JUDGMENT : 1. These writ petitions arise from the very same subject matter and hence they are disposed by a common judgment. The parties and documents are referred to as per the description in W.P(C) No.3095/2021 unless otherwise specifically stated. 2. The petitioners 1 to 13 are Managing Committee members, the 14th petitioner is the Secretary, and the petitioners 15 to 18 are the former Managing Committee members of ‘Naruvamoodu Service Cooperative Bank Limited’ (for short ‘the Society'). The petitioners have filed this writ petition challenging Ext.P2 Enquiry Report under S. 65 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act,1969 (for short "the Act') and Ext.P17 Surcharge Order under S.68(2) of the Act. They have also sought declarations that no amount can be recovered from them on the basis of Ext.P17 Order without quantification under S.69 of the Act and that S.68(2)of the Act is violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India as uncanalized power is vested with the administrative authority without any rule or regulation. 3. The facts relevant for this writ petition are: Enquiry under S.65 of the Act is ordered with respect to the affairs of the Society as per Ext.P1 order dated 17.10.2018 issued by the 1st respondent. It is seen from Ext.P1 that the Ext.P1 order was issued on the basis of a Report dated 03.05.2018 of the Assistant Registrar General Neyyattinkara on the basis of a complaint submitted by one Sri. Shajikumar C.R. who is the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6179/2021. Ext.P2 is the Enquiry Report dated 14.03.2019 submitted by Senior Cooperative Inspector Balaramapuram Unit. In Ext.P2 Enquiry Report, the enquiry was made under five Points. Point No.1 relates to the appointments of Appraiser, Salesman, Peon, and Night Watchman made in the bank on 30.06.2017. Point No.2 relates to the permanent appointments and fixation of the salary scale in the post of appraiser without obtaining prior permission from the Department. Point No.3 relates to the appointment of the daughter of the Secretary of the Bank in the post of Peon while she was a member of the Bank who had several MDS in her name, who was given payments therefrom without sufficient security and who had arrears in the said MDS. Point No.4 relates to the irregularities in granting loan to the husband, son, and son-in-law of the Secretary and the deficiency of securities for the same. Point No.4 relates to the irregularities in granting loan to the husband, son, and son-in-law of the Secretary and the deficiency of securities for the same. Point No.5 relates to the general enquiry with respect to the constitutional working and financial condition of the Bank. In Ext.P2, the names of the eleven members of the Managing Committee with their Membership numbers and addresses are stated. 4. After enquiry, the Enquiry Officer has arrived at four Findings. In Finding No.1, the Enquiry officer has stated that there are irregularities and illegalities in the appointments stated therein and recommended action against the Managing Committee and the Secretary who are responsible for the same. In Finding No.2, the Enquiry officer has stated that illegal appointments are made in the temporary posts of Appraiser granted by the Joint Registrar for 179 days; that salary enhancement and promotion were given without the approval of the Registrar; that the same affected the financial condition of the Society and that the Managing Committee members and the Secretary are responsible for the same. In Finding No.3, it is found that there are derelictions of duties and favoritism in the matter of appointment of the daughter of the Secretary of the Bank and it is found that the Managing Committee and the Secretary have committed serious irregularities. In Finding No.4 it is found that the Managing Committee and Secretary have committed irregularities and favoritism while discharging official functions with respect to the loan given to the husband of the Secretary of the Bank. In view of the said findings the Enquiry Officer arrived that there are irregularities in making appointments and in granting MDS without proper security in favour of the relatives of the Secretary; that there is an erosion of common fund for an amount of Rs.9.53 crores; that collection agents were appointed without approval and that there is no proper recovery of the loan arrears and hence recommended either to obtain an explanation from the Society or to initiate proceedings under S.68(1) of the Act. 5. The President/Secretary of the Society submitted Ext.P4 Explanation to Ext.P2. On the basis of the Ext.P2 Enquiry Report, the 1st respondent passed Ext.P5 order dt 31.12.2019 appointing the Assistant Registrar General Neyyattinkara as Enquiry Officer under S.68(1) of the Act. 6. 5. The President/Secretary of the Society submitted Ext.P4 Explanation to Ext.P2. On the basis of the Ext.P2 Enquiry Report, the 1st respondent passed Ext.P5 order dt 31.12.2019 appointing the Assistant Registrar General Neyyattinkara as Enquiry Officer under S.68(1) of the Act. 6. The Ext.P5 Order was challenged by the Managing Committee of the Society in this Court by W.P(C) No.888/2020 and this Court disposed the same as per Ext.P6 judgment dated 14/01/2020 holding that the prayers in the writ petition can not be granted and directing that the 1st respondent shall specifically advert to the objections raised by the petitioner to the proceedings under S.68 of the Act and give clear reasons as to why the objections of the petitioner do not merit consideration and that the Order shall be passed after hearing the petitioner. 7. The Enquiry Officer submitted Ext.P7 Enquiry Report dated 08.10.2020 under S.68(1) of the Act finding that 22 persons were responsible for the loss that occurred to the Society and fixing the loss at Rs.1,75,35,741/-and fixing liability of each persons. 8. The 1st respondent issued an Ext.P8 Notice dated 11/11/2020 enclosing the copy of the Ext.P7 Enquiry Report to all the 22 persons mentioned in Ext.P7. The President/Secretary and Committee Members of the Society submitted Ext.P9 Reply dated 03/12/2020 to Ext.P8 Notice, which is seen signed by only 14 persons including the President and Secretary. 