ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Bhavin Thakar, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Jayneel Parikh, the learned A.G.P. appearing for the respondent No. 1. 2. Rule, returnable forthwith. Mr. Jayneel Parikh, the learned A.G.P. waives service of notice of rule for respondent No. 1. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was running a shop of grocery shop namely (Pandit Dindayal Grahak Bhandar) under the department of respondent authority at Mukam District: Kheda and the shop was closed for five to six days. In view therefore, respondent No. 3 passed an order in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/Hukam/262-265/2020 dated 4.2.2020 suspending the licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04, which was issued in favour of the petitioner. 3.1. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 passed the said order under Section 9(2) of the Gujarat Essential Commodities Order, 2004 and Clause 8(2) of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing, Controlling and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981. 4. Being aggrieved by the order suspending the licence by the respondent No. 3, the petitioner approached the appellate authority by preferring appeal being Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24. It is further stated that the appellate authority, by impugned order dated 24.1.2024, while confirming the order passed by the respondent No. 3, cancelled petitioner’s licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04, a copy of the said order dated 24.1.2024 is duly produced at Annexure “A.” 5. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner herein has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has prayed for the following reliefs: “9. The petitioners, therefore, prays as under: (A) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ by quashing and setting aside both orders of respondent No. 1 vide dated 24-01-2024 in Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24 (ANNEXURE-A) AND further be please to quashing and setting aside order dated 04-02-2020 pass by the respondent No. 3 in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/Hukam/262-265/2020 (ANNEX-B). (B) During the pendency and final disposal of the present petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution order of respondent No. 1 vide dated 24-01-2024 in Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24 (ANNEXURE-A) AND order passed by the respondent No. 3 in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/ Hukam/262-265/2020 vide dated 04-02-2020 (ANNEX-B). (B) During the pendency and final disposal of the present petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution order of respondent No. 1 vide dated 24-01-2024 in Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24 (ANNEXURE-A) AND order passed by the respondent No. 3 in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/ Hukam/262-265/2020 vide dated 04-02-2020 (ANNEX-B). (C) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ by directing the respondents to revived the suspension of license being licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04 of petitioner forthwith. (D) Any other that are necessary in the interest of justice be passed.” 6. Mr. Thakar, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, at the outset, submitted that the impugned action undertaken by the appellate authority, while passing the impugned order dated 24.1.2024, is against the settled position of law and Clause-8 of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing, Controlling and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981. 6.1. Reliance was placed on 9(2) of Gujarat Essential Commodities Order, 2004 and sub-clause (2) of Clause-8 wherein if the licencing authority is prima-facie satisfied that there is a case for cancellation of a the licence, it may suspend the licence for a period not exceeding 90 days during which period the authority shall consider and finally decide. 6.2. Mr. Thakar, the learned advocate submitted that on expiry of 90 days, the order of suspension would come to an end, however, the appellate authority, while passing the impugned order challenging the suspension proceeded to cancel the petitioner’s licence. It is submitted that even otherwise, the 90 days period is over, the petitioner be directed to placed in the same position, prior to the passing of the impugned orders. 7. Mr. Jayneel Parikh, the learned AGP was not in a position to controvert the submissions advanced by Mr. Thakar, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner. 8. In the facts of present case, the petitioner was in receipt of licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04, which came to be suspended by order dated 4.2.2020 in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/ Hukam/262-265/2020. The said order was subject matter of challenge by preferring appeal being Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24. 9. While passing the final order, the learned Appellate authority proceeded to cancel the licence of the petitioner whereas the petitioner had challenged the order of suspension dated 4.2.2020, which is duly produced at page-13-14. 10. The said order was subject matter of challenge by preferring appeal being Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24. 9. While passing the final order, the learned Appellate authority proceeded to cancel the licence of the petitioner whereas the petitioner had challenged the order of suspension dated 4.2.2020, which is duly produced at page-13-14. 10. In light of the aforesaid undisputed facts, this Court deems it fit to produce Clause-8(2) of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing, Controlling and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981, which read thus: “Clause-8 empowers the licencing authority to suspend or cancel the licence for contravention of order or conditions of licence. Under sub-clause (2) thereof, the following provisions have been made: (2) When the licencing authority is prima-facie satisfied that there is a case for cancellation of the licence, it may suspend the licence for a period not exceeding 90 days during which period the authority shall consider and finally decide.” 10.1. The position of law in LPA No. 732 of 2011, wherein in identical case and situation, considering the Clause-8, the Hon’ble Division Bench passed the following order: “In the present case, admittedly, the proceeding has not been finally decided within a period of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension of the licence and the authority had no power to suspend the licence for a period exceeding 90 days. Similar issue came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of J.T. Kotak vs. State of Gujarat, 1986 (2) GLR 1312 . The Court held that pending inquiry licence can be suspended only for a period of 90 days maximum and that part of clause 8(2) is mandatory. Clause 8(2) does not prescribe that inquiry must be completed within a period of 90 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, while we hold that the licensing authority had no power to keep the licence suspended for more than 90 days under clause 8(2) and thereby the licence stands revived on completion of 90 days i.e. 11th June 2011” 10.2. It is apposite to refer to the position of law reported in 1986 (2) GLR 1312 , wherein Paras, 3, 5, 8 and 12 read thus: “3. The petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on business as a dealer in petroleum products at Morvi in Rajkot district. It is apposite to refer to the position of law reported in 1986 (2) GLR 1312 , wherein Paras, 3, 5, 8 and 12 read thus: “3. The petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on business as a dealer in petroleum products at Morvi in Rajkot district. At the relevant time, it held essential commodities retail trade licence No. 166 and essential commodities wholesale trade licence No. 192. Both these licences were for dealing in crude kerosene. The aforesaid licences were issued to the petitioner as per the relevant provisions of the Licensing Order which in turn was issued by the Government of Guj. in exercise of the power conferred on it by Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 . It appears that somewhere in later part of Nov. 1984, the Chief Supply Inspector, Rajkot inquired into the petitioner’s working as a dealer of kerosene at its shop at Morvi when he found certain alleged misconduct in the said working. He made a report to the Disciplinary authority, viz. District Supply Officer, Rajkot, respondent No. 2 herein. Respondent No. 2 thereafter by his order dated 26-11-1984 ordered that the petitioner’s both licences as a wholesale dealer and retail dealer of petroleum product shall stand suspended for 90 days from the date of the order or till the disposal of the case whichever was earlier. That order was passed under the powers conferred on the authority under Clause 8(2) of the Licensing Order. The said suspension order is at Annexure ‘A’. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 23-1-1985 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why both the licences granted to it should not be cancelled on account of the alleged misconducts listed in the show cause notice at items Nos. 1 to 4. A copy of the show cause notice is at Annexure ‘B’. The inquiry was thereafter conducted by respondent No. 2 at his office. Date of hearing was fixed on 5-2-1985. As no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing and as fresh date of hearing was sought for, the inquiry was adjourned to 9-2-1985 at 12.15 p.m. in the office of the second respondent. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a detailed written reply on 16-2-1985 refuting the charges levelled against it about the alleged misconducts as listed in the show cause notice. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a detailed written reply on 16-2-1985 refuting the charges levelled against it about the alleged misconducts as listed in the show cause notice. It appears that on 19-2-1985, the petitioner’s partner Harshadrai Jamnadas Kotak appeared before the second respondent and gave his statement in writing. Thereafter, the second respondent passed his impugned order dated 4-4-1985.” 5. Mr. S.B. Vakil, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions in support of the petition. (1) The impugned order is null and void and without jurisdiction inasmuch as it is passed beyond the time-limit as enjoined by Clause 8(2) of the Licensing Order. (2) Even assuming without admitting that the requirement of time-limit as provided by sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the Licensing order is directory and not mandatory, even then, the impugned order as passed by the second respondent is bad in law as there is not even substantial compliance with the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the Licensing order and that time taken by the second respondent in passing the order is unreasonable. Consequently, the order is liable to be quashed on the ground of undue delay. (3) The provision of proviso to Clause 8 of the Licensing order is violative of the guarantee of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the said provision is wholly arbitrary and gives no real opportunity to the dealer to have his say against the charges that may be levelled against him. (4) No reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner on the facts of the present case by the second respondent before passing the impugned order and consequently, the impugned order is ultra vires the proviso to Clause 8 of the Licensing order and hence, it is liable to be quashed. (5) Lastly, Mr. Vakil contended that in any case, looking to the charges levelled against the petitioner, even if they are held to be proved, the ultimate punishment of cancelling both the licences is grossly disproportionate to the misconducts alleged against the petitioner and hence also, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. It is no doubt true that the petitioner is entitled to prefer appeal against the impugned order before the Collector but the said remedy on the facts of the present case cannot be said to be equally efficacious. 8. It is no doubt true that the petitioner is entitled to prefer appeal against the impugned order before the Collector but the said remedy on the facts of the present case cannot be said to be equally efficacious. The reasons for the conclusion of ours are obvious. The petitioner has challenged the vires of the proviso to Clause 8(1). This question can obviously not be examined by the appropriate authority under the Order. Secondly the petition was admitted to final hearing last year. It has been pending for final hearing on the file of this court for almost one year. In the meanwhile time for filing the appeal has elapsed. It will therefore be unfair to the petitioner to dismiss the petition at such late stage on the ground of alternative remedy which has become time-barred. Preliminary objection of Mr. Bhatt is, therefore, over-ruled. [We shall now deal with the contentions of Mr. Vakil seriatim.] So far as the first contention is concerned, a look at the relevant provisions of the Licensing Order becomes at once necessary. Clause 8 which is relevant for our present purpose reads as under: “8. Suspension or Cancellation of Licence for contravention of Order or conditions of licence: (1) No holder of a licence issued under this order or his agent or servant or any other person acting on his behalf shall contravene any of the terms or conditions of a licence issued to him and if any such licenceholder or his agent or servant or any person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms or conditions then, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him, his licence may be cancelled or suspended with regard to one or more essential articles by an order of the licensing authority in writing. Provided that no order shall be made by the licensing authority under this clause unless the licence-holder has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case to that authority against the proposed cancellation or suspension not being suspension referred to in the sub-clause (2) during the proceeding for cancellation of a licence. Provided that no order shall be made by the licensing authority under this clause unless the licence-holder has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case to that authority against the proposed cancellation or suspension not being suspension referred to in the sub-clause (2) during the proceeding for cancellation of a licence. (2) When the licensing authority is prima fade satisfied that there is a case for cancellation of the licence it may suspend the licence for a period not exceeding 90 days during which period the authority shall consider and finally decide.” The earlier noted resume of facts leading to the present petition shows that after receiving report of the Chief Supply Inspector, Rajkot, respondent No. 2 prima facie took the view that irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner as a dealer of crude kerosene called for interim suspension of the licence pending the inquiry. The order suspending the licences is dated 26-11-1984. As already noted earlier, licences were suspended for 90 days from the date of the order or till the disposal of the case whichever was earlier. Thus, 90 days would be over on 24-2-1985; while the impugned order was passed on 4-4-1985. It was therefore 39 days beyond the prescribed period of 90 days for completion of the inquiry and for passing order therein. Mr. Vakil, therefore, submits that the impugned order is ultra vires sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the Licensing order. This contention of Mr. Vakil on the background of the aforesaid facts clearly raises the moot question as to whether the time-limit of 90 days for the life of suspension order pending the inquiry and for completion of the inquiry and passing order therein is such a mandate which can be bypassed at the peril of getting the order in the inquiry voided if it is not passed strictly within that time-limit. In other words, whether the provision of 90 days’ period for completion of the inquiry as mentioned in Clause 8(2) of the Licensing Order is mandatory in nature or it is merely directory. In our view, in the context of the entire Clause 8 of the Licensing order, the provision of the said time-limit is merely directory in nature and is not a mandatory provision. The reasons which weigh with us for coming to this conclusion are obvious. In our view, in the context of the entire Clause 8 of the Licensing order, the provision of the said time-limit is merely directory in nature and is not a mandatory provision. The reasons which weigh with us for coming to this conclusion are obvious. Clause 8 caters to the situations wherein the dealers in essential commodities are found to have contravened relevant provisions of the Licensing order and of the licences granted to them for dealing in such commodities. When such misconducts are detected, two ‘types of penalties get attracted qua such misconducting licence-holders. Either their licences may be cancelled or may be suspended as contemplated by sub-clause (1) of Clause 8 of the Licensing order. It is obvious that cancellation of licences would debar the licence-holder for all times to come from trading in the concerned essential commodity. Such type of penalty would obviously be based on grave misconducts. But in cases where the misconducts alleged against the concerned licence-holders are not very grave, but all the same, the licence-holders are required to be suitably dealt with so that they may not commit such irregularities and misconducts in future, a less severe penalty is provided by way of suspension of licence which may be for a given period of time. But that suspension is by way of penalty. Before such penalty order is passed, the procedure of the proviso to Clause 8(1) has to be complied with so that basic principles of natural justice get complied with and the penalty can be imposed after giving an opportunity to the concerned delinquent to have his say in the matter and that he may not be condemned unheard. However, the cases in which grave misconducts are alleged and the inquiry into the same with a view to ultimately imposing penalty of cancellation of licence on the licence-holder is likely to take some time, looking to the gravity of the misconducts alleged, the disciplinary authority is armed with power to suspend the licence pending inquiry. That power inhers in him as per sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the licensing order. The only safeguard against the protracted suspension of licence pending inquiry is to the effect that in any case, such interim suspension of licence pending inquiry should not exceed 90 days. That power inhers in him as per sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the licensing order. The only safeguard against the protracted suspension of licence pending inquiry is to the effect that in any case, such interim suspension of licence pending inquiry should not exceed 90 days. Thus, the order-making authority has very clearly expressed its intention that if suspension of any licence for any alleged misconduct is by way of interim suspension such suspension cannot last for more than 90 days pending the inquiry. It is obvious that if inquiry proceeds beyond 90 days, interim suspension would come to an end. Thus, life of interim suspension pending inquiry has been clearly limited to 90 days’ period. That period cannot be extended by any implication. To that extent, provision of 90 days’ period of the life of interim suspension as laid down by sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 of the licensing order has to be treated to be mandatory. However, the next question is as to whether further prescription of sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 that during that period, the authority shall consider and finally decide, is mandatory in nature or not. It is obvious that if the licence is to be cancelled after due inquiry without interim suspension, no period for completion of inquiry is contemplated by Clause 8(1). However, once the inquiry is preceded by interim suspension of licence, the question of completion of inquiry within 90 days would assume importance as per the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause 8. Once the period of 90 days for completion of inquiry pending interim suspension of licence gets over, automatically interim suspension of licence would come to an end and would terminate by efflux of time. Thereafter, if the inquiry continues, it would partake the character of an inquiry into charges of misconduct of the concerned dealer in the absence of any inter-rim suspension of the licence. If for such inquiry, there is no time-limit fixed by sub-clause (1) of Clause 8, there is no reason to treat any inquiry proceeding beyond 90 days from the date of interim suspension of licence to be unauthorised or ultra vires. The question then arises as to whether prescription of completion of such inquiry within 90 day& of cancellation of licence as per sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 is redundant or is of any efficacy. The question then arises as to whether prescription of completion of such inquiry within 90 day& of cancellation of licence as per sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 is redundant or is of any efficacy. In our view, if it is held, as contended by Mr. Vakil, that moment 90 days of suspension are over, not only interim suspension gets exhausted but the power of inquiry also gets exhausted, the very purpose and intention of the order making authority to punish the concerned misconducting dealer would get frustrated. It is easy to visualise that if period of 90 days for completion of inquiry preceded by interim suspension of licence is mandatory, the inquiry cannot be completed on 91st day and its such completion and any orders passed therein would be liable to be treated as void. Such nullifying consequences do not appear to have been intended by the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause 8. Thus, it must be held that the mandate of the aforesaid rule about finishing of inquiry within the same period of 90 days during which interim suspension of licence would be current, to that extent, is a directory provision which should be substantially complied with and not strictly complied with and that if on the facts of a given case, the inquiry is completed beyond 90 days by itself, if cannot be said to be visited with any nullifying consequences and would not get voided. 12. So far as the third contention of Mr. Vakil is concerned, it has to be Stated to be rejected. It is difficult to appreciate how proviso to clause 8 can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable so as to be treated as violating guarantee of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It must be kept in view that the principles of natural justice are not a straight-jacket formula. Various statute and rule making authorities incorporate the provisions of principles of natural justice in diverse manners to suit exigencies of situations meant to be catered to by such provisions. So far as clause 8 is concerned, the licence may either be suspended by way of punishment or cancelled on account of the misconduct proved against the licence-holder. When such misconducts are alleged against him, he has to be given an opportunity to have his say in the matter, otherwise he can be said to be condemned unheard. So far as clause 8 is concerned, the licence may either be suspended by way of punishment or cancelled on account of the misconduct proved against the licence-holder. When such misconducts are alleged against him, he has to be given an opportunity to have his say in the matter, otherwise he can be said to be condemned unheard. If that happens, provisions of inquiry would fail on the touch-stone of basic principles of natural justice. However, in the present case, the proviso in terms ensures giving a reasonable opportunity of stating the case to me licence-holder who naturally will get all opportunities to have his say in the matter. Thus, basic principles of natural justice and fair play are incorporated in the proviso which have got to be followed by the concerned authority before any penal action is taken against the concerned licence holder. It is difficult to appreciate how such benign provision can be dubbed as arbitrary or unreasonable. It is also difficult to appreciate the contention of Mr. Vakil that the proviso is bad because reasonable opportunity afforded is reasonable opportunity of stating the case and not proving the case. With respect, this distinction is without any real difference. Reasonable opportunity of stating the case would necessarily imply reasonable opportunity of proving the case. It is obvious that the case which the alleged delinquent-licence holder has to state is the case to establish his innocence and for discharging the show cause notice that might be given to him. He states his case not for the sake of fun but for the sake of proving the same. May be, the proof may be implicit in the statement of the defence supported by relevant documentary evidence and may not be followed by oral arguments. But that would not affect the nature of the reasonable opportunity of stating the case and establishing it. That opportunity would not remain in any way less reasonable nor will it become arbitrary in any view of the matter. It is interesting to note that on the facts of the present case, this contention of Mr. Vakil really becomes academic as the petitioner was given not only the reasonable opportunity of stating the case but he was given personal hearing and he was requested to furnish whatever evidence he wasted to furnish in support of his defence. It is interesting to note that on the facts of the present case, this contention of Mr. Vakil really becomes academic as the petitioner was given not only the reasonable opportunity of stating the case but he was given personal hearing and he was requested to furnish whatever evidence he wasted to furnish in support of his defence. Thus, on the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any reasonable opportunity of stating the case and for that matter, proving the case was denied to the petitioner. But that is a different matter. So far as the challenge to the legal efficacy of the proviso to clause 8 goes, it must be repelled by holding that the proviso as framed does ample service to the basic principles of natural justice and is in no way arbitrary as to falter on the touch-stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The third contention of Mr. Vakil, therefore, stands repelled.” 11. Having considered the prayers as prayed for, as referred above, and having considered Clause-8 of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing, Controlling and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981, the position of law as laid down in LPA No. 732 of 2011, and the petitioner holding licence being licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04 was suspended by the respondent No. 3 by order dated 4.2.2020 passed in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/Hukam/262-265/2020, after suspending petitioner’s licence, as referred above, no orders were passed within 90 days. The life of suspension pending inquiry is limited to 90 days period and the same cannot be extended. The aforesaid Clause is held to be mandatory as held in 1986 (2) GLR 1312 and LPA No. 732 of 2011. 11.1. In light of the aforesaid, the appellate authority while passing impugned order dated 24.1.2024, in Appeal being Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24, proceeded to cancel the petitioner’s licence, however, in absence of any order passed within 90 days, the said order of suspension dated 4.2.2020 lived its life on completion of 90 days. Resultantly, the petitioner’s licence stands revived on completion of 90 days, no orders having been passed within said period. 12. Resultantly, the petitioner’s licence stands revived on completion of 90 days, no orders having been passed within said period. 12. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 24.1.2024 passed by the appellate authority in Appeal being Appeal No. 03 of 2023/VASHI/60/24 cancelling the petitioner’s licence, is quashed and set aside, resultantly the suspension order passed by respondent No. 3 in Purvatha/Tapas/Mokuf/Hukam/262-265/2020 dated 4.2.2020, having lived its life on completion of 90 days and no orders having been passed, the said order dated 4.2.2020, as referred above, is held to be infructuous. 13. Accordingly, the petitioner’s licence being licence No. N/SH/CHU/51/04, stands revived. 14. Liberty is reserved in favour of the respondent authority to initiate appropriate action, in accordance with law. 15. The petition stands allowed. Rule is made absolute. Direct Service is permitted.