Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 813 (AP)

Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited v. Chairperson-cum-presiding Officer

2024-07-23

V.SUJATHA

body2024
ORDER : V.Sujatha, J. This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:- “...to issue a suitable order, direction or a writ more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari and quash and set-aside the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court at Anantapuramu in I.D.No.93 of 2012 dated 08.05.2015 and which was published vide G.O.Rt.No.421 dated 23.07.2015 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the interest of justice and equity...”. 2. The 2nd petitioner herein is the Regional manager of the 1st petitioner company at Kurnool, which deals with business of vehicle finance. The 2nd respondent herein used to work as a Senior Credit Executive in the petitioner company, whose duties are to supervise the employees working under him and has got a power to take independent decisions relating to the collection of amounts from customers who had taken finance from the petitioner company. The petitioner used to get a monthly salary of Rs.15,250/-. 3. The case of the petitioners is that though the 2nd respondent was transferred from Kurnool to Adoni branch office vide letter dated 01.03.2012 due to administrative reasons, the 2nd respondent, having received the transfer order and in spite of several reminders including reminder dated 17.03.2012, has not joined for duty at the said place. As such, the petitioners have issued letter dated 26.03.2012 stating that the 2nd respondent has left the employment on his own by abandoning the services. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the 2nd respondent has raised an industrial dispute vide I.D.No.93 of 2012 before the Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court at Anantapuramu District under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, alleging that the petitioner company has terminated him without giving any notice or without conducting any proper enquiry. An award dated 08.05.2015 was passed in the aforesaid I.D.No.93 of 2012, wherein the labour court has directed for reinstatement of the respondent No.2 with all consequential benefits. Aggrieved by the award passed by the 1st respondent herein, the present writ petition is filed. 5. When the writ petition came up for admission on 16.09.2015, this Court has passed the following order in W.P.M.P.No.39033 of 2015: “There shall be stay of award in ID No.93/12 dated 08.05.2015 in respect of consequential benefits.” 6. Heard Sri Sai Sanjay Suraneni, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Labour and Sri. 5. When the writ petition came up for admission on 16.09.2015, this Court has passed the following order in W.P.M.P.No.39033 of 2015: “There shall be stay of award in ID No.93/12 dated 08.05.2015 in respect of consequential benefits.” 6. Heard Sri Sai Sanjay Suraneni, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Labour and Sri. M.V. Pratap Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 7. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners would state that the 2nd respondent was initially appointed as Junior Field Executive in the year 2007 and was thereafter promoted as Product Executive, Credit Executive and Senior Credit Executive from time to time; and his pay was revised accordingly. Learned counsel for the petitioners further stated that the 2nd respondent was transferred to Kurnool upon his request and was posted in a supervisory role, but not as a workman. When the 2nd respondent was transferred from Kurnool to Adoni branch office vide letter dated 01.03.2012 due to administrative reasons, the 2nd respondent, having received the transfer order and even after several reminders including the reminder dated 17.03.2012, has not joined for duty at the said place. As such, the petitioners herein have issued letter dated 26.03.2012 stating that the 2nd respondent has left the employment on his own by abandoning the services, which in fact is in violation of the rules and regulations of the petitioner company. Subsequently, as the 2nd respondent himself was absent for duties, a letter of abandonment of services was issued on 26.03.2012, challenging which the 2nd respondent has approached the Industrial-Cum- Labour Court, Anantapuramu by filing I.D.No.93 of 2012. 8. While referring to the impugned award of the labour court, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that as per sub clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, any individual who is employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages exceeding Rs.10,000/- per month or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. The respondent No.2 himself has admitted that the last drawn salary by him is Rs.15,000/-, which admittedly is more than the prescribed amount as per sub clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. The respondent No.2 himself has admitted that the last drawn salary by him is Rs.15,000/-, which admittedly is more than the prescribed amount as per sub clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. In spite of the same, the labour court has turned a blind eye of the said fact and has laid the burden on the petitioners herein stating that if at all the petitioners herein were successful in establishing that the respondent No.2 herein was employed in a supervisory capacity and was drawing an amount of Rs.15,000/-, then it can be held that the 2nd respondent will not fall within the purview of the word ‘workman’ as mentioned in the Sub clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He further submitted that the labour court, while asserting that the respondent No.2 is a ‘workman’ has wrongly declared that the petitioners herein have failed to establish the fact that the respondent No.2 was employed in a supervisory capacity or at least by the nature of duties attached to his office or by reason of the power vested to him, he was functioning mainly in a managerial nature of work. It is a well settled principle of law that if a person set up a plea that he is a workmen, the burden of proof would be on the workman to establish the employer-employee relationship, but, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against the employer that if he were to produce books of accounts, they would have proved the employer-employee relationship (vide N.C. John V. Secy., Thodupuzha Taluk Shop and Commercial Establishment Workers’ Union 1973 Lab IC 398: (1973) 1 LLJ 366 (Ker)). 