JUDGMENT : Ganesh Ram Meena, J. 1. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellant against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 07.02.1994 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Cases, Kota (for short ‘the learned trial court’) in Misc. Criminal Case No.3/1987, whereby, the accused appellant has been sentenced as under:- U/s. 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : One Year Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100/-. In default of payment of fine, the accused appellant has to further undergo three months Imprisonment. U/s. 161 IPC : One Year Simple Imprisonment. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. As per the case of the prosecution, complainant Ram Kishan (PW1) submitted a hand written report (Ex.P1) before the Addl. S.P., Anti Corruption Department, Kota (Rajasthan) to the effect that he is resident of Indra Gandhi Nagar, Kota and his agricultural land is situated in Kaithun and for obtaining electricity connection on the application the attestation of Halka Patwari is necessary. It is further mentioned that around 15 days ago when he went to Halka Patwari Patwari of Kaithoon Shri Lal Nagar for attestation of the application, he kept his application with him and told that he will attest the same lateron. He met 2-3 times Shri Lal Nagar Patwari but he did not attest the same and he tried to avoid. On 30.08.1986 (Saturday) at around 4:00 in the evening when he met with Shri Lal, Patwari and requested to attest his application in regard to the land then he made a demand of Rs.120/- as a fee in regard to attestation. He told that Rs.120/- is much more amount and requested to charge less amount but he (Shri Lal, Patwari) refused to charge the less amount. Thereafter, he went at his home. Complainant further mentioned in the report that yesterday i.e. on 01.09.1986 he again met with Shri Lal, Patwari at Patwarghar, Kaithoon and requested him to attest his application and requested him to charge less amount towards fee. Upon this Patwari told him to give Rs.100/- towards fee and he will immediately attest the same. Complainant further mentioned in the report that at that time he was not having the amount, so on 02.09.1986 he agreed for giving Rs.100/-. Upon this Patwari told him to give Rs.100/- towards fee and he will immediately attest the same. Complainant further mentioned in the report that at that time he was not having the amount, so on 02.09.1986 he agreed for giving Rs.100/-. Complainant further mentioned that there remains no column on the form in regard to the electricity connection. He submitted that he does not want to give Rs.100/- to him as a bribe for attestation of the application and want him to be caught red handed. It has also been mentioned in the report that he has no enmity with the Patwari. After conducting the trap proceedings the accused appellant was arrested. On the basis of aforesaid hand written report (Ex.P1), an FIR No.166/1986 (Ex.P26) was registered at Police Station Pradhan Aarakshi Kendra, Anti Corruption Department, Jaipur, for the offence under section 161 IPC and section 5(1)(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short ‘the old Act of 1947’). 3. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against the accused appellant for the aforesaid offences in the concerned Court. 4. The learned court framed the charges against the accused appellant for the offence under section 161 IPC and section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947. The accused appellant denied the charges and opted for trial. 5. From the prosecution side, the statements of thirteen witnesses were recorded and certain documents were exhibited. 6. The statement of the accused appellant was recorded under section 313 CrPC. The accused appellant in his statement has denied about the allegations levelled against him and deposed that he has been falsely implicated in the instant case. In defence the accused appellant did not produce any witness but exhibited five documents. 7. The learned trial court vide its judgment 07.02.1994 convicted and sentenced the accused appellant for the offences as mentioned above. 8. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Ms. Savita Nathawat, counsel appearing for the accused appellant argued and submitted that admittedly in the case at hand the investigation was conducted by PW12 Gopi Lal Sharma, who was only an Inspector in rank. Section 5(A) of the old Act of 1947 enjoys a statutory mandate that investigation in such cases shall be made by Dy. Superintendent of Police or officers higher in rank thereof. Section 5(A) of the old Act of 1947 enjoys a statutory mandate that investigation in such cases shall be made by Dy. Superintendent of Police or officers higher in rank thereof. In case an Officer of the rank of police inspector was conducting investigation, he could not have done it without seeking prior permission of a Magistrate of First Class. No such permission was obtained by PW12 Gopi Lal Sharma. Otherwise also no general or special order authorizing PW12 Gopi Lal Sharma were issued by the State Government. The trap as well as the investigation was thus wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. Senior Counsel further submitted that neither of the two independent Motbir witnesses namely; PW4 Surendra Mohan Mathur and PW7 Vimal Kumar Jain have supported the prosecution version. Absence of corroboration from independent witnesses renders the trap highly doubtful. 9. Senior Counsel further submitted that admittedly there were three Patwaris sitting near the appellant at the time of impugned trap. None of them have been examined on behalf of the prosecution. They were the material witnesses. With-holding of such material witnesses impinges upon the credibility of trap. 10. Senior Counsel further submitted that normally the informant in a criminal case is never entrusted with investigation. In the case at hand Inspector Gopilal Sharma is both i.e. informant as also the investigator. Since Mr. Gopilal Sharma had arranged the trap, some other senior officer should have been entrusted with the investigation. In such a situation any conviction based on the statement of PW12 Gopilal Sharma, Inspector should be viewed with inherent suspicion. 11. Senior Counsel submitted that the testimony of PW1 Ram Kishan (complainant) suffers from numerous infirmities apart from being highly improbable and unnatural. 12. Senior Counsel further submitted that Motbir witness PW4 Surendra Mohan Mathur admits in the cross-examination that during the trap the appellant had informed the Inspector that the amount has already been entered into the relevant register. The learned trial court has erred in ignoring this part of the statement of the witness and it has resulted in failure of justice. 13. Senior Counsel further submitted that the trial court has failed to attach adequate significance to statement of PW11 Ram Chandra. This witness admitted that Bhanwari Bai was his grand mother. He further admitted that he had asked Ram Kishan (complainant) to deposit the outstanding ‘Lagan’ on behalf of Bhanwari Bai also. 13. Senior Counsel further submitted that the trial court has failed to attach adequate significance to statement of PW11 Ram Chandra. This witness admitted that Bhanwari Bai was his grand mother. He further admitted that he had asked Ram Kishan (complainant) to deposit the outstanding ‘Lagan’ on behalf of Bhanwari Bai also. This statement completely negates the charge levelled against the accused appellant. 14. Senior Counsel also submitted that the learned trial court has convicted the appellant under section 13(1)(d)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the new Act of 1988’). The conviction of the accused appellant is completely illegal. The accused appellant was never charged under section 13(1)(d)(i) of the new Act of 1988. The accused appellant faced the trial for the offence / charge under section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947. Thus, the accused appellant could not have been convicted under the Act of 1988. 15. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the appeal and has submitted that there is no material irregularity or illegality committed by the learned trial court and keeping in view the evidence on record, the accused appellants have been rightly convicted. 16. Considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the accused appellants, learned Public Prosecutor and examined the material made available to the Court. 17. One of the argument of the Senior Counsel appearing for the accused appellant is that the accused appellant was charged for the offence under section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 but was erroneously convicted for the offences under sections 13(1)(d) (i) read with section 13(2) of the Act of new Act of 1988. It is submitted by the Senior Counsel that there was no charge framed against the accused appellant for the offences under sections 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act of 1988. Therefore, the accused appellant cannot be convicted for the said offences. 18. The criminal case was registered on 02.09.1986 before the Anti Corruption Bureau, Kota, alleging that the accused appellant being the Patwari of Halka Kaithun demanded bribe of Rs.120/- and during the trap proceedings Rs.100/- were recovered from his possession. Senior Counsel submitted that on the date of registration of the offence, the old Act of 1947 was in force. 19. The provisions of Section 5 of the old Act of 1947 are as under:- “5. Senior Counsel submitted that on the date of registration of the offence, the old Act of 1947 was in force. 19. The provisions of Section 5 of the old Act of 1947 are as under:- “5. Criminal misconduct in discharge of official duty- (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct: — (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains on agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person; any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been; or to be, or to be likely to be "concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any othe r person so to do, or (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or (e) if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.- In this clause “dependent” in relation to a public servant means his wife, children and step-children, parents, sisters and minor brothers residing with and wholly dependent on him. Explanation.- In this clause “dependent” in relation to a public servant means his wife, children and step-children, parents, sisters and minor brothers residing with and wholly dependent on him. (2) Any public servant, who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. (3) Whoever habitually commits :- (i) an offence punishable under section 162 or section 163 of the Indian Penal Code, or (ii) an offence punishable under section 165 A of the Indian Penal Code, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. (3A) Whoever attempts to commit an offence referred to in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (3B) Where a sentence of fine is imposed under sub-section (2) or subsection (3) the Court in fixing the 'amount of line shall take into consideration. the amount or the value of the property if any, which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1), the