JUDGMENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P. The petitioner, an Inspector of Customs is presently posted in the Customs (Preventive) Department at Kannur. Upon the allegation that while serving as Inspector of Customs at the Thiruvananthapuram International Airport, he facilitated the smuggling of gold by certain persons, Ext.P2 show cause notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), where the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why; “(i) The seized 4083.43 gram of foreign origin gold valued at around Rs.2,48,06,838/-(Market value) should not be confiscated under Sections 111(d), 111(i), 111(l), 111(j) and 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) gold totally weighing 4500 gram valued at around Rs.2.73 crore smuggled by the syndicate during the previous occasions, