ORDER : 1. This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (`CPC’ for short) being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 22.11.2023 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.145 of 2019 passed by the learned 8th Additional District Judge, Bhuj at Kachchh whereby the appeal preferred by the appellants herein was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 25.10.2019 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.27 of 2009 by the Additional Civil Court, Mandvi-Kutchch, wherein the suit of the appellants was dismissed, was confirmed. 2. The appellants preferred the suit for recovery of possession of the suit land R.S.No.159 of village Mota Goniyasar, Dub-district Mandvi-Kutch and also for cancellation of registered sale deed dated 25.03.1996 stating it as null and void by stating that the suit land was ancestral land of the plaintiff as the status of Inamdar; that the suit belonged to plaintiffs’ ancestor Jadeja Dungarji Sabraji and Deshalji Ganda and it was placed under mortgage before Joshi Shivji Vaghaji in Vikram Samvant 1947 Kartak Sud 7th by Ruparibai, the suit land was further sold out with mortgage by the heirs of Joshi Shivji Vaghaji before Shri Swaminarayan Nar Narayan Dev Temple on Vikram Samvant 2003 Magsar Vad 11th and it was under possession of Pragji Ramji as the agriculturist of vitantar Shri Swaminarayan Nar Narayan Dev Temple; the redemption deed was executed by Shri Swaminarayan Nar Narayan Dev Temple on 6.7.2007 and there is no right of Pragji Ramji as he was the agriculturist of the mortgagee; that the possession of Pragji Ramji is illegal and the heirs of the Pragji Ramji sold the property to the defendants which is challenged. It is further stated by the petitioners in the suit plaint that the said Pragji Ramji filed case no.990 of 1971 for the possessory right under Inam Abolition Act and his name was not running in the land, even though he received an order in his favour; that the right of tenancy on the property which was under mortgage was denied and stated that the order was without their knowledge and without service of any notice; that the execution of sale deed on 25.3.1996 by the heirs of Pragji Ramji in favour of the defendant is not legal and therefore the suit is filed. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr.Barot for the appellants. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr.Barot for the appellants. 3.1 He submitted that both the courts below have erred in holding that the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving the ownership on the suit land; that the defendants are not having any rights on the suit land; that both the courts below have erred in holding that the suit is suffering from non-joinder of parties and also that it was a time barred suit; that the appellants were not a party before the revenue authority and hence the order is not applicable to the appellants; that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the said proceedings; that the appellants have mortgaged the suit property to one Joshi Shivji Vagyhji and therefore the appellants are original owners and have valid title over the suit property; that the appellants have redeemed the mortgage. 3.2 He submitted that the suit cannot be said to be filed after unreasonable delay as the ancestors of the present appellants are the original owners of the suit land and thereafter, the suit land came to be mortgaged with one Shri Shivji Vaghji Joshi; that the said mortgagee transferred the mortgage rights to one Shir Swaminarayan Temple, Bhuj with a rider of redemption of mortgage; that the said mortgage was redeemed in the year 2007; that the suit premises is mortgaged property and therefore there cannot be any tenant of mortgaged property; that the orders passed by the learned Special Mamlatdar, Bhuj in the year 1972 whereby the inferior holder of the Swaminarayan Trust was declared as tenant/occupant of the suit land, however, the Swaminarayan Trust was a mortgagee and mortgagee does not have any legal right with and therefore the orders passed by the Special Mamlatdar, Bhuj was without jurisdiction and undisputedly the ownership rights were not vested into the then mortgagee i.e. Joshi Shivji Vaghji and therefore he could only assign limited rights/interest to Swaminarayan Temple from whom the present appellants redeemed the mortgaged property after paying consideration; that the revenue records is merely for fiscal purpose and it does not create any right, title or interest in the property. He, therefore, submitted that the appellants who are the original owners, and the suit land is sold by the cultivator of mortgagee, therefore, the same deserves to be set aside and the possession be restored to the appellants. He, therefore, submitted that the appellants who are the original owners, and the suit land is sold by the cultivator of mortgagee, therefore, the same deserves to be set aside and the possession be restored to the appellants. He, therefore, prayed to quash and set aside the impugned orders and admit this appeal by framing the substantial questions of law. 4. I have heard learned advocates for the parties, perused the material placed on record including the impugned judgments passed by both the Courts below. 5. The suit was filed by the appellants with the facts stated hereinabove. The opponent-defendant filed the written statement to the suit raising the issue of locus standi of the appellants, non-joinder of necessary parties, that the receiving of suit land by Pragji Ramji under the Inam Abolition Act against the payment of money decided by the government and no appeal is filed and also on the issue of limitation, delay and laches. The learned trial Court framed the issues, considered the oral and documentary evidence led before it and then dismissed the suit. The learned lower appellate Court, reappreciated the evidence, framed the points of consideration as required under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC and then dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal is filed. 