JUDGMENT : Venuthurumalli Gopala Krishna Rao, J. The appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 07-01-2004 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kadiri, Anantapur District, in O.S.No.18 of 1993. The suit is filed for the relief of partition and separate possession of 3/8th share of plaintiffs 2 and 3 in the plaint schedule properties and to direct the defendant to pay future mesne profits to the plaintiffs from the date of plaint till the date of delivery of properties to the plaintiffs and for costs of the suit. 2. The case of the plaintiffs as narrated in the plaint, in brief, is as follows: (a) It is pleaded that the plaint schedule properties originally belonged to one Saddapalli Venkata Reddy, son of S. Bali Reddy of Cherlopalli, hamlet of Kassamudram, Amadaguru Mandal. He was in possession and enjoyment of the same. He died on 01-9-1947 leaving behind him, his two wives i.e. the 1st plaintiff and one Lakshmi Narasamma. The said Venkata Reddy had married one Salemma who pre-deceased him. The said Venkata Reddy died issueless. During his life time, the said Venkata Reddy had adopted the defendant. The said Venkata Reddy died undivided with his adopted son who is the defendant. (b) It is further pleaded that after the death of the said Venkata Reddy, the 1st plaintiff, her co-widow Lakshmi Narasamma and the defendant all became entitled to the plaint schedule properties. The defendant has been paying land revenue for the schedule mentioned properties on behalf of himself and the 1st plaintiff and at the time of sharing the produce, the defendant has been deducting some produce to be given to the 1st plaintiff towards proportionate share of land revenue payable by the 1st plaintiff for her share in the schedule mentioned properties. (c) It is further pleaded that the 1st plaintiff died on 25-9-1998 at Kadiri, leaving behind her the plaintiffs 2 and 3 as the only legal representatives to succeed her estate. The 2nd plaintiff is the younger brother, while the 3rd plaintiff is the son of the 1st plaintiff’s another younger brother viz., M. Venkata Krishna Reddy. The welfare of the deceased 1st plaintiff was looked after by the 2nd plaintiff and the father of 3rd plaintiff. The deceased 1st plaintiff has no issues whatsoever and she is to reside with both the 2nd plaintiff and the father of 3rd plaintiff. The welfare of the deceased 1st plaintiff was looked after by the 2nd plaintiff and the father of 3rd plaintiff. The deceased 1st plaintiff has no issues whatsoever and she is to reside with both the 2nd plaintiff and the father of 3rd plaintiff. During her life time, the 1st plaintiff bequeathed all her properties including her claim in the above suit equally to the plaintiffs 2 and 3 by executing a registered Will on 16-5-1998 in their favour in a sound disposing state of mind and out of free will and volition. The said Will is the last testament of the testator. The said Will has been acted upon and by virtue of the said Will, the plaintiffs 2 and 3 became entitled to all the properties of the deceased 1st plaintiff including her claim in the above suit. Hence, the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are entitled for the decree for the 3/8th share of the deceased 1st plaintiff in the plaint schedule mentioned properties as prayed for. (d) It is further pleaded that due to misunderstandings between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant, the 1st plaintiff felt it no longer beneficial for her to enjoy the plaint schedule mentioned properties jointly with the defendant. The 1st plaintiff made several demands on the defendant for amicable partition and separate possession of the plaint schedule mentioned properties and the defendant while acknowledging 3/8th share of the 1st plaintiff and her joint possession of the plaint schedule mentioned properties, has not complied with the request of the 1st plaintiff and that the 1st plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 3. Brief averments in the written statement filed by the defendant are as follows: (a) It is contended that in the year 1947 itself, the 1st plaintiff herein filed O.P.No.108 of 1947 on the file of District Court, Anantapur and at that time, elders mutually interested in the parties effected a settlement between the 1st plaintiff and this defendant, whereunder adoption of this defendant was recognized and the 1st plaintiff herein was given a sum of Rs.20,000/- in cash in full settlement of her claim and that she did not have any rights in the properties thereafter. The matter was settled and the 1st plaintiff did not claim any rights in the properties right from that time. The matter was settled and the 1st plaintiff did not claim any rights in the properties right from that time. This defendant continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the property in his own right enjoying them with full and absolute rights without reference to the 1st plaintiff in any manner. However, by 1975, the Land Ceiling Act came into effect and declarations have to be submitted with respect to the properties. Then the 1st plaintiff herein sent her own declarations claiming a right in the properties. As there were no documents evidencing the settlement referred to above, the land ceiling authorities granted 1/4th share to the 1st plaintiff as her holding and the other 3/4th share was included in the holding of this defendant. (b) It is further contended that by 1986, once again the plaintiff claimed a right in the properties and wanted her share to be separated. Then elders intervened in the matter and the circumstances were such that the family reputation