9. The 1st respondent passed Ext.P17 order dated 21.01.2021 under S.68(2) of the Act directing the Managing Committee members and Secretary mentioned therein to pay Rs.1,75,35,741/-with 18% interest within one month failing which directing the Society to recover the same from those persons. It is also made clear that in case any person is dead, the amounts due from them are to be recovered from their legal representatives. In the Ext.P17 report the aforesaid amount of loss to the Bank is arrived at under four heads which are given below : 1. With respect to the irregular appointments in the Bank Rs.49,42,637.00 2. With respect to granting MDS to the relatives of the secretary without sufficient security Rs.33,231.00 3. With respect to the appointment of collection agents without approval Rs.25,26,186.00 4. With respect to erosion from the common fund Rs.1,00,33,770.00 Total Rs.1,75,35,824.00 10. The proportionate amounts payable by each of the persons are also stated in Ext.P17 Report. With respect to granting MDS to the relatives of the secretary without sufficient security Rs.33,231.00 3. With respect to the appointment of collection agents without approval Rs.25,26,186.00 4. With respect to erosion from the common fund Rs.1,00,33,770.00 Total Rs.1,75,35,824.00 10. The proportionate amounts payable by each of the persons are also stated in Ext.P17 Report. It is stated in Ext.P17 Report that there occurred a difference of Rs.83/-on account of rounding of the fractional amounts. 11. The principal challenge in the Writ Petition is against Ext.P17 Order under S.68(2) of the Act. 12. The 1st respondent has filed a Counter Affidavit dated 31.08.2021 supporting Ext.P7 Enquiry report and Ext.P17 order. With respect to the legal contentions raised in the writ petition, no answer is given in the Counter Affidavit. Along with the Counter Affidavit, the 1st respondent has produced Ext.P7 Enquiry Report as Ext.R1(a). As per the direction of this Court dated 16.11.2021, the complaint of Sri. Shajikumar C.R. and the Order dated 03.05.2018 of Neyyattinkara Assistant Registrar (General) referred in Ext.P1 order were produced by the Senior Government Pleader along with a Memo dated 16.11.2021. Since enquiry was ordered on the basis of those documents, I accept those documents into the files of the writ petition marking as Ext.R1(b) and R1(c) respectively. Though the Counter Affidavit of the 1st respondent does not answer the legal contentions raised by the petitioner, the legal contentions can be considered on the basis of the arguments of the respective counsels and I do so. 13. I heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri. P.N. Mohanan, the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Bimal K. Nath for the respondents and the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 6179/2021 Sri. T.R. Harikumar. 14. 13. I heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri. P.N. Mohanan, the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Bimal K. Nath for the respondents and the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 6179/2021 Sri. T.R. Harikumar. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no finding of personal liability in Ext.P2 Report and hence the 1st respondent has no power or authority to order enquiry under S. 68(1) of the Act; that Ext.P2 report is in violation of Rule 66 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules (‘the Rules’ in short); that Rule 65(6) mandate that Ext.P2 Report shall contain latest Balance Sheet of the Society which is absent; that Ext.P2 Report shall contain the findings of the enquiry officer and the reason thereof supported by such documentary or other evidence as recorded by him during the course of the enquiry or inspection; that the enclosures in Ext.P2, in which, apart from the official documents, Audit Certificate of the year 2017-18 and the Temporary Statement dt 31.12.2018 alone are enclosed; that Rule 66(7) is applicable for the enquiry under S.68(1) and there is specific mandate in Rule 66(7) (i) (c) that the order should contain the specific point or points on which the enquiry is made; that Rule 66(7) (vii) provides that the Registrar shall give the person or persons concerned an opportunity of being heard before issuing an order of surcharge which is in consonance with S.68(2); that as per S.68 there should be specific finding with respect to the illegal payments or the loss or damage in the assets of the society by breach of trust or willful negligence or mismanagement or misappropriation or fraudulent retention of money or property of the society or destruction or causing destruction of records in the Enquiry Report under S.68(1) as mandated in the said Section, but the same is absent in Ext.P7 Enquiry Report; that in an enquiry under S.68(1) the Registrar can consider only the Report under S.65 or 66 and the documents mentioned therein and he cannot admit new documents or evidence in his enquiry; that since S.65 enquiry and 68(1) enquiry are conducted by the authorities without notice to the persons found responsible, such persons get opportunity only after the enquiry report under S.68(1); that Surcharge Order under S.68(2) is having serious civil consequences and hence such persons are entitled to get an effective opportunity of hearing in the matter; that the opportunity of hearing provided under S.68(2) should include opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and adduce evidence; that since civil court jurisdiction is barred under S.100 with respect to any matter coming under the Act, the persons found responsible in the Surcharge Order are left without any remedy against the Surcharge Order; that though some of the petitioners submitted Ext.P9 objection to Ext.P7 Enquiry Report, the same was not considered in the impugned Ext.P17 order; that the liability of two deceased members of the Managing Committee is fixed on the other Managing Committees without fixing the same on the legal representatives of the deceased persons; that in Ext.P2 the transactions only up to 31.12.2018 is considered whereas in Ext.P17 the transactions up to 31/01/2020 is considered; and that going by the allegations this is a fit case to be tried in an arbitration proceedings under S.69 of the Act and not in a Surcharge proceedings under S.68 of the Act. He invited my attention to Exts.P2, P7, and 17 to substantiate his contentions that the same is not in accordance with the law. 15. Per contra the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the challenge against Ext.P17 is not maintainable in this writ petition for the sole reason that the petitioner is having an effective remedy by way of appeal provided under S. 83(1)(e) of the Act; that all the contentions raised by the petitioner could be considered in an appeal filed under Section 83 (1)(e) of the Act; that surcharge proceedings under S.68 and the arbitration proceedings under S.69 are totally different; that arbitration proceedings under S.69 is not an action in substitute of the surcharge proceedings; that surcharge proceedings are initiated by the Registrar but the arbitration proceedings could not be initiated by the Registrar; that in the case on hand if the recovery of loss to the Society is to be recovered through arbitration proceedings under S.69 from the petitioners/Managing Committee members and Secretary, the Society has to initiate the same and since the Society is managed by the petitioners themselves the Society will not initiate any arbitration proceedings under S.69 of the Act to the petitioners; that for initiating proceedings under S.68 mismanagement alone is sufficient and it need not be willful; that the Managing Committee of the Society had filed W.P.