9. The labour court did not take the aforementioned principle into account before classifying respondent No. 2 as a workman and when the respondent No.2 has approached the labour Court with a grievance, without determining whether the respondent No.2 fall within the purview of the word ‘workman’ as mentioned under Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947, has laid the burden upon the petitioners to prove that the 2nd respondent is not a workman. In view of the principle of law laid down in N.C. John V. Secy., Thodupuzha Taluk Shop and Commercial Establishment Workers’ (referred supra), it is for the respondent No.2 herein to assert that he is a workman in the petitioners company and it is for him to prove the said fact. The Labour Court by the impugned order held that the respondent No.2 is a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the ID Act and has come to a finding that refusing employment to the respondent from 07.06.2012 is not justifiable and has directed reinstatement with all other future consequential benefits except back-wages. As the said impugned order is passed without following the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the same is liable to be set-aside. 10. On the other hand learned Government Pleader for Labour, while denying the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners, has stated that merely stating that the last drawn salary of the respondent No.2 is Rs.15,000/- does not mean that he does not fall under the purview of workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. When the petitioners herein have failed to establish that the respondent No.2 was employed in a supervisory capacity or at least that by the nature of his duties attached to his office or by the reason of the power vested to him, he was functioning mainly in a managerial nature of work; they cannot contend before this Court that the order of reinstatement of the respondent No.2 is illegal. He further contended that the reminder letters said to have been issued by the petitioners were not at all received by the respondent No.2 and as such, the termination of services of the respondent No.2 certainly amounts to retrenchment as contained in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the conditions precedent to retrenchment of the 2nd respondent as mentioned in Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 should have been followed; which was not adhered to by the petitioners. While concluding his arguments, learned Government Pleader submitted that the labour court has rightly reinstated the 2nd respondent, as the services of the 2nd respondent were terminated without following the due procedure. As such, he requested to dismiss the present writ petition. 11. Perused the material available on record. 12. While concluding his arguments, learned Government Pleader submitted that the labour court has rightly reinstated the 2nd respondent, as the services of the 2nd respondent were terminated without following the due procedure. As such, he requested to dismiss the present writ petition. 11. Perused the material available on record. 12. For better understanding of the case Section 2(s) of the ID Act which defines ‘workman’ is extracted as under: “2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,— (s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person— (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 13. For an employee in an industry to be a ‘workman’ under the definition, it is manifest that he must be employed to do the following: a) Manual work b) Unskilled work c) Skilled work d) Technical work e) Operational work f) Supervisory work 14. The question as to whether an employee is a ‘workman’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the ID Act has to be determined with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions. The Apex Court in the case of Miss A. Sundarambal Vs. The question as to whether an employee is a ‘workman’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the ID Act has to be determined with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions. The Apex Court in the case of Miss A. Sundarambal Vs. Government of Goa, Daman and DIU and others (1998) 4 SCC 42 (Miss A. Sundarambal) held that in order to be a ‘workman’ a person should be one who satisfy the following conditions: i. He should be the person employed in an industry for hire or reward; ii. He should be engaged in skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work and; iii. He should not be a person falling under any of the four clauses, i.e., (i) to (iv) mentioned in the definition of workman in Section 2(s) of the ID Act. 14. 15. The Apex Court, while referring to the judgment in Miss A. Sundarambal Vs. Government of Goa, Daman and DIU and others (referred supra) in the case of Management of M/S May and Baker (India) Ltd. Vs. Workmen AIR 1967 SC 678 , held that if the employee therein did not satisfy any of the above descriptions, he would not be a ‘workman’ even though he is an employee of an industry. The Apex Court in the said decision held that the teacher employed in an educational institution cannot be called a ‘workman’ because imparting of the education, which is the main function of the teacher cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled, managerial or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. 16. In the case on hand, admittedly, the respondent No.2 was issued reminder letters by the petitioners herein directing him to join at Adoni branch. In spite of receiving the same, as he failed to respond and join at Adoni branch, the petitioners herein vide letter dated 26.03.2012 has declared that the respondent is absconding from services and removed him from services. Challenging the said termination, the 2nd respondent has approached the 1st respondent by way of I.D. No.93 of 2012, wherein the labour court has passed an order on 08.05.2015, directing the petitioners to reinstate the respondent No.2 with all consequential benefits except back-wages. Challenging the said termination, the 2nd respondent has approached the 1st respondent by way of I.D. No.93 of 2012, wherein the labour court has passed an order on 08.05.2015, directing the petitioners to reinstate the respondent No.2 with all consequential benefits except back-wages. On a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the petitioners herein have mainly objected the maintainability of the industrial dispute before the labour court on the sole ground that the 2nd respondent is working in managerial cadre by drawing a salary of Rs.15,250/- and as such, under any stretch of imagination he won’t come under the definition of ‘workman’ as defined under Industrial Disputes Act. Though the said fact was also identified by the labour Court, the same was not taken into consideration by merely stating that drawing a salary more than the amount prescribed in per sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 does not bar the person from being a workman. Instead, the labour Court had laid the burden on the petitioners herein duly stating that if the petitioners-company would have been successful in establishing the respondent No.2 was employed in a supervisory capacity and was drawing such a pay, then it can be held that he will not fall within the purview of the word ‘workman’. At this stage, for better appreciation of the case, this Court feels it appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the judgment referred by learned counsel for the petitioners in Nirtubai w/o Jayantilal Mahule Vs. Head Master, Higher Grade Marathi Girls School, Gondia and others: “5. In view of the aforesaid two decisions, it is apparent that the burden to establish the fact as to whether the relationship of “employer and employee” has been established or not, lies upon the employee. It is not for the employer to prove negative fact that there was no relation of “employer and employee”. The defect in framing of the issue, has deprived the petitioner-employee of a right to lead evidence. The Labour Court has held that the petitioner-employee has not led any evidence to establish this fact. In view of this, the impugned Award cannot be sustained and the same will have to be quashed and set aside with an order of remand.” 17. The Labour Court has held that the petitioner-employee has not led any evidence to establish this fact. In view of this, the impugned Award cannot be sustained and the same will have to be quashed and set aside with an order of remand.” 17. It can be understood from the above that when a person asserts that he is a workman of the company and the said fact was denied by the company, then it is for the workman to prove the fact that he falls under the purview of the word ‘workman’. The burden cannot be shifted on the company to prove that the person was not an employee of the company. In the present case, when the respondent No.2 has approached the labour Court as a workman, the first thing that should have been determined by the labour Court is “whether the 2nd respondent falls under the purview of the word ‘workman’ as defined in Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act”. Though the labour court has identified that the 2nd respondent, who is claiming to be a workman, is drawing a salary exceeding ten thousand rupees per month, which is against the sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, it has failed to determine that the respondent No.2 does not falls under the purview of the word ‘workman’; but instead placed the burden on the petitioners stating that they have failed to establish that the 2nd respondent was employed in a supervisory capacity or at least that by the nature of duties attached to his office or by reason of the power vested to him, he was functioning mainly in a managerial nature of work. 18. In Miss A. Sundarambal Vs. Government of Goa, Daman and DIU and others (referred supra), the Apex Court held that if the employee do not satisfy any of the descriptions mentioned therein (cited supra), he would not be a ‘workman’ even though he is an employee of an industry. As the respondent No.2 was drawing a salary of more than the prescribed amount of salary in sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947, he should not have been treated as a ‘workman’, though he is an employee of the petitioner company. However, the labour court has failed to address this point. 19. Even otherwise, as laid down in Nirtubai w/o Jayantilal Mahule Vs. However, the labour court has failed to address this point. 19. Even otherwise, as laid down in Nirtubai w/o Jayantilal Mahule Vs. Head Master, Higher Grade Marathi Girls School, Gondia and others, when the respondent No.2 asserts to be a workman of the petitioners company and when the same is denied by the petitioners, the burden of proof would be upon the 2nd respondent herein that he is a workman, but, in the present case an adverse inference was drawn by the labour court against the petitioners stating that it is for them to prove that the 2nd respondent does not fall under the definition of ‘workman’ 20. In view of the fact that the labour court has wrongly placed burden on the petitioners herein to prove that the respondent No.2 is not a workman, which is against the principle of law laid down in Nirtubai w/o Jayantilal Mahule Vs. Head Master, Higher Grade Marathi Girls School, Gondia and others, this Court feels that the impugned award in I.D.No.93 of 2012 needs to be set-aside to the extent of consequential benefits and the matter shall be remanded back to the labour court for fresh consideration. 21. Accordingly, this writ petition is partly allowed and the award in I.D.No.93 of 2012 is set-aside in respect of consequential benefits only. However, the matter is remanded back to the tribunal to pass orders keeping in view the aforesaid observations. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall also stand closed.