was at stake. Parties were about to launch upon futile litigation. The entire resources of the family were to be exhausted and the people supporting the 1st plaintiff wanted to ruin the interest of this defendant. Elders mutually interested in the parties and who had the reputation of S. Venkata Reddy in mind, intervened and settled claim of the parties in 1986. With the sum of Rs.20,000/- given in full settlement of her claim in O.P.No.108 of 1947 on the file of District Court, Anantapur, the 1st plaintiff purchased properties in Nagireddipalli and she is in possession and enjoyment of the same. She has also a house. She is residing in that house. The plaintiff is living with her brother and he has been instrumental along with others to instigate the 1st plaintiff to file the present suit with totally false and untenable claim. (c) It is further contended that under the settlement which was entered into in January, 1986, it was suggested that the 1st plaintiff has to be given a further sum of Rs.20,000/- and she must be given a half share in Survey No.375 of an extent of Ac.7-47 cents and that she must give up her claim in all the properties belonging to the family of S. Venkata Reddy. The 1st plaintiff herein accepted the same and agreed to it. The 1st plaintiff herein accepted the same and agreed to it. As a consequence thereof, on 30-01-1986, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was given to the 1st plaintiff and she was given half share in Survey No.375 as referred to above and the 1st plaintiff got into possession of half share in Survey No.375. Both the parties continued to enjoy the said properties in pursuance of the arrangement referred to above. In order to avoid bickering and any disputes in future, the elders suggested that a memorandum of family arrangement has to be drawn up. On 20-02-1986, a family arrangement was drawn up and the 1st plaintiff and the defendant herein were consenting parties to the same and they have signed in it. It was written in two sets. One document was given to this defendant and another document was given to the 1st plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the same. The family arrangement which was arrived at in the circumstances referred to above, is binding on the 1st plaintiff and she is a consenting party to the same. (d) It is further contended that this suit based upon joint possession is totally unsustainable and it is conflicting with the plea that has been raised and the relief that has been claimed for. This defendant’s ancestors, to the knowledge of the 1st plaintiff, have sold away certain properties to third parties and they were not available for partition. The 1st plaintiff deliberately and with a mala fide motive, included them just to harass this defendant. Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the suit with costs. 4. Based upon the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues for trial: (1) Whether the relinquishment deed dated 20-02-1986 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession as prayed for ? (3) Whether the court-fee paid is not correct ? and (4) To what relief ? Additional issues dated 08-7-1997: (1) Whether the relinquishment deed said to have been executed by plaintiff is true and valid ? (2) To what relief ? Additional issue dated 05-7-1999: (1) Whether the Will in favour of the plaintiffs is true, valid and binding? 5. (3) Whether the court-fee paid is not correct ? and (4) To what relief ? Additional issues dated 08-7-1997: (1) Whether the relinquishment deed said to have been executed by plaintiff is true and valid ? (2) To what relief ? Additional issue dated 05-7-1999: (1) Whether the Will in favour of the plaintiffs is true, valid and binding? 5. During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 4 are examined and Exs.A-1 to A-9 are marked. On behalf of the 1st defendant, D.W.1 is examined and Exs.B-1 to B-17 are marked. 6. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court preliminarily decreed the suit with costs in favour of plaintiffs 2 and 3 directing the defendant to divide the plaint schedule mentioned properties into 8 equal shares and put the plaintiffs 2 and 3 in possession of 3 such shares taking into consideration the good and bad nature of soil, while granting liberty to the plaintiffs 2 and 3 to file a separate application for ascertaining mesne profits. 7. During the pendency of the appeal, the 2nd respondent/2nd plaintiff died and respondents 4 and 5 are brought on record as his legal representatives vide order dated 07-02-2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2022. So also, the sole appellant/defendant also died and appellants 2 to 5 are brought on record as his legal representatives vide order dated 22-02-2024 in I.A.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2024. 8. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri M.V. Suresh, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent and Sri Sumanth Amirapu, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent. 9. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would contend that the trial Court erred in law in holding that the 1st plaintiff and one Lakshmi Narasamma were not consenting parties for the adoption of the 1st appellant/1st defendant. 9. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would contend that the trial Court erred in law in holding that the 1st plaintiff and one Lakshmi Narasamma were not consenting parties for the adoption of the 1st appellant/1st defendant. He would further contend that the trial Court failed to observe that as per Ex.B-11, the 1st plaintiff has relinquished her entire share in the plaint schedule properties and he would further contend that the trial Court ought to have seen that there was a settlement between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share and the trial Court erred in law in holding that the defendant failed to prove the genuineness of Ex.B-11 and also its execution. He would further contend that the trial Court came to wrong conclusion and decreed the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties and allotted 3 shares to the plaintiffs from out of 8 equal shares in the plaint schedule properties and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is not sustainable under law and the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 10. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed. 11. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: (1) Whether the sole plaintiff i.e. the 1st plaintiff, who instituted the suit for partition of plaint schedule properties, relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties prior to institution of the suit for partition ? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition in the plaint schedule properties and whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court needs any interference ? and (3) To what extent ? 12. Point No.1: Whether the sole plaintiff i.e. the 1st plaintiff, who instituted a suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties, relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties prior to institution of the suit for partition? and (3) To what extent ? 12. Point No.1: Whether the sole plaintiff i.e. the 1st plaintiff, who instituted a suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties, relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties prior to institution of the suit for partition? The admitted facts of both the parties are that one Saddapalli Venkata Reddy had a wife by name Salemma, who pre-deceased him and he had two wives, the 1st plaintiff herein and one Lakshmi Narasamma and Lakshmi Narasamma also died after the year 1956 and the present 1st plaintiff died pendente lite of the suit. The said Venkata Reddy died on 01-9-1947 and during his life time, he adopted the 1st defendant as he had no issues through any of his wives. The plaintiffs and the 1st defendant admitted that the plaint schedule properties are originally belonged to S. Venkata Reddy and the relationship of the parties is not in dispute. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that by virtue of adoption, the 1st defendant got half share while the two widows i.e., 1st plaintiff and Lakshmi Narasamma together succeeded remaining half share i.e., 1/4th share each in the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiffs further pleaded that Lakshmi Narasamma died intestate after the year 1956 and that her 1/4th share devolved on the 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant equally. 13. The learned Senior Counsel for appellants would contend that both Lakshmi Narasamma and Nanjamma i.e., the 1st plaintiff instituted O.P.No.108 of 1947 on the file of District Court, Anantapur for in forma pauperies with a prayer to set aside the adoption of the 1st defendant herein and also partition for 1/6th share in the family properties of Venkata Reddy and the 1st defendant herein is a minor in the aforesaid suit and the 1st defendant herein is defendant No.11 in the said case, represented by a guardian and there are also other defendants in the said suit and the said case was ended with compromise on 27-6-1950, Lakshmi Narasamma and the 1st plaintiff herein relinquished their shares in the properties of late Venkata Reddy by receiving an amount of Rs.9,000/- each. The learned counsel for respondents/ plaintiffs would contend that the said compromise is in respect of non-agricultural properties, but the present suit is for agricultural properties. The learned counsel for respondents/ plaintiffs would contend that the said compromise is in respect of non-agricultural properties, but the present suit is for agricultural properties. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs herein are not at all disputing for arriving compromise in between both the parties and receiving amount from the 1st defendant in the aforesaid suit. It is not in dispute that Lakshmi Narasamma died intestate. It is also not in dispute that the 1st plaintiff herein died issueless during the pendency of the suit and Venkata Reddy also died issueless. 14. As seen from the original plaint in the aforesaid O.P.No.108 of 1947, subsequently numbered as O.S.No.10 of 1949 on the file of District Judge, Anantapur and later it was transferred to Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur vide O.S.No.46 of 1950, subsequently I.A.No.53 of 1949 was filed by the 1st plaintiff herein and Lakshmi Narasamma for seeking amendment of the plaint. 