(C) No.3370/2019 in this Court challenging Ext.P1 order and this Court dismissed the said writ petition as per judgment dated 16.10.2019 and as such challenge against the points of enquiry in Ext.P1 could not be re-agitated by the petitioners in this writ petition; that the Managing Committee of the Society had filed W.P.(C) No.888/2020 challenging Ext.P5 order passed under S.68(1) of the Act appointing the Enquiry Officer on the ground that the Registrar has no ground or reason to initiate S.68 proceedings on the basis of Ext.P5 Enquiry Report under S.65 and this Court passed Ext.P6 judgment finding that the petitioners are not entitled to get the prayers sought for in the writ petition; that he contended that in view of Ext.P6 judgment, the petitioners cannot raise any objection with regard to the legality of the proceedings initiated under S.68 as per Ext.P5; that S.68(2) contemplates only an opportunity of hearing which cannot include right to cross examination; and that Ext.P17 order was passed in full compliance of the principles of natural justice. He invited my attention to several findings in Exts.P2, P7, and 17 to substantiate his contentions that all points were specifically dealt with by the 1st respondent. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6179/2021 supported the contentions of the learned Government Pleader and submitted that the authorities are not taking further action on Ext.P17 Order, even though there is no stay in the writ petition; that the Managing Committee members of the Society mentioned in Ext.P17 are liable to be disqualified from continuing as managing committee members; that the authorities are refusing to take action on Ext.P4 Representation submitted by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6179/2021 and hence direction may be issued to take action on the said Ext.P4. 17. In the light of the pleadings and arguments of either side, the following substantial issues arise for consideration in these writ petitions : 1. Whether the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India maintainable against an Order under S.68(2) of the Act, when a statutory appeal is provided for challenging the same? 2. What should be the nature of the finding with respect to the liability of persons in the management, in the Enquiry Report under S.65 in order to initiate Surcharge proceedings under S.68? 3. What is the nature and extent of opportunity of hearing provided under S.68(2) of the Act? 4. Whether S.68(2) of the Act is unconstitutional? 18. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the following decisions in support of his contentions:-Cheranelloor Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Deputy Registrar 1976 KLT 353 , Vincent Y.R. and others v. Joint Registrar of Co-op Societies and others ILR 2024 (1) Kerala 344, Anil M.S. v. Joint Registrar (General) of Cooperative Societies, Tvm and others 2021 (4) KHC 119 , Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched v. Union of India [2024 SCC Online SC 121], Mustaffa T.H. v. State of Kerala and others ILR 2021 (4) Kerala 74, Challa Sanyasinaidu v. the Dy. Registrar of Cooperative Society Srikakulam (1997) SCC online AP 948, Lankala Koderu Cooperative Rural Bank Limited, Palacol Mandal, W.G. District v. Ungarala Pullaiah Naidu and another (2002) SCC online AP 681, Single Bench Judgment of this Court dt. 21.02.2022 in WPC no. 12783/2021, Division Bench judgment dated 29.03.2022 of this Court in W.A NO.342/2022 and Division Bench judgment dated 18/01/2024 of this Court in W.A No.95/2024. 19. 21.02.2022 in WPC no. 12783/2021, Division Bench judgment dated 29.03.2022 of this Court in W.A NO.342/2022 and Division Bench judgment dated 18/01/2024 of this Court in W.A No.95/2024. 19. The learned Government Pleader cited the following decisions in support of his contentions: - Mahendran P.K. and Others v. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies (General) Alappuzha 2019 (3) KLT 627 , Abraham V. Additional Collector of Customs 1976 KLT 660 , State of Kerala v. Sudarsanan 1997 (2) KLT 522 , Joint Registrar (General) of Cooperative Societies, Thrissur and another v. Charley Panthallookaran and others 2022 (2) KHC 70 , M/s. Kanungo and Co. v. Collector of Customs and others 1973 (2) SCC 438 , Single Bench Judgment dt. 16.10.2019 in WP(C) No. 3370/2019 of this Court and Division Bench Judgment dt. 22.11.2021 in WA No. 1447/2021 of this Court. Issue No.1: 20. The settled law is that if the impugned proceedings are totally without jurisdiction or ex-facie not maintainable or abuse of the process of the Court or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the Writ Court is perfectly justified to interfere even if alternative remedies are available. But the mere assertion of the writ petitioner that the proceedings are without jurisdiction or ex-facie not maintainable or abuse of process in violation of the principles of natural justice are not sufficient, there should be legal materials to substantiate the same. When a statutory appellate forum is created, strong reasons are to be there for bypassing the statutory hierarchy. 21. It is useful to extract a word of caution made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ABL International Ltd v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd (2004) 3 SCC 553 : “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC 1 . The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC 1 . And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Art.14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” 22. The Counsel for the petitioners argued that since the Writ petition is admitted and has been pending in this Court for a quite long time, it would not be appropriate for this Court to dismiss the same citing an alternative remedy. There is no general rule that all admitted or long pending matters are to be disposed of on merits rather than dismissing the same citing alternative remedy. The very same contention was met by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Genpact India Private Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1500 in the following words. “Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution in view of availability of alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.” 23. All the contentions raised in the writ petitions are with regard to the legality of Ext. P7 Enquiry Report under S.65 of the Act and Ext.17 order under S. 68(2) of the Act. Only if I find the succeeding substantial issues in favour of the petitioner, the Writ Petition would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Issue No.2: 24. The Counsel for the petitioner cited the Single Bench decision of this Court in Vincent Y.R. (supra)to substantiate the point that the enquiry under S.68(1) can only be against a person and not a committee. It is held in Paragraph No.14 of the said decision that a reading of the Section would show that it refers to ‘any person’ and not to a ‘committee’; that if the intention was only to take action against the members of the Committee the Section need not have referred to ‘any person entrusted with organization or management of the Society’ or ‘who is or has at any time be an officer or an employee of the society’; that it refers to the conduct of the individuals and not the collective conduct of the committee; that there are provisions in the Act which deal with collective conduct of the committee and that the contention of the Government Pleader that the word persons would also include the Committee cannot be sustained. In paragraph No.16 of the said decision, this court held that the question is whether there is any finding regarding the conduct of ‘any person’ and the Court found that there is no specific finding regarding the involvement of the petitioners as is required under the statutory provisions in the said case. The Court held that a finding regarding the involvement of the persons mentioned in the provision in the manner provided therein is necessary for the purpose of surcharging them. With respect to the manner of fixing liability on the persons this Court held in Paragraph 17 that coming to the manner in which the liability is fixed on the petitioner in the impugned order, what has been done is only a reassessment of the liability and that as far as the fixation of liability on individuals is concerned, the Section 66 Enquiry Report does not specify any person individually and instead only makes mention of the Committee as a whole. In W.A. No.95/2024 against the said Single Bench Judgment this Court found that the finding of the learned Single Bench by remanding the matter is perfectly legal and justified. Though the counsel for the appellant sought liberty to the Court to withdraw the writ petition with a request that the Registrar may pass an order by fixing the time line the Division Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal directing the Registrar to pass a fresh order within a period of one month. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that since the writ petition leading the decision in Vincent Y.R. (supra) is withdrawn the said decision has gone. I am unable to accept the said argument since the Division Bench has confirmed the finding of the Single Bench and though there was a prayer to withdraw the writ petition, the same was not granted, but only a time limit was fixed within which the Registrar is to pass orders in compliance with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 25. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the case on hand also in Ext.P2 Enquiry Report under Section 65, the reference is only to the Committee as a whole and not to any person individually. 26. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the Full Bench decision of this Court in Anil M.S. (supra)in support of the legal proposition that the surcharge proceedings could be initiated against any person who is/was entrusted with the organization and management of the society. In Paragraph 17 of the said decision, it is held that surcharge proceedings should be initiated against the members of the committee subject to the satisfaction of the ingredients to attract S.68. 27. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the Single Bench decision of this Court in Mustaffa T.H. (supra)and argued that an element of criminal intention is necessary in the act of persons mentioned in S.68 for initiating surcharge proceedings against them and that it should not be used to initiate proceedings for minor negligence or default of an employee or office bearer of the society. In paragraph 13 of the said decision, this Court held that an element of criminal intention in the action of the person is necessary to initiate a proceeding under Section 68 of the Act and that mere negligence on the part of the person mentioned under s. 68 of the Act is a ground to initiate proceedings under S.68 of the Act unless there is willful negligence. 28. The learned Government Pleader cited Mahendran P.K. (Supra) in support of his contention that a simple mismanagement is sufficient to initiate proceedings under S.68, it need not be wilful or otherwise. In Paragraph 14 of the said decision, it is held that the word mismanagement in the said section has been used without any other qualification and therefore simplicitor mismanagement or even without it being willful or otherwise certainly would bring the responsible persons under the clutches of the said section. 29. The learned Government Pleader cited Charley Panthallookaran's case (supra) which holds that materials disclosed in the Enquiry Report of the Vigilance Officer can be used for the purpose of surcharging a person after due enquiry as provided under S.68(1) and that it may not be correct hold that the report of enquiry and investigation conducted by the Vigilance Officer under S.68A in relation to matters involving breach of trust, misappropriation, etc., is to be endorsed by an officer functioning under the Registrar who normally conducts an enquiry under S.65 of the Act before making use of the same for enquiry under S.68(1). On the strength of this decision, he argued that even without an enquiry under S.65, proceedings under S. 68 can be initiated and hence the legality of the proceedings under S.68 need not be based on the legality of the enquiry report under S.65. This case is clearly distinguishable as Enquiry Report of the Vigilance Officer is not available in the present case. If Enquiry Report under S.65 is ignored there is nothing available to initiate Surcharge proceedings under S.68. 30. This case is clearly distinguishable as Enquiry Report of the Vigilance Officer is not available in the present case. If Enquiry Report under S.65 is ignored there is nothing available to initiate Surcharge proceedings under S.68. 30. The learned Government Pleader cited the judgment in W.A.No.1447/2021 and argued that in the said decision the subject matter of enquiry was a purchase of land and this court discarded the contention of the petitioner that the owner of the land offered to purchase the said land, finding that the issue of whether such a loss could be mitigated by the selling of land is not an issue relevant for consideration in proceedings under S.68 of the Act. 31. The learned Government Pleader cited Sudarsanan's case (supra) to support his contention that there is no prescribed form as to how an order under S.68(2) is passed. He invited my attention to Paragraph No.11 which stated that one of the essential features of natural justice is that orders should give reasons for conclusions; and that the person who is affected by the order should know on what basis the authority had made the order against him; that an administrative body or a quasi-judicial one cannot be expected to give reasoning as it expected from a regular court that there is no prescribed form and the reasons prescribed by the adjudicating authority need not be detailed and elaborate and the requirement of reasons to be satisfied only if relevant reasons are recorded. 32. In view of the decision in Vincent Y.R. (supra) which is confirmed by the Division Bench the enquiry under S.68(1) can only be against persons and not a committee. The Section also makes it abundantly clear. Only if the findings of personal liability are there in the Enquiry Report under S.65, the Surcharge proceeding under S.68 is justified. If the findings of personal liability are not there in the Enquiry Report under S.65, the Surcharge proceeding under S.68 based on such Enquiry Report is liable to be quashed. Such finding of personal liability should be there both in the Enquiry Report under S.65(1) and in the Order under S.68. If the findings of personal liability are not there in the Enquiry Report under S.68(1), the Surcharge proceeding under S.68(2) based on such Enquiry Report is liable to be quashed. Such finding of personal liability should be there both in the Enquiry Report under S.65(1) and in the Order under S.68. If the findings of personal liability are not there in the Enquiry Report under S.68(1), the Surcharge proceeding under S.68(2) based on such Enquiry Report is liable to be quashed. If the findings of liability are with respect to the Committee in the said Reports/Order, the same are bad in law. 33. The purpose of the Surcharge proceeding under S.68 of the Act is to recover the loss and damage caused to the Society by the persons entrusted with the organization and management of the Society. When S.68 is read with Rule 44(1) (l), the purpose is to avoid such erring persons from the organization and management of the Society. This Court has specifically held in the judgment in W.A No.1447/2021 that the scope of the proceedings under S.68 of the act is only to ascertain whether loss or damage has been caused to the assets of the Society on account of the reasons mentioned therein and to surcharge the persons responsible for the same and to recoup the loss caused to the society if it is found that loss or damage has been caused to the assets of the society after affording the parties concerned an opportunity of hearing. 34. On going through S.68(1) of the Act, the identification of the person who has done the mischiefs referred therein is a condition precedent to initiate the proceedings under S.68. The said persons should find a place in the Reports in audit, enquiry, report, inspection or winding up proceedings. I am of the view that reference of the person by name is not mandatory and it is sufficient if the identity of the person is sufficiently disclosed by reasonable description. 35. As rightly held in the decision in Sudarsanan(supra) there is no prescribed form by which the findings are to be entered by the authorities in proceedings under S.65 and 68 of the Act. We cannot expect the authorities to give findings and reasonings as precisely as those are done by a Court. The question is whether the findings and reasons which are required under the Act are discernible from the report/orders of the authorities. We cannot expect the authorities to give findings and reasonings as precisely as those are done by a Court. The question is whether the findings and reasons which are required under the Act are discernible from the report/orders of the authorities. The question is whether it is discernible from the order who are all the persons against whom the report/order is made and whether those persons have understood the findings and reasons from the order. If the persons are identifiable and the findings and reasons are discernible from the order no prejudice will be caused to the persons against whom the enquiry/order is passed. 36. Now let me examine whether there is a finding of personal liability is there in the impugned orders. In Ext.P2 Enquiry Report under S.65, Ext.P7 Enquiry Report under S.68(1), and Ext.P17 Order S.68(2) the names addresses, and membership numbers of the managing committee are specifically stated. It is stated in these documents that the Managing Committee members and the Secretary are liable for the loss to the Society. It is true that in some portions of these documents, the references are made to the Managing Committee and the Secretary and not the Managing Committee members. But a document has to be read as a whole to understand its true meaning and intention. When the impugned orders are read as a whole it clearly indicates that the findings are with reference to the Managing Committee Members and the Secretary of the Society whose names are mentioned therein. References of the Committee in some places are immaterial. 37. That apart, on initiating the proceedings under S.68(1) as per Ext.P5 order the Managing Committee of the Society approached this Court by filing W.P(C) No. 888/2020 on the ground that the said proceedings on the basis of Ext.P2 Enquiry Report under S.65, are unsustainable. This Court specifically found in Ext.P6 judgment in W.P(C) No.888/2020 that the prayers sought in the writ petition could not be granted. So with regard to the institution of proceedings under S.68(1) on the basis of Ext.P5 Report the petitioners cannot make any challenge. 38. The legality of the Ext.P17 Order passed under S. 68(2) is a matter to be considered by the Appellate authority under S.83. So with regard to the institution of proceedings under S.68(1) on the basis of Ext.P5 Report the petitioners cannot make any challenge. 38. The legality of the Ext.P17 Order passed under S. 68(2) is a matter to be considered by the Appellate authority under S.83. When Ext.P17 order passed under S.68(2) is challenged in appeal, naturally the Appellate Court is bound to consider the legality of Ext.P7 Enquiry Report under S.68(1), based on which the order under S.68(2) is passed. 39. In support of the contention that the enquiry should be conducted on every point as mandated under Rule 66(1)(c), the counsel for the petitioner cited the decision of this Court in Cheranelloor Co-operative Society Ltd (supra). In Paragraph 5 of the said decision, it is held that in ordering an enquiry under S.65 specific points or points on which the enquiry is to be made, are to be made known in the proceedings that are issued in view of R.66(1)(c); that no proper enquiry is possible without the point or points on which enquiry is to be conducted and that the indication of the point or points on which the enquiry is to be conducted is essential for the society and its office bearers to face the enquiry in a just manner. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government pleader, the Managing Committee had filed W.P(c) No.3370/2019 challenging Ext.P1 ordering enquiry under S.65, and the same was dismissed by this Court by judgment dated 16/10/2019 which is produced as Ext.P1 in W.P(c) No.3370/2019 hence the same could not be agitated in this Writ petition. Of course, as pointed out by the Counsel for the petitioner, there is an observation in the said judgment that the validity of tentative findings for ordering the enquiry can be subjected to test at an appropriate stage. But it does not mean the same can be re-agitated in this writ petition. It is a matter to be agitated in appeal. 40. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the Division Bench judgment in WA No.342/2022 and contended that what is contemplated in Rule 65 is not a general enquiry but enquiry on specific points. In the said judgment the Division Bench of this Court considered an enquiry under S. 66 and the scope of Rule 66(1) applicable to S.65 enquiry and S.66 inspection. In the said judgment the Division Bench of this Court considered an enquiry under S. 66 and the scope of Rule 66(1) applicable to S.65 enquiry and S.66 inspection. After referring to S.66(1)(c) the Division Bench found that the inspection of the books of account of a society can be ordered by the Registrar invoking power under Section 66(2) of the Act only on specific points or points, i.e., on a detailed and exact point or points, in contradistinction to a rowing inspection, that the object of the rule is to ensure that powers under Section 66(2) are not abused for fishing out materials with oblige motives. A specific finding was entered by the Division Bench that the point of enquiry therein that ‘with respect to the financial condition, working, administration and commercial transaction in general’ contained in the impugned order would be contrary to rule 66(1) of the Rules in as much as the same would amount to a rowing and fishing enquiry generally into the matters mentioned in the order and that when the rule categorically provides that an inspection can be ordered only on specific point or points an inspection cannot be conducted otherwise than in accordance with the rule. I am of the view that though the said Division Bench decision arose from an inspection report under S.66 the same principle is applicable to an enquiry under S.65 also. Going by the said decision, prima facie, I am of the view that the enquiry under Point No.5 in Ext.P2 is unsustainable, but there are other specific points also within the scope of enquiry, and hence enquiry under Point No.5 alone cannot be considered in this Writ Petition. 41. In view of these findings, I am of the view that the challenge against Ext.P7 Enquiry Report and Ext.P17 order is not maintainable before this Court in this writ petition. It is a matter to be agitated in a properly framed Appeal before the Appellate Authority by the petitioners. Issue No.3 42. There is no doubt that the opportunity for hearing should be adequate, real, reasonable, and effective. It should not be for name sake and an empty formality. This principle is inviolable. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating. Issue No.3 42. There is no doubt that the opportunity for hearing should be adequate, real, reasonable, and effective. It should not be for name sake and an empty formality. This principle is inviolable. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating. It would be apposite to quote some classic decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with respect to the principles of Natural Justice. 43. In State Bank of Patiala v. K Sharma [1996] 3 SCC 364, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : “Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion a failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.” 44. In Chairman Mining Board v. Ramjee AIR 1977 SC 965 , the Supreme Court observed as under : “Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features, and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating.... If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures.” 45. In the case of Satyavir Singh v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 555 , the Supreme Court observed as under : “The principles of natural Justice must be confined within their proper limits and not allowed to run wild. The concept of natural justice is a magnificent thoroughbred on which this nation gallops forwards towards its proclaimed and destined goal of Justice, social, economic and political. The concept of natural justice is a magnificent thoroughbred on which this nation gallops forwards towards its proclaimed and destined goal of Justice, social, economic and political. This thoroughbred must not be allowed to turn into a wild and unruly horse, careering off where it lists, unsaddling its rider, and bursting into fields where the sign “no pasaran” is put up.” 46. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India AIR 1984 SC 273 , it was observed as under: “The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitably form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version of the credibility of the statement. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached on disputed facts but only an explanation to the acts, absence of opportunity to cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases. The principles of natural justice will, therefore, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” 47. The contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the opportunity of hearing mentioned in S.68(2) includes the right to cross-examine also. The principles of natural justice will, therefore, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” 47. The contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the opportunity of hearing mentioned in S.68(2) includes the right to cross-examine also. In support of his contention, he cited the Division Bench judgment in Challa Sanyasinaidu (supra) and the single Bench judgment in Lankala Koderu (supra) of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Both these decisions come under S. 60 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, dealing with surcharge proceedings. Proviso to S.60(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, states no order shall be passed against any person referred to in this subsection unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making his representation. 48. The relevant portion in Paragraph 9 of the decision in Challa Sanyasinaidu (supra) is extracted hereunder. “In our view this is the proper occasion where the officer or the servant has to be given an opportunity of explaining his stand and allow him to participate in the enquiry before a final order is passed. This is a valuable right given to the delinquent which cannot be brushed aside in a routine manner. After the show-cause-notice is served and an explanation is called for, an opportunity should be given to the affected person to cross-examine the witnesses examined in the course of enquiry under Section 52 of permit him to examine his witnesses to rebut their evidence.” 