondent No.4 dated 11.05.2023 as the petitioner conducted meetings as per the requirement of Section 32 (3) of the Act. In fact, the report of the respondent No.4 is not binding on the respondent No.3 and moreover the said report of the respondent No.4 is not in consonance with the Section 32 (3) of the Act. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner cannot be acceptable. 29. The Judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti’s case (cited 3 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under; 58. In the case of London and North Eastern Rly. Co. v. Berriman, Lord Simonds quoted with approval (at All ER p. 270 C-D) the following observations of Lord Esher, M.R. in the case of Tuck & Sons v. Priester, QBD at p. 638: "We must be very careful in construing that section, because it imposes a penalty. If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections." It is trite that fiscal statute must not only be construed literally, but also strictly. It is further well known that if in terms of the provisions of a penal statute a person becomes liable to follow the provisions thereof it should be clear and unambiguous so as to let him know his legal obligations and liabilities thereunder. The above Judgment is not apply to the instant case as there are no two reasonable interpretations in Section 32(3) of the Act. 30. The Judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent No.6 in Dipak Babaria’s case (cited 4 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para No.61 as under; “61. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor and then followed by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh. This proposition was further explained in para 8 of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh24 by a Bench of three Judges in the following words: (AIR p. 361) "8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted." This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka26 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. The above Judgment squarely apply to the instant case. The statute provides in Section 32 (3) of the Act that it shall be the duty of the President of the Society to call the meeting of the Committee at least one meeting of the committee in every three months. But there is no mention of every quarter or three months as one unit. In view of the same, the contention of the writ petitioner cannot be acceptable. 31. In spite of receipt of notice, the petitioner failed to attend the enquiry. The petitioner, in the writ affidavit, no where mentioned the reason for not attending the personal hearing on 28.05.2024 and also not mentioned in his letter dated 18.06.2024. On the second date of personal hearing i.e., 11.06.2024 also, the petitioner has not attended, but sent an e-mail on 10.06.2024 stating that he will be discharged from the hospital on 13.06.2024 without giving any particulars and asked for four days time. In view of the same, the petitioner was not utilized the opportunity of personal hearing. On the second date of personal hearing i.e., 11.06.2024 also, the petitioner has not attended, but sent an e-mail on 10.06.2024 stating that he will be discharged from the hospital on 13.06.2024 without giving any particulars and asked for four days time. In view of the same, the petitioner was not utilized the opportunity of personal hearing. As per Section 32(3) of the Act, once, the petitioner failed to conduct the Management Committee Meeting in every three months, he shall be ceased from the post of Chairman/President of the Society. The respondent No.3, after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, passed the impugned order and there is no irregularity in passing the said order. 32. In view of the above findings, there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned order in R.C.No.1413/2016-WS dated 20.06.2024 passed by the respondent No.3 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the same, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 33. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. No order as to costs. 34. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand dismissed.