JUDGMENT : 1. By way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs : “7. The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order of direction to the respondent authorities and may be pleased to:- (A) Quash and set aside the impugned punishment order dated 26.8.2010, Annexure-A to this petition, and (B) Quash and set aside the order dated 2.7.2015, Annexure-B to this petition, and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner in service, with all consequential benefits, and (C) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned orders dated 26.8.2010 and 2.7.2015, Annexure-A and B to this petition, and (D) Award the cost of the present petition; (E) Grant any other relief or pass any other order which the Honourable Court may consider as just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as under : 2.1 The petitioner joined the service of the respondent authority on 12.08.1983 at the post of Typist and in due course, he came to be promoted to the post of Deputy Mamlatdar in the year 2000. That, during that period, the petitioner had rendered service with utmost sincerity and dedication, for which appreciation letters were also issued to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 01.09.2009 for the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while discharging his duties as Deputy Mamlatdar (Administrative Branch) at Junagadh, during the period from 13.06.2008 to 22.06.2009. That, pursuant to the receipt of the said charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply to the respondent authority on 25.02.2010, wherein, the petitioner had stated that, at the relevant point of time, four applicants had threatened the petitioner on mobile phone in the office to issue the certificates, but he had not received any amount from the said applicants. That, pursuant to the receipt of the said charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply to the respondent authority on 25.02.2010, wherein, the petitioner had stated that, at the relevant point of time, four applicants had threatened the petitioner on mobile phone in the office to issue the certificates, but he had not received any amount from the said applicants. 2.2 It is the case of the petitioner that, thereafter, the Inquiry Officer came to be appointed by the respondent authority by order dated 08.03.2010 to conduct the departmental inquiry against the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer conducted the departmental inquiry against the petitioner, wherein, the charges levelled against the petitioner were held to be proved by the Inquiry Officer. Thereafter, a copy of the inquiry report alongwith the show-cause notice dated 05.07.2010 came to be issued to the petitioner. Pursuant to the said show-cause notice, the petitioner remained present before the disciplinary authority on 19.07.2010 and had made oral submissions, which were not even recorded by the authority. That thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed the impugned punishment order dated 26.08.2010, whereby, the punishment of compulsory retirement from service came to be imposed upon the petitioner. 2.3 It is the case of the petitioner that, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order of punishment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Gujarat Civil Service Tribunal being Appeal No.27 of 2013, which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 02.07.2015. That, after the punishment order was passed by the disciplinary authorities, the petitioner made a request to the respondent authorities to sanction him compassionate pension as per the Rules, however, the said request of the petitioner came to be rejected by the respondent authorities vide order dated 19.12.2012. 2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 26.08.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the order dated 02.07.2015 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid prayers. 3. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Shalin Mehta assisted by learned advocate Mr.Ninad Shah, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Dharitri Pancholi, appearing on behalf of the respondent – State Authorities. 4. 3. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Shalin Mehta assisted by learned advocate Mr.Ninad Shah, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Dharitri Pancholi, appearing on behalf of the respondent – State Authorities. 4. Learned senior advocate Mr.Mehta has submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities are absolutely illegal, arbitrary and unjust and are in gross violation of principles of natural justice. He has submitted that the orders passed by the respondent authorities and confirmed by the appellate authority are without considering the materials available on record and without considering the oral as well as documentary evidence led before the authorities and therefore, the impugned orders of punishment are very harsh and disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. He has therefore, urged that the present petition be allowed and the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities and confirmed by the appellate authority be quashed and set aside. 5. As against that, the learned AGP Ms.Pancholi has vehemently opposed the present petition and submitted that the nature of the misconduct of the petitioner is grave and serious and therefore, after following all the rules and procedure, the inquiry officer has submitted the report to the answering authority and thereafter the impugned order was passed which is just, proper and legal. She has referred to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent No.2, more particularly paragraph nos. 4 to 11, and submitted that earlier also the petitioner was found guilty and penalty was imposed upon the petitioner of stoppage of three increments for three years without future effects for the offence of misconduct vide order dated 30.03.2007. She has submitted that even thereafter, the petitioner was found indulging in such offence and the inquiry report was submitted by the inquiry officer after examining all the witnesses and after following all the procedure, the impugned order of imposing penalty of compulsory retirement was issued to the petitioner. She has submitted that the said inquiry report was considered by the disciplinary authority after following the provisions of Rule 9(17) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 and after giving ample opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned orders were passed by the respondent authorities, which were subsequently confirmed by the appellate authority and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities. She has further submitted that now it is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot sit into appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority relying upon the relevant documentary as well as oral evidence led before it and therefore, the orders passed by the respondent authorities are in consonance with the settled legal principles. She has therefore, urged that the present petition be dismissed and the orders passed by the respondent authorities be confirmed. 6. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the material placed on record. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner was charge-sheeted for the alleged misconduct, wherein, the petitioner was found guilty for the said misconduct and was imposed major punishment under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Disciple and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Against the said order of punishment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Gujarat Civil Service Tribunal being Appeal No.27 of 2013, which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 02.07.2015, whereby, the order of the disciplinary authority was confirmed by the Tribunal and therefore, the present petition is preferred against the concurrent findings. It is also an undisputed fact that the petitioner was earlier also punished for his alleged misconduct of misappropriation and was imposed punishment of stoppage of three increments with future effects and subsequently the impugned orders were passed . It is also an undisputed fact that during the course of inquiry, the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity and thereafter, the inquiry officer has placed his report before the disciplinary authority and after considering the relevant material and the documentary as well as the oral evidence produced before the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned orders. It is also now well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited scope to interfere in the findings in the rarest of the rare case if any perversity or any illegality is found with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority. It is also now well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited scope to interfere in the findings in the rarest of the rare case if any perversity or any illegality is found with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority. Here in the present case, it does not fall under the said category and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in the departmental proceedings with regard to the quantum of punishment and the present petition is required to be dismissed. 6.1 At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in case of State Bank of India Vs. A.G.D. Reddy, reported in [2023] 3 SCC 117, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held as under : “Scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings 32. From the above discussion, it is clear that it could not be said that the Enquiry Report, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appointing Authority are based on no evidence or are perverse. Even if we eschew the report insofar as the aspect of non-submission of control form, the transgression of the area of operation and non-declaration of the immovable property and certain other charges are concerned, the order of penalty can be sustained. 33. As has been demonstrated above, the aspects of failure to conduct periodic inspection and the negligence in not stipulating the taking of immovable property as collateral security in the case of M/s Saraswathi Fabricators in spite of the party offering it, constrain us to conclude that there was material on record for the appellant to pass the order of penalty. 34. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the judgments of this Court in Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1978) 3 SCC 366 and Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 contends that the Disciplinary Authority should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence with some degree of definiteness pointing to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. He would contend that a suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof and scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished by recording findings merely based on ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. We are unable to accept the contention that the principles laid down in the above judgments are attracted to the present case. The judgments cited are clearly distinguishable, for the reasons that we have set out hereinabove, while analyzing the facts of the present case. 35. Shri Sanjay Kapur, learned counsel for the Bank relies on State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 249 . In that judgment the scope of judicial review of departmental proceedings was set out and the principle laid down in State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , was reiterated, which reads as follows:- “This Court has held in State of A.P. and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 , para 7): "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." 13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re- appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re- appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against the respondent no.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of any misconduct.” 36. It is now well settled that the scope of judicial review against a departmental enquiry proceeding is very limited. It is not in the nature of an appeal and a review on merits of the decision is not permissible. The scope of the enquiry is to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and to ensure that the findings are not bereft of any evidence. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognized and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court. 37. In the present case, it could certainly not be said that the report is based on no evidence or that it is perverse. The learned Single Judge transgressed the limits of judicial review in setting aside the enquiry proceedings and the punishment imposed. The Division Bench, in a short order has, after extracting a part of the learned Single Judge’s judgment, gone on to hold that having perused the records of the enquiry they do not find that the charges have been dealt with in any manner of specificity. Thereafter they conclude that the learned Single Judge was justified in arriving at its conclusion. We are not able to sustain the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Severability of charges 38. The question that remains is, in the light of the findings above, does the order of penalty imposed call for any interference? 39. The law is well-settled that if in a disciplinary proceeding, the order of penalty can be imposed on the charges proved and the punishment imposed is lawfully sustainable on those charges, it is not for the Court to consider whether those grounds alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. 39. The law is well-settled that if in a disciplinary proceeding, the order of penalty can be imposed on the charges proved and the punishment imposed is lawfully sustainable on those charges, it is not for the Court to consider whether those grounds alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. No doubt, on the facts of the present case, on some aspects of the charge, the proof may have been found wanting. However, since the law laid down by this Court is that unless punishment imposed is only co-relatable to any of those charges found not proved, the penalty cannot be set aside. In this case, the punishment can be sustained even if the charges held not proved are severed. [See State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 648 and Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 ]. 40. Then the only question is does the penalty imposed shock the conscience of the Court? In the oral arguments as well as in the written submissions, the respondent contended that there was no charge of financial misappropriation or of causing any financial loss to the Bank. This submission was countered by the appellant by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Disciplinary Authoritycum- Regional Manager and Others vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , particularly, the holding of the Court in para seven thereof to contend that the test is really not of loss having been resulted or profit having been made. The test is whether the delinquent employee, has observed the prescribed norms of the Bank. The penalty imposed in this case is “reduction in basic pay to the lowest stage in Scale-I” as envisaged under Rule 49 (e) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules and further, to treat the period spent by the delinquent officer under suspension from 18.08.1990 till the date of his reinstatement as suspension only. Since the charge of not conducting periodical inspection and the failure to complete the formalities for creating equitable mortgage with regard to M/s Saraswathi Fabricators are supported by evidence, we do not think that the penalty as imposed is disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. Since the charge of not conducting periodical inspection and the failure to complete the formalities for creating equitable mortgage with regard to M/s Saraswathi Fabricators are supported by evidence, we do not think that the penalty as imposed is disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. We maintain the penalty as imposed in the order of the Appointing Authority dated 31.01.1995 and as confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 41. For the reasons stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were in error in allowing the writ petition and interfering with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the order of the Appointing Authority and the decision of the Appellate Authority. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench and dismiss the Writ Petition No. 29547 of 1997 filed by the respondent. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs.” 6.2 In case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T T Murali Babu, reported in [2014] 4 SCC 108, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held as under : “23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government servant, expressed the afore-stated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is willful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorized absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla[11] the Court, dealing with unauthorized absence, has stated thus: - “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: - “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorized absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this regard a passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ashok Kumar Arora is worth reproducing: - “20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee.” 29. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, the Court analysed the conception of proportionality in administrative law in England and India and thereafter addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary matters and opined that unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. 30. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, the Court, after analyzing the doctrine of proportionality at length, ruled thus: - “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his absence by stating that he did not have intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded to say that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment is whether any reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances taking into consideration the major, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances after excluding irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 31. 31. It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the court at his own will. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India and another v. George Philip:- “18….In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.” We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and restate with the hope that employees in any organization should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organization. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organization develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development. 34. Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid premises, the irresistible conclusion is that the interference by the High Court with the punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable, and further the High Court was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the High Court are set aside leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.” 7. In view of the above referred facts and circumstances and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am of the opinion that this Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority and considering the seriousness of charge, the punishment imposed by the authority is not disproportionate to the charge which was proved against the petitioner and therefore, the present petition being devoid of any merits, is required to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.