Madhuchandra, Proprietor, Chams Cartoons v. State of AP
2024-07-29
V.SUJATHA
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in C.C.No.145 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Puttur, Chittoor District, registered for the offence punishable under Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N.I.Act”) read with Section 200 Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “Cr.P.C.”). 2. Petitioner herein is the accused. Respondent No.2 is the complainant. Respondent No.2 filed a private complaint against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act read with Section 200 of Cr.P.C. alleging that the 2nd respondent-complainant is working as General Manager of Kolar Paper Mills Limited, Parameswaramangalam Village, Puttur Mandal, Chittoor District and he maintains the affairs of the company. 3. The petitioner-accused is customer of the said factory and used to transact the business with the complainant company by taking Kraft paper for using for his business which is named as “Chams Cartons” situated at K.R.S.Road, Mogarahalli, Hosahalli Post, Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District, Karnataka. During the business transaction, the accused took consignments of Kraft paper for the purpose of business and at one point of time he fell due of some amounts in respect of which the petitioner-accused issued six cheques bearing No.991198 on 17.03.2017 for an amount of Rs.2,04,717/-; bearing No.991199 on 25.03.2017 for an amount of Rs.2,04,718/-; bearing No.991200 on 17.04.2017 for an amount of Rs.2,00,237/-; bearing No.991201 on 25.04.2017 for Rs.2,09,518/-; bearing No.991202 on 17.05.2017 for Rs.2,09,518/- and No.991203 on 25.05.2017 for Rs.2,09,519/- drawn on his branch, State Bank of Mysore. When the said cheques were presented by the complainant, the said cheques were dishonoured due to „insufficient funds?. Upon which, legal notice was issued and the same was acknowledged by the accused. The accused also gave reply on 15.07.2017 accepting his liability to pay the amount but he failed to repay the amount as accepted. Hence, the present complaint came to be filed by the complainant. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr.P.Venkata Rao, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 5.
The accused also gave reply on 15.07.2017 accepting his liability to pay the amount but he failed to repay the amount as accepted. Hence, the present complaint came to be filed by the complainant. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr.P.Venkata Rao, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 5. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: “Whether the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.145 of 2018 on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Putur, Chittoor District, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice.
Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: In “R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 ”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious.
The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 ” In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 6. The counsel for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the order, dated 14.11.2018 passed in Crl.P.Nos.5737 of 2014 and batch by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, wherein the Hon’ble Court duly referring to the settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., 2012 5 SCC 661 , has held as under: “Undisputedly, the cheques in question were drawn from the account of the Happy Estate Private Limited and the drawer is Entity- Happy Estates Private Limited represented by its Managing Director. Those were not individual cheques issued by the signatory but by the Company represented by him. Undisputedly, the Company was not arrayed as accused. It is the drawer if at all to be made liable along with the Managing Director also vicariously. Without adding the Company as a party, the question of adding Managing Director as a party does not arise as per the settled law from the 3JB expression of the Apex Court scanning the law in Aneeta Had v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., 2012 5 SCC 661 particularly from para-59. Thus without impleadment of the Entity, the question of vicarious liability of individual arrayed as accused does not arise. Thereby the cognizance taken by the respective learned Magistrates supra for the offence under Section 138 of the Act, in respective cases is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.” 7.
Thus without impleadment of the Entity, the question of vicarious liability of individual arrayed as accused does not arise. Thereby the cognizance taken by the respective learned Magistrates supra for the offence under Section 138 of the Act, in respective cases is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.” 7. As seen from the above order, it is clear that without impleading the company as a party, the question of vicarious liability of individual arrayed as accused does not arise. If at all, it is the drawer i.e. Entity-Chams Cartons represented by its Proprietor be made vicariously liable. 8. In the instant case, the cheques in question were drawn from the account of the Chams Cartons and the drawer is Entity-Chams Cartons represented by its Proprietor. Those were not individual cheques issued by the signatory, but by the Company represented by him. Undisputedly, the Company was not arrayed as accused. If at all, it is the drawer i.e. Entity- Chams Cartons represented by its Proprietor be made vicariously liable. Without adding the Company as a party, the question of adding Proprietor as a party does not arise. Thus, without impleadment of the Entity, the question of vicarious liability of individual arrayed as accused does not arise. Thereby the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate for the offence under Section 138 of the Act, is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 9. Hence, in view of the above, this Court opines that this is a fit case for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner, as the company on behalf of which the cheques are issued is not arrayed as party. 10. With the above observations, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in C.C.No.145 of 2018 on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Puttur, Chittoor District, are hereby quashed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this petition, shall stand closed.