ORDER : B.S. Bhanumathi, J. 1. The unsuccessful petitioner/defendant filed this revision assailing the order, dated 19.12.2022, dismissing the petition in I.A.No.460 of 2021 in O.S.No.11 of 2020 on the file of the Court of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District & Sessions Court, Anantapuramu, filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, requesting to condone the delay of 40 days in filing petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 09.04.2021, passed in the above said suit. 2. Heard Sri Butta Vijaya Bhasker, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/defendant and Sri J. Narayana Swamy, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff and defendant for convenience and clarity. 3. The case of the revision petitioner/defendant in support of the request for condonation of delay in filing the application seeking to set aside the ex parte decree passed in the suit, in brief, is as follows: The sole plaintiff filed the suit to pass a preliminary decree for the suit amount of Rs.1,20,00,000/- with costs and subsequent interest thereon. Immediately after receipt of summons from the Court, he contacted his counsel and gave vakalat to him and the counsel informed him that there is no physical functioning of courts and vakalat has to be filed online. Accordingly, the learned counsel filed his vakalat through online before the Court of Principal District Judge, Anantapuramu. Thereafter, due to Covid pandemic situation, the petitioner could not meet his counsel. Later, he came to know that the matter is not on the file of the Principal District Judge's Court, Anantapuramu, but it is before the Court of VII Additional District Judge, Anantapuramu and that an ex parte decree, dated 09.04.2021 was passed against him by the Court of VII Additional District Judge, Anantapuramu. Immediately after coming to know of the same, the petitioner filed this petition along with the written statement. His non-appearance and non-filing of the written statement is neither intentional nor wanton but due to prevalence of Covid pandemic. The plaintiff filed the suit with all false allegations by suppressing the material facts and obtained an ex parte decree. If the ex parte decree and judgment are not set aside by condoning the delay, he will be deprived of his valuable rights. The plaintiff filed the suit with all false allegations by suppressing the material facts and obtained an ex parte decree. If the ex parte decree and judgment are not set aside by condoning the delay, he will be deprived of his valuable rights. Hence, the present petition is filed to condone delay of 40 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree and judgment, dated 09.04.2021 passed in O.S.No.11 of 2020. (b) The plaintiff filed counter before the trial Court stating that the respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of the suit amount basing on the registered mortgage deed executed by the petitioner/defendant. The respondent demanded for discharge of the mortgage deed amount with interest but the petitioner intentionally dragged on the matter. The petitioner received the summons and also engaged counsel and the counsel sought time for filing written statement. After examining the plaintiff, the trial Court passed the judgment and decree. However, the petitioner filed the petition to condone delay of 40 days in filing petition to set aside the ex parte decree without there being any reasons for the delay. There are no tenable grounds. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. The trial Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the petition observing that the petitioner failed to explain the delay for his non- appearance and he is taking advantage of the pandemic situation by suppressing the reasons for his failure to contest the suit and that there are no bona fides on the part of the petitioner. Hence, this revision by the petitioner/defendant. 5. Now, the point for determination is: Whether sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay? And, if so, whether the delay can be condoned? 6. POINT: 6(a) It is settled law that the length of delay is not the criterion, but sufficiency of the cause of the delay is the criterion to condone delay or not. It is pertinent to refer to the decision in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishna Murthy (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123, wherein at paragraph Nos. 9, 11 and 12, it is observed as follows: "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. 9, 11 and 12, it is observed as follows: "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in regional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, [1968:INSC:225 : AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality. [1971:INSC:348 : AIR 1972 SC 749 ]" 6(b) What is 'sufficient cause' has been elaborated by the Supreme Court in the decision in The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 Supreme Court Cases 366, and at paragraph No.26, it was held as follows: "26. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fairly well-settled. It is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But it may be safely stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps, which he could have or should have taken. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and each case will have to be decided by the courts on the facts and circumstances of the case. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and each case will have to be decided by the courts on the facts and circumstances of the case. Any observation of an illustrative circumstance or fact, will only tend to be a curb on the free exercise of the judicial mind by the Court in determining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to "sufficient cause" or not. It is needless to emphasize that courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice." 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the trial Court erred in dismissing the petition by wrongly calculating the number of days of delay, that is, from a date prior to the date of ex parte decree. He further submitted that the reason for the delay either from the date of non-appearance in the suit or from the date of decree is the same, and therefore, the trial Court erred in observing that the petitioner failed to explain the delay for non- appearance. It is also submitted by him that during the period of Covid pandemic, the movement of persons is restricted and the functioning of the Courts was also limited, but the same was not taken into consideration. He further submitted that to show his bona fides, written statement was also filed along with the petition and if the reason is found satisfactory, the petition ought to have been allowed, subject to some terms of costs to protect the interests of the petitioner/defendant instead of dismissing the petition in toto. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff supported the observation of the trial Court. 9. Since the petitioner filed this petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 40 days in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree passed on 09.04.2021, the delay ought to have been calculated in the light of the provisions of the Limitation Act. The relevant provision is Article 123 of the Limitation Act and it is excerpted hereunder: Article Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 123 To set aside a decree passed ex parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte. The relevant provision is Article 123 of the Limitation Act and it is excerpted hereunder: Article Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 123 To set aside a decree passed ex parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte. Explanation.- For the purpose of this article, substituted service under rule 20 of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not be deemed to be due service. Thirty days The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. 10. A perusal of the above provision indicates that the limitation commences from a date subsequent to the passing of the ex parte decree. If summons or notice was served, the period of limitation commences from the date of decree. If the summons or notice was not duly served, the period of limitation commences from the date when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. Therefore, calculating the period of limitation from a date prior to the date of decree is improper. Therefore, the petitioner has rightly sought to condone the delay of the period calculated taking into consideration the date of the decree, as he received summons and engaged a counsel. 11. The reason stated by the petitioner for the delay is sufficient to condone the delay. Moreover, the petitioner has filed the written statement along with the petition to show his bona fides. The reason is the same for not contesting the suit before passing the decree and for the delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree. The trial Court failed to exercise its discretion by wrongly calculating the period of limitation from the date of service of notice in the interlocutory application in the suit and improperly appreciating the cause for the delay. It could have allowed the petition by imposing terms as during the relevant period, Covid pandemic situation was prevalent. 12. The trial Court failed to exercise its discretion by wrongly calculating the period of limitation from the date of service of notice in the interlocutory application in the suit and improperly appreciating the cause for the delay. It could have allowed the petition by imposing terms as during the relevant period, Covid pandemic situation was prevalent. 12. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the impugned order, dated 19.12.2022, passed in I.A.No.460 of 2021 in O.S.No.11 of 2020 and consequently, I.A.No.460 of 2021 is allowed on the condition that the petitioner shall deposit the suit costs and pay the respondent/plaintiff a sum of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousand only) within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which the petition shall stand dismissed without any further order. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand dismissed.