6. On going through the material on record and the record of the learned trial court, it is undisputed that the appellants have not narrated the pedigree of the person to whom they are claiming to be ancestors; that there is no document to prove the ownership of the appellants; that the property was allotted to Pragji Raghavji in the year 1972 under Inam Abolition Act and as per that Act, the Government i.e. the revenue authority is the only competent authority to decide the entitlement of the land and the civil court is barred under the said Act; that as regards the issue raised by the appellants that they are not having any knowledge of the order of year 1972, the suit is filed in the year 2009 but the alleged redemption was done in the year 2007 and therefore it cannot be believed that they were not aware of the order of revenue authority passed in the year 1972. 7. 7. The appellants have stated in the plaint that the suit property was given in mortgage to Shivji Joshi in the year 1947 and thereafter the descendent of Shivji Joshi gave it to Kothari Mostri Jeram Ramji who was the administrator of Swaminarayan Mandir in mortgage, which is proved by the documentary evidence produced before the learned trial Court. Further, vide order passed by Special Mamlatdar in the year 1972 in case no.1007 of 1971, Pragji Raghavji is held as occupier of the said land and thereafter his heir Chandrakant Pragji sold the said land on 25.3.1996 to the present defendants. In these circumstances, when the plaintiffs-appellants are challenging the rights of ownership of the defendants, then the Swaminarayan Mandir, Pragji Raghavji and his heir Chandrakant Pragji, Mamlatdar and State are required to be joined in the suit, which is not done and therefore the suit was dismissed on the ground of non- joinder of necessary parties. Provision of Order 1 Rule 9 and Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC is reproduced as under: “9. Misjoinder and non-joinder.— No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. [Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.] 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.— (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.—Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant (5) Subject to the provisions of the [Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV of 1877)], section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.” 8. Further, the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation as, the time limit to file the suit is thirty years as per Section 61 of the Transfer of Property Act i.e. within thirty years from the date of 1972 when the Special Mamlatdar passed the order, however, the suit is filed in the year 2009 which is much later than the period of limitation. Further, the sale deed which is challenged is of the year 1990 and if it is treated as a cause for filing the suit, then also the time limit prescribed for challenging the said deed is three years i.e. the suit could have been filed latest by 1996; however, the suit is filed in the year 2009 i.e. after a period of more than 37 years. The suit is barred by limitation under Articles 58, 59 and 61(a) of the Limitation Act. Articles 58, 59 and 61(a) of the Limitation Act read as under: 58 To obtain any other declaration. The suit is barred by limitation under Articles 58, 59 and 61(a) of the Limitation Act. Articles 58, 59 and 61(a) of the Limitation Act read as under: 58 To obtain any other declaration. Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 59 To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. Three years. When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him. 61. By a mortgagor— (a)to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged; Thirty years. When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. 9. The citations relied on by learned advocate for the appellants in the cases of Hanumant Kumar Talesara V/s Mohan Lal reported in 1988 (1) SCC 377 and Mahabir Gope V/s Harbans Narain Singh reported in 1952 AIR (SC) 205, there cannot be any dispute with regard to the principles laid down in the said judgments, however, they are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 10. It is fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 , wherein it is held in paragraphs 29.16 to 29.20 as under: “29.16. The present case is a classic case, where the plaintiffs by clever drafting of the plaint, attempted to make out an illusory cause of action, and bring the suit within the period of limitation. Prayer (1) of the plaint reads as: “(1) The suit property being agricultural land of old tenure of Revenue Survey No. 610 whose Block No. is 573 situated at Village Mota Varachha, Sub-District : Surat City, District Surat has been registered by Opponent 1 of this case in Office of the Sub-Registrar (Katar Gam) at Surat vide Sl. No. 5158 in Book No. 1. Since, the same is illegal, void, ineffective and since the amount of consideration is received by the plaintiffs, and by holding that it is not binding to the plaintiffs and to cancel the same, and since the sale deed as aforesaid suit property has been executed by Opponent 1 to Opponents 2, 3, it is registered in the Office of Sub-Registrar, Surat (Rander) on 1-4-2013 vide Sl. No. 443 which is not binding to we, the plaintiffs. No. 443 which is not binding to we, the plaintiffs. Since, it is illegal, void, ineffective and therefore, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to cancel the same and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to send the Yadi in that regard to the Sub- Registrar, Surat (Karat Gam) and the Sub-Registrar (Rander) in regard to the cancellation of both the aforesaid documents.” 