JUDGMENT : (Pankaj Jain, J.) : Defendants-Union of India and State of Punjab are in appeal. 2. Piara Singh migrated from Western Punjab in 1947. He was allotted two parcels of land by the Rehabilitation Department. Vide order dated 05.07.1976, he was allotted 42 kanal, 11 marlas of land in Village Seenpura. Vide order dated 19.07.1977, he was allotted 3 standard acres 91/2 units in village Mainwan_ Piara Singh died and the land was inherited by his three sons, namely, Gurdial Singh.. Gurbachan Singh and Mohinder Singh in equal shares. 3. Plaintiff is the purchaser of land in village Seenpura, The sons of the allottee Piara Singh his successors sold their respective shares in favour of the plaintiff vide 07 sale deeds Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-7. The Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelled the allotment made in favour of Piara Singh vide order dated 16.04.1980. Plaintiff filed revision petition before Chief Settlement Commissioner whereby parties were ordered to maintain status quo till further orders, After the authorities decided to auction the land, present suit was filed seeking restrained against the respondents from auctioning the same. The suit stands decreed by both the Courts below. 4. The primary contention. raised by the counsel for the appellant is with respect to jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the present suit. Reliance is being placed upon Sections 27 and 36 of the Displaced Person (C&R) Act, 1954. 5. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Vinod Kumar & Ors. 1986 PLJ 161 , Bagicha Singh & Anr. vs. The Chief Settlement Commissioner & Anr. 1967 PLR 296, Smt. Bhuro. & Anr. vs. Punjab State & Ors, 1981 PLJ, 379, Kali Ram etc. vs. Union of India & Ors., ILR(1077) P&H 361, Sardara Singh & Anr. vs. Harbhajan Singh & Ors., AIR 1974 P&H 345 , Bhagwan Kaur etc. vs. Ranjit Singh & Anr., 1990 (1) PLR 290, Sona Ram & Anr. vs. Mulakh Raj alias Lekh Raj & Anr. 1999 (1) PLJ 165, Gurbax Singh vs. The Financial Commissioner & Anr. 1991 PLJ 192(SC), Sadhu Singh (dead) by LRs vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1979 SC 1609 and Sarupa & Ors. vs. The Panchayati Akhara, Kala Bara Udasian, Thanesar & Ors. 1998(2) PLR 713. 6. vs. Mulakh Raj alias Lekh Raj & Anr. 1999 (1) PLJ 165, Gurbax Singh vs. The Financial Commissioner & Anr. 1991 PLJ 192(SC), Sadhu Singh (dead) by LRs vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1979 SC 1609 and Sarupa & Ors. vs. The Panchayati Akhara, Kala Bara Udasian, Thanesar & Ors. 1998(2) PLR 713. 6. Further reliance is being placed upon law laid down by Supreme Court in case of Randhir Kaur vs. .Prithvi Pal Singh and others reported as (2019) 17 SCC 71 to submit. that the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact of the lower Courts including findings based upon evidence as provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act and Section 100 of CPC as it stood prior to its ;amendment in 1976 are in pari materia. 7. Counsel for the appellants has placed heavily reliance on Para 15 thereof which reads as under:- “A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that the jurisdiction in second appeal is not to interfere with the findings of fact on the ground that findings are erroneous, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, The findings of fact will also include the findings on the basis of documentary evidence. The jurisdiction to interfere in the second appeal is only where there is an error in law or procedure and not merely an error on a question of fact.” 8. The preliminary objection raised by the senior counsel for respondent by relying upon Randhir Kaur’s case ibid is not applicable as the question raised by the appellants is purely legal with respect to jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff in order to answer the question raised upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has tried to find under the provision of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submits that the plaintiff being transfer in good faith and for consideration had no other remedy but to approach the Civil Court, Learned Senior counsel submits that it is only before the Civil Court. that the plaintiff could have established his civil right. 10. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 11. This is a case wherein original allottee Piara Singh was allotted land under the provisions of Displaced Person (C&R) Act, 1954. that the plaintiff could have established his civil right. 10. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 11. This is a case wherein original allottee Piara Singh was allotted land under the provisions of Displaced Person (C&R) Act, 1954. Competent authority i.e. Chief Settlement Commissioner resorting to provisions as contained under Section 24(2) cancelled the allottment in favour of Piara Singh. The question is can the plaintiff invoke Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act claiming himself to be trasferee in. good faith for consideration to maintain the civil .suit against cancellation of allotment in favour of original allottee. 12. The issue is no more res integra and has been answered against the plaintiff by Full Bench of this. Court in the case of. Smt. Niranjan Kaur and others vs. The FC Revenue and Secrete to Government, Punjab and others, wherein the Pull Bench observed as under:- “XX XX XX 14. The Hon’ble Division Bench doubted., the observations made by this Court, holding the vendees to be protected under Section 41 of the Property Act, and accordingly made reference to the Larger Bench for the following reasons :- (1) The provisions of Section 41 of the Property Act are attracted only when with the consent, express or implied, of the person interested in immovable property, a. person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration. It is, therefore, obvious that before this provision can be attracted, there has to be a real owner and an ostensible owner who transfers the property with express or implied consent of the former. In the case before the Division Bench and the other cases noticed above, the allottee upon whom the rights had been conferred was the real owner and there was no question of anybody being the ostensible owner, (2) The principle involved in section 41. of the Property Act is basically one of estoppel, It is well-established that the principle of estoppel cannot override the provisions of a Statute. Obviously, therefore, the provisions of section 41 of the Property Act would not be able to override the provisions of section 24 of the Act which authorises the Chief Settlement Commissioner to cancel any allotment. of the Property