JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. Prayer 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 18.07.2023 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, Circuit Bench, in OA No.051/00428/2023 has been assailed, by which, the original application has been held to be devoid of merits and accordingly, has declined to pass positive direction to direct the respondents to accept the joining of the present petitioner. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, as also, the impugned order, required to be enumerated, which reads as under. 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was selected for the post of Auditor in the Defence Accounts Department and offer of appointment on 26.11.2018 was sent to him. 4. According to offer of appointment, he had to report for joining within 30 days from the date of receipt of the letter. The writ petitioner has made request for extension of joining time and vide letter dated 20.02.2019, extension of joining time of six months was granted but he has not joined the said post on the extended time. 5. Thereafter, he has made another request for extension of joining time and at that time, vide order dated 18.06.2019, three months’ time, up to 26.08.2019, was granted. Again, he had not joined the post and on 10.02.2020, dossier of the petitioner was returned back by the respondents to Staff Selection Commission. 6. The writ petitioner/applicant, thereafter, on 02.02.2021, sent petition/application addressed to the CDA and his said application was referred to the CDA Guwahati by the Sr. Accounts Officer, vide letter dated 11.02.2021, and pursuant thereto, letter dated 26.02.2021, was sent to the petitioner/applicant stating that his candidature nomination has been automatically cancelled as he has failed to join his duty within the stipulated time. 7. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner, in pursuant to the advertisement floated by the Recruitment Agency to the post of Auditor in the Defence Accounts Department, has found to be successful based upon the performance in the recruitment process. 8. 7. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner, in pursuant to the advertisement floated by the Recruitment Agency to the post of Auditor in the Defence Accounts Department, has found to be successful based upon the performance in the recruitment process. 8. The recommendation made with respect to the appointment of the writ petitioner has been accepted by the competent authority, thereafter, the offer of appointment was issued on 26.11.2018 but the petitioner for one reason or the other, has not joined the said post. 9. The ground has been taken that his father was having some cardiac issue, therefore, an application was made for extension of time. The same was extended up to the month of August, 2019 but even then, he has not joined the service, thereafter, Pandemic Covid-19 has come and hence, the delay has been caused. Representations were filed and the same were also rejected, thereafter, the petitioner/applicant has approached the tribunal by filing original application under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 10. The respondents have been called upon. The respondents have taken the ground that after lapse of extended period, the joining cannot be accepted to the post of Auditor. 11. The learned Tribunal has accepted the opposition made on behalf of the respondents and has dismissed the original application, against which, the present petition has been filed. Arguments of the writ petitioner 12. Mr. Arvind Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the ground that there is no deliberate laches on the part of the writ petitioner, rather, due to the reason beyond his control, i.e., in the initial stage, due to suffering of his father from some cardiac issue and thereafter, the Pandemic Covid-19 are the reasons, due to which, the petitioner could not be able to give his joining. 13. The ground has also been taken that the said facts have also been brought to the notice of the respondents-authority while filing representations but the aforesaid aspect of the matter, has not been appreciated by the learned Tribunal, therefore, the present petition. Arguments of the Respondent-UOI 14. Per contra, Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-UOI has argued the case by defending the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 15. Arguments of the Respondent-UOI 14. Per contra, Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-UOI has argued the case by defending the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 15. It has been contended that the said decision cannot be interfered with due to the reason that the recruitment was of the year, 2018-19 and now, we are in the end of year, 2024 and as such, there is substantial delay, i.e., about six years. As such, in such a long delay, there cannot be any direction to accept the joining of the petitioner that too, in a case, where after issuance of offer of appointment, so many advertisements in the meanwhile, have come. Analysis 16. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition, as also, the order passed by the learned tribunal. 17. This Court, before entering into the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, is of the view that the reference is required to be made with respect to the jurisdiction which is to be exercised by the High Court showing interference with the order passed by the learned Tribunal under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 18. The aforesaid issue has already been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its Constitution Bench Judgment rendered in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 , wherein, it has been held that the High Court has been conferred with the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise the power of judicial review. The reference of the relevant paragraph needs to be referred herein, which reads hereunder as:- “99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323- B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 19. It is evident from paragraph-99 of the aforesaid judgment, as quoted and referred above, that the High Court has been conferred with the power to exercise the power of judicial review. 20. The “judicial review” means that if there is any error apparent on the face of the record then the power of judicial review can be exercised, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Ors Vs. Abdul Halim & Ors., (2019) 18 SCC 39 , wherein, at paragraph-30 it has been held as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 21. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa, (1955) 1 SCR 250 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” 22. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, herein the admitted position is that the recruitment process has begun in the year 2018 and on conclusion thereof, the appointment letter was issued to the petitioner on 26.11.2018. The petitioner has made request for extension of joining time and vide letter dated 20.02.2019, the extension of joining time of six months was granted but he has not joined the post on the extended time. Thereafter, he has made another request for extension of joining and at that time, vide order dated 18.06.2019, three months’ extension time up to 26.08.2019 was again granted but he has not joined. The reason has been shown of suffering of his father due to some cardiac issue. The second ground has been taken of Pandemic Covid-19. 23. Thereafter, he has made another request for extension of joining and at that time, vide order dated 18.06.2019, three months’ extension time up to 26.08.2019 was again granted but he has not joined. The reason has been shown of suffering of his father due to some cardiac issue. The second ground has been taken of Pandemic Covid-19. 23. The question herein which requires to be considered that whether after lapse of six years, any such direction can be passed by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review by showing interference with the decision so taken by the learned tribunal? 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court, since, has laid down the proposition in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others (supra), wherein, the power of judicial review is only to be exercised in order to look into the propriety of the decision taken by the learned tribunal, which power is to be exercised only in a case where the decision on the face of the order is found to suffer from perversity. 25. Here, the reason might be bona fide. But the question is that when the recruitment process is going on year-wise and the law is well settled that if after the issuance of appointment letter, the recruitment will be said to be closed but the remaining process will have to be carry forwarded to the new vacancy year. As such, there is no question of availability of post, the moment, the recruitment process has been closed, rather, the remaining vacancy will have to be considered by notifying the same by issuance of the fresh advertisement. 26. The power is to be exercised by the High Court only in two circumstances, i.e., if there is any breach of fundamental right or any legal vested right. 27. This Court has gathered from the pleading made, as also, from the argument that it is not a case of breach of fundamental right or even the legal vested right, the aforesaid view has also been taken note by the learned tribunal. 28. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned tribunal, cannot be said to suffer from vice of perversity. 29. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. 28. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned tribunal, cannot be said to suffer from vice of perversity. 29. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others (supra), therefore, is of the view that the impugned order requires no interference. 30. Accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is, dismissed.