15. In para No.8 of amendment of plaint, it was specifically pleaded that under the provisions of Hindu Women Right to Property Act of 1937 read with Madras Act 26 of 1947 and claimed that she and another widow of late Venkata Reddy are entitled to the share of their husband in the joint family properties (by virtue of amendment of plaint). It has to be observed that the said amendment was ordered on 05-7-1949 vide I.A.No.53 of 1949 and the said suit was ended with compromise on 27-6-1950, the time gap in between the amendment of plaint and final disposal of the suit in O.S.No.46 of 1950 is approximately more than one year. In para Nos.10, 12 and 15 of the plaint in the aforesaid suit, they have claimed 1/6th share each in the plaint schedule properties. Therefore, it is clear that the aforesaid suit is initially filed for partition of non-agricultural properties, later an amendment was taken place more than one year prior to the disposal of the suit for amending the words “non-agricultural property” into “joint family properties” and the said amendment was allowed and after more than one year of the aforesaid amendment, the said suit vide O.S.No.46 of 1950 was ended with compromise in between the 1st plaintiff herein and Lakshmi Narasamma and also the 1st defendant herein and others i.e., co-parceners. In view of consequential amendment of the plaint in O.S.No.46 of 1950, the said suit relates to the partition of joint family properties of late Venkata Reddy. The judgment in O.S.No.46 of 1950 is marked as Ex.B-15. In Ex.B-15, it was clearly held that a compromise petition is filed and the suit is dismissed by recording compromise, the said original terms of compromise petition is also exhibited as Ex.B-2 in the present suit. 16. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that the suit O.S.No.46 of 1950 relates to non-agricultural properties only, but they are not at all disputing the compromise held between both the parties in O.S.No.46 of 1950. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that in prayer portion i.e., first para in judgment and decree Exs.B-14 and B-15, it was specifically mentioned that the said suit relates to non-agricultural properties. It is not in dispute that the said suit was initially filed for partition of non-agricultural property, later the suit was amended for partition of all the joint family properties of late Venkata Reddy. It is not in dispute that the said suit was ended with compromise after more than one year of the amendment of the plaint. On the sole ground, the office of trial Court prepared prayer portion in the judgment and decree by committing an error without verifying the original amended plaint, it cannot be construed that the said compromise before the trial Court in the aforesaid suit is in respect of non-agricultural properties. In the judgment and decree in O.S.No.46 of 1950, it was specifically mentioned that the 1st plaintiff herein and Lakshmi Narasamma received Rs.9,000/- each by relinquishing their rights in family properties. Therefore, the amended plaint, the terms of compromise in the decree and compromise petition are crucial to decide the point involved in this issue. In para No.4 of the judgment in O.S.No.46 of 1950, it was specifically mentioned that a compromise petition filed, recorded and the suit in O.S.No.46 of 1950 was dismissed. Ex.B-2 is compromise petition filed by both the plaintiffs Lakshmi Narasamma and Saddapalli Nanjamma, in which they have specifically mentioned that they received Rs.18,000/- (Rs.9,000/- each) by relinquishing their total rights in the family properties. It does not mean that Lakshmi Narasamma and Nanjamma relinquished their rights in non-agricultural properties. Ex.B-2 is compromise petition filed by both the plaintiffs Lakshmi Narasamma and Saddapalli Nanjamma, in which they have specifically mentioned that they received Rs.18,000/- (Rs.9,000/- each) by relinquishing their total rights in the family properties. It does not mean that Lakshmi Narasamma and Nanjamma relinquished their rights in non-agricultural properties. In the decree (Ex.B-14) also, the terms of compromise were specifically mentioned that Lakshmi Narasamma and Nanjamma i.e., the 1st plaintiff herein relinquished their total rights in family properties by receiving Rs.18,000/-. As stated supra, the plaint in O.S.No.46 of 1950 is amended in the year 1949 i.e., one year prior to the compromise by amending the relief of ‘non-agricultural properties’ into ‘total joint family properties’. Therefore, Exs.B-2 and B-14 have to be read along with amended plaint in O.S.No.46 of 1950. I have verified the original plaint schedule in the trial Court record, the plaint schedule includes agricultural properties and the total Survey numbers of lands and extent are also mentioned in the plaint schedule in the original plaint, therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for plaintiffs that the said suit O.S.No.46 of 1950 is confined to non-agricultural properties only. 17. All the co-parceners are joined as parties in O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Anantapur (formerly O.S.No.10 of 1949 on the file of District Court, Anantapur). Lakshmi Narasamma and the 1st plaintiff herein relinquished their rights in the joint family properties of late Venkata Reddy in the year 1950 in the suit vide O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur. As stated supra, the 1st defendant herein and other co-parceners have entered into a registered partition deed among themselves on 11-12-1957 itself and the 1st defendant got right over the plaint schedule properties by way of registered partition deed dated 11-12-1957. 