ORDER : Ashok Kumar Jain, J. 1. Instant second appeal is preferred aggrieved from judgment dated 15.10.2008 in civil regular appeal No.06/2008 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.9, Jaipur City, Jaipur, wherein an appeal preferred by respondent defendant aggrieved from judgment and decree dated 08.01.2008 in civil suit No.185/1982 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jaipur West was allowed and decree for eviction in favour of present appellant plaintiff was set aside. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant second appeal indicate that a civil suit for eviction, arrears of rent and perpetual injunction was filed by Mandir Girdhari Ji Trust and 6 other persons (total seven) against Bhanwar Lal, Raghunath, Ghanshyam, Hanuman and Prakash (total five) on 26.06.1982. During pendency of civil suit a joint written statement was filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5. During pendency of this civil suit defendants Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash entered into compromise with original plaintiffs and this compromise was exhibited as Ex.4. As per compromise, defendant Nos. 3 to 5 had acknowledged the tenancy and handed over partial possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs. The suit was continued against Bhanwar Lal and Ragunath. 3. After attestation of compromise between original 7 plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 to 5 on 05.07.1989, a prayer is made to continue civil suit against defendant No.1 Bhanwar Lal and No.2 Raghunath. During pendency of civil suit, an application under Order XXII rule 10 CPC was filed on 08.12.1995 to substitute and implead Navratan Lal Agarwal in place of original plaintiffs, who acquired the suit property by way of registered sale deed on 18.08.1988. The trial court has allowed the application on 16.09.1996 and permitted present appellant Navratan (purchaser during pendency of civil suit) to continue the civil suit. 4. The plaintiff appellant examined five witnesses and eighteen documents were exhibited whereas defendant examined DW-1 Ragunath in his defence. After considering the material on record the civil suit was initially decreed for eviction on 12.04.2007 against the respondent defendant. Aggrieved from aforesaid a civil regular appeal was filed before learned District Judge and same was transferred to learned Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur and same was decided on 12.09.2007 as civil regular appeal No. 38/2007. After considering the material on record the civil suit was initially decreed for eviction on 12.04.2007 against the respondent defendant. Aggrieved from aforesaid a civil regular appeal was filed before learned District Judge and same was transferred to learned Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur and same was decided on 12.09.2007 as civil regular appeal No. 38/2007. The appellate court has set aside the judgment dated 12.04.2007 and remanded the suit back to the trial court for examination of witnesses PW-1 (Ramavtar) and to decide the civil suit afresh. 5. The trial court after complying with the order has again decreed the civil suit on 08.01.2008 and directed the defendant No.1 and 2 to hand over the possession of the suit property and further directed payment of rent including arrears. Aggrieved from the aforesaid a regular appeal was preferred and same was decided on 15.10.2008 as civil regular appeal No.06/2008 by learned Additional District Judge No.9 Jaipur City and the appeal was allowed and judgment and decree dated 08.01.2008 was set aside, hence this appeal. 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for appellant submitted that the suit property was initially given on rent to Gulji, father of respondent and as a legal heir of Gulji the respondent with others LRs of Gulji inherited possession of the suit property as tenant. He further submitted that initially the suit was filed against 5 legal heirs of Gulji and three of them acknowledged the tenancy inherited from Gulji and vacated the suit premises partially. He also submitted that brother of respondent defendant Hanuman who was also a defendant before was examined as PW-4 before the trial court, wherein he supported the statement of plaintiff that Gulji was original tenant on the suit premises and after his death his legal heirs inherited the right of tenancy over the suit property. He also submitted that present appellant was examined as PW2 to corroborate the fact related to transfer of the property by the original plaintiff. He also submitted that plaintiff trustee PW-1 Ramavtar and PW-3 Malchand were examined by the appellant to establish what was mentioned in the plaint. He also submitted that besides the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 to prove that Gulji was a tenant who was paying Rs.4/- p.a. as rent, was further corroborated from testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 Shyam Devi (who was wife of Narayan). He also submitted that besides the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 to prove that Gulji was a tenant who was paying Rs.4/- p.a. as rent, was further corroborated from testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 Shyam Devi (who was wife of Narayan). He specifically referred to Ex.-3 obtained for maintenance of the suit property. He also referred to the rent receipt to submit that these rent receipts clearly establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. He also referred to the admission of DW-1 in cross examination to contend that the suit property belongs to original plaintiffs as has been claimed and house was build within the compound. He also referred to the cross-examination of DW-1 to submit that at no point of time was the sale to PW-2 disputed by DW-1 or any other person. He also referred to the admission of DW-1, that the portion of house in which he is residing belong to all 6 brothers. He also referred to the admission of DW-1 that he had not seen any paper showing the suit property as government building in any record. 7. Learned Senior Advocate while relying upon full Bench judgment of this court in case of Pushpa Devi Vs. Gopal Lal Rawat AIR 1986 Rajasthan 187 would submitted that in case of any suit for eviction filed by landlord against the tenant wherein the parties have been assuming that the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied and same are not established, even then decree can be passed on the basis of the title of landlord. He specifically submitted that in this case Gulji was original tenant and rent was paid by Gulji and same was admitted by three legal heirs of Gulji, who are brothers of respondent defendant. He specifically referred to the doctrine of estopple and submitted that the respondent defendant is estopped from denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. He also referred to judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this court in case of Ram Singh Vs. Lal Chand Sadhnani (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 331/2018 order dated 15.03.2022) and submitted that the claim of defendant that he is the owner of the suit property was not established as he has failed to submit any document in support of his claim therefore, he is liable for eviction even if he is trespasser. 8. Lal Chand Sadhnani (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 331/2018 order dated 15.03.2022) and submitted that the claim of defendant that he is the owner of the suit property was not established as he has failed to submit any document in support of his claim therefore, he is liable for eviction even if he is trespasser. 8. He also submitted that in case of landlord and tenant basic fact of relationship is required to be established and after application of rule of estopple the tenant is not free to deny relationship as tenant without any basis. He also referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Chandramul AIR 1966 SC 735 and submitted that while relying upon judgment of Allahabad High Court in case of Abdul Vs. Babni 25 All 256, it was laid down that decree for ejectment can be passed even though tenancy is not specifically established. He further referred to the judgment in cases of Shri Ram and Anr. Vs. Smt. Kasturi Devi and Anr. AIR 1984 ALL 66 and Radha Devi And Ors. Vs. Ajay Kumar Sinha 1998 (2) BLJR 1061 and submitted that in a case like the present one, the appellant has established a good case for eviction and the appellate court without any cogent reason has interfered in the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 9. Learned Senior Advocate further contended that on two occasions learned trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff (appellant) and on one occasion the appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the trial court but afterwards the suit was again decreed in favour of appellant but the appellate court on erroneous interpretation of legal provisions and evidence on record has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. He also submitted that the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord in present suit for eviction. He submitted that the appellate court on erroneous interpretation of legal provisions had allowed the appeal merely on non-convincing defence of the respondent defendant. He further submitted that the order of the trial court was well reasoned and there is no scope of interference in the order of trial court therefore the order passed by appellate court is perverse and illegal. He further submitted that the order of the trial court was well reasoned and there is no scope of interference in the order of trial court therefore the order passed by appellate court is perverse and illegal. He also submitted that on record document Ex.-6 was filed by the plaintiff to prove that before transfer of suit property, permission was obtained from Assistant Commissioner Devasthan, by the previous owner. He also submitted that the documents relating to property were already exhibited and the respondent has no right to challenge the title and ownership of the appellant, therefore, judgment passed by learned appellate court is liable to be set aside. 10. On the contrary, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent submitted that initially the suit was filed by the public trust and trustee, wherein a joint written statement was filed all the defendants including the present respondent and all of them had denied the relation of landlord and tenant with the original plaintiff. He also submitted that during the pendency of this civil suit the defendant Nos. 3 to 5 had compromised and the compromise was for a consideration (value/premium) therefore, the compromise Ex.4 was not a bonafide exercise by plaintiff and defendant Nos. 3 to 5. He also submitted that learned trial court without considering objection of the defendant had decreed the suit and aggrieved from the order of trial court, an appeal was preferred under Section 96 of CPC. The appellate court after considering the legal objections concluded that sale by a public trust to present appellant was contrary to Section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act. He also referred to Rule 35 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules 1962 and submitted that any immovable property exceeding value of Rs.2000/- cannot be sold without sanction of Devasthan Commissioner and such disposal must be through public auction. He also referred to rent receipts relied upon by the appellant and submitted that these receipts were not proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. He also submitted that the signature of Bhanwar was not proved though he was alive, moreover the rent paid by Gulji or any of the legal heirs were not proved by previous landlord. He also referred to rent receipts relied upon by the appellant and submitted that these receipts were not proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. He also submitted that the signature of Bhanwar was not proved though he was alive, moreover the rent paid by Gulji or any of the legal heirs were not proved by previous landlord. He also submitted that not a single incident of creation of tenancy was established from the evidence of the appellant plaintiff and appellate court was right in setting aside the findings of the trial court. 11. He specifically submitted that the respondent defendant is residing in the suit property for last more than 50 years and in absence of any rent note or rent receipt, the relationship of landlord and tenant is not established. He also submitted that even the admission of defendant No. 3 to 5 and Shyama is not binding upon present respondent defendant, as they were evicted from the suit property on payment of premium and same was established from cross-examination. He specifically referred to the cross-examination of plaintiff and submitted that no property right was transferred in favour of appellant plaintiff therefore the suit was liable to be dismissed and the appellate court has rightly dismissed the suit by allowing the appeal of respondent defendant. 12. He specifically referred to the provisions of Section 100 CPC and submitted that the first appellate court is the last court on question of facts and under Section 100 CPC this Hon’ble Court cannot enter into the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. He also submitted that the scope of present appeal is very limited and only error of law can be corrected and not more than that error. He also submitted that statement of PW-1 is merely an information as per Section 47 of Indian Evidence Act and same cannot be considered as conclusive proof in favour of plaintiff. He also submitted that PW-3 Malchand in his evidence has stated that there is a sanction of JDA but same was not produced. He also submitted that neither official of JDA nor the record was submitted along with the claim of title by the plaintiff. He also submitted that PW-3 Malchand in his evidence has stated that there is a sanction of JDA but same was not produced. He also submitted that neither official of JDA nor the record was submitted along with the claim of title by the plaintiff. He specifically submitted that no documents to establish the ownership of Murti Mandir (Public Trust) was produced by PW-1 and PW-3 to prove title over the land therefore on the basis of ownership present appellant cannot claim eviction of defendant from the suit property. He also submitted that no documents relating to repair or maintenance of building was produced by the plaintiff to support his claim of ownership and possession of the suit property and there is genuine doubt on the documents produced by the plaintiff. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Gurdev and Ors. Vs. Kaki and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1975 , Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solan Vs. Tholu AIR 1963 SC 361 , Rameshchandra Daulal Soni Vs. Devichand Hiralal Gandhi (dead) through LR 2020 (19) SCC 102 and Shri Shivaji Balaram Habibatti Vs. Shri Avinash Maruthi Pawar 2018 (11) SCC 652 and Co-ordinate Bench of this court in cases of Sunderlal vs. Mohan Lal 2015 (1) WLN 226 Rajasthan and Kishore Kumar Vs. Smt Daya 2017 (3) CCC 397 Rajasthan. 13. Heard learned Senior AdvocateS for both the parties. Perused the entire record along with judgments as cited by learned Senior Advocates for both the parties. 14. This court while admitting the appeal has framed following substantial question of law : “(1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate court below was right in not believing the receipt i.e. Ex.3 of the payment of the rent by not examine Shri Bhanwar Lal whereas other defendants including Ghanshyam has admitted the receipt and payment of the rent through receipt Ex.3? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate court below was justified in reversing the judgment and dismissing the suit by misconstruing and misreading the evidence? (3) Whether the First Appellate Court committed error in holding that the sale deed in favour of appellant Navratanlal Agarwal is null & void because it was not made with the permission of the Court as prescribed under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1964? (3) Whether the First Appellate Court committed error in holding that the sale deed in favour of appellant Navratanlal Agarwal is null & void because it was not made with the permission of the Court as prescribed under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1964? (4) Whether the First Appellate Court committed error in holding that prior permission of Court was necessary to transfer of the disputed trust property because the provisions of Rule 35 of Rajasthan Public Trust Rules 1962 is applicable in the present case? (5) Further Whether the First Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the Section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1964 and the registered sale deed wherein it is clearly mentioned that permission was sought from the Assistant Commissioner, Devesthan Department for transfer of the Trust property but the Devesthan Department failed to pass final order within two months and, therefore, it was presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of the transfer of the trust property. (6) Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in holding the transfer of Trust property in favour of Navratan Lal Agarwal is illegal and null &void when no one has challenged the sale deed and the issue of validity of the sale deed was not under challenge?” A. The substantial question of law No.3 to 6- 15. All these issues are related to each other therefore we are deciding these issues together. Initially the suit was filed on 26.06.1992 by following plaintiffs : 1. Mandir Shri Girdhari Ji (Purviyan) 2. Rajnarayan Singh son of Nandlal 3. Shri Nivas son of Moolchand 4. Ramprasad son of Nandlal 5. Malchand son of Ramnarayan 6. Ramavtar son of Moolchand 7. Vishnu Singh son of Ram Kishore 16. The averment in para No.1 of the plaint is as under:- 17. During pendency of this civil suit an application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC was filed by the present appellant Navratan on 08.12.1995 and same was decided on 16.09.1996 after considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The application was allowed on the basis of sale deed dated 18.08.1988. After substitution of Navratan in place of aforementioned plaintiffs, the trial court has permitted Navratan to continue to prosecute the civil suit filed by the original plaintiff. 18. The application was allowed on the basis of sale deed dated 18.08.1988. After substitution of Navratan in place of aforementioned plaintiffs, the trial court has permitted Navratan to continue to prosecute the civil suit filed by the original plaintiff. 18. At the time of filing of appeal under Section 96 of CPC, no ground was raised challenging the order dated 16.09.1996 for substitution under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC and to continue to prosecute the civil suit by Navratan. By any other proceeding, purchase by Navratan (present appellant) and his substitution was not challenged by the present respondent. 19. A perusal of record indicated that PW-2 Navratan appeared in witness box and he exhibited original sale deed as Ex.1. Further he stated that at the time of purchase, documents were shown to him. PW-3 Malchand was one of the original plaintiff who also accepted the execution of deed. PW-1 Ramavtar was one of the original plaintiffs deposed that by Devisthan Department has accorded permission to sell the property. In cross examination, he admitted that the sale to Navratan is not by auction but no other question in cross examination with regard to any of the document including permission to transfer the property was asked. A perusal of documents indicated that this permission letter dated 21.10.1988 was exhibited by PW-1 and same is reproduced as under:- 20. A perusal of aforesaid indicated that in pursuant to decision dated 29.12.1986 and 14.10.1988 by the Regional Advisory Committee, the permission is accorded to sell 2577 sq. yards land for a sale consideration of Rs.2.35 lacs to Navratan. The document indicated that the permission was accorded by the Devisthan after advise of the advisory committee. 21. Section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 provides that no sale of any immovable property belonging to public trust shall be valid without the sanction of the Assistant Commissioner. The application for sanction shall be made in the prescribed manner but in case no sanction was granted within two months of receipt of application then it shall be presumed that sanction is accorded for the transaction. The provision was enacted to grant permission and simple language indicate that normally the sanction shall not be refused. 22. The provision of Section 31 of Rajasthan Public Trust Act is reproduced as under:- “Previous sanction to be obtained for certain transfers:” 1. The provision was enacted to grant permission and simple language indicate that normally the sanction shall not be refused. 22. The provision of Section 31 of Rajasthan Public Trust Act is reproduced as under:- “Previous sanction to be obtained for certain transfers:” 1. Subject to the directions in the instrument of trust or any directions givenunder this Act or any other law by any court: (a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property or of movable property exceeding five thousand rupees in value, and (b) no lease, for a period exceeding five years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building belonging to a public trust shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner. 2. An application for the sanction of the Assistant Commissioner, under sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed manner and form. 3. Where, on the application duly made for sanction in respect of any transaction specified in sub-section(1), the Assistant Commissioner does not, within two months of the receipt thereof, pass final orders, it shall be presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of that transaction, provided that the application described the transaction, with sufficient accuracy. 