Act is basically one of estoppel, It is well-established that the principle of estoppel cannot override the provisions of a Statute. Obviously, therefore, the provisions of section 41 of the Property Act would not be able to override the provisions of section 24 of the Act which authorises the Chief Settlement Commissioner to cancel any allotment. (3) It is again highly doubtful if the word “persons” would include the Union or the State Government, Reference in this context may profitably be made to Sarkar-E-Aali Zaria Nazim v. Athar, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 714 and M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and another, AIR 1966 Punjab 229. (4) Express or implied. consent under section 41 of the Property Act has to be a valid and free consent. lf the allotment has been secured by fraud or misrepresentation and is sought to be cancelled on such ground under Section 24 of the Act, it cannot be said that the allottee on whom the permanent rights were conferred was the ostensible owner with express or implied consent, the alleged consent having been procured by misrepresentation or fraud. 39. Though in reply to the first question raised, it has to be answered that the allottee can be treated to be an ostensible owner and the Government as real, but, whether the benefit of Section 41 of the Property Act would be permissible to subsequent vendee, is required. to be considered under question No. 2. 44. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, question No. 2 is answered against the petitioners, by holding, that the provisions of the special statute, would override the provisions of Section 41 of the Property Act. 48. It is made clear, that non-availability of protection. under Section 41 of the Property Act would not be a bar to the subsequent vendee also being a proper party to contest the order of cancellation by resorting to the provisions of Section 24 and 33 of the Act. 49. The answer to the question, as to what right the subsequent vendee would have in view of the cancellation of the allotment which is finally upheld, is to be found in Sections 13 and 19 of the Specific Relief Act. 49. The answer to the question, as to what right the subsequent vendee would have in view of the cancellation of the allotment which is finally upheld, is to be found in Sections 13 and 19 of the Specific Relief Act. The property of the real owner would be protected, and bona fide purchaser will be entitled to get back his money along with interest and costs etc. from his vendor. 50. For the reasons stated, we are of the view that Section 41 of the Property Act, will have no application where transfer is held invalid under Sections 19 and 24 of the Act, as no estoppel can he pleaded against the provisions of the statute. 51. It would be within the right of the subsequent purchasers to challenge the order of cancellation on merits, but sale in their favour cannot be protected under Section 41 of the Property Act. The subsequent vendee can only claim refund or damages from his vendor.” 13. Once the provision of Section 41 have been held to be not applicable to the orders passed under Section 24 of the Displaced Person (C&R) Act, 1954, this Court finds that the plea raised by senior counsel for the plaintiff sans merit and needs to be rejected. 14. Coming on to the question with respect to jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the present suit, it will be apt to peruse the relevant provisions of law as contained in Sections 24, 27 and 36 of 1954 Act :- “24. Power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner:- (1) The Chief Settlement Commissioner may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act in which a Settlement Officer, an Assistant Settlement Officer, an Assistant Settlement Commissioner, an Additional Settlement Commissioner, a Settlement Commissioner, a managing officer or a managing corporation has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power under sub-section (1), if the Chief Settlement Commissioner is satisfied that any order for payment of compensation to a displaced person or any lease or allotment granted to such a person has been obtained by him by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of any material facts, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner may pass an order directing that no compensation shall be paid to such a person or reducing the amount of compensation to be paid to him or as the case may be, canceling the lease or allotment granted to him; and if it is found that a displaced person has been paid compensation which is not payable to him or which is in excess of the amount payable to him, such amount or excess, as the case may be, may on a certificate issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. (3) No order which prejudicially affects any person shall be passed under this Section without giving him at reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) Any person aggrieved by any order made under sub-section (2) may within thirty days of the date of the order make an application for the revision of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed to the Central Government and the Central Government may pass such order thereon it thinks fit. 27. Finality of Orders—Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. 36. Bar of jurisdiction—Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect at any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.” 15. Section 27 of the 1954 Act provides finality to the orders passed by the officer or authority under the said Act. Section 36 specifically bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 24 of the 1954 Act has been carefully couched to address the situation as in the present case. The remedy prescribed under Section 24(4) is not only confined to an allottee, but the same has been provided to any person aggrieved. 16. Apart therefrom it is not disputed that the plaintiff himself preferred petition under Section 24(4) before the Central Government which finally resulted in dismissal. Once the plaintiff himself choose to proceed and avail remedy in terms of Section 24(4), he cannot be allowed to turn back to maintain the present suit invoking Section 9 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. 17. Resultantly, this Court finds that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff and the same deserves to be dismissed on the said ground. 18. In view of above, this Court finds that both the Courts below erred in law in entertaining the suit and decreeing the same. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed, Suit filed by the plaintiff is ordered to be dismissed.