49. The relevant portion in Paragraph 9 of the decision in Lankala Koderu (supra) is extracted hereunder- “It is a settled principle of law that no order shall be passed against any person referred to in Sec. 60(1), unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making his representation. As held by this Court in above referred decisions, it is mandatory to conduct enquiry upon the subject to lead evidence both oral and documentary affording opportunity to the first respondent to cross-examine and also to lead rebuttal evidence and then initiate surcharge proceedings after giving show-cause notice to make representation. Therefore, I hold that the impugned order of surcharge proceedings to compensate the funds misappropriated by the delinquent officer i.e., the first respondent herein is issued without conducting enquiry under Section 60 of the Act by the second respondent (sic. Therefore, I hold that the impugned order of surcharge proceedings to compensate the funds misappropriated by the delinquent officer i.e., the first respondent herein is issued without conducting enquiry under Section 60 of the Act by the second respondent (sic. Deputy Registrar) and since he has not discharged his mandatory obligation conferred under Sec.60 of the Act, and failed to conduct independent or regular enquiry to satisfy himself and give opportunity to the first respondent to defend himself and put forth his case, the order is liable to be set aside for not following the procedure contemplated under Sec.60 of the Act.” 50. In the aforesaid decisions, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh expanded the scope of opportunity to make representation and held that it includes the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined in the course of enquiry and to examine the witnesses to rebut the evidence. The learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in view of S.65(2)(b) of the Act, there may be statements of persons who are summoned to give statements on oath. If those statements are relied on without giving opportunity to the affected persons to cross-examine those witnesses it would be a negation of the principles of natural justice. 51. It is true that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Challa Sanyasinaidu and Lankala Koderu (both supra), while interpreting S.60 of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 which is similar to S.68 of Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 held that an opportunity should be given to the affected persons to cross-examine the witnesses examined in the course of the enquiry under S.52 and to permit him to examine the said witnesses to rebut their evidence. 52. The Learned Government Pleader cited the decision of this Court in Abraham (supra) in support of his contention for the proposition that reasonable opportunity of being heard does not include the right to cross-examination. The question considered by this Court is whether a reasonable opportunity of being heard in S.124(c) of the Customs Act,1962 includes a right to cross-examine who has not been summoned by the Department as its witnesses but whose statements are relied on by it in an enquiry against the petitioner. In that case, a specific request for cross examination was made by the petitioner. This Court held in Paragraph No.12 as follows. “12. Principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. In that case, a specific request for cross examination was made by the petitioner. This Court held in Paragraph No.12 as follows. “12. Principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. Their aim "............... is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it." (A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. AIR 1970 SC 150 ) Principles of natural justice cannot be applied uniformly. They vary from case to case depending upon the facts of each case and the constitution of each tribunal. As stated by Tucker, D. J., in Russell v. Duke of Morfolk and others (1949 (1) All England Reports 109, 118), See also N. P. T. Co. Ltd. v. N. S. T. Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1957 SC 232 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division ( AIR 1958 SC 398 , 409); State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa ( AIR 1963 SC 375 ); State of J. & K. v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammed ( AIR 1967 SC 122 Paragraph 20); and Wiseman and another v. Borneman and others (1971 Appeal Cases 297). "The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case." 53. After referring to several Indian and foreign decisions, this Court further held in Paragraph 18 as follows. “Rules of audi alteram partem are not neatly cut and dried or nicely weighed and measured. What is a fair opportunity must of necessity depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the constitution of each tribunal and the provisions of law applicable to it. The requirements of natural justice thus vary from case to case and they are not rigid or fixed rules.” 54. He cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanungo (supra) which deals with the question of breach of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice thus vary from case to case and they are not rigid or fixed rules.” 54. He cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanungo (supra) which deals with the question of breach of natural justice. In paragraph No.12 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the principles of natural justice do not require that in matters like this, the persons who have given information should be examined in the presence of the appellant or should be allowed to be cross-examined by them on the statement before the Customs Authorities. 55. I have no quarrel that an opportunity of hearing is contemplated in Section 68(2). But I am of the view that the nature and extent of opportunity of hearing is a matter to be decided by the Registrar according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Sometimes submission of a representation is sufficient. Sometimes a detailed adjudication involving the opportunity to adduce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses is required. It is at the discretion of the Registrar to decide how far the opportunity is to be permitted. It is the objective and subjective satisfaction of such authority to confirm that there is no violation of natural justice. If the affected persons are of the view that cross-examination or oral evidence is essential in the enquiry, they may bring it to the notice of the Registrar by filing a proper application to the same. If any party to the proceedings feels that a particular mode of opportunity is required for him to establish his case, he has to alert the Registrar to grant the same by filing an appropriate application for the same. If the Registrar rejects such prayer whether such rejection was proper or not is also a matter to be considered while challenging the order passed under Section 68(2). Compliance with natural justice is also a matter to be verified by the Appellate Forum. With respect to the Statements recorded on oath under S.65(2)(b) also, I am of the view that the Enquiry Report may or may not contain statements recorded under S.65(2)(b). In this case, the petitioners have not pointed out any such statement before me. Compliance with natural justice is also a matter to be verified by the Appellate Forum. With respect to the Statements recorded on oath under S.65(2)(b) also, I am of the view that the Enquiry Report may or may not contain statements recorded under S.65(2)(b). In this case, the petitioners have not pointed out any such statement before me. If such statements are there and if the aggrieved person thinks that those statements are detrimental to him, he may file an application to cross-examine the witnesses who have given those statements and it is for the Registrar to decide whether it is to be allowed or not. 56. In the case on hand, the petitioners have not filed any Application before the Registrar seeking permission to cross-examine or to adduce oral evidence in support of their contentions. The records would reveal that they have not even made an oral prayer for the same. If the petitioners were in requirement of such an opportunity, the petitioners ought to have filed an application for the same. 57. With respect to the point of non-consideration of Ext.P9 Reply submitted against Ext.P7 Enquiry, in Ext.P17 Order the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ex-Recruit Babanna Machched (supra). In Paragraph 19 of the said decision, it is found that the authorities have not dealt with the explanation/claims of the appellant and accordingly in Paragraph 20 entered a finding that at the order of discharge or dismissal of the appellant and that of Tribunal stands vitiated for non-consideration of the material aspect. On a perusal of Ext.P17 Order, prima facie, I find that the Registrar has considered Ext.P9 Reply while passing Ext.P17 Order. If the Registrar has omitted consideration of any material point raised in the Reply, it is a ground of appeal for the petitioners and is for the Appellate Authority to consider the same. 58. With due respect, I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Challa Sanyasinaidu and Lankala Koderu (both supra). 58. With due respect, I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Challa Sanyasinaidu and Lankala Koderu (both supra). I am of the view that the nature and extent of opportunity of hearing is a matter to be decided by the adjudicating authority according to the facts and circumstances of each case and it could not be laid down as an invariable rule that opportunity of hearing includes right to cross-examine the witnesses and right to examine of witnesses to rebut the evidence. Issue No.4 59. Though prayer is made in the Writ Petition to declare that S.68(2() of the Act, is violative of Article 14, 19(1) g, and 21 of the constitution as uncanalized power is vested with administrative authority without any rule or regulations, no serious argument with respect to the same was advanced from the part of the petitioner in support the said prayer. 60. On a perusal of S,68(2) I find that the power under S.68 is subject to the condition that the order under S.68(2) requiring the person mentioned therein to repay or restore the money or other property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate or to pay contribution and cause or compensation to such an extent as the Registrar may consider just and equitable should be passed only after giving the persons concerned an opportunity of being heard. The order of the Registrar under S.68(2) should precede with an enquiry under S.68(1). Naturally, the affected persons are entitled to get a copy of the Report of the Enquiry under S.68(1) for advancing their contentions against the same in the proceedings under S.68(2). In S.68(1) sufficient safeguards are there while making enquiry with respect to the conduct of the person mentioned therein. There should be a clear finding in the Enquiry Report under S.68(1) that the person made any payment contrary to the Act and the Rules or bye-laws or has caused any loss or damage in the assets of the society by committing the mischiefs referred therein or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property of the Society or caused the destruction of records. An appellate remedy is provided under S.83(1(e) of the Act to the Government to consider the legality of the Order passed under S.68(2) of the Act. An appellate remedy is provided under S.83(1(e) of the Act to the Government to consider the legality of the Order passed under S.68(2) of the Act. Thus it cannot be said that the Registrar has uncanalised power under S.68(2) of the Act. There is no violation of the right to property guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India as the order for recovery is passed by an authority of law viz; S.68 of the Act. 61. Hence the contention of the petitioner that S.68(2) is unconstitutional is rejected. 62. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the judgment dt 21.02.2022 in WPC No. 12783/2021 rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court for the proposition that the impugned order, in so far it burdened the surviving members with the liability of the other Managing Committee members who are no more cannot be sustained. This judgment is followed in the decision Vincent Y.R (Supra). This is a factual aspect to be verified and corrected by the Appellate Authority according to the law laid down by this Court in the said decisions. 63. In view of the aforesaid prepositions of law and discussions, W.P.(C) No.3095/2021 is dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the impugned orders before the appellate authority under S.83(1)(e) of the Act. If the petitioner files the appeal within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment the Appellate Authority shall consider and dispose of the same treating it as filed within the period of limitation. 64. W.P.(C) No.6179/2021 is filed by Sri. Shaji Kumar at whose instance the enquiry was initiated as per Ext.P1 order. The prayer in the said writ petition to consider Ext.P4 representation filed by him and initiate and complete proceedings under R.44(3) of the Rules against the members of the Managing Committee by disqualifying them from continuing as managing committee members within a time limit. Since I have already relegated the petitioners in W.P(C) No. 3095/2021 to the appellate remedy, I deem it not proper to direct the 1st respondent to dispose of Ext.P4 representation for the time being. Hence W.P.(C) No.6179/2021 is dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to represent the matter again after disposal of the appeal filed by the petitioners in W.P(C) No.3095/2021 or in the absence of any appeal from the petitioners in W.P(C) No. 3095/2021.