JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.-This writ petition is directed against an order dated 15.9.2015 passed by the Regional Level Committee, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, rejecting the petitioners' claim for grant of financial approval to the petitioners' selection and appointment as Class IV employees with the Janta Inter College, Ajitmal, Auraiya. 2. The petitioners, who are a thirteen strong, have moved this Court, saying that though selected to Class IV posts in accordance with rules at the Janta Inter College, Ajitmal, Auraiya ('the Institution' for short) way back on 27.2.2009, the Regional Level Committee, Kanpur Region, Kanpur have denied sanction to their selection and appointment, leading them to go without their salaries. They say that they have joined the Institution and are discharging their duties regularly. 3. The petitioners' case has somewhat of a chequered history. The Institution is a recognized intermediate college under the Uttar Pradesh Education Act, 1921 ('the Act of 1921' for short). The provisions of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 as well as U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971, including the rules and regulations framed under all these statutes are applicable to the Institution. According to the petitioners, prior to the year 1970, there were 18 posts of Class IV employees sanctioned for the Institution. With an increase in the strength of scholars, a minimum of 20 Class IV posts were required. This requirement went with the number of sanctioned sections for each class that the Institution had. By an order of 2nd November, 1970, 30 extra Class IV posts were sanctioned. On the 14th August, 1981, the then District Inspector of Schools ('DIOS' for short) issued a notice to the Institution, calling upon them to justify the strength of teachers and employees, going by the strength of scholars enrolled. The notice dated 14.8.2021 was replied to, whereafter, it is said that it was withdrawn by an order dated 21.9.1981. It is the petitioners' case that the strength of Class IV employees in the Institution, duly sanctioned, is a figure of 31. The petitioners say that according to the Government Order dated 10.2.2005, a copy whereof has been annexed, it is provided that the posts that were sanctioned prior to 9.12.1986 shall not be abolished by any officer, except under orders issued by the Director of Education, Madhyamik, U.P., Lucknow. The petitioners say that according to the Government Order dated 10.2.2005, a copy whereof has been annexed, it is provided that the posts that were sanctioned prior to 9.12.1986 shall not be abolished by any officer, except under orders issued by the Director of Education, Madhyamik, U.P., Lucknow. The said order dated 10.2.2005, this Court may notice, is not a Government order ('GO' for short), but an order issued by the Director of Education aforesaid. In the year 2008, the Principal of the Institution applied for permission to fill up 13 posts of Class IV employees that were lying vacant. The DIOS granted permission vide order dated 5.5.2008, but in an action soon to follow, stayed his order granting permission on 28.5.2008. He again granted permission to fill up these Class IV posts on 20.7.2008. The petitioners assert that there were objections by outsiders to these posts being filled up, which compelled the Institution to clarify their staff position by submitting all documents relevant to the issue. 4. This done, an advertisement was issued in Hindi dailies Swatantra Bharat and Desh Dharam issues dated 10.1.2009 and 9.1.2009, respectively. In response to the advertisement aforesaid, the petitioners made an application for consideration of their candidature against one or the other Class IV posts in the Institution. The date of interview was scheduled as 1.2.2009. A duly constituted Selection Committee sat and held interviews. It found the petitioners to be eligible and suitable for appointment to Class IV posts with the Institution. All papers after selection were submitted to the education authorities for their approval. The management of the Institution waited for the requisite period of time, whereafter, appointment letters were issued to the petitioners, subject to orders of approval by the DIOS. All the appointment letters were issued by the Principal of the Institution on the same day, that is to say, 27th February, 2009. 5. Acting on the letters of appointment, the petitioners joined the Institution on 1.3.2009. They were permitted by the Principal to join. It is the petitioners' case that since 1st March, 2009, they are continuously working with the Institution on whatever posts in Class IV they have respectively been appointed. The petitioners say that they have rendered unblemished and satisfactory service. It is their further case that they were appointed after following the due procedure prescribed by law. It is the petitioners' case that since 1st March, 2009, they are continuously working with the Institution on whatever posts in Class IV they have respectively been appointed. The petitioners say that they have rendered unblemished and satisfactory service. It is their further case that they were appointed after following the due procedure prescribed by law. The process to select the petitioners had commenced with the permission of the DIOS and after due advertisement, completing all formalities, the petitioners were selected by a validly constituted Selection Committee. 6. There was some strife amongst members of the Committee of Management of the Institution, which led to false complaints being addressed to the education authorities. These complaints led the education authorities to dither in granting sanction to the petitioners' appointment. The petitioners say that though the Committee of Management have nothing to do with the appointment of a Class IV employee, but complaints were addressed about the petitioners' appointment, because, as already said, there was strife amongst members of the Committee of Management. 7. An inquiry into the validity of the petitioners' appointment seems to have been ordered by the District Magistrate, Auraiya. Here, this Court may remark, as we have often found to our dismay, that the District Magistrates in this State have assumed the role of busy bodies, almost knight errants, who are all too willing to intermeddle in the affairs of any department of the Government at the drop of a hat. Little do they ponder about their jurisdiction to interfere in a matter relating to a department or an autonomous statutory body set up by law or a local body, where, they may not have the slightest of business to interfere. 8. Here also, the matter pertains to a privately managed and aided intermediate institution regarding employment of their Class IV employees, with the sanction of the DIOS. There is a complete hierarchy of officers in the Department of Secondary Education to take care of such matters. At the helm of affairs in the district relating to secondary education is the DIOS. He functions under a hierarchy of officials, including the Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), the Joint Director of Education (Secondary) and the Director of Education (Secondary). All of them are answerable to the Principal Secretary or the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government in the Department of Secondary Education. He functions under a hierarchy of officials, including the Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), the Joint Director of Education (Secondary) and the Director of Education (Secondary). All of them are answerable to the Principal Secretary or the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government in the Department of Secondary Education. It goes without saying that the Secretary too is not a sovereign functionary and works under the command of the Hon'ble Minister of this Department. 9. In this set up of things, one finds it difficult to understand why the District Magistrate entertained a complaint regarding a private aided college and asked the DIOS to inquire. All the more intriguing is the fact that the DIOS complied with the District Magistrate's order and submitted a report to him, dated 15.2.2010. All that is relevant is that copies of this report by the DIOS were addressed to the Director of Education, Madhyamik, Allahabad and the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur. It was, again, quite irrelevantly marked for a copy to the Divisional Commissioner of the Revenue Division of Kanpur. It seems that the DIOS submitted a report to the District Magistrate by an act of habitual obedience. We disapprove this practice of District Magistrates intermeddling in the affairs of other departments and autonomous bodies, where, by the law, they have no say or jurisdiction. 10. Still, since a copy of this report was marked to some of the education authorities, including the Director of Education (Secondary), it would be relevant to note that the report, a very detailed one, on all aspects of the complaint, clearly said that the petitioners' appointments were made against substantive and vacant posts, after due permission by the education authorities, due advertisement and selection done by a competent selection committee, transparently done. No irregularity was found in the selection process. The petitioners point out that a further report dated 15.3.2010 was submitted by the DIOS, Auraiya to the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, carrying all details of the sanctioned posts, how each post was created and how many of these posts were duly sanctioned. This report was submitted in answer to some complaint. It was specifically said in the report of the DIOS dated 15.3.2010 that the petitioners were appointed against substantive and vacant posts advertised after permission by the competent education authority and selected in accordance with rules. This report was submitted in answer to some complaint. It was specifically said in the report of the DIOS dated 15.3.2010 that the petitioners were appointed against substantive and vacant posts advertised after permission by the competent education authority and selected in accordance with rules. So, there was no irregularity about their appointment. 