ORDER : 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this special appeal and the writ petition are heard finally. 2. The prayer in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4553/2024 preferred by the writ petitioners Basant Kumar and Ors. is as follows :- "(a) That the impugned order dated 19.02.2024 passed by the respondent No.2 Director Cum Special Secretary, Local Self Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur may please be quashed and set aside. (b) any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court considers just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner; and (c) cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner." 3. The prayer in the special appeal preferred by the appellant against the impugned order dated 10.05.2024 passed in the aforesaid writ petition reads as follows :- "I. The impugned order dated 10.05.2024 passed by HON'BLE JUSTICE VINEET KUMAR MATHUR in S.B.MISC STAY PETITION in S.B.CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4553/2024 [BASANT KUMAR & ORS V/S. STATE OF RAJ. & ORS.] may kindly be quashed and set aside. II. Any other order or direction that may be deemed fit, just and proper may kindly be issued in favour of the appellant. III. Costs may kindly be also awarded in favour of the appellant." 4. The facts noted by this Court are that the appellant was elected as Chairman, Municipal Board, Suratgarh in the year 2019. A tender for laying down sewerage line, construction of safety tank and removal of old sewerage tank was awarded to one M/s Monti Carlo Ltd. and while the complaints against the said tender process was being investigated, a sum of Rs.1,60,98,940/- was withheld from the dues of the company. At that juncture, the action was initiated against the appellant under the provisions of Section 39 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (hereinafter "the Act of 2009"). The inquiry was challenged by the appellant in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5413/2023 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 21.07.2023. Another writ petition was preferred by the appellant being S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.10207/2023 challenging the inquiry and inquiry report as well, which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 17.08.2023 on account of the fact that the appellant was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.07.2023. Another writ petition was preferred by the appellant being S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.10207/2023 challenging the inquiry and inquiry report as well, which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 17.08.2023 on account of the fact that the appellant was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.07.2023. After suspension, the respondent State took a stand of holding a judicial inquiry against the present appellant, which was challenged by him along with the suspension order by filing another writ petition being S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.12569/2023, that was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 26.09.2023. 5. The fresh writ petition being S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 4553/2024 was preferred by the writ petitioners Basant Kumar and three others on account of the fact that there was a revocation of the suspension order vide order dated 19.02.2024 resulting into reinstatement of the appellant. The said revocation order has been stayed by the Single Bench vide the interim order dated 10.05.2024, against which this special appeal is preferred by the present appellant. 6. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.N. Mathur assisted by Mr. Muktesh Maheshwari made his submissions on behalf of the appellant principally on three grounds; firstly that the order of suspension was duly revoked by the State, however, while ignoring the powers and findings of the State Government, the impugned interim order has been passed staying the revocation order dated 19.02.2024. The second submission made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mathur was that the revocation of the suspension order was on account of prolonged suspension and for that he has drawn attention of this Court to the judgment of this Court passed in SBCWP No.2839/1997 "Parmanand Paliwal Vs. State & Anr.", decided on 1.10.1997 and reported in 1997 (3) RLW (Raj.) 2076. The relevant paras of the said judgment read as follows :- "(3). The conjoint reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of S. 63 indicates that the proceedings would be taken to be commenced within the meaning of sub-section (4) of S. 63 when the authority makes up its mind to take action against the person. The affidavit filed by the Deputy Director (Regional), Local Bodies, Jodhpur alleges that on 19.7.97, charges against the petitioner were framed and thereafter the order of suspension has been issued against the petitioner. The charges framed against the petitioner are as mentioned above. Framing of charges by the respondent against the petitioner clearly indicates the Govt. The affidavit filed by the Deputy Director (Regional), Local Bodies, Jodhpur alleges that on 19.7.97, charges against the petitioner were framed and thereafter the order of suspension has been issued against the petitioner. The charges framed against the petitioner are as mentioned above. Framing of charges by the respondent against the petitioner clearly indicates the Govt. making up its mind to take action against the petitioner. Prima facie, on reading the charges, it cannot be said that they do not fall within S. 63(1)(d) of the Act or that there is a colourable exercise of powers. As the matter is pending consideration before the Judicial Officer, it would not be proper for me to dilate upon the question regarding validity, proof and justification for framing charges. (4). Sub-section (4) of S. 63 of the Act provides that notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of S. 63, the State Govt. may place under suspension a member against whom proceedings have been commenced u/s. 63 and that suspension order continues until the conclusion of the enquiry or passing of the final order. The result of suspension is that the member so suspended shall not be entitled to take part in any proceedings of the Board or otherwise perform the duties of a member thereof. Thus, as a result of the suspension order issued under sub-section(4) of S. 63 pending enquiry or till the final order is passed, the member shall be debarred from taking part in the proceedings of the Municipal Board or otherwise performing his duty as a member of the Board. Sub-section (4) cannot be read as giving unlimited power in the hands of the State to debar a member from performing his duties for all times to come. It is to be kept in mind that the member is elected by the public and he is the representative of the public in the Municipal Board. His tenure is limited and he can act as a representative of the public for a fixed term. In the democratic set up, the elected member cannot be restrained from performing his duties for unlimited period without there being proved charge against him. He has a right to perform his duties as a member he being elected to represent wish and will of the people. In the democratic set up, the elected member cannot be restrained from performing his duties for unlimited period without there being proved charge against him. He has a right to perform his duties as a member he being elected to represent wish and will of the people. One has to read the inherited limitation of the authority in applying the powers under sub-section (4) debarring any elected member from performing his duties as such. The suspension should not result into a removal of the member, a power vested under sub-section ( 3) of s. 63 can be exercised after due and proper enquiry, by the State, as per the procedure prescribed for holding an enquiry into a charge against the member of a Municipal Board or Counsellor of Municipal Council. The enquiry contemplated under sub-section (2) and the order thereafter under sub-section (3) has to be passed after giving opportunity to the member to lead oral and documentary evidence and after consideration and giving due weight to the facts found on record. The order is required to be a speaking order giving reasons for arriving at a particular logical conclusion. There is no equation between the order passed of suspending a member and order of removal of member. Proceeding for removal of a member may take a longer period but that should not result in continued suspension of the member until the enquiry is concluded or order is passed. The matter can be looked into from another angle. An enquiry is commenced against the member for his removal and continue for two years and ultimately the member is exonerated from all the charges framed against him, result would be, he will not be removed from membership, but what will happen to his suspension for two years, the period he could not function as member, he could not be relegated to the original position. The power to suspend a member could be held to be legal if it is for a limited period or some machinery is provided for review of the matter and extension thereafter of the suspension period of the member. Considering the term of the member of Board, reasonable period of suspension of member could be for six months from the date of suspension. Considering the term of the member of Board, reasonable period of suspension of member could be for six months from the date of suspension. An enquiry contemplated under sub-section (2) of S. 63 of the Act and the resultant order would be passed within the period of six months from the date of suspension of a member. For some reason or the other, the enquiry u/s 63(2) is not completed or order under sub-section (3) of S. 63 is not passed, that shall not come in the way of cessation of suspension order. On the day six months are completed from the date of suspension order, the suspension order of a member under Sub-section (4) of S. 63 of the Act shall come to an end. (5). Accordingly, the petition is dismissed but it is directed that if no order is passed against the petitioner u/s 63(3) of the Act within six months from 19.7.97, the suspension order shall stand revoked from 19.1.98." 7. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the appellant has been bound down and an undertaking has been called for and thus, there is no reason for anybody to suspect any interference in the judicial inquiry which is going on. 8. At this juncture, learned Additional Advocate General was asked as to in what circumstances the State took the decision to revoke the suspension order. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General tried to take this Court to Section 39 of the Act of 2009 with particular reference to sub-sections (3), (4) and (6) stating that it was the power of the State to revoke the suspension of a duly elected representative after proper consideration of the issues involved. Learned AAG, at this juncture, in addition to his submissions that proper deliberation was made and power to revoke the suspension vests with the State, also submitted that he had fairly submitted before the Hon'ble Single Bench that the State Government be given liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law dealing with the issue involved and such submission has been recorded in paragraph 15 of the impugned order. Learned AAG has taken this Court to the revocation order which admittedly does not have any reasons for revocation of the suspension. Thereafter, learned AAG has taken this Court to the notings which are also part of the record. The relevant part of the notings reads as follows:- 10. Learned AAG has taken this Court to the revocation order which admittedly does not have any reasons for revocation of the suspension. Thereafter, learned AAG has taken this Court to the notings which are also part of the record. The relevant part of the notings reads as follows:- 10. Learned AAG however, could not point out a single word or line which could reflect that there is an application of mind or that the decision to revoke the suspension has been arrived at after due consideration or reasoning. Although the prerogative and power of the State may be an issue, but even if they have the power then also, the State ought to have at least in its notings reflected some reasoning, even if short, for arriving at such decision of revocation, which they say is in their domain. 11. Mr. Sandeep Shah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent an elected member of the Municipality and the author of the writ petition submits that neither there was power with the State Government to revoke the suspension nor such order of revocation reflects any kind of reasoning which could result into the State coming at a conclusion of revocation of inquiry/suspension. 12. After hearing the submissions on the limited subject of impugned interim order, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mathur assisting the Court on behalf of the appellant submits that in case this Court is not satisfied on the merits of the case, then an opportunity may be given to the State of Rajasthan to revisit the issue in question and while quashing the revocation order, a liberty may be given to the State to pass a fresh order showing due consideration and application of mind. 13. The proposition made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mathur is accepted by the counsel for the respondents Mr. Sandeep Shah, Mr. Manish Patel, AAG and Mr. Ankur Mathur only to the extent that revocation order may be quashed and a liberty may be given to the State to pass a fresh order, while reserving their rights to contest on all the issues raised at subsequent stage. Mr. Sandeep Shah insists that such order be passed only if the law permits. 14. Manish Patel, AAG and Mr. Ankur Mathur only to the extent that revocation order may be quashed and a liberty may be given to the State to pass a fresh order, while reserving their rights to contest on all the issues raised at subsequent stage. Mr. Sandeep Shah insists that such order be passed only if the law permits. 14. This Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case, where the impugned order itself is only an interim order, agrees with the agreed upon proposition of limiting the today's adjudication only to the issue of reasoning behind the revocation order. The reasoning is absolutely missing in the revocation order and the notings. The power of suspension is a powerful tool in the hands of the employer and has to be exercised very cautiously taking into consideration the critical sensitivities involved with such power. The power is unbridled but with the unbridled power comes more responsibility. In the considered opinion of this Court, neither the impugned order of revocation of the suspension dated 19.02.2024 nor the reasoning given in the notings indicate even a fraction or a small reflection that due consideration was made regarding revocation of the suspension. The suspension order carries far-reaching ramification for both the parties and once the State had taken a decision to pass suspension order, then at the time of revocation also, equal responsibility lies upon the State to have considered revocation. 15. In a very limited zone of interference which this Court is exercising, the revocation order dated 19.02.2024 is quashed and set aside with complete liberty to the State to pass fresh order in accordance with law while keeping into consideration all the issues which have been raised by both the parties. The State shall pass a speaking order within a period of 30 days from receiving the certified copy of this order, supported by whatever consideration they make, after taking into count factual matrix which is on record. Needless to say that this order and the directions given in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 4553/2024 shall not prejudice the State to make an order in either side. 16. It is also clarified that the expeditious disposal of the judicial inquiry which has already been directed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, is the order which shall remain in existence. 17. Needless to say that this order and the directions given in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 4553/2024 shall not prejudice the State to make an order in either side. 16. It is also clarified that the expeditious disposal of the judicial inquiry which has already been directed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, is the order which shall remain in existence. 17. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, with the consent of the parties, the writ petition and the special appeal stand disposed of. However, liberty is also granted to the aggrieved parties to avail the remedies available to them in case any fresh order is passed by the State.