18. The 1st appellant has taken a defence in the written statement itself that in the year 1985, once again the 1st plaintiff claimed a right in the properties of late Venkata Reddy and wanted her share to be separated. Thereupon, the elders intervened in the matter and the circumstances were such that family reputation of late Venkata Reddy was at stake and entire resources of the family was to be exhausted and honestly a pathetic condition and there was a strained relationship in between the 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant. Thereupon, the elders intervened in the matter and the circumstances were such that family reputation of late Venkata Reddy was at stake and entire resources of the family was to be exhausted and honestly a pathetic condition and there was a strained relationship in between the 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant. The 1st defendant further pleaded that elders mutually interested in the properties settled claims of the parties in the year 1985 and a sum of Rs.20,000/- was given in full settlement of her claim and later, the 1st plaintiff purchased the properties at Nagireddipalli and she is in separate possession and enjoyment of the same and the 1st plaintiff is living with her brother. The 1st appellant further pleaded that in view of the settlement arrived, the 1st defendant had given a sum of Rs.20,000/- and also she must be given a half share in Survey No.375 of an extent of Ac.7-47 cents and that she has to give up her claim in all the properties belong to joint family of late Venkata Reddy and the 1st plaintiff herein accepted and agreed the same and the 1st plaintiff was given half share in Survey No.375 and the 1st plaintiff got into possession of the half share in Survey No.375. The 1st appellant further pleaded that both the parties continued to enjoy the said properties in pursuance of the arrangement made before the elders and subsequently that was reduced into writing on 20-02-1986 and both the parties signed on the said family arrangement. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would contend that the 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant entered into a memorandum of family agreement under Ex.B-11 on 20-02-1986 i.e. 7 years prior to the institution of the suit. 19. The recitals in Ex.B-11 go to show about the compromise held in between both the parties in O.P.No.108 of 1947 (O.S.No.46 of 1950) and a declaration filed before the land ceiling authorities and the properties allotted to the share of 1st plaintiff. The recitals in Ex.B-11 further go to show that past transaction has been recorded, therefore, it is admissible in evidence, more so the 1st defendant paid stamp duty and penalty, since the past transaction of family settlement is reduced into writing under Ex.A-11 and therefore, it does not require registration. The recitals in Ex.B-11 further go to show that past transaction has been recorded, therefore, it is admissible in evidence, more so the 1st defendant paid stamp duty and penalty, since the past transaction of family settlement is reduced into writing under Ex.A-11 and therefore, it does not require registration. The learned trial Judge came to wrong conclusion that Ex.A-11 has to be disbelieved on the ground that the signature on Ex.A-11 of Nanjamma is not tallying with that of admitted signatures on Exs.A-7 and A-8 and the learned trial Judge further held that Saddapalli Nanjamma signed as ‘S. Nanjamma’ on Exs.A-7 and A-8 and that the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion and disbelieved Ex.B-11. Admittedly, Exs.A-7 and A-8 relate to the year 1991 and the 1st plaintiff is a signatory and she does not know English language. It is not in dispute about the filing of O.P.No.108 of 1947 (O.S.No.46 of 1950) on the file of District Court, Anantapur. In the plaint itself, Nanjamma signed as ‘Saddapalli Nanjamma’ but not as ‘S. Nanjamma’ and in the compromise petition in the aforesaid suit, she also signed as ‘Saddapalli Nanjamma’. Therefore, I am unable to accept the finding of the learned trial Judge that since Saddapalli Nanjamma signed on Exs.A-7 and A-8 as ‘S. Nanjamma’ and that Ex.B-11 is not a genuine document. 20. To prove Ex.B-11, the 1st defendant examined the scribe of Ex.B-11 as D.W.2. D.W.2 deposed in his evidence that earlier to the litigation, the parties to the suit and others have effected compromise in the civil court at Anantapur and Smt. S. Nanjamma has taken a sum of Rs.20,000/- and relinquished her rights in the properties of late Venkata Reddy and settled herself at Nagireddipalli and purchased properties in her name and living there at Nagireddipalli. He further deposed that after receiving Rs.20,000/- from the 1st defendant, the 1st plaintiff given up her rights in the properties of late Venkata Reddy and subsequently, the 1st plaintiff had later sold half share in the land to one S. Siva Reddy under a registered sale deed and later on the advice of elders, a family settlement was prepared and executed on 20-02-1986 at Kadiri in their presence and he scribed the said document. He further deposed that one K. Venkat Reddy and one S. Siva Reddy were present and all of them signed on Ex.A-11 as attestors. He further deposed that one K. Venkat Reddy and one S. Siva Reddy were present and all of them signed on Ex.A-11 as attestors. In cross-examination, he admits that he worked as U.D. Clerk in A.P. Secretariat in Hyderabad in the year 1965. In cross-examination, he also affirmed that a panchayat was convened in the year 1985 in between both the parties in the presence of himself and other elders and a family arrangement was taken place and later the same is reduced into writing. Though D.W.2 was cross-examined, the evidence of D.W.2 is not at all disturbed on the material aspects such as earlier suit litigation between both the parties and also past transaction. 21. In the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2020) 9 SCC 706 , while relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kale v. Director of Consolidation [ (1976) 3 SCC 119 ], the Apex Court held at para-26 as follows: “26. In para 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: (Kale case [Kale v. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 ] , SCC pp. 126-27) “10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions: ‘(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.’” (emphasis supplied) 22. The Apex Court also held in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal (supra), while relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh [ (1995) 5 SCC 709 ], at para-32 as follows: “32. In our considered view, reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court will be of no avail to alter or impact the conclusion recorded by the first appellate court. As aforementioned, in Bhoop Singh [Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 709 ] and Som Dev [Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (2006) 10 SCC 788 ] , the Court was dealing with the issue of compulsory registration of a decree or order of Court. As aforementioned, in Bhoop Singh [Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 709 ] and Som Dev [Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (2006) 10 SCC 788 ] , the Court was dealing with the issue of compulsory registration of a decree or order of Court. In the context of the applicable clause (vi) in sub-section (2) of Section 17, the Court in Bhoop Singh [Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 709 ] went on to hold as follows: (Bhoop Singh case [Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 709 ] , SCC pp. 715-16, para 18) “18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below: (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration. (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order would require registration. (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration. (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case [Fazal Rasul Khan v. Mohd-ul-Nisa, 1943 SCC OnLine Lah 128] , benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in question. (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the “subject-matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause (vi) of sub-section (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated.” (emphasis in original) 23. Therefore, the law is well settled that when by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement is to protect the family from long-drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred between the various members of the family. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, the 1st appellant by producing documentary evidence apart from the oral evidence proved that the 1st plaintiff herein and Lakshmi Narasamma relinquished their rights in the plaint schedule properties. It is not in dispute that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties of late Venkata Reddy. Lakshmi Narasamma died intestate. Having been relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties, again the 1st plaintiff approached the Court below and filed the present suit for seeking the relief of partition. As noticed supra, originally the 1st plaintiff instituted the suit for partition. During the pendency of the suit, the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs, who are none other than the brother of 1st plaintiff and son of another brother of 1st plaintiff, are brought on record as 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs for claiming the share of 3/8th share in the plaint schedule properties by virtue of a registered Will said to have been executed by the 1st plaintiff dated 16-5-1998 during the pendency of the suit. It is not in dispute that the 1st plaintiff died after 9 days of the alleged execution of Ex.A-5 Will. The recitals of Ex.A-5 go to show that the 1st plaintiff bequeathed all her rights including her claim of 3/8th share in the plaint schedule properties herein in favour of the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs equally. As stated supra, since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, she has no right to execute the alleged Will in respect of her claim in the present plaint schedule properties. Ex.A-5 is the alleged Will dated 16-5-1998 executed during the pendency of the suit. As stated supra, since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, she has no right to execute the alleged Will in respect of her claim in the present plaint schedule properties. Ex.A-5 is the alleged Will dated 16-5-1998 executed during the pendency of the suit. It was specifically mentioned in Ex.A-5 alleged Will by the 1st plaintiff that in case if she got any share in the plaint schedule properties in the case on hand, the same will be bequeathed in favour of the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs apart from other properties. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the 1st plaintiff relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered. 25. Point No.2: Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition in the plaint schedule properties and whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court needs any interference ? The case of the plaintiffs is that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties and that the plaintiffs sought the relief of partition of plaint schedule properties. In a suit for partition, the burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the plaint schedule properties are jointly held by them and the 1st plaintiff herein, who instituted the suit for partition, is also supposed to prove that she is a co-owner in the plaint schedule properties. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that there was an admission by the 1st appellant in a land ceiling declaration that the 1st plaintiff was a co-owner. The learned counsel for appellants would contend that the suit filed by the 1st plaintiff seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties on the basis of declaration made before the Land Reforms Tribunal itself is not at all maintainable and the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would place reliance on the judgment of a learned single Judge of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in the case of K. Bhaskar Rao v. K.A. Rama Rao, 2010 (5) ALD 339 , wherein at para-13, it is held as follows: “13. It is, therefore, well settled that when parties make statement for the purpose of escaping rigors of ceiling laws of tax laws, that by itself is not decisive and such statements cannot be equated to admissions so as to form basis of a status of a thing. It is on record that defendant did gave a statement in his declaration under the Act and A and B schedule properties are joint family properties but it is also on record that competent authority did not accept the same and finalized the declaration treating A and B schedule properties as individual properties of defendant. The appeal filed by the defendant against the said order also went against him. Thus, notwithstanding the said declaration given by the defendant to escape the rigor of laws of holding under the Act, ultimate order of determination was that A and B schedule properties are individual properties of defendant.” 26. Considering the aforesaid legal position, it is very clear that the statement made by the 1st defendant will not confer any right to the 1st plaintiff in respect of title of the property. In fact, no evidence is placed by the 1st plaintiff to show that she is a co-owner of the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiffs relied on a pattadar pass book and title deeds stands in the name of the 1st plaintiff. The law is very clear that entries in revenue records do not confer any title in respect of plaint schedule property. Moreover, the plaint averments go to show that the 1st defendant used to pay land revenue to the Government in respect of the plaint schedule properties. 27. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh (Dead) by LRs, (2002) 2 SCC 62 , wherein at para-9 it is held as follows: “9. 27. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh (Dead) by LRs, (2002) 2 SCC 62 , wherein at para-9 it is held as follows: “9. In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied.” In the case on hand, the 1st plaintiff who instituted the suit for partition passed away during the pendency of the suit and the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs, by virtue of the Will said to have been executed by the 1st plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, came on record. The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs are brought on record as legal heirs by virtue of the Will under Ex.A-5 in suit proceedings. The 2nd plaintiff is none other than the brother of 1st plaintiff and the 3rd plaintiff is son of another brother of the 1st plaintiff. The case of both the parties is that late Venkata Reddy adopted the 1st defendant and the said adoption is not at all disputed by the 1st plaintiff. The plaintiffs are claiming the relief of partition of plaint schedule properties of late Venkata Reddy. In the case on hand, as noticed supra, the 1st plaintiff relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties by receiving considerable amount in those days way back in the year 1950 and subsequently in the mediation before the elders, she also received considerable amount and the same is recorded under Ex.B-11. Having been relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties, the 1st plaintiff is not supposed to file the suit for partition. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the aforesaid case law are different to the instant case. 28. The respondents/plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-5 Will said to have been executed by the 1st plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Having been relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties, the 1st plaintiff is not supposed to file the suit for partition. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the aforesaid case law are different to the instant case. 28. The respondents/plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-5 Will said to have been executed by the 1st plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that by virtue of Ex.A-5 Will, the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are entitled to the properties fallen to the share of 1st plaintiff in the plaint schedule properties. It is a fact that the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs are not natural legal heirs of the 1st plaintiff. The husband of 1st plaintiff Venkata Reddy died prior to 1950 and the 1st plaintiff died issueless during the pendency of the suit. The 2nd plaintiff is none other than the brother of 1st plaintiff and the 3rd plaintiff is son of another brother of the 1st plaintiff. It is not in dispute by both sides that the 1st defendant is the adopted son of late Venkata Reddy. Therefore, in the absence of any Will, naturally the 1st defendant would be entitled for the share of the 1st plaintiff. As noticed supra, the 1st plaintiff relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties by receiving considerable amount from the 1st defendant. Since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties, she will not entitle to any share in the plaint schedule properties. The recitals of Ex.A-5 Will are that in case if the 1st plaintiff got any share in the present suit proceedings, the same will be bequeathed in favour of the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs. As noticed supra, since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties by taking a considerable amount from the 1st defendant, therefore, she is not having any right to execute any Will respect of the plaint schedule properties. 