11. It appears that nothing moved for the petitioners regarding financial sanction to their appointments for a considerable period of time. The petitioners, therefore, instituted Writ - A No. 5294 of 2010 before this Court. This Court, by an order dated 2.2.2010 made in the aforesaid writ petition, directed the Joint Director of Education to take a decision relating to the petitioners' appointment and payment of salary by a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law, on the basis of the recommendations made by the DIOS within a period of three weeks of the date of production of a certified copy of the order. The Joint Director of Education, in compliance with the orders of this Court dated 2.2.2010 last mentioned, passed an order dated 16.3.2010, rejecting the petitioners' claim for approval of their appointments. The petitioners impugned the said decision of the Joint Director of Education by means of Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010, wherein, an interim order was passed on 16.3.2010, directing that the petitioners' services shall not be terminated. However, this Court said that the order shall not entitle the petitioners to payment of salary till a final decision of the writ petition. Pending this petition, the Government carried out an exercise to verify the sanctioned strength of employees in private aided institutions across the State. This was done under the directions of this Court made in Dhruv Narain Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ - A No. 26307 of 2010 and connected matters, decided on 13.1.2017. To comply with the order, a committee was constituted by the Government on 15.6.2012, dedicated to the task of determining the sanctioned strength of teachers and other employees in private aided intermediate institutions, like the Institution. This Committee was headed by the Additional Director of Education (Secondary). The Committee submitted a report dated 22.2.2013. In their inquiry report with regard to the institutions in District Auraiya, the sanctioned strength was determined for all private aided institutions. It was reported that the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees for the Institution was 31. This Committee was headed by the Additional Director of Education (Secondary). The Committee submitted a report dated 22.2.2013. In their inquiry report with regard to the institutions in District Auraiya, the sanctioned strength was determined for all private aided institutions. It was reported that the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees for the Institution was 31. It is asserted by the petitioners that the name of the Institution finds place at Serial No. 33 of the list for the District of Auraiya. Whether the report submitted by the committee was just a report or something more would be alluded to a little later in this judgment. 12. Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010, which was earlier filed by the petitioners, was heard and allowed by a judgment and order dated 18.5.2015, setting aside the order dated 16.3.2010 passed by the Joint Director of Education and the matter was remanded to the said officer to consider and pass fresh orders. In reaching the conclusion that the order of the Joint Director of Education deserves to be set aside, there are certain remarks of this Court in the judgment and order dated 15.5.2015 last mentioned, which are relevant. These will be referred to a little later in this judgment. 13. This is how the matter came up before the Regional Level Committee headed by the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur and comprising, besides that officer, the Deputy Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur and the DIOS, Auraiya. The Regional Level Committee again proceeded to reject the petitioners' claim. The reasons assigned are more than one. These too would be enumerated a little afterwards, when testing the petitioners' challenge to the impugned order. 14. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.9.2015 passed by the Regional Level Committee, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, who are impleaded as respondent No. 3 to this petition, this writ petition has been instituted. 15. A supplementary-affidavit was filed alongside the writ petition. A counter-affidavit dated 23.12.2015 was filed by the DIOS, Auraiya, respondent No. 4 on behalf of the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, respondent No. 2. A rejoinder-affidavit dated 18.1.2016, to the aforesaid counter-affidavit, was filed. In compliance with the order dated 26.10.2015, by which notice was issued, Rajendra Prasad, the then Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, filed his personal affidavit. A rejoinder-affidavit dated 18.1.2016, to the aforesaid counter-affidavit, was filed. In compliance with the order dated 26.10.2015, by which notice was issued, Rajendra Prasad, the then Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, filed his personal affidavit. A counter-affidavit to the aforesaid personal affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner. This is an affidavit dated 24.1.2015. It was on this state of pleadings that this petition was admitted to hearing on 21.9.2023 and heard forthwith. Judgment was reserved. 16. Heard Mr. Yogesh Kumar Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 5. No one appeared on behalf of respondents Nos. 6 and 7. 17. It is argued by Mr. Yogesh Kumar Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the report of the Committee constituted pursuant to the orders of this Court in Dhruv Narain Singh (supra), the strength of Class IV employees in the Institution was determined as 31 on 22.5.2013. It is submitted that this was the strength of Class IV employees based on the GO dated 22.2.2013, taking note whereof, this Court had set aside the earlier order dated 16.3.2010 passed by the Joint Director of Education, doubting the number of Class IV posts with the Institution as 31 and ordered him to decide the matter afresh, taking into account the GO last mentioned. The submission, therefore, proceeds that the determination of strength made by the Regional Level Committee is not only contrary to the GO dated 22.2.2013, but also orders of this Court dated 18.5.2015 passed in Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010. 18. On the other hand, Ms. Monika Arya, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees in the Institution is not a static figure and can very well be reviewed, depending upon the strength of students at the time when the process of recruitment commences. In this regard, she has referred to the terms of the GO dated 20.11.1976, which not only prescribes the number of posts for a high-school and intermediate institution, but also, by the note appended relating to the staff sanctioned for an intermediate college, upwards and downwards revision of the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees is permissible, depending upon the increase or decrease of the strength of students in an Institution. In addition, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has argued that in this case, a report dated 22.10.2010, annexed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter-affidavit, was submitted by the DIOS to the Joint Director of Education, where, the entire process of recruitment was reported to be suspect on account of the involvement of relatives of employees in the Office of the DIOS and the Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), Kanpur Region, Kanpur. It was also reported that a candidate named Kamlesh Babu, petitioner No. 12, a candidate of the then DIOS, was also amongst the selectees. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel says that there is a detailed reference to the contents of this report in paragraph No. 11 of the counter-affidavit. She has further argued that the contents of paragraph No. 11 of the counter-affidavit have not been denied about this report submitted by the DIOS or the truth of its contents in paragraph No. 16 of the rejoinder-affidavit. The submission is, therefore, that the selection proceedings are clearly tainted with favourtism and, therefore, refusal of financial sanction by the Regional Level Committee is well-founded. 19. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of learned Counsel for parties and perused the record. 20. There is a reference to the provisions of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the regulations framed under the Act of 1921. What the Regional Level Committee endeavour to say, by reference to the provisions of Regulation 101 aforesaid, as these stood after the amendment dated 31st December, 2009, is shrouded in a mystery of silence. 21. It is then observed, which would be the first count to reject the petitioners' claim, that the GO bearing number csŒvkŒ&2&27@nl 59 ¼,Ek½@2008 dated 6.11.2011, makes it imperative, except in cases of junior technical positions to appoint all Class IV employees by outsourcing. 22. The second count of reasoning is rather elaborate. It says that in terms of the judgment and order of this Court in Dhruv Narain Singh, three parameters to determine the approved strength of staff in an institution are postulated. The first is the original posts created, the second, the first pay-bill, and the third, the number of posts determined in the financial survey of the year 1985, minus the number of posts based on the current student strength. The first is the original posts created, the second, the first pay-bill, and the third, the number of posts determined in the financial survey of the year 1985, minus the number of posts based on the current student strength. It is remarked that in the first pay-bill relating to the Institution, 31 posts of Class IV employees were sanctioned. In the current selection/interview, there is a recommendation to fill up one post of Clerk and thirteen posts of Class IV employees, for which, financial approval was sought from the DIOS, Auraiya on 20.2.2009. The DIOS referred the matter to the Joint Director of Education by letter dated 27.6.2009. In compliance with the directions issued by this Court on 2.2.2010 in Writ - A No. 5294 of 2010, Udai Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, the then Regional Level Committee, vide an order dated 23.3.2010, disposed of the matter. This Court, vide an order dated 18.5.2015 passed in Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010, Udai Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, directed the matter of financial approval to be considered afresh on the foot of there being 31 posts of Class IV employees. There is then a reference to some GO dated 20th November, 1976, regarding determination of the sanctioned strength for aided high-schools and intermediate colleges, separately referring to the sanctioned strength for a high-school and intermediate college. The GO aforesaid details the sanctioned strength : (a) For a High-school : 1- Chowkidar : One, 2 - Farrash : One, 3 - Jamadar : One, 4 - Paniwala : One, 5 - Principal Orderly : One, 6 - Science Lab Peon : One, 7 - Daftari : One, 8 - Library Peon (where there is a separate and regular library in existence) : One, 9 - Office Peon : One, 10 - Gardener (wherever a garden compound is available) : One. Note - Upon the student strength being more than 500, one additional post of Office Peon would be available. Note - Upon the student strength being more than 500, one additional post of Office Peon would be available. (b) For an Intermediate College : In additional to the aforesaid employees in a High-school, the following posts according to the requirement would be available - 1 - Physics Lab Peon : One, 2 - Chemistry Lab Peon : One, 3 - Biology Lab Peon : One, 4 - Book Binder : One, 5 - Tailoring Peon : One, 6 - Home Science Peon : One, 7 - A man to look after the farm (if there is a farm) : One. Note - In any institution (routine) Clerks' and Office Peons' additional posts would be created or the number of posts evaluated, in the event of their being continuous increase or loss in student strength over a period of two years. It is then said that in accordance with the aforesaid GO dated 20.11.1976, the sanctioned strength of students on the date of advertisement was 1765, on the foot of which, 17 Class IV employees, described as Peons in this part of the impugned order, would be required. It is remarked that Regulation 101, as it now stands, would show that the permission to fill up thirteen posts of Class IV employees was granted on the basis of the student strength, which is not appropriate. 23. The third count, on which financial approval has been declined, goes to the effect that the DIOS had permitted the thirteen posts to be filled up vide his order dated 5.5.2008, which, by his later order dated 28.5.2008, he cancelled until further orders (a description about the terms of the order, which is either incorrect or the order itself is strange). It is then remarked that later on, the DIOS, by his order dated 10.7.2008, permitted the posts to be filled up. After about six months of the permission being granted, the recruitment process commenced by advertisements published on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009. Serious complaints with regard to irregularities were received, where, it was said that there was appointment of relatives (of the Management etc.), but despite these complaints, the Principal/Manager issued letters of appointment to all the selected candidates and made them join duties on 1.3.2009. These proceedings were held to be arbitrary and against Regulation 101 of the Regulations framed under the Act of 1921. These proceedings were held to be arbitrary and against Regulation 101 of the Regulations framed under the Act of 1921. It is remarked that the aforesaid Regulation provides that without the permission of the DIOS, the Principal shall not fill up any Class IV vacancy. 24. The fourth count, on which financial approval has been declined for two of the petitioners on added ground, that is to say, petitioner No. 1, Udai Singh and petitioner No. 6, Brijesh Kumar Singh, is that, whereas petitioner No. 1, on the date of commencement of the academic session i.e. on 1.7.2009 was 36 years, 1 month and 16 days old, petitioner No. 6 was 38 years, 8 months and 11 days old. It has been opined that according to the ''Government Order'', for candidates of the general class, the upper age limit for appointment is 35 years. Going by the provisions of the ''Government Order'', the proposal to appoint both these candidates is irregular. In this manner, the selection process is vitiated. 25. For a fifth count, the order condemns the selection to the solitary post of Clerk filled up in the same recruitment exercise on grounds of violation of the law embodying the reservation policy of the State. This petition is not about the validity of appointment to the solitary post of Clerk and is limited in its office to the validity of selection and appointment of the thirteen Class IV employees, the petitioners. Nothing is said in particular about the violation of the Reservation Act or the policy in relation to appointment of Class IV employees under this count. 26. In the concluding part, it is remarked that the selection was without necessity, one made in violation of the reservation policy, involving selection and appointment of candidates overage, and all of it has been done in an arbitrary fashion. It is for these reasons that the Committee said that the appointments cannot be accepted as valid in law. To add to all this, particular emphasis is laid on the GO dated 6.11.2011 (supra), which provides that all Class IV posts have to be filled up through outsourcing. It is also said that the said GO is currently in force, and another GO bearing number 891/15-12-39 of 2012 dated 23.5.2012 is in force as well (perhaps to the same effect, though not said explicitly). It is also said that the said GO is currently in force, and another GO bearing number 891/15-12-39 of 2012 dated 23.5.2012 is in force as well (perhaps to the same effect, though not said explicitly). It is on all these grounds that financial approval to the petitioners' appointment has been declined by the Regional Level Committee. 27. We think that the report that the DIOS has submitted to the Joint Director of Education, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 4, which seeks to taint the entire selection process with extraneous considerations and favourtism on ground that the candidates selected, at least to the extent of three, are either relatives or favourites of someone in the Office of the DIOS or the Deputy Director of Education or the DIOS himself, does not carry much force. The foremost reason is that this is not one of the reasons at all that have weighed with the Regional Level Committee in passing the impugned order. It is far too well-settled to brook doubt that the validity of an order under challenge must be adjudged by what it says. Of course, submissions in law can be advanced to buttress the order, but, that would not entitle the respondents to add to the grounds or the facts on which the order is founded by way of affidavit. The principle is that the impugned order cannot be supplemented for its reasons or grounds by an affidavit. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohindhr Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , where their Lordships of the Constitution Bench stated the principle thus: 8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 ] : ''Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.'' Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. 28. For this reason, this Court is not inclined to affirm the order on a ground that has not figured in the order itself. 29. The foremost to be considered, therefore, is the point if the number of sanctioned posts were indeed 31, or going by the GO dated 20.11.1976, the number of posts on the date when the recruitment process was initiated could be reduced from the initial sanctioned 31 to a lower number, dependent upon the strength of students contemporaneously enrolled in the Institution. The GO dated 20.11.1976, for one, appears to be quite an ancient standard for determining the strength of Class IV employees. Between the year 1976 and the time of issue of the advertisement, through which, process of selection was initiated, many events would have gone by. The advertisement in this case was published on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009. After the advertisement was issued, there was a searching determination of the sanctioned strength undertaken for all private aided institutions of Auraiya, under orders of this Court in Dhruv Narain Singh. Based on the report of the Committee that was submitted, a GO bearing number 425/15-12-2013-1601(250)/2010 dated 22.2.2013 was issued by the Secretary to the Government of U.P. and the Department of Secondary Education, addressed to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow. Based on the report of the Committee that was submitted, a GO bearing number 425/15-12-2013-1601(250)/2010 dated 22.2.2013 was issued by the Secretary to the Government of U.P. and the Department of Secondary Education, addressed to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow. To the said order, though not made part of the record of the writ petition, there is no quarrel between parties that the sanctioned strength of Class IV employees in the Institution was shown in an appended list at Serial No. 33. The sanctioned strength determined by this GO in the appended list for the Institution was 31. After this determination was made for the Institution by the GO dated 22.2.2013, this Court is of considered opinion that the respondents cannot take a stand that the sanctioned strength was not 31, falling back upon an antiquated GO of the year 1976. More than that, when the same matter came up before this Court in Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010, directed against the order dated 16.3.2010, passed by the Joint Director of Education, rejecting the petitioners' claim on ground of lack of sanction for the 31 posts, this Court set aside the order of the Director of Education dated 16.3.2010 and remanded the matter to the Director aforesaid for decision afresh on grounds that are expressed in the following remarks : Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the aforesaid order of the State Government. The name of the Institution finds place at Serial No. 33 of the said order, wherein the State Government has recorded that there are 31 post of Class IV employee in the Institution. Having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the finding recorded by the Joint Director of Education doubting the correctness of the comment of the District Inspector of Schools and the Committee of Management with regard to 31 sanctioned post is vitiated on the ground that the material facts have not been considered by the Joint Director of Education. In view of the supervening event that the State Government has determined the sanctioned strength on 22.2.2013 the order of the Joint Director needs reconsideration in the light of the order of the State Government. 30. This Court did not hold that 31 posts are the sanctioned strength for Class IV employees of the Institution. In view of the supervening event that the State Government has determined the sanctioned strength on 22.2.2013 the order of the Joint Director needs reconsideration in the light of the order of the State Government. 30. This Court did not hold that 31 posts are the sanctioned strength for Class IV employees of the Institution. We did say that it was a material fact, which ought to have been considered by the Joint Director. This Court is inclined to think that it was the most material fact and could hardly be brushed aside. In writing the impugned order, the Regional Level Committee on the point under consideration, did notice the order of this Court dated 18.5.2015 passed in Writ - A No. 35208 of 2010 regarding the existence of 31 sanctioned posts of Class IV, but did not consider it at all. Rather, the Regional Level Committee chose to ignore the effect of the GO dated 22.2.2013, as well as the order of this Court dated 18.5.2015, and instead, harped upon the GO of 20th November, 1976, which does not seem to be material to the question in hand at the point of time that it arose. This Court is inclined to think that in view of the GO dated 22.2.2013, there is no reason to doubt the fact that the Institution had a sanctioned strength of 31 at the time when the recruitment process was initiated, in terms of the advertisements published on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009. 31. The most important point that has been mooted before this Court is if on the date when the recruitment process was commenced, it was no longer open to the Institution to select and appoint Class IV employees and instead, the option left to them because of the GO dated 6.1.2011 was to engage employees through outsourcing. It is, no doubt, true that before the amendment made to Regulation 101 of the Regulations framed under the Act of 1921 with effect from 31.12.2009, the DIOS could grant permission to fill up a Class IV post, but, after amendment of Regulation 101 as aforesaid, the DIOS had to submit the total number of vacancies to the Director of Secondary Education and showing the number of students, give justification to fill up the existing vacancies. It was only upon receipt of orders permitting the vacancies to be filled up from the Director of Education (Secondary) that the DIOS could permit the Institution to fill up any kind of non-teaching posts, of course, following the rules for reservation made by the Government. Here, the selection process commenced prior to the amendment of Regulation 101 vide Notification dated 31.12.2009, when it could be initiated by the Institution with the permission of the DIOS, which, in this case, was granted on 10.7.2008. The hurdle that was mooted was the GO dated 6.1.2011, that had forbidden appointment to Class IV posts, except junior technical posts, and instead, provided for engagement of employees through outsourcing. 32. This GO dated 6.1.2011, to the extent of paragraph No. 2 thereof, was struck down as unconstitutional by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Committee of Management, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Lodipur, Ghaziabad and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2012(4) ADJ 586 . It is not in dispute that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Committee of Management, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College (supra) was never challenged and became final. It would have the effect of effacing, therefore, the GO dated 6.1.2011. Therefore, prior to the amendment made to Regulation 101, Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act of 1921 on 24.4.2014, there was no embargo on filling up sanctioned posts of Class IV employees with permission of the DIOS. In fact, prior to 31.12.2009, permission of the DIOS would have sufficed and justification to fill up any non-teaching posts, including Class IV posts, was not required to be offered to the Director of Education (Secondary) by the DIOS and his orders obtained for filling up such vacancies. Here, as already said, the process of recruitment commenced with the publication of the advertisement on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009, much before the amendment to Regulation 101 with effect from 31.12.2009 and long before the amendment brought about with effect from 24.4.2014. Much was, therefore, argued before this Court on the strength of well established principle that the amendment would not have retrospective operation. Much was, therefore, argued before this Court on the strength of well established principle that the amendment would not have retrospective operation. Since, in this case, the recruitment process was initiated on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that assuming that the GO dated 6.1.2011, which introduced the system of outsourcing through paragraph No. 2 and since struck down by this Court, was an antecedent step to give effect to a policy decision of the Government, that ultimately took shape on 24.4.2014, when Regulation 101 was finally amended to give effect to the policy, it would not affect a recruitment process already initiated before the earliest introduction of the policy through GOs, with due permission of the DIOS, that had already been granted and the process of selection completed on 27.2.2009 and appointment letters issued on 1.3.2009. The rights of the petitioner, according to the contention advanced, would be governed by the position, as existed, before the amended Regulation 101 came into force with effect from 24.4.2014 as also the antecedent policy decision of the Government in this regard, expressed in different Government Orders, one of which relating to the Department of Secondary Education was struck down by this Court in Committee of Management, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College. 33. We may notice that though the GO dated 6.1.2011 was struck down by this Court, a position which attained finality with no challenge, the underlying policy about the changeover with regard to the recruitment of Class IV employees in intermediate institutions from regular appointments on posts funded by the State to contractual appointments through service providers had become a firm resolve with the Government, who had to fund these institutions for the posts of Class IV employees sanctioned. The Government had decided to changeover to a system of contractual employment of Class IV employees through service providers. Therefore, notwithstanding the GO dated 6.1.2011 being struck down, Regulation 101 came to be amended with effect from 24.4.2014, making provision for filling up of Class IV vacancies through outsourcing alone, except in cases where a Dying-in-Harness appointee had to be accommodated. Therefore, notwithstanding the GO dated 6.1.2011 being struck down, Regulation 101 came to be amended with effect from 24.4.2014, making provision for filling up of Class IV vacancies through outsourcing alone, except in cases where a Dying-in-Harness appointee had to be accommodated. The amendment to Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act of 1921 introduced with effect from 24.1.2014 was challenged before this Court by managements of colleges, who were deprived of posts supported by State grant and relegated to a system of engaging Class IV employees through service providers. The writ petitions were heard by a Division Bench of this Court and allowed vide judgment and order dated 19.11.2001, holding Regulation 101, as amended on 24.4.2014, unconstitutional. 34. The State appealed the judgment of this Court by Special Leave to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals preferred by the State of U.P. in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College and others, (2021) 15 SCC 600 , holding the amendment to Regulation 101 valid. Their Lordships addressed the history of Regulation 101 and how and why did it change, which is very apposite to quote in extenso : Regulation 101 6. Regulation 101 was inserted vide Parishad 9/592 dated 28-8-1992 and was notified by way of Government Notification No. 400/15-7-2(1)-90 dated 30-7-1992 in the following manner: ''Appointing authority except with prior approval of Inspector shall not fill up any vacancy of non-teaching post of any recognised aided institution.'' 7. It was substituted through Notification No. 300/XV-7-2(1)/90 dated 2-2-1995 as under: ''Appointing authority except with prior approval of Inspector shall not fill up any vacancy of non-teaching post of any recognised aided institution: Provided that filling of the vacancy on the post of Jamadar may be granted by the Inspector.'' 8. On 23-1-2008 with a view to regulate and curtail staff expenditure a policy decision was taken by the State of Uttar Pradesh (the first appellant) to not create any new post in Class IV category and wherever it may be necessary, the work may be carried out through ''outsourcing''. Thereafter, the recommendation was made by the Sixth Central Pay Commission in the month of March 2008 to the effect that it would only be appropriate to have ''outsourcing'' of Class IV employees instead of seeking any new recruitment. 9. Thereafter, the recommendation was made by the Sixth Central Pay Commission in the month of March 2008 to the effect that it would only be appropriate to have ''outsourcing'' of Class IV employees instead of seeking any new recruitment. 9. Regulation 101 once again went through an amendment by way of Notification No. 9/898 dated 31-12-2009, which reads as under: ''The appointing authority shall not fill any vacancy of the non-teaching staff of recognised aided institutions, except with the approval of Inspector, subject to a restriction that District Inspector of Schools shall make available total number of vacancies to Director of Education (Secondary Education), and showing the number of students put forth justification for the filling of the vacancies. On receipt of order from the Director of Education (Secondary Education), the District Inspector of Schools shall, for filling said vacancies, give permission to the appointing authority; and while giving such permission he shall ensure to follow the reservation rules specified by the Government and the prescribed norms in justification for the posts. The aforesaid amendment in the Regulation shall come into force with immediate effect.'' 10. Taking into consideration the recommendations made by the Sixth Central Pay Commission, Government Orders were passed on 8-9-2010 and 6-1-2011 making it applicable to all Government Departments and aided schools, thus, deciding not to go for fresh recruitment of Class IV employees and further directing that any arrangement concerning the post to be vacated may be made only through ''outsourcing''. Appropriate communications were sent to all the stakeholders intimating them of the decision taken. 11. Following the said decision, Regulation 101 was once again amended by the Government Order dated 4-9-2013, which was accordingly notified on 24-4-2014. The effect of the said amendment is to make the post of Class IV employees which was hitherto supposed to be filled up by the institutions through ''outsourcing''. Therefore, the permanent posts were accordingly abolished, thereby, replacing the method of appointment by way of ''outsourcing''. An exception has been carved out only for the dependants of those employees dying in harness during employment. Amended Regulation: ''101. Therefore, the permanent posts were accordingly abolished, thereby, replacing the method of appointment by way of ''outsourcing''. An exception has been carved out only for the dependants of those employees dying in harness during employment. Amended Regulation: ''101. The appointing authority, except for the prior approval of the Inspector, shall not fill any vacant post of non-teaching staff (clerical cadre) in any recognised or aided institution; with the restriction that the District Inspector of Schools shall make available the total number of vacancies to the Director of Education (Secondary Education) and also put forth justification for filling of the posts, showing the strength of the students in the institution. On receipt of the order from Director of Education (Secondary Education), the District Inspector of Schools shall give permission to the appointing authority for filling the said vacancies (except the vacancies of Class IV posts) and while giving the permission, he shall ensure compliance of the Reservation Rules specified by the Government as also of the prescribed norms in justification for the posts. With respect to the Class IV vacancies, arrangements shall be made by way of outsourcing only; but the relevant Rules, 1981, as amended from time to time, for recruitment of dependants of teaching or non-teaching staff of the non-Government aided institutions dying in harness shall be applicable in relation to the appointments to be made on the vacant posts of Class IV category.'' Seventh Central Pay Commission 12. By the Seventh Central Pay Commission Report, the recommendations made in the Sixth Central Pay Commission were reiterated with a word of ''caution'' in its implementation. Accordingly, the need to go for ''outsourcing'', keeping in view of the financial constraints and efficiency, was once again reiterated: Paras 3.72 and 3.83 of the Report ''3.72. The General Financial Rules provide for outsourcing of services in the interest of economy and efficiency. Broad guidance is provided in the Rules on identification of contractors and the tendering process. There are three kinds of contractual appointments: (i) Tasks of a routine nature, typically those relating to housekeeping, maintenance, related activities, data entry, driving, and so on, which are normally bundled and entrusted to agencies. These agencies then depute the necessary persons to carry out these tasks… * * * 3.83. There are three kinds of contractual appointments: (i) Tasks of a routine nature, typically those relating to housekeeping, maintenance, related activities, data entry, driving, and so on, which are normally bundled and entrusted to agencies. These agencies then depute the necessary persons to carry out these tasks… * * * 3.83. The following are the conclusions and recommendations: * * * (vii) The Commission is of the view that a clear guidance from the Government on jobs that can and should be contracted out would be appropriate. While doing so the concerns of confidentiality and accountability may be kept in view. Further, to bring about continuity and to address the concerns regarding exploitation of contractual manpower, uniform guidelines/model contract agreements may be devised by the Government…'' 13. From the aforesaid facts it is abundantly clear that a decision was made way back on 8-9-2010 to do away with the recruitment to the post of Class IV employees, by replacing the process with the utilisation of the service through ''outsourcing''. It was accordingly made by taking note of the recommendations of the Pay Commission, with the primary concern being financial difficulty, followed by efficiency. The Regulation was brought forthwith as an abundant caution by way of a subsequent act to complete the formalities. Institutions were being put on notice about the decision to withhold any fresh recruitment. However, recruitments have been made dehors the same either with or without the Court orders, by the institutions. It was also done without obtaining the prior permission as per the mandate of the unamended Regulation 101 except in one case which is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 2753 of 2021. In Civil Appeal No. 2754 of 2021 a direction to grant prior permission was obtained from the High Court. 35. In disposing of some of the principle contention of parties, ignoring those that are not relevant to the issue here, it was observed by their Lordships : Discussion and conclusion Right to aid 28. We will first take up the right of institutions qua the aid. A decision to grant aid is by way of policy. While doing so, the Government is not only concerned with the interest of the institutions but the ability to undertake such an exercise. There are factors which the Government is expected to consider before taking such a decision. We will first take up the right of institutions qua the aid. A decision to grant aid is by way of policy. While doing so, the Government is not only concerned with the interest of the institutions but the ability to undertake such an exercise. There are factors which the Government is expected to consider before taking such a decision. Financial constraints and deficiencies are the factors which are considered relevant in taking any decision qua aid, including both the decision to grant aid and the manner of disbursement of an aid. 29. Once we hold that right to get an aid is not a fundamental right, the challenge to a decision made in implementing it, shall only be on restricted grounds. Therefore, even in a case where a policy decision is made to withdraw the aid, an institution cannot question it as a matter of right. Maybe, such a challenge would still be available to an institution, when a grant is given to one institution as against the other institution which is similarly placed. Therefore, with the grant of an aid, the conditions come. If an institution does not want to accept and comply with the conditions accompanying such aid, it is well open to it to decline the grant and move in its own way. On the contrary, an institution can never be allowed to say that the grant of aid should be on its own terms. 30. We are dealing with a case where aid is not denied in toto but sought to be given in different form. The reason for such a decision is both efficiency and economy. When such a decision is made as a matter of policy and is being applied not only to educational institutions but spanning across the entire State in every department, one cannot question it and that too when there is no express arbitrariness seen on the face of it. .................... ...................... Policy decision 35. The challenge before us is the amendment to the Regulation 101. This Regulation is in the form of a subordinate legislation. A subordinate legislation can also be in the form of a policy decision. We have already noted that a policy decision has come into force in the year 2010 itself. 36. .................... ...................... Policy decision 35. The challenge before us is the amendment to the Regulation 101. This Regulation is in the form of a subordinate legislation. A subordinate legislation can also be in the form of a policy decision. We have already noted that a policy decision has come into force in the year 2010 itself. 36. A policy decision is presumed to be in public interest, and such a decision once made is not amenable to challenge, until and unless there is manifest or extreme arbitrariness, a constitutional Court is expected to keep its hands off. 37. A challenge to a Regulation stands on a different footing than the one that can be made to an enactment. However, when the Regulation is nothing but a reiteration of a policy reinforcing the decision of the Government made earlier, then the parameters required for testing the validity of an Act are expected to be followed by the Court. 38. An executive power is residue of a legislative one, therefore the exercise of said power i.e. the amendment of the impugned Regulation, cannot be challenged on the basis of mere presumption. Once a rule is introduced by way of a policy decision, a demonstration on the existence of manifest, excessive and extreme arbitrariness is needed. Other contentions 39. Section 9(4) of the Act is certainly of a wider import. The power conferred to the State Government to give effect to the Act is unbridled. It is the very same Regulation, based upon which, recruitments have been made by the management. One has to understand the impugned Regulation in the context alongwith the setting. It is only by way of abundant caution, that the amendment has come into force. The existence of the power under Section 9(4) of the Act has been dealt with by this Court in Ramji Dwivedi [Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P., (1983) 3 SCC 52 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 361] : (SCC pp. 58-59, paras 12 & 14) ''12. Sub-section (4) of Section 9 which has been extracted hereinbefore confers power on the State Government without making any reference to the Board to make an order or take such other action consistent with the provisions of the Act as it deems necessary and in particular, may by such order modify or rescind or make any Regulation in respect of any matter. It would thus unquestionably transpire that while enacting the Regulations prior sanction of the State Government is necessary and under sub-section (4) of Section 9 the State Government enjoys the power to make, modify or rescind any Regulation. Armed with this power the State Government issued an order dated 7-7-1981 stopping all fresh selections and appointments of Principals, etc. in all non-Government-aided schools. Shrinath Intermediate College is a non-Government-aided school. The effect of the order conveyed by the radiogram would be to rescind the Regulation conferring power on the Committee of Management to make appointment and withdrawing and/or suspending power of appointment of Principal and teachers. The issuance of the order is not in dispute. The argument, in the High Court [Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P., 1982 SCC OnLine All 1392], was that the State Government had no such power and that even if sub-section (4) is deemed to confer such a power it has to be read in juxtaposition with the power conferred on the State Government by sub-sections (1), (2), (3) preceding sub-section (4) of Section 9. The High Court therefore had to examine the width and ambit of the executive power of the State Government in exercise of which, according to the High Court, the order contained in the radiogram was issued. We need not go that far because in our opinion sub-section (4) specifically confers power on the State Government without making any reference to the Board to make, modify or rescind any Regulation as also make such other order consistent with the provisions of the Act. This power of wide amplitude will comprehend the power to stop all appointments for the time being. And the power appears to have been exercised as Government was contemplating taking away the power of private management of non-Government-aided schools to make appointment of teachers including Principals. In order to avoid forestalling of Governmental action by private managements, the power to make appointments was suspended for the time being. As pointed out earlier, the Regulation confers power on the Committee of Management to make appointment. That Regulation was enacted by the Board with the prior sanction of the State Government. The State Government could be said to have rescinded that Regulation conferring power of appointment or at any rate suspended the power conferred on the Committee of Management to make appointment. That Regulation was enacted by the Board with the prior sanction of the State Government. The State Government could be said to have rescinded that Regulation conferring power of appointment or at any rate suspended the power conferred on the Committee of Management to make appointment. The order became effective the moment it is issued. The effect of this order is that the Selection Committee had no right to select the appellant nor the Committee of Management had any power to make the appointment. *** 14. In view of the finding that sub-section (4) of Section 9 did confer power on the State Government to make, modify or rescind the Regulation or make any other order consistent with the provisions of the Act, the second contention of Mr Sanghi is equally bound to fail.'' 40. Section 9(4) of the Act is to be read in conjunction with Section 16-G, as the provisions will have to be read keeping in view all the objects of the enactment. In this connection, we need to point out that if the practice of recruitment, prior to the amendment of the impugned Regulation, was done by tracing the power under it, then it is not open to the respondents to contend to the contrary. 41. Regulation 101, prior to the amendment, imposes strict compliance of getting prior approval. We find that except in Civil Appeal No. 2753 of 2021, no such approval has been granted. Obviously, it only indicates the real intention of the respondents/management which is to have their own recruitment other than anything else. 42. The Division Bench in considering the view has entered into an arena which was not required to be done. Much labouring was done in interpreting the word ''outsourcing'', however, such an exercise ought to have been avoided as it stands outside the scope of judicial review. We have already noted the fact that ''outsourcing'' as a matter of policy is being introduced throughout the State. It is one thing to say that it has to be given effect to with caution as recommended by the Seventh Central Pay Commission, and another to strike it down as unconstitutional. ''Outsourcing'' per se is not prohibited in law. We have already noted the fact that ''outsourcing'' as a matter of policy is being introduced throughout the State. It is one thing to say that it has to be given effect to with caution as recommended by the Seventh Central Pay Commission, and another to strike it down as unconstitutional. ''Outsourcing'' per se is not prohibited in law. It is clear that a recruitment by way of ''outsourcing'' may have its own deficiencies and pitfalls, however, a decision to take ''Outsourcing'' cannot be declared as ultra vires the Constitution on the basis of mere presumption and assumption. Obviously, we do not know the nature of the scheme and safeguards attached to it. ............................ 44. We are also not dealing with the scheme per se, and therefore, are in dark on the conditions of service. The challenge in the present case is not by the employee, recruited by way of ''outsourcing'', and hence, we hold the said decision on which much reliance is sought to be made by the respondents will not be of any help. One cannot simply presume that ''outsourcing'' as a method of recruitment would necessarily be adopting contract labour and that there exists an element of unfair trade practice, as sought to be contended by the respondents. ....................... 46. The entire issue has to be looked at from different perspective as well. By the policy decision made, the appellants have abolished the post though in an indirect way by providing for ''outsourcing''. Now, a Court cannot create or sustain the aforesaid post. There is nothing on record to hold that the decision made is extraneous as it is obviously made applicable not only to the aided institutions but also to all Government Departments as well. ........................ 