4. The Assistant Commissioner shall not refuse to accord sanction in respect of any transaction specified in sub-section (1) unless such transaction is, in this opinion, likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the public trust, and no order refusing to accord sanction shall be passed unless the working trustee of such public trust has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 23. Aforesaid indicated that in order to check and balance the interest and properties, vested in the public trust previous sanction was required but in case sanction is not granted within two months then there is clause of presumption. Moreover there is provision for check on power of refusal by the Assistant Commissioner. It also mean that normally the sanction is a rule and refusal is an exception thus the provision of Section 31 of the Act is required to be read in positive manner rather in negative manner. 24. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent has referred to Rule 35, which provides condition and restriction in respect of acquisition and disposal of property by Committee of Management. 24. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent has referred to Rule 35, which provides condition and restriction in respect of acquisition and disposal of property by Committee of Management. The provision of rule provides for disposal of any immovable property exceeding Rs.2,000/- and value otherwise than by public auction shall be made by the Management. When an application for previous sanction is filed under Section 31 of the Act with detail of sale consideration, and same was obtained by original plaintiff, then non-compliance of provision of this part of rule is not fatal, unless someone challenges the transfer on the ground of inadequate sale consideration. The rules are made to carry out purpose and object of the act provided under Section 76 of the Act. Thus, if sale deed is executed in pursuant to compliance as provided under Section 31 of the Act then bona fides of the parties to tramsaction cannot be challenged under any of the rule. 25. Basically the instant suit is filed by landlord against tenant wherein original tenancy was alleged to be of Gulji and after his death the legal representatives of Gulji namely Raghunath, Bhanwar Lal, Ghanshyam, Prakash, Hanuman and Narayan had succeeded the interest of Gulji and they acquired the interest that Gulji was having on suit property. After compromise with Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash, the instant civil suit was decided against them but continued against Bhanwar Lal and Raghunath. The wife of Narayan examined as PW-5 had supported the case of plaintiff. It means four out of six legal representatives of Gulji supported plaintiff. 26. A perusal of written statement by original defendants (all five) in respect to original plaint submitted by original plaintiffs indicated that they have denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for doctrine of estopple and in case of Sriram Pasricha vs. Jagannath & Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 184 while referring “doctrine of tenant’s estopple” from english law, also considered statutory recognition in Indian Law. It was held that the tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and the tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. 27. Further in case of Subhash Chandra vs. Mohammad Sharit And Ors. It was held that the tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and the tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. 27. Further in case of Subhash Chandra vs. Mohammad Sharit And Ors. AIR 1990 SC 636 referred the provision of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and Hon’ble Supreme Court held that title of landlord cannot be challenged but derivative title of subsequent landlord can be challenged. 28. Herein this case the landlord has filed a suit on the basis of tenancy granted to Gulji by plaintiff No.1 and para 2 of the plaint filed on 26.06.1982, states that Gulji was paying Rs.4/- per year as rent to plaintiff No.1 but after death of Gulji and his wife the Bhanwar Lal, Ghanshyam, Prakash, Raghunath and Hamuman were in possession and after paying rent to plaintiff No.1, an attornment of tenancy was made. Original plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction on ground of default in payment of rent, denial of title and acting contrary to the interest of landlord. The written statement filed by all five defendants reflects that the fact narrated in the plaint were denied, which includes attornment of tenancy and relationship of landlord and tenant and also committing any encroachment on other land of plaintiffs. In the entire written statement, no specific claim of counter ownership was made by the defendants. Thus, denial of ownership or title of landlord was bald and general. 29. During pendency of the civil suit, the original plaintiffs have entered into compromise with defendant Nos. 3 to 5 and same was exhibited as Ex.4. The compromise was attested on 05.07.1989, between the parties and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had not objected to the compromise. After this compromise between plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 to 5, the suit was closed between them and it continued against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only. Thereafter an application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC was allowed on 16.09.1996 and amended written statement was filed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 30. A perusal of pleading of the parties clearly indicated that neither any counter claim was made by the respondent nor any prayer was made to declare the sale deed dated 18.08.1988 as null and void. 1 and 2. 30. A perusal of pleading of the parties clearly indicated that neither any counter claim was made by the respondent nor any prayer was made to declare the sale deed dated 18.08.1988 as null and void. The amended written statement filed by present respondent clearly indicated that no specific objection about Section 31 of the Act or Rule 35 of the Rules was raised by respondent-defendant Nos. 1 and 2. 31. The first appellate court not only scanned the title of landlord but it specifically referred to Section 35 of the Act which provides for budget. It appears that appellate court without any proper application of mind swayed by the whimsical thought process in deriving conclusion on the issue not raised before the Trial Court by way of specific pleading or evidence. 32. The power of first appellate court was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Malluru Mallappa(D) Thr. Lrs vs. Kuruvathappa AIR 2020 SC 925 , wherein referred the judgments of B.V. Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 and Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 and observed that the first appellate court is required to give reasons to record its findings and comply with Rule 31 of Order XLI of CPC. A perusal of findings recorded on issues 8 (a), (b) and (c) indicated that appellate court was of the view that the plaintiff has failed to produce any documents relating to title of the suit property. The appellate court has also referred to Section 88 of the Land Revenue Act and concluded that all lands which are not private lands belongs to the Government. Further, appellate court has affirmed findings on issue No.8(b) but on 8(c) again referred Section 35-B of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act. There was no such provision under Section 35B of the Act. The provision was under Section 31 of the Act and we have referred to it hereinabove. The provision was made under Rule 35 and we have referred to the same. The legal position is that the rule is subservient to the main provision. Looking to Section 31 of the Act the provision of rule 35 cannot override provision of Act thus the first appellate court without application of mind and without considering the provisions of Act came to conclusion that without public auction such property cannot be sold. The legal position is that the rule is subservient to the main provision. Looking to Section 31 of the Act the provision of rule 35 cannot override provision of Act thus the first appellate court without application of mind and without considering the provisions of Act came to conclusion that without public auction such property cannot be sold. The appellate court has failed to consider the permission Ex.6, which we have referred to hereinavove and also accepted by PW-1 Ramavtar in his evidence. The findings recorded by the appellate court on issues No.8 (A) and 8 (C) are contrary to the material on record. 33. Learned Appellate court insisted that the plaintiff had failed to prove his title. A perusal of the plaint indicated that the suit was filed for eviction, arrear of rent and perpetual injunction by original plaintiffs (A public trust and trustees). A perusal of record and evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 clearly suggested that a public trust was registered with the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan and document of registration Ex.1/1 was filed by the plaintiff, moreover, certain more documents were filed by the plaintiff to establish that the property belongs to them. The appellate court was of the view that the plaintiff was required to file Patta, JDA record or land revenue record. The demand of title documents in such case is contrary to law and settled position. As regard to suit for eviction is concerned, it is an established proposition of law that in a suit for eviction the plaintiff has not required to prove the title of the suit property, to claim possession. 34. The Appellate court was required to see whether there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. A full Bench judgment of this court in case of Pushpa Devi Vs. Gopal Lal Rawat (supra) relied upon by a Co-ordinate Bench of this court in case of Ram Singh Vs. Lal Chand Sadhnani (supra) held that in case of tenancy and denial of the title of the plaintiff then on the basis of evidence led by the parties, a decree for possession can be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of title of plaintiff. 35. In case of Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Lal Chand Sadhnani (supra) held that in case of tenancy and denial of the title of the plaintiff then on the basis of evidence led by the parties, a decree for possession can be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of title of plaintiff. 35. In case of Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Chandramul (supra) it was held that as a general rule, the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties but in case if tenancy is not established then the decree can be passed on the basis of title of the plaintiff and possession of defendant was as a licensee on the premises. 36. Herein, perusal of written statement filed on 18.10.1992 indicated that defendants had denied tenancy and attornment of tenancy. Defendants had denied the tenancy of Gulji but insisted that suit property was in their possession since their forefather Chottilal. A statement is made that the defendants are in possession on the basis of title, but neither description nor document was filed in support of claim. 37. During pendency of the suit before the trial court, a compromise between defendant No.3 to 5 with original plaintiffs was executed on 05.07.1989 and to corroborate this compromise PW-4 Hanuman and PW-5 Shyama Devi were produced by the plaintiff. PW-4 Hanuman admitted that he was paid to evict the suit property but he remained ignorant about the fact that whether his father has taken this premises on rent. PW-5 Shyama Devi, who is wife of son of Gulji admitted that after death of her father in law her husband paid the rent in 1981. She also admitted that respondent Raghunath has evicted her by using force and since then communication with Raghunath is stopped. She remained ignorant about payment to Bhanwar Lal, Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash to surrender possession to the plaintiff. At the same time DW-1 Raghunath claimed that the property is government (najul) land and he is in possession of government land. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not applied to get lease from Nagar Nigam. He also admitted that property of temple trust was rightly indicated by trustees in the plaint. He further admitted that the houses constructed within four-walls of the land of temple and one of the house belongs to him. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not applied to get lease from Nagar Nigam. He also admitted that property of temple trust was rightly indicated by trustees in the plaint. He further admitted that the houses constructed within four-walls of the land of temple and one of the house belongs to him. He also admitted that he did not raise any objection about the sale deed though he was aware about the sale deed. He also admitted that he did not see any document relating to suit property. 38. Except DW-1, no other evidence was produced by the defendants. A perusal of written statement submitted by all five defendants and subsequently amended written statement indicated that no serious objection about the title of the public trust (plaintiffs) was raised by the defendants but if the matter was compromised with other defendants respondent, which resulted into partial surrender of suit property by defendants No. 3 to 5 then can present respondents, still resist and deny the title of landlord. 39. Herein this case no document to discredit the claim of plaintiff was filed by defendant DW-1 in his evidence. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 suggested that despite that the property belongs to public trust and same was registered with Devasthan department, the registration certificate along with other documents were produced and they are more than sufficient to establish that the suit property belong to original plaintiffs. Even DW-1 admitted that ownership of original plaintiffs. PW-4 and PW-5 have supported the case of plaintiff and the evidence of PW-4 cannot be discredited solely on the basis that he handed over the possession of the suit property for a value though learned senior advocate for respondent has raised this issue but same is not enough to discredit the evidence of PW-4. 40. Learned appellate court not only entered to examine the title of plaintiff but it has commented upon the documents which were exhibited by the plaintiff and same is contrary to established principles of law. 41. The legal position to read evidence on record in case of suit between landlord and tenant prescribes that the Appellate Court is required to consider whether there exists a relation of landlord and tenant, if not then simple option is to set aside the issue and leave the parties to go for further litigation, if advised. 41. The legal position to read evidence on record in case of suit between landlord and tenant prescribes that the Appellate Court is required to consider whether there exists a relation of landlord and tenant, if not then simple option is to set aside the issue and leave the parties to go for further litigation, if advised. A suit for eviction based on relationship of landlord and tenant is always different than suit for title and possession against any other claimant. 42. The trial court while considering the evidence on record has decided issue Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 together and concluded that rent receipt dated 01.12.1972 exhibited as Ex.2, signed by Bhanwar Lal was filed on record. The trial court has further determined provisional rent on 11.11.1987. The defence of defendants on default was struck down by the trial court. Herein Ex.4 compromise with three of LRs of Gulji was attested and verified on 05.07.1989 and same is enough to prove that except present respondent, all other LRs had acknowledged that Gulji was tenant on suit property and they have also attorned the tenancy rights after death of Gulji. 43. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Suresh Kumar Kohli vs Rakesh Jain AIR 2018 SC 2078 came across a situation wherein, the question was whether after death of tenant, succeeding LRs are in possession as tenancy in common or joint tenancy. It was held on the basis of judgment in case of H.C. Pandey vs G.C. Paul (1989) 3 SCC 77 that when original tenant dies LRs inherit the tenancy as joint and occupation of one of the tenants is occupation of all the joint tenants. It is not necessary for landlord to implead all LRs of deceased, when some of them are occupying the property. An eviction petition against one of the joint tenant is sufficient to evict all the joint tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the rent controller as joint tenancy is one tenancy. Herein, out of five defendants (LRs of Gulji) three of them had surrendered tenancy after compromise on 05.07.1989 but present defendant has resisted the eviction and he remained firm with the written statement filed jointly with other defendants. Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act provides for rule of estopple and the original tenant and LRs after death of tenant are estopped from denying the tenancy. Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act provides for rule of estopple and the original tenant and LRs after death of tenant are estopped from denying the tenancy. After death of Gulji, it is a joint tenancy of legal heirs but this tenancy right cannot be split into different heirs as a separate tenancy. 44. Herein the respondent defendant Nos. 3 to 5 had admitted tenancy of Gulji and moreover PW-5 who was not a put her signature to Ex.4 had also admitted tenancy of her father in law Gulji. Similarly the cross-examination of DW-1 also established, title/ownership of original plaintiffs. The plaintiff appellant has filed The documents of Devasthan Department to claim and prove that the property in question belong to original plaintiffs at the time of institution of suit. Further no notice of encroachment either by JDA or Municipal Council was ever served to original plaintiffs to show that the suit property was considered as a government or Nazul land. 45. Now comes the question that PW-1 and PW-3 who were trustees of the public trust came to support the case of the plaintiff though they were original plaintiffs. Similarly, as PW-2 (Navratan) came as witness in witness box to prove his registered sale deed. The evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 clearly suggested that after obtaining permission from Assistant Commissioner as Ex.6 the suit property was transferred to PW-2 Navratan. This sale deed was within knowledge of DW-1 and he never challenged the sale deed on any of the count. The admission of DW-1 also suggested that he has not filed any application for issuance of patta from Nagar Nigam or any other authority. 46. The grounds and the submissions, raised by learned senior advocate for respondent defendant are not enough to defend the findings recorded by learned appellate court, which are not only perverse but contrary to the record and law, and thereby the appellate court set aside the findings recorded by the trial court. 47. The tenant remains as tenant and for this purpose, rule of estopple was inserted in Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The risk also runs with the tenant in case he denied title or acts against the interest of landlord. When the tenant is running the risk voluntarily and title is established then the defence of tenant becomes redundant. 48. The risk also runs with the tenant in case he denied title or acts against the interest of landlord. When the tenant is running the risk voluntarily and title is established then the defence of tenant becomes redundant. 48. Considered the aforesaid, there was no occasion for the appellate court to examine the correctness and authenticity of the sale deed executed in favour of appellant substituted plaintiff Navratan. No one including respondent defendant has ever challenged the permission Ex-6 granted by Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan to transfer the suit property to present appellant. 49. Rule 35 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules nowhere provides for prior permission of any court as property is held by public trust and same is governed by the Rajasthan Public Trust Act. The requisite permission under Section 31 of the Act was already exhibited as Ex-6 and obtained by original plaintiffs before transferring the property. Moreover, this permission was granted on the basis of recommendation of Advisory Committed dated 29.12.1986 and 14.10.1988, therefore, the Appellate Court has misconstrued the provision of Rule 35 and transgressed its jurisdiction. 50. The permission under Section 31 was exhibited and the sale deed reflects that application for permission was made on 29.09.1986 and on the basis of recommendation of the Advisory Committee on dated 20.01.1987, same was pending for consideration and in view of clause for presumption of deemed permission, a transferee (Public Trust) can presume permission under Section 31(3) of the Act. The language used in Section 31 clearly indicated that the provision was inserted just to regulate transfer and alienation of trust property and not to restrict the alienation or transfer of property. Herein, all trustees of the public trust were unanimous in transferring the suit property in favour of appellant and same is established from sale deed. 51. After taking into consideration of the aforesaid material, which was placed on record before the Trial Court, the Appellate Court has no occasion to declare sale deed executed in favour of Navratan as illegal, null and void, as no one including present respondent has ever challenged the sale deed. Herein this case, the respondent has never challenged the sale deed either by filing a separate suit or by a counter claim. Herein this case, the respondent has never challenged the sale deed either by filing a separate suit or by a counter claim. A written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 CPC can be filed to deny the averments in the plaint but under Rule 2, the defendant can present new facts raising those objection, which are relevant to oppose the claim of plaintiff but the facts must be clearly and specifically stated, not in vague and general terms. 52. On the basis of pleadings, specific objections in amended written statement of defendant (respondent), three issues- 8(A), 8(B) and 8(C) were framed by the Trial Court. On issue No. 8(B), there is concurrent findings of both the Courts below, but on issue No. 8(A) and 8(C), the Appellate Court has set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court. The issue Nos. 8(A) and 8(C) are reproduced as under:- 53. The issues framed by the trial court clearly indicated that if defendant respondent was able to establish that the suit property was a Nazul land then only issue No.8A can be proved in favour of respondent defendant but no document to support this issue was exhibited by DW-1, which can conclusively establish that the suit property is Nazul land. The admission of DW-1 reflects that the suit property belongs to plaintiffs(Trust) and has rightly mentioned the description of suit property. The admission of DW-1 in cross-examination is reproduced as under:- 54. Aforesaid indicated that no evidence on issue No.8A was led by the DW-1 therefore the appellate court has transgressed its powers and only on the basis of whims and fancies decided the issue No.8A against the plaintiff who were respondent before the first appellate court. A perusal of aforementioned discussion makes it clear that the suit property was originally belonging to a Public Trust, registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act and same was transferred to the present appellant after following procedure as prescribed under Section 31 of the Act. The Trial Court has allowed the substitution and permitted to continue the civil suit by the newly added plaintiff. Thus, the First Appellate Court has committed serious error in holding that transfer of trust property in favour of Navratan is illegal and null and void. 55. The Trial Court has allowed the substitution and permitted to continue the civil suit by the newly added plaintiff. Thus, the First Appellate Court has committed serious error in holding that transfer of trust property in favour of Navratan is illegal and null and void. 55. Since the appeal was admitted and substantial question of law were framed by a coordinate Bench of this Court, therefore the contention of learned Senior Advocate for respondent cannot be accepted that in second appeal, this Court cannot touch upon question of facts (issues decided by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court). Moreover, it is a case of reversal of finding and the questions framed by this Court at the time of admission, are required to be answered on the basis of material on record. 56. On the basis of deliberations made hereinabove, the question Nos. 3 to 6, are answered as under:- (Question No.3) Yes, the First Appellate Court has made grave error in holding that the sale deed was not made with the permission of the Court. (Question No.4) Yes, the First Appellate Court has committed serious error in holding that prior permission was necessary under Rule 35 of the Rules of 1962. (Question No.5) Yes, the First Appellate Court has failed to appreciate the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, particularly provision under Section 31(3) of the Act, wherein there is a clause for presumption, in case permission is not granted within two months of the application by the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan. (Question No.6) Yes, the First Appellate Court not only made grave and serious error, but it totally misconstrued the provision of Civil Law. In view of the aforesaid, the First Appellate Court has transgressed the authority of First Appellate Court while setting aside the finding of the Trial Court. B. Question No.1 57. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent relying upon judgment in case of Shri Shivaji Balaram Habibatti Vs. Shri Avinash Maruthi Pawar (supra) submitted that the sale deed of the property nowhere stated that respondent was in possession of suit property as tenant. He submitted that nowhere PW-4 and PW-5 admitted that Gulji was a tenant. Further, rent receipt dated 12.04.1972 allegedly signed by defendant No.1 Bhanwar Lal and defendant No.4 Ghanshyam was not established as plaintiffs had failed to examine Bhanwarlal and Ghanshyam. He further relied upon judgment in case of Kishore Kumar Vs. He submitted that nowhere PW-4 and PW-5 admitted that Gulji was a tenant. Further, rent receipt dated 12.04.1972 allegedly signed by defendant No.1 Bhanwar Lal and defendant No.4 Ghanshyam was not established as plaintiffs had failed to examine Bhanwarlal and Ghanshyam. He further relied upon judgment in case of Kishore Kumar Vs. Smt Daya (supra). 58. Normally relationship of landlord and tenancy is finding of fact as submitted by learned Senior Advocate for respondent defendant. In case of Rameshchandra Daulal Soni Vs. Devichand Hiralal Gandhi (dead) through LR (supra) it was held that the question of relationship of landlord and tenancy between the parties is question of fact and cannot be entered into second appeal. Herein this case the trial court has considered the issue and recorded a finding in favour of appellant-plaintiff, but the appellate court by taking a contrary view reversed the finding. At the time of admission, a specific substantial question of law was framed by this court. 59. Now the issue is before us and we have to decide whether the appellate court has committed an error while considering the evidence on record. The PW-1 and PW-3 remained firm in their deposition before the Trial Court and they had supported the version of original plaint. After dispute property was sold to PW-2, the evidence on record of PW-1 and PW-3 wad further supported by PW-4. In para 2 of the affidavit tendered in examination-in-chief PW-4 has admitted the tenancy of Gulji and issuance of receipt by the landlord, whereas PW-4 (daughter in law of Gulji) further fortified the contention that the suit property was in possession of Gulji as tenant. She also asserted in para 6 that the rent was paid by her father in law and after him, same was paid by other including Ghanshyam. In cross-examination, PW-5 has further submitted that her husband had paid rent after death of father in law. The deposition of PW-4 and PW-5 clearly indicated that there was a relationship between original plaintiff and Gulji. 60. On the other side, DW-1 Raghunath has denied the tenancy but admitted that he is not having animosity with Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash. He also admitted that in this house Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash were also residing, thus, DW-1 has only denied the claim of tenancy. 60. On the other side, DW-1 Raghunath has denied the tenancy but admitted that he is not having animosity with Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash. He also admitted that in this house Hanuman, Ghanshyam and Prakash were also residing, thus, DW-1 has only denied the claim of tenancy. He also denied the signature of Ghanshyam on Ex.2 (rent receipt) and on a specific question about Ex.2, this witness has answered question in following manner:- 61. The manner in which aforesaid questions were answered indicated that only for the purpose of denial, DW-1 has denied the receipt Ex.-2. A coordinate Bench of this Court at Jodhpur in the case of Ved Prakash v. Vijendra Kumar Rampuria and Anr. (S.B. Execution First Appeal No. 7/2018, decided on 28.05.2019), observed that in case of devolution of interest on LRs on death of tenant, any legal heir cannot maintain independent right on rented property. 62. Considering the aforesaid, there is enough evidence on record to presume that Gulji was a tenant on the suit premises and same was inherited by legal representatives of Gulji after his death. The compromise Ex.-4 was verified by trial court and also fortify the contention of the plaintiff that the suit property was rented with Gulji and after death of Gulji and his wife, the defendants inherited the tenancy. From the compromise dated 05.07.1989 and evidence on record, the question of tenancy was established before the trial court and the trial court has rightly drawn the conclusion. 63. The First Appellate Court while setting aside the findings recorded by the trial court, failed to consider that the defendant Raghunath inherited possession with his remaining brothers and his brothers had not supported him in consolidating his defence. Moreover, the possession on suit property was admittedly from time of his father and possession of Gulji was neither an owner nor encroacher. Thus, findings recorded by the Appellate Court are perverse and contrary to the record. Therefore, the First Appellate Court has committed serious error while setting aside the finding recorded by the trial court. The non-examination of Bhanwarlal and Ghanshyam has no effect on the instant case. Thus, the question is answered accordingly. C. Question No.2 64. Thus, findings recorded by the Appellate Court are perverse and contrary to the record. Therefore, the First Appellate Court has committed serious error while setting aside the finding recorded by the trial court. The non-examination of Bhanwarlal and Ghanshyam has no effect on the instant case. Thus, the question is answered accordingly. C. Question No.2 64. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent submitted that under Section 100 CPC there is limited scope of interference but herein there is reversal of decree passed by first appellate court and this court while admitting the appeal has framed the substantial question of law and we are considering these substantial questions of law settled at the time of admission of the appeal. Therefore, the scope of Section 100 CPC is subject to substantial question of law. 65. Issue of relationship of landlord and tenancy is a finding of fact and discussion made hereinabove indicated that sufficient evidence was on record, was available and same was believed by the trial court. The Trial Court, on the basis of evidence concluded that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenant, hence the finding recorded by trial court was in accordance with evidence on record but the appellate court has examined the title of landlord, that too beyond the material on record. The tenancy was established from the admission in Ex.4 and the rent receipt Ex.-2 and also from deposition of DW-4 and DW-5. Moreover, the respondent defendant Raghunath has inherited the suit property as heir of Gulji. A tenant has no right to deny the title of landlord at the beginning of the tenancy in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and further explained in the case of S. Thanagappan v. P. Padmavathy, AIR 1999 SC 3584 . 66. The appellate court has failed to appreciate that without establishing any independent right, the respondent-defendant has no authority to challenge the title and relationship, which was admitted by some of the LRs of the original tenant. The LRs of tenant cannot take contrary stand to each other. Herein, PW-4 has admitted that he has received the money to vacate the suit premises but it is not enough to discredit his evidence. The evidence was only for receiving money and not to accept tenancy of plaintiff. The defendant respondent has not raised any objection at the time of attestation of compromise on 05.07.1989. Herein, PW-4 has admitted that he has received the money to vacate the suit premises but it is not enough to discredit his evidence. The evidence was only for receiving money and not to accept tenancy of plaintiff. The defendant respondent has not raised any objection at the time of attestation of compromise on 05.07.1989. Order XII Rule 6 CPC provides for judgment on admission. There cannot be a bifurcation of rights of tenancy after death of original tenant. 67. Therefore, the Appellate Court has committed a serious error in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court has not only misconstrued and misread evidence, but also transgressed the authority in acting contrary to law. The question is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION 68. Having considered deliberations on substantial question of law Nos. 1 to 6, a fact is quite clear that the learned trial court has accepted version of plaintiff and found that the facts narrated and claimed by plaintiff were established from the oral and documentary evidence placed on record but learned appellate court on erroneous interpretation of legal position has over-stepped and travelled beyond the scope of the suit which resulted into unsettling the findings recorded by the learned trial court. The judgments referred by learned senior advocate for respondent are not applicable in the instant case as this court at the time of admission has found that the grounds give rise to this substantial question of law which we have discussed hereinabove therefore now this appeal cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that under Section 100 of CPC this court cannot interfere in the findings recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 of CPC. 69. Having considered aforesaid, I am of considered view that a reasoned judgment was passed by the trial court but the appellate court has set aside the well founded judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Therefore, the Appellate Court has committed serious error in allowing first appeal under Section 96 of CPC. The Second Appeal is bound to be allowed and judgment dated 15.10.2008 in civil regular appeal No.06/2008 is liable to be set aside. After setting aside of order dated 15.10.2008 in Civil Regular Appeal, the original judgment & decree in civil suit No. 185/1982 is bound to be restored. 70. The Second Appeal is bound to be allowed and judgment dated 15.10.2008 in civil regular appeal No.06/2008 is liable to be set aside. After setting aside of order dated 15.10.2008 in Civil Regular Appeal, the original judgment & decree in civil suit No. 185/1982 is bound to be restored. 70. In view of aforesaid the instant S.B. Civil Second Appeal preferred by appellant plaintiff is hereby allowed against the respondent defendant in following manner : (i) The judgment dated 15.10.2008 in civil regular appeal No. 06/2008 passed by the Additional District Judge No.9, Jaipur City, Jaipur, is hereby set aside and (ii) The judgment and decree dated 08.01.2008 in civil suit No. 185/1982 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jaipur City (West), Jaipur for eviction, arrear of rent and perpetual injunction, is hereby restored and affirmed. (iii) Three months’ time is granted to the respondent defendant to hand over vacant possession of suit property to plaintiff or his representative(s). 71. No order as to cost. 72. Decree be drawn accordingly. 73. Any pending application, if any, stands disposed of.