ORDER : (Harinath N., J.) : The petitioner is aggrieved by the action of 1st respondent in issuing the memo GM (Per)/AS(per)/PO(DC-I)/264-C3/2001-13, dated 21.03.2007 and consequently seeks a direction to treat his period of suspension from 29.07.1999 to 22.06.2005 as on duty and to be paid the service benefits due payable for the said period. 2. The petitioner joined the service of the respondent on 22.03.1974 and he attained the age of superannuation on 30.06.2006 and retired as Junior Accounts Officer. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 24.07.1999 as Cr.No.97 of 1999 was registered against the petitioner and seven others. The petitioner was tried for the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and others by the V Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Anantapur in SC.No.506 of 2004. The petitioner was acquitted along with others on 17.03.2005. The petitioner was reinstated into service on 22.06.2005. 3. The petitioner submitted a representation on 21.12.2006 to treat the period during which he was under suspension as on duty and to release the full pension. The 1st respondent issued proceedings dated 21.03.2007 treating the suspension period as extraordinary leave. The learned counsel for petitioner submits that the period of suspension of 5 years 177 days was to be considered as extraordinary leave. 4. The learned counsel further submits that no disciplinary proceedings were initiated in pursuance of the order of suspension. The period of suspension continued till the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the criminal case registered against the petitioner had nothing to do with discharging the petitioner’s regular duties. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that continuing the period of suspension without initiating any disciplinary proceedings till the criminal case attained finality is gross injustice to the petitioner. 6. The injustice meted to the petitioner by treating the period of 5 years 177 days as extraordinary leave is bad in law and a glaring example of the arbitrary act of the respondents. 7. The learned standing counsel for the respondent/corporation submits that the departmental enquiry was also ordered into the criminal charge against the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner was reinstated into service vide proceedings dated 17.06.2005 and that the petitioner joined duty on 22.06.2005. 8. 7. The learned standing counsel for the respondent/corporation submits that the departmental enquiry was also ordered into the criminal charge against the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner was reinstated into service vide proceedings dated 17.06.2005 and that the petitioner joined duty on 22.06.2005. 8. The petitioner’s representation was also considered in so far as regularization of the services of the petitioner from 29.07.1999 to 21.06.2005 by sanctioning leave and that the petitioner joined duty after acquittal in the criminal case. The petitioner was granted earned leave for 156 days from 29.07.1999 to 31.12.1999 and half pay leave for 32 days from 01.01.2000 to 01.02.2000 and the extraordinary leave for 5 years 4 months 20 days as per regulation 19(v) of APSEB Leave Regulations. 9. The respondents in their additional counter referred to regulation 55 (5) of Fundamental Rules. The learned standing counsel further places reliance on memo dated 14.05.1990 which relates to Employees Suspended/Dismissed from service on conviction by Court of law in a criminal case and reinstated into service after acquittal by appellate Court regularization of period-regarding. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel for the respondents. 11. The denial of the respondents in considering the period of suspension as not on duty and instead considering the same as extraordinary leave on the basis of the memo cited supra. The said memo would not be of any relevance to the case on hand. Fundamental Rule 54(B)(3)and (4) and instruction 1 under Fundamental Rule 54 would have to be pressed into service as the same is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the ground that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case. Departmental enquiry is said to have been initiated as seen from the counter filed by the respondent. The departmental enquiry is evidently and deliberately kept pending till the final outcome of the criminal case against the petitioner. The petitioner was reinstated into service after his acquittal in a criminal case. The departmental enquiry is either still pending conclusion or is given a silent burial by issuing the impugned proceedings. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Prem Nath Bali Vs. The petitioner was reinstated into service after his acquittal in a criminal case. The departmental enquiry is either still pending conclusion or is given a silent burial by issuing the impugned proceedings. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Prem Nath Bali Vs. High Court of Delhi, (2015) 16 Supreme Court Cases 415 and A.B. Venkateswara Rao, IPS, S/o.late Balaswamy vs. Mr.Sameer Sharma IAS, presently working as Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2022 0 Supreme (AP) 997. The inordinate delay in concluding departmental enquiry and in absence of any justification for such delay. The employee cannot be penalized for the inaction on part of the employer. 13. The departmental enquiry against any employee ought to be completed within a reasonable period of time. Reasonable period does not have a reasonable definition. This cannot be a basis for the employer to extend the period of disciplinary enquiry for an unreasonable period of time. At any rate, the departmental enquiry ought to be completed preferably within a period of six months from the date of initiation of the proceedings. In cases involving complex aspects, the enquiry ought to be completed within a period of twelve months from the date of initiation of such enquiry. At any rate, no disciplinary proceedings can be extended beyond a period of twelve months without any substantial cause. 14. On the facts in this case the petitioner was placed under suspension from 29.07.1999 to 21.06.2005 and even on the date of reinstatement the departmental enquiry could not conclude for the reasons which are unexplained by the respondent. 15. The judgment of the V Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Anantapur in SC.No.506 of 2004 is also perused. It is specifically stated that out of 13 witnesses examined none of the prosecution witnesses supported the case of prosecution. No direct eye witness was examined, as such the Public Prosecutor has given up the rest of the witnesses from examination. The Court also discarded examination of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and acquitted all the accused. On the merits of the criminal case the petitioner was acquitted without any blemish or benefit of doubt. 16. In these circumstances the proceedings dated 21.03.2007 issued by the respondents deserve to be set aside. The respondents are further directed to treat the period of suspension of the petitioner from 29.07.1999 to 21.06.2005 as on duty. On the merits of the criminal case the petitioner was acquitted without any blemish or benefit of doubt. 16. In these circumstances the proceedings dated 21.03.2007 issued by the respondents deserve to be set aside. The respondents are further directed to treat the period of suspension of the petitioner from 29.07.1999 to 21.06.2005 as on duty. The respondents are further directed to compute the service benefits due payable to the petitioner on account of reconning the services of petitioner as on duty from 29.07.1999 to 21.06.2005 and pay the same within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 17. For aforementioned reasons, the writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stands closed.