JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondent-BCCL to provide employment to the petitioner in lieu of acquisition of his ancestral land and house situated at Village-Kantapahari as other similarly situated persons have already been provided employment as per the scheme of the respondent-BCCL. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the ancestral land recorded in the name of the petitioner's grandfather-Late Mohan Dubey situated at Mouja-Kantapahadi, P.S- Katras (Topchanchi), P.S. No. 265, District-Dhanbad was acquired by the respondent-BCCL vide L.A. Case No. 23 of 80-81/26 of 82-83 and compensation for the same was also paid. The grievance of the petitioner is that though he filed several representations before the respondent authorities along with the relevant documents relating to his educational qualification as well as his family certificate issued by the office of the Block Development Officer, Baghmara for providing employment to him in lieu of acquisition of his ancestral land and house, however, no action was taken on the same. 3. It is further submitted that the other similarly situated persons have been provided employment in lieu of acquisition of their lands, however, no employment has yet been provided to the petitioner. The petitioner has neither any source of income nor has any job to earn his livelihood. As per the agreement and award, the petitioner has already vacated the acquired property and the same is being used by the respondent-BCCL. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-BCCL submits that the present writ petition has been filed after an inordinate delay and on this ground alone, the same is liable to be dismissed. The process for acquisition of the land in question has been completed several years ago and the scheme of employment under the rehabilitation policy has already been closed and hence the petitioner’s prayer is not worth consideration. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that though compensation has been paid to him in lieu of acquisition of the ancestral land and house recorded in the name of his grandfather, however, no employment has been provided as per the scheme of the respondent-BCCL. 6. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that though compensation has been paid to him in lieu of acquisition of the ancestral land and house recorded in the name of his grandfather, however, no employment has been provided as per the scheme of the respondent-BCCL. 6. On bare perusal of Annexure-1 to the writ petition, it appears that the land and house in question were acquired vide L.A. Case No. 23 of 80-81/26 of 82-83. However, the first representation for employment was filed by the petitioner’s father along with other persons in the year 2014 i.e. after more than 30 years of acquisition of the land in question. The petitioner has failed to bring on record any representation which was filed at the time of acquisition of the land in question or within a reasonable period thereafter. If any legally entitled person had sought employment against acquisition of the land in question, he would have been provided employment as per the scheme prevailing at that time. It is further evident from the record that the petitioner was not even born at the time of the said acquisition. It appears that neither the petitioner’s grandfather nor his father was interested in getting employment in lieu of acquisition of the land in question at the relevant time, however, after attaining the age of majority, the petitioner has pursued for employment. 7. This Court in the case of Pravin Kumar Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online Jhar 1372, has held as under:- “5. In the case Syed Maqbool AM v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 15 SCC 383 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:— “12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community as for example, construction of an access road to the village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are made after several decades, the State would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may.” 6. In the aforesaid case, Their Lordships have held that the High Court should be cautious to entertain belated claims of compensation in lieu of acquisition as it would be very difficult for the State to contest such belated claims of the aggrieved person on account of nonavailability of record. It has thus been held that there must be a proper explanation for making belated claim of compensation. 7. So far as the belated claim of employment is concerned, this Court had an occasion to deal with the same in the matter of compassionate appointment in the case of Shibu Rajwar v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited reported in 2017 SCC OnLineJhar 3307 wherein after discussing judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been held as under:— “7. In the case of Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. Steel Authority of India reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 225 held in para 6 as under:— “6. The Constitutional challenge based on Article 21 does not appear to have any substance. In Olga Tellis ( (1985) 3 SCC 545 ) it was observed by this Court that the concept of right of life conferred was wide and far-reaching and the deprivation of the right to livelihood without following the procedure established by law was violative of the fundamental guarantee to a citizen. Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Even otherwise the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. Rourkela Plant was established for the growth of the country. It is one of the prestigious steel plants. It was established in public sector. The Government has paid market value for the land acquired. Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right. Yet considering the poverty of the persons who were displaced both the Central and the State Government took steps to ensure that each family was protected by giving, employment to at least one member in the plant. We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14.” 8. I have perused the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), as has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Merely because, there is delay in raising the claim, it is not an impediment to exercise judicial discretion. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Merely because, there is delay in raising the claim, it is not an impediment to exercise judicial discretion. In the said case, the fact was that the land was taken in possession by the authorities but due to lapse of the proceeding, the compensation and other benefits as were given to the other displaced persons, were not extended to the appellant despite the fact that he had been pursuing his claim before the authorities continuously. 9. However, in the present case, the land of the father of the petitioner was acquired in the year 1989-1990 and at that time, the children of the petitioner were minor. Though it is claimed by the petitioner that an application for appointment was initially made by his wife in time, yet the said claim was not pursued. The fact also reveals that the family of deceased was not in dire need of any immediate assistance. The said claim was perhaps preserved by the petitioner to secure employment of his children after they attain majority. The scheme of rehabilitation employment cannot be allowed to perpetuate for more than 20 years. Grant of employment under rehabilitation scheme after such long delay or a claim for such employment after attaining majority would itself be violating of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. It would amount to reserving the employment for the descendants of the displaced persons only. Rehabilitation by way of appointment cannot be considered as another source of recruitment or a scheme for reserving future vacancies for minors of the displaced persons. It is apparent from the fact of the present case that during the period the lands of the petitioner were acquired, the petitioner did not make any claim for getting employment in lieu of the acquisition of 7.63 acres of lands. Once the children of the petitioner attained majority, the petitioner started pursuing the matter with the respondent BCCL for their employment in lieu of acquisition of his land made in the year 1989-1990. Once the children of the petitioner attained majority, the petitioner started pursuing the matter with the respondent BCCL for their employment in lieu of acquisition of his land made in the year 1989-1990. Thus, in the facts of the case, I am not persuaded by the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, so as to condone the delay committed by the petitioner in pursing the matter of employment in lieu of acquisition of his land made in the year 1989-1990.” 8. Thus, the claim of appointment after a huge delay by a person, who was minor at the time of acquisition, cannot be allowed. The rehabilitation by way of appointment cannot be considered as another source of recruitment or a scheme for reserving further vacancies for minors of the displaced persons, rather it is to meet the immediate hardships of the displaced family. Reserving the employment for the descendants of displaced person would amount to violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 9. Admittedly, the acquisition proceeding of the said land, is of the year 1981-82 and the possession of the said land has also taken by the State Government after providing compensation and employment to the displaced persons. The petitioner has himself averred in the writ petition that compensation and employment for acquisition of the said land were already availed by one Madan Prasad. The petitioner's mother during her life time had not raised any objection before the concerned authority against payment of compensation and providing employment to said Madan Prasad. Had the petitioner's mother made the said claim during the acquisition proceeding or within reasonable period after her dispossession from the said land, the same would have effectively been determined by the concerned authority. If the petitioner's claim is allowed by this Court at this belated stage, it would open a pandora box for those, who feel themselves aggrieved by one or the other reason and in such a situation, no acquisition proceeding would ever, come to an end. Even if it is assumed that no notice was served to the petitioner's mother during acquisition of the said land, she was certainly aware of the reason for her dispossession i.e. the acquisition proceeding. The petitioner has not sufficiently explained in the writ petition as to why no objection was raised by his mother at the time of dispossession from the said land. The petitioner has not sufficiently explained in the writ petition as to why no objection was raised by his mother at the time of dispossession from the said land. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the considered view that the belated claim of the petitioner seeking compensation and employment for acquisition of the land in question cannot be entertained under extraordinary writ jurisdiction.” 8. It is thus well settled that claim for employment by a person under rehabilitation scheme after inordinate delay on attaining majority will itself be violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India as it will amount to reserving the employment for the descendants of the displaced persons only. Rehabilitation by way of appointment cannot be considered as another source of recruitment or a scheme for reserving future vacancies for the minor children of the displaced persons. It is also well established that a belated writ petition without proper explanation for such delay is liable to be dismissed. The reason behind this is that it would be very difficult for the State to contest such belated claims of the aggrieved person on account of non-availability of record. Otherwise also, if such type of claim is entertained, the same will open a pandora box and no acquisition process would ever be finalized. 9. In view of the above discussions, I do not find any ground to entertain the present writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.