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2024 DIGILAW 853 (AP)

Sureddy Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2024-07-29

V.SUJATHA

body2024
ORDER : V. Sujatha, J. The present Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quash of proceedings in C.C.No.1537 of 2018 on the file learned VI Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Rajamahendravaram, for the offence under Section 353 read with 34 IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution against the accused is as follows: The accused is resident of Jampeta, Rajamahendravaram. They are the organizers of Godavari DSC Coaching Centre which is being run in the vacant land situated opposite to Siri Hospital at Rajamahendravaram. LW9-Surada Srinivas is working as Police Constable in Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajamahendravaram and his wife is preparing for DSC TET examination. For the purpose of coaching, he admitted his wife in the said coaching centre. While so, on 10.01.2018, his wife Mahalakshmi after completion of the classes at the Coaching centre returned home and informed that the organizers are not providing any facilities like drinking water, toilets, chairs etc., due to which, she experienced some sort of inconvenience. On that, the husband of Mahalakshmi i.e. LW9 approached the Director of said coaching centre and discussed about the necessary arrangements. But he did not respond properly. Upon which, he lodged a complaint to LW1-Tahsildar, Rajamahendravaram about the improper maintenance of coaching centre and requested to take necessary action against the organizers. On the report of LW9, LW1 directed the concerned to inspect the coaching centre. Upon inspection it is found that there are no proper facilities provided and running the coaching centre with nearly 1800 students and it is found that the registers, particulars of the students, commercial tax, GST and permission from the concerned are also not maintained properly. On the inspection report given by the R.I., V.R.O. on 11.01.2018, when the staff of LW1 went to serve a notice to the Director-Rambabu, he refused to take notice, the faculty Harinadh provoked the students to agitate by surrounding LW1 and caused obstruction to his official duties. On causing obstruction to LW1 in discharging his legitimate duties as public servant and report given by him, the Sub-Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station, Rajamahendravaram registered a case in Cr.No.12/2018 for the offences under Section 353, read with 34 IPC. On causing obstruction to LW1 in discharging his legitimate duties as public servant and report given by him, the Sub-Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station, Rajamahendravaram registered a case in Cr.No.12/2018 for the offences under Section 353, read with 34 IPC. LW11-Inspector of Police take up investigation and after recording the statements of LW1, visited the scene of offence, prepared of rough sketch and recording the statements of witnesses and after completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. The same was numbered as C.C.No.1537 of 2018 on the file of VI Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Rajamahendravaram. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a bare reading of the charge sheet itself to show that the ingredients of Section 353 of IPC does not attract against the petitioner herein since the petitioner has neither criminally assaulted nor criminally forced to defer the LWs 2 to 4 in discharging their legitimate duties. In fact the complaint initially was made by one Surada Srinivas who is working as Police Constable in ACB Department alleging that when his wife went to the coaching center of accused No.1 it is found that the organizers not provided facilities like drinking water, toilets, chairs etc. On that, LW9-Surada Srinivas spoke with director who did not respond properly. Hence, he lodged a complaint to LW1-T.R.Rajeswararao, Tahsildar to take necessary action. Subsequently, LW1 instructed his staff i.e. LWs 2 to 4 to serve notice on accused No.1, who refused to take notice and it is mentioned that the faculty Harinadh provoked students and agitated by surrounding the LW1. Hence, due to some differences between LW9 and accused No.1, the present false case came to be registered against the accused. Hence, prayed to allow the petition. 4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the alleged acts of the petitioner is sufficient to conclude that the petitioner committed offence punishable under Section 353 r/w 34 IPC and requested to dismiss the petition. 5. Hence, prayed to allow the petition. 4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the alleged acts of the petitioner is sufficient to conclude that the petitioner committed offence punishable under Section 353 r/w 34 IPC and requested to dismiss the petition. 5. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows : “Whether the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.1537 of 2018 on the file of learned VI Additional Judicial Magistrate of First class, Rajamahendravaram, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: In “R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 ”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles : (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 ” In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 6. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons obstructed the official duties of LWs 2 to 4 and hence the present case came to be registered against the accused for the offence under Section 353 read with 34 of IPC. A reading of the contents of the charge sheet, it reveals that initially the complaint was give by LW9-Surada Srinivas to LW1-Tahsildar with respect to accused Nos.1 and 2 for not providing proper facilities in the coaching centre run by them when the wife of LW9 complained about this to him. On receipt of such report, LW1 who is working as Tahsildar instructed LWs 2 to 4 to serve notice on accused No.1. When they went to serve noticed it is stated that accused No.1 refused and accused No.2 provoked the students to agitate and thereby caused obstruction to official duties. 7. Section 353 of IPC, which deals with an offence of assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his official duties. Section 353 of IPC reads as under:- “353. 7. Section 353 of IPC, which deals with an offence of assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his official duties. Section 353 of IPC reads as under:- “353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 8. Hence, the definition of Section 353 IPC clearly discloses that whoever assaults or uses criminal force on any person being a public servant, thereby deterring or preventing them from discharging their official duties, fulfills the ingredients of the offence described in this section. 9. In the case on hand, in the charge sheet it is simply mentioned that when LWs 2 to 4 went to serve notice on accused No.1, he refused and it is mentioned that the faculty Harinadh provoked the students and agitated by surrounding the Tahsildar. When such is the scenario there appears nothing to prove that accused Nos.1 and 2 used criminal force against LWs 2 to 4 and deterred from discharging their duties. It is also to be noted that in consequences of such criminal force and assault there must be an attempt to hold the person in discharging his duties lawfully. It is relevant to note that originally the wife of LW9 joined in the coaching centre, and when some inconvenience is caused to her, she informed the same to LW9, who then reported the same to LW1. However, in the list of witnesses of the charge sheet the name of wife of LW9 is not found to the reasons best known to the prosecution. 10. In the light of the above discussion, since the ingredients of Section 353 of IPC are not satisfied, the alleged offence against the petitioner herein does not attract. 11. However, in the list of witnesses of the charge sheet the name of wife of LW9 is not found to the reasons best known to the prosecution. 10. In the light of the above discussion, since the ingredients of Section 353 of IPC are not satisfied, the alleged offence against the petitioner herein does not attract. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention has relied on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Manik Taneja and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , wherein it is held as follows : “….that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out.” 12. Even in the case on hand also, a bare perusal of the contents of the charge sheet shows that no assault or criminal force is used by the petitioner herein to prevent the LWs 2 to 4 from discharging their official duties. There is evidence in the record to show that the petitioner either assaulted or used criminal force to prevent LW2 to LW4 from discharging their official duties. As such, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 of IPC are not made out. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.1537 of 2018 on the file of the learned VI Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Rajamahendravaram, are hereby quashed as against the petitioner/accused No.2. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Petition shall stand closed.