pecuniary resources or property referred to in that clause for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. (4) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might apart from this section, be instituted against him.” 20. The new Act came into force w.e.f. 09.09.1988. The provisions of section 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act, 1988 is quoted as under:- “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant: 1. The new Act came into force w.e.f. 09.09.1988. The provisions of section 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act, 1988 is quoted as under:- “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant: 1. A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person to do so; or (d) if he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public: interest; (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 2. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 2. Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 21. On repealing of the old Act of 1947 and coming into force of the new Act of 1988, section 30 of the new Act of 1988 provides for Saving Clause. Section 30 of the new Act of 1988 is quoted as under:- “30. Repeal and Saving : 1. The Prevention of' Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby repealed. 2. Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act.” 22. Now it is to be seen that whether an accused who has been charged for the offences under the provisions of the old Act of 1947 can be convicted and sentenced under the provisions of the new Act of 1988 or not ? It is argued by Mr. Bajwa, Senior Counsel that there was sufficient safeguard for continuing the prosecution with old charge in view of provisions of sub-section (2) of section 30 with save operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to which reference has been made, reads as under:- “6. It is argued by Mr. Bajwa, Senior Counsel that there was sufficient safeguard for continuing the prosecution with old charge in view of provisions of sub-section (2) of section 30 with save operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to which reference has been made, reads as under:- “6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” The provisions therefore clearly show that the legal proceedings could have been conducted without any difficulty and the penalty contemplated by the provisions of section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 and section 161 IPC could have been imposed in-spite of repeal of the said enactments. 23. The Delhi High Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh, AC Vs. Union of India, reported in 1996 Crl.L.J. 4079 has observed in paras 16 and 17 as under:- “16. From the above discussion, it is clear that so far as the first charge is concerned, the authority did not apply its mind. The petitioner could not have been convicted or sentenced for this Charge under Section 7 of the Prevention and Corruption Act,1988 because the offence alleged to have been committed during March,1986 i.e. prior to coming in force of the Act of 1988. 17. The petitioner could not have been convicted or sentenced for this Charge under Section 7 of the Prevention and Corruption Act,1988 because the offence alleged to have been committed during March,1986 i.e. prior to coming in force of the Act of 1988. 17. Even the Karnataka High Court in the case of R.S. Kalakpur (supra) observed that the Legislature has placed Section 7 on a higher pedestal than that of Section 161 IPC. Section 7 of the Act of 1988 while enhancing the period of punishment to five years, stipulates that the offender shall be compulsorily imprisoned for a period of not less than six months which was not there either under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 or under Section 161 Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the offence for which a person is sought to be convicted must have been in force at the time when the act with which he is charged was alleged to have been committed. In this case also Section 7 of the Act of 1988 was not in force at the time the petitioner is alleged to have demanded and accepted the illegal gratification. The provision of Section 161 Indian Penal Code have been omitted by the Act of 1988 as is clear from the reading of Section 31 of the Act. In view of this legal position, to my mind, the petitioner could not have been convicted under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1988 because the provision was not in force at the relevant time. Therefore, the conviction and sentence against Charge No. 1 under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 cannot be sustained being opposed to Article 20(1) of the Constitution.” 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagan M. Seshadri Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2002 Crl.L.J. 2982 in specifically words paras 4 and 5 as observed as under:- “4. There is no dispute that when the offence was committed, it was the Act which was in operation. It is also not in dispute that at the time when FIR was lodged, it was also the 1947 Act which was in operation. Reliance on Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act to hold that offence for which the appellant should have been charged was one which fell under Section 13 of the 1988 Act is wholly misplaced. 5. It is also not in dispute that at the time when FIR was lodged, it was also the 1947 Act which was in operation. Reliance on Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act to hold that offence for which the appellant should have been charged was one which fell under Section 13 of the 1988 Act is wholly misplaced. 5. A bare reading of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act shows that any act done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Act, shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the Act. It does not substitute Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2) is applicable "without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897". In our opinion, the application of Section 13 of the 1988 Act to the fact situation of the present case would offend Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which, inter alia provides that repeal shall not (i) affect previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or (ii) affect any investigation legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture of punishment. Section 13 both in the matter of punishment as also by the addition of the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is materially different from Section 5 of the 1947 Act. The presumption permitted to be raised under the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) was not available to be raised under Section 5(1 )(e) of the 1947 Act. This difference can have a material bearing on the case.” 25. On consideration of the provisions of the Old Act of 1947, the new Act of 1988 and the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, this Court can safely held that there is no justification in convicting and sentencing the accused appellant for the offence under section 13(1)(d)((i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act of 1988, though the accused appellant was charged for the offences under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947. Therefore, the judgment in regard to the conviction of the accused appellant for the offences under section 13(1)(d) (i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act of 1988 deserves to be quashed. 26. Now after quashing the judgment of conviction for the offences under sections 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act of 1988, the charges against the accused appellant for the offences under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 becomes restored. Therefore, now the Court has to consider whether after so many years, the matter should be remanded back to the trial court for judgment afresh. The criminal case was registered against the accused appellant on 02.09.1986. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted and charges for the offences under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 and section 161 IPC were framed against the accused appellant on 16.10.1987. Remanding the matter back to the trial court after 38 years of registration of the criminal case against the accused appellant and about 37 years of the framing of the charge against the accused appellant for the offence under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 does not seem to be appropriate in the interest of justice. If the matter is remanded back to the trial court and for a moment it is presumed that the accused appellant is convicted afresh for the charges which were framed against him on 16.10.1987 then the accused appellant will again file a criminal appeal before the High Court which may take further years for final decision. Such a lengthy process which certainly affects the rights of the accused appellant, will also be an addition to the judicial proceedings. 27. As per the facts and the material available on the record, the trap leader and the Investigating Officer of the case is same. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the investigation by the same Officer who was the trap leader, has resulted and prejudiced the accused appellant. Complainant Ramkishan submitted a written report to Shri Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector, ACD, Kota on 02.09.1986 in regard to demand of bribe made by the accused appellant from the complainant for verification of the revenue record which he was seeking for grant of electricity connection at his well. Complainant Ramkishan submitted a written report to Shri Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector, ACD, Kota on 02.09.1986 in regard to demand of bribe made by the accused appellant from the complainant for verification of the revenue record which he was seeking for grant of electricity connection at his well. The trap proceedings were conducted under the leadership of Shri Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector. It is not in dispute that the investigation of the criminal case was also conducted by the same person Mr. Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector, ACD, Kota. It is not the case that the Police Officer has simply recorded an information about some incident happened, which is a crime. In the present case on receiving a report from the complainant, Mr. Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector, ACD, Kota, has leaded the trap proceedings as regard the accused appellant and thereafter he has conducted the investigation of the matter. Since the trap proceedings have been conducted by Mr. Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector. In a normal course if the same Officer after completion of the investigation cannot had the trap proceedings conducted by himself, to be false. Such an Officer will always try to say that the trap proceedings conducted under his leadership was just and proper on the basis of the facts and will also try to bring on record the evidence which could prove that the trap proceedings conducted by him are fair and proper. Such an investigation cannot be said to be fair and impartial. Though the investigation of a criminal case by the person who is the informant, cannot be a sole ground for acquittal/ discharge of the accused. However, the same has to be decided on case-to-case basis without any universal generalisation having regard to proof of bias and prejudice against the accused. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukesh Singh Vs. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), reported in (2020) 10 SCC 120 has observed in paras 12.2 to 13.2 as under:- “12.2. Similarly, even with respect to offences under the IPC, as observed hereinabove, there is no specific bar against the informant/complainant investigating the case. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukesh Singh Vs. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), reported in (2020) 10 SCC 120 has observed in paras 12.2 to 13.2 as under:- “12.2. Similarly, even with respect to offences under the IPC, as observed hereinabove, there is no specific bar against the informant/complainant investigating the case. Only in a case where the accused has been able to establish and prove the bias and/or unfair investigation by the informant-cum-investigator and the case of the prosecution is merely based upon the deposition of the informant-cum-investigator, meaning thereby prosecution does not rely upon other witnesses, more particularly the independent witnesses, in that case, where the complainant himself had conducted the investigation, such aspect of the matter can certainly be given due weightage while assessing the evidence on record. Therefore, as rightly observed by this Court in the case of Bhaskar Ramappa Madar (supra), the matter has to be decided on a case to case basis without any universal generalisation. 12.3. As rightly held by this Court in the case of V. Jayapaul (supra), there is no bar against the informant police officer to investigate the case. As rightly observed, if at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer the question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and therefore it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition that in every case where the police officer who registered the case by lodging the first information, conducts the investigation that itself had caused prejudice to the accused and thereby it vitiates the entire prosecution case and the accused is entitled to acquittal. 13. 13. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, we conclude and answer the reference as under: 13.1(I) That the observations of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15 ; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709 ; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by this Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, this Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal; 13.2(II) In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.” 29. Taking into consideration the facts of the case as stated in above paras and the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred above, this Court can safely held that in the present case the investigation of the case registered against the accused appellant by Mr. Taking into consideration the facts of the case as stated in above paras and the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred above, this Court can safely held that in the present case the investigation of the case registered against the accused appellant by Mr. Gopilal Sharma, Police Inspector, ACD, Kota, who is the complainant, as he has recorded the case after trap proceedings, conducted his leadership, has caused prejudice to the case of the accused appellant and the whole investigation is vitiated. This Court feels that this is a fit case to exercise inherent powers flowing from section 482 CrPC. In such circumstances, this Court after setting aside the conviction of the accused appellant for the offences under sections 13(1) (d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the new Act of 1988 and section 161 IPC also quashes the charges framed against him for the offences under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 and section 161 IPC as the investigation report on the basis of which the charges have been framed against the accused appellant has been held to be vitiated. 30. With the aforesaid observations, the criminal appeal filed by the accused appellant is allowed. The judgment dated 07.02.1994 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Cases, Kota, as regards the conviction and sentence of the accused appellant for the offences under sections 13(1)(d)(i) read with section 13(2) of the Act of 1988 and 161 IPC is set aside. Further, the charge framed against the accused appellant for the offences under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the old Act of 1947 and under section 161 IPC as well as the criminal proceedings arising against the accused appellant from FIR No. 166/1986 registered at Police Station Pradhan Aarakshi Kendra, Anti Corruption Department, Jaipur for the offences under section 161 IPC and section 5(1)(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 are also hereby quashed and set aside. 31. Consequences to follow. 32. The accused appellant is on bail, he need not to surrender. His bail bonds and surety bonds are accordingly discharged. 33. 31. Consequences to follow. 32. The accused appellant is on bail, he need not to surrender. His bail bonds and surety bonds are accordingly discharged. 33. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the accused appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or on grant of leave, the said appellant, on receipt of notice therefore, shall appear before the Supreme Court. 34. The record be sent back to the trial court forthwith.