29.17. The plaintiffs deliberately did not mention the date of the registered sale deed dated 2-7-2009 executed by them in favour of Respondent 1, since it would be evident that the suit was barred by limitation. The prayer however mentions the date of the subsequent sale deed i.e. 1-4-2013 when the suit property was further sold by Respondent 1 to Respondents 2 and 3. The omission of the date of execution of the sale deed on 2-7-2009 in the prayer clause, was done deliberately and knowingly, so as to mislead the court on the issue of limitation. 29.18. The delay of over 5 and ½ years after the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was instituted on 15-12-2014, even though the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. 29.19. Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh [Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 601 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 372] wherein this Court held that the suit would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, if it was filed beyond three years of the execution of the registered deed. 29.20. The plaintiffs have also prayed for cancellation of the subsequent sale deed dated 1-4-2013 executed by Respondent 1 in favour of Respondents 2 and 3; since the suit in respect of the first sale deed dated 2-7-2009 is rejected both under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11, the prayer with respect to the second sale deed dated 1-4-2003 cannot be entertained.” In the case of Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel And Anr. V/s Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel And Ors. reported in 2013(1) GLR 398 , it is held by this Court in paragraphs 6, 6.1 and 6.2 as under: “6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the plaint the original plaintiffs have challenged the registered sale-deed dated 25-8-1975 which has been executed by the original defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and the said suit has been filed in the year 2010 i.e. after a period of 35 years. It is also required to be noted and even so pleaded/averred in the plaint that name of father of the defendant No. 1 was mutated in the revenue record, and even thereafter, on the death of father of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2-Chhotabhai Bhagwanbhai mutated in the revenue record on 11-10-1979 vide Mutation Entry No. 1024. It is also further averred in the plaint that even the name of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were also mutated in the revenue record pursuant to the sale-deed dated 25-8-1975 vide Entry No. 1115 and not only that even in 1981 there was partition between defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and the land bearing Survey No. 380 (disputed suit land) has gone into the share of Ambalal Patel-defendant No. 4 and his name is mutated in the revenue record vide Mutation Entry No. 1283 dated 10-6-1981. Even considering cause of action pleaded in the plaint in Para 8, it appears to the Court that the averments in the plaint are too vague and nothing has been mentioned in the said Para on which date he came to know about the registered sale-deed dated 25-8- 1975. Even in the entire plaint, nothing has been pleaded with respect to limitation. Mere clever drafting in the plaint and by such vague averments and the pleading the cause of action in the plaint, the suit which is otherwise barred by law of limitation cannot be brought within a period of limitation. 6.1. It is not disputed that while considering application under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to consider the averments in the plaint and the supporting documents produced along with plaint. 6.1. It is not disputed that while considering application under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to consider the averments in the plaint and the supporting documents produced along with plaint. However, it cannot be disputed that if on the face of it and even considering the averments made in the plaint, it is found that the suit is clearly barred of law of limitation, the plaint can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even considering the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of N. V. Srinivasan Murthy v. Mariyamma (Dead) by Proposed L.Rs., reported in AIR 2005 SC 2897 as well as decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs., [ 2000 (7) SCC 702 ] the plaint can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure if it is found that even accepting all the averments made in the suit, it is found therefore, the suit is barred by law of limitation. Considering the above proposition of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, it is required to be considered whether considering facts and circumstances of the present case and even considering averments made in the plaint and even accepting all the averments made in the plaint as they are, whether the suit is barred by law of limitation or not? 6.2. As stated above, registered sale-deeds was executed by the original defendant No. 1 in favour of original defendant Nos. 3 and 4 (petitioners herein) on dated 25-8-1975. It is also required to be noted and even so pleaded/averred in the plaint that mutation entry in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 on the basis of registered sale-deed was made in the revenue record vide Entry No. 1115 and not only that even in 1981 there was partition between defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and the land bearing Survey No. 380 (disputed suit land) has gone into the share of Ambalal Patel-defendant No. 4 and his name is mutated in the revenue record vide Mutation Entry No. 1283 dated 10-6-1981. 3 and 4 and the land bearing Survey No. 380 (disputed suit land) has gone into the share of Ambalal Patel-defendant No. 4 and his name is mutated in the revenue record vide Mutation Entry No. 1283 dated 10-6-1981. As held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs., [ 2000 (7) SCC 702 ] whenever the document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge and in other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge. Thus, when the sale-deed dated 25-8- 1975 was registered in the year 1975 itself and even the mutation entry was made in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 on the basis of the registered sale-deed, immediately thereafter, the plaintiff is deemed to have the knowledge of the said transaction and by making such vague averments in the plaint that earlier he had no knowledge and he came to know about the transaction only in the 2010, by such clever drafting, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to bring the suit within the period of limitation which otherwise is barred by law of limitation as the suit challenging the registered sale-deed dated 25-8-1975 has been filed after a period of 35 years. Under the circumstances and considering the aforesaid, it appears to the Court that learned trial Court has materially erred in rejecting the application Exh. 14 and in not rejecting the plaint exercising the power under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained and same deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 11. It is also appropriate to refer to Sections 90, 91 and 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, which read as under: “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained and same deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 11. It is also appropriate to refer to Sections 90, 91 and 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, which read as under: “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old. –– Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.–– Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This explanation applies also to section 81. 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. –– When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. Exception 1.––When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2.–– Wills 3 [admitted to probate in 4 [India]] may be proved by the probate. Exception 1.––When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2.–– Wills 3 [admitted to probate in 4 [India]] may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1.––This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one. Explanation 2.–– Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3. –– The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.” 101. Burden of proof. –– Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” 12. In view of the above provisions, plaintiff has failed to prove his case by discharging burden on him to produce convincing evidence before the learned trial Court and therefore, the learned trial Court has specifically found that the plaintiff has failed to prove his case. 13. Both the lower courts below have dealt with each and every aspect, discussed the provisions of law, appreciated and re-appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in detail and then dismissed the suit and appeal respectively, which are concurrent finding of fact which are not required to be interfered with in this second appeal, as no perversity or illegality is found and no substantial questions of law are found to be involved in this appeal. 14. Section 100 of CPC reads as under: “[100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 15. It is fruitful to refer the judgment in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others.reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875 paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 which are reproduced as under: “7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. In HeroVinoth v. Seshammal [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means— of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ 28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs. , had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity” the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.” 16. It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nazir Mohamed vs J. Kamala reported in AIR 2020 SC 4321 , wherein, it is observed in paragraphs 56, 57 and 59 as under: “56.As held by the Privy Council in Peri v. Chrishold reported in (1907) AC 73, it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner...and if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his right of possession by law, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever distinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. 57. The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, whenever a question is framed by the High Court, the High Court will have to show that the question is one of law and not just a question of facts, it also has to show that the question is a substantial question of law. 59. When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose. 59. When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose. Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal can not satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC.” 17. In view of the above, as there is no illegality, no erroneous findings of fact or law in the impugned orders, no perversity in the impugned order, this second appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. As the second appeal is dismissed, civil application stands disposed of.