29. The partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. As noticed supra, since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties by taking a considerable amount from the 1st defendant, therefore, she is not having any right to execute any Will respect of the plaint schedule properties. 29. The partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. In the case on hand, a widow of late Venkata Reddy relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties by receiving considerable amount from the adopted son of late Venkata Reddy in an earlier suit proceeding for partition way back in the year 1950, that too in a suit instituted by the 1st plaintiff herein and subsequently she also received considerable amount by recording past transaction under Ex.B-11. Therefore, the suit for partition is not at all maintainable. In fact, there is no pleading in the plaint that when there is a re-union between the 1st plaintiff, Lakshmi Narasamma and the 1st defendant, in the absence of any pleading and evidence on record, the plaint schedule properties cannot be treated as joint family properties. As stated supra, Lakshmi Narasamma, one of the widows of late Venkata Reddy, received considerable amount from the 1st defendant by relinquishing her share in the plaint schedule properties in the year 1950 itself in earlier suit proceedings and the 1st plaintiff also relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties in the year 1950 itself and also considering Ex.B-11 relied on by the 1st appellant, the present suit for partition and separate possession itself is not at all maintainable. In the case on hand, the 1st appellant specifically pleaded in the written statement itself about the relinquishment of right by the 1st plaintiff in the joint family properties of late Venkata Reddy. To substantiate the same, the 1st appellant has filed the plaint in O.P.No.108 of 1947 on the file of District Court, Anantapur (O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur), compromise petition and compromise decree in the said case proceedings. But, there is no evidence on record to show that when there is a re-union between the 1st plaintiff, Lakshmi Narasamma and the 1st defendant. 30. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that P.W.1 i.e. the 1st plaintiff was not at all cross-examined by the learned counsel for 1st defendant before the trial Court. But, there is no evidence on record to show that when there is a re-union between the 1st plaintiff, Lakshmi Narasamma and the 1st defendant. 30. The learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs would contend that P.W.1 i.e. the 1st plaintiff was not at all cross-examined by the learned counsel for 1st defendant before the trial Court. The evidence of P.W.1 goes to show that she was examined-in-chief by the Advocate Commissioner. Though she was not cross-examined by the 1st defendant on that day, the Advocate Commissioner recorded the cross-examination of P.W.1 is treated as ‘nil’ and later P.W.1 died during the pendency of the suit and subsequently the 2nd plaintiff is examined as P.W.2 before the trial Court. 31. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the 1st plaintiff having been received considerable amount from the 1st defendant relinquished her right in the plaint schedule properties way back in the year 1950 itself in O.P.No.108 of 1947 (O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur) and subsequently disputes arose between the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant and the matter is placed before the elders in the year 1985 and the 1st defendant also gave further sum of Rs.20,000/- in view of the full settlement of her claim and thereby the 1st plaintiff relinquished her total rights in the plaint schedule properties. Since the 1st plaintiff relinquished her share in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, the present suit for partition and separate possession is not at all maintainable and the 1st plaintiff is not at all entitled to any share in the plaint schedule properties. The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs are claiming right in the share of 1st plaintiff. Since the 1st plaintiff will not get any share in the plaint schedule properties as she relinquished her rights in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs will not get any share in the plaint schedule properties. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the trial Court came to wrong conclusion that the earlier suit proceedings in O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur, is confined to non-agricultural properties only. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the trial Court came to wrong conclusion that the earlier suit proceedings in O.S.No.46 of 1950 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Anantapur, is confined to non-agricultural properties only. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. Resultantly, the suit in O.S.No.18 of 1993 on the file of Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Kadiri, is liable to be dismissed. 32. Point No.3:- To what extent ? In the result, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 07-01-2004 in O.S.No.18 of 1993 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kadiri. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Considering the circumstances of the case, I order each party to bear their own costs in the suit as well as in the appeal.

S. Suryanarayana Reddy (Died) v. S. Nanjamma (Died)