48. Whenever a lis is raised before the Court the grievance alongwith interest of the party concerned while laying a challenge has to be kept in mind. The aforesaid principle is expected to be kept in mind. More so, while invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India being extraordinary and discretionary in nature. The aforesaid principle would help the Court to understand the actual reason behind seeking a relief by a party. Keeping the said principle in mind we could only say that the respondents/petitioners, being the institutions endowed with the power of recruitment, do not wish to let go of their hold. 36. The aforesaid principle would help the Court to understand the actual reason behind seeking a relief by a party. Keeping the said principle in mind we could only say that the respondents/petitioners, being the institutions endowed with the power of recruitment, do not wish to let go of their hold. 36. Having laid down the above principles, the appeals were allowed by the Supreme Court in terms of the following orders : 57. Accordingly, we have no difficulty in setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench dated 19-11-2018 [Abhay Nandan Inter College v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5685] and the consequential orders passed while upholding the impugned Regulation. The appeals are allowed with the following directions: 57.1. The respondents/writ petitioners in Civil Appeal No. 2753 of 2021 are directed to be confirmed by granting adequate approval as Class IV employees, having given prior approval. 57.2. The respondents/writ petitioners and similarly placed persons who are recruited by the institutions including the respondents shall be continued with the same scale of pay as if they are recruited prior to 8-9-2010 for which the entire disbursement will have to be made by the institutions alone. 57.3. The appellants shall undertake the necessary exercise to see to it that there is a mechanism available for the proper implementation of ''outsourcing'' with specific reference to the conditions of service of those who are employed while taking note of the recommendations made in the Seventh Central Pay Commission. 37. So far as the validity of the amended Regulation 101 with effect from 24.4.2014 is concerned, the same stands upheld by the last Court and there cannot be any quarrel about its validity anymore. The law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College (supra) would most certainly apply to all appointments made on or after amendment of Regulation 101 with effect from 24.4.2014. In view of the remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No. 13 of the report in Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College, the most retrospective effect that the policy to discontinue recruitment to Class IV posts can be given is 8.9.2010, when a decision was taken to abolish recruitment on Class IV posts, replacing it by recruitment through outsourcing. 38. In view of the remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No. 13 of the report in Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College, the most retrospective effect that the policy to discontinue recruitment to Class IV posts can be given is 8.9.2010, when a decision was taken to abolish recruitment on Class IV posts, replacing it by recruitment through outsourcing. 38. Now, therefore, if a process of recruitment had commenced before 8.9.2010, and still more, concluded well ahead of that date by issue of appointment letters and the appointees joining with the Institution, can the policy be held to effect their appointments? We do not think so. This issue squarely arose for consideration in the context of a different Statute, together with the Act of 1921, that is to say, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 (UP. Act No. 5 of 1982) ('the Act of 1982' for short) before a Full Bench of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2015(7) ADJ 179 (FB). 39. The facts giving rise to the reference before the Full Bench cannot be better recapitulated than in the words of their Lordships in Santosh Kumar Singh (supra). The facts and the background of the reference have been thus stated by their Lordships : 2. The Act established the Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Board) for selection of teachers in institutions recognized under the Act of 1921. Section 16 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act of 1921 or the regulations made thereunder but subject to certain specified provisions of the Act, every appointment of a teacher shall on or after the date of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 2001 be made by the Management only on the recommendation of the Board. Section 32 provides that the provisions of the Act of 1921 and the regulations made thereunder, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or its regulations, shall continue to be in force for the purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher. Section 32 provides that the provisions of the Act of 1921 and the regulations made thereunder, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or its regulations, shall continue to be in force for the purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher. Section 33 of the Act provides that the State Government may, for the purposes of removing any difficulty, by a notified order, direct that the provisions of the Act shall, during such period as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission as it may deem to be necessary or expedient. Section 33-E was introduced into the Act by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1999 so as to provide for the rescission of the Removal of Difficulties Orders made under Section 33 of the Act and is in the following terms: ''33-E. Rescission of Orders.-The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Third) Order, 1982 and the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Fourth) Order, 1982 are hereby rescinded.'' 3. Section 33-E was introduced with effect from 25 January 1999. Prior to the introduction of Section 33-E, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 (Removal of Difficulties Order) was issued in exercise of the power conferred by Section 33 to remove difficulties. Para 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order provided for the vacancies on which ad hoc appointments could be made while Para 3 referred to the duration of ad hoc appointments. The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 19816 was thereafter notified. Para 2 of Removal of Difficulties (Second) Order provided the procedure for filling up short term vacancies, while Para 3 provided for the duration of ad hoc appointments. 4. The issue which has been referred to for adjudication before the Full Bench relates to a situation where the process of selection for making an ad hoc appointment had commenced prior to 25 January 1999 when the Removal of Difficulties Orders stood rescinded as a result of the insertion of Section 33-E. 40. 4. The issue which has been referred to for adjudication before the Full Bench relates to a situation where the process of selection for making an ad hoc appointment had commenced prior to 25 January 1999 when the Removal of Difficulties Orders stood rescinded as a result of the insertion of Section 33-E. 40. Based on the aforesaid facts, the following questions were referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench : (a) Whether even after the rescission of Removal of Difficulties Orders under Section 33-E of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 (Act) (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982), with effect from 25 January 1999, the Committee of Management retains the power to make ad hoc appointment against short term vacancies only because it had published an advertisement for the purpose prior to 25 January 1999; (b) Whether on enforcement of Section 33-E of the Act rescinding the Removal of Difficulties Orders issued earlier, the Committee of Management has lost all powers to make ad hoc appointment against short term vacancies; (c) Whether under Section 16-E of the Intermediate Education Act 1921 (Act of 1921), there is a power with the Committee of Management to make ad hoc appointment against short term vacancies and if so then for what period; and (d) Whether the Division Bench in the case of Subhash Chandra Tripathi v. State of U.P., Writ-A No. 70721 of 2010, decided on 14 July, 2014, has laid down the correct law. 41. In answering the relevant question, which would be Question (a), their Lordships in Santosh Kumar Singh observed : 10. The decision in A A Calton (supra) is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that once a process of selection has been initiated, a subsequent amendment of the law by which the power to make an appointment has specifically been taken away from a statutory authority - in that case from the Director - would have no application to a pending selection process which must be governed by the law as it stood when the selection process was initiated. Undoubtedly, the Legislature does have the power to make a law with retrospective effect but unless the law is made expressly retrospective or retrospective by necessary implication, the position of law as it stood when the selection process was initiated, would govern the selection. 11. Undoubtedly, the Legislature does have the power to make a law with retrospective effect but unless the law is made expressly retrospective or retrospective by necessary implication, the position of law as it stood when the selection process was initiated, would govern the selection. 11. In certain other contexts, the Supreme Court has held, for instance, that a selection process has to be governed by the Rules and Government Orders in existence on the date on which the process is initiated. In N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 , the Supreme Court held as follows: ''...Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and Government orders and any amendment of the rules or the Government order pending the selection should not affect the validity of the selection made by the selecting authority or the Public Service Commission unless the amended Rules or the amended Government orders, issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate the amended Rules shall be applicable to the pending selections. See P Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 1 SCC 411 : JT (1989) 4 SC 459.'' 12. In State of Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar, (2010) 13 SCC 467 , the Supreme Court held that a change in the norms of recruitment could be applied prospectively and could not affect those who have been selected for being recommended for appointment after following the norms which were in place at the time when the selection process was commenced. The submission to the contrary was based on the decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1612 , to the effect that mere inclusion in a select panel did not confer indefeasible right to appointment. The Supreme Court explained the position in law as follows: ''The decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent have clearly explained the law with regard to the applicability of the rules which are amended and/or altered during the selection process. The Supreme Court explained the position in law as follows: ''The decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent have clearly explained the law with regard to the applicability of the rules which are amended and/or altered during the selection process. They all say in one voice that the norms or rules as existing on the date when the process of selection begins will control such selection and any alteration to such norms would not affect the continuing process, unless specifically the same were given retrospective effect...While a person may not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment merely on the basis of selection, in the instant case the fact situation is different since the claim of the respondent to be appointed had been negated by a change in policy after the selection process had begun.'' 13. In a subsequent decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Sevadas Vidyamandir High School, (2011) 9 SCC 613 , the Supreme Court held that a ban on recruitment to grant-in-aid posts had been issued after the school in question had been permitted by the State to fill up vacant posts. The Supreme Court held that in these circumstances, the State could not contend that the process of rationalization which was introduced subsequently, would also apply to private aided schools, where the process of recruitment had already been commenced pursuant to the approval granted earlier. 14. The judgment in A A Calton (supra) has been recently followed in a decision of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh v. Daya Ram, (2015) 3 SCC 177 , in the context of the principle that vacancies which had occurred prior to an amendment of rules would be governed by the unamended rules and not by the amended rules where the amended rules are not made retrospective either expressly or by implication. 15. The judgment of the Division Bench in Subhash Chandra Tripathi's case was based on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in A A Calton (supra). In the referring judgment, the Division Bench has doubted the correctness of that view based on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash (supra). In the view of the Division Bench, the Supreme Court has held that even a selection does not confer a right of appointment. In the referring judgment, the Division Bench has doubted the correctness of that view based on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash (supra). In the view of the Division Bench, the Supreme Court has held that even a selection does not confer a right of appointment. Hence, the view which has been taken by the Division Bench is that a mere initiation of the process of selection will not result in the retention of the power of appointment by the authority concerned even when the power of appointment had been withdrawn under a statutory provision, in this case Section 33-E. The decision in Shankarsan Dash (supra) of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the issue as to whether a candidate whose name appears in the merit list on the basis of a competitive examination acquires an indefeasible right of appointment as a Government servant merely because a vacancy exists. In that context, the Supreme Court held as follows: ''7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 1 SCR 165 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2216 ), Miss Neelim Shangla v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 268 : AIR 1987 SC 169 , or Jitendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCR 899 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1850 )'' 16. These observations of the Supreme Court would indicate that the issue in Shankarsan Dash (supra) was completely distinct. A candidate who is on a select list does not have an indefeasible right to appointment merely because a vacancy exists. That is not the issue in the present case. The issue in the present case is whether a process of selection which was initiated prior to the insertion of Section 33-E which rescinded the Removal of Difficulties Orders must be governed by the law as it then stood at the time when the process was initiated by the issuance of an advertisement. Plainly, the issue is not about the right of a particular candidate to appointment but whether the selection process should be governed by the law as it stood when the selection process was initiated. On this aspect, the consistent position of law has been laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in A A Calton (supra). 42. The questions referred to the Full Bench were answered by their Lordships in the following terms : (a) Despite the rescission of the Removal of Difficulties Orders by Section 33-E of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1999 with effect from 25 January 1999, the power of the Committee of Management to make appointments against short term vacancies, where the process of appointment had been initiated prior to 25 January 1999 by the publication of an advertisement, would continue to be preserved; (b) On the enforcement of the provisions of Section 33-E, the power of a Committee of Management to make ad hoc appointments against short term vacancies would not stand abrogated in a case where the process of selection had been initiated prior to 25 January 1999; (c) Under Section 16-E of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, the Committee of Management is empowered to make an appointment against a temporary vacancy caused by the grant of leave to an incumbent for a period not exceeding six months or in the case of death, termination or otherwise, of an incumbent occurring during an educational session. An appointment made under sub-section (11) of Section 16-E as provided in the proviso thereto shall, in any case, not continue beyond the end of educational session during which the appointment was made; and (d) The judgment of the Division Bench in Subhash Chandra Tripathi (supra) is affirmed as laying down a correct interpretation of the judgment in A A Calton (supra). (emphasis by Court) 43. The aforesaid enunciation of the law, therefore, makes it vivid that in a case where the process of recruitment has commenced before a change to the law governing recruitment, the process already commenced does not abate or get rescinded. It has to be carried forward to its logical conclusion. Here, the advertisement was issued on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009, whereas, the earliest that the change in policy of recruitment to Class IV posts was brought about was on 8.9.2010. It was followed by the GO dated 6.1.2011, which, though quashed by this Court, and technically dead, now has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College. We do not wish to go into that question, but all that we say is that any process of recruitment commenced before 8.9.2010 would have to be carried to its logical conclusion, irrespective of the policy decision taken on 8.9.2010, the GO dated 6.1.2011 or the ultimate amendment made to Regulation 101 with effect from 24.4.2014. Here, the advertisement was admittedly issued and the process of recruitment commenced as per the then prevalent Regulation 101 by the Management with the publication of the advertisement on 9.1.2009 and 10.1.2009. The process of selection was completed on 27.2.2009 and letters of appointment were issued to the petitioners on 1.3.2009, the date on which they joined their duties also with the Institution. This then being the calendar of events governing the rights of the petitioners, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the respondents, howsoever stretched, to uphold their policy decision, now embodied in Regulation 101, to undo a recruitment process commenced well before the policy decision was taken on 8.9.2010. There is no way the recruitment process, commenced much earlier than the change of policy and much before the amendment to Regulation 101 brought about on 24.4.2014, can be subjected to the changed law or policy and held invalid. 44. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and stands allowed. There is no way the recruitment process, commenced much earlier than the change of policy and much before the amendment to Regulation 101 brought about on 24.4.2014, can be subjected to the changed law or policy and held invalid. 44. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and stands allowed. The impugned order dated 15.9.2015 passed by the Regional Level Committee, Kanpur Region, Kanpur is hereby quashed. A mandamus is issued to the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur or the Regional Level Committee, whosoever be the authority competent as per assignment of business in the Department of Secondary Education to pass fresh orders considering the grant of financial sanction to the petitioners' appointment, bearing in mind the directions in this judgment. Necessary orders shall be passed within a month of receipt of a copy of this judgment by the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur. 45. There shall be no order as to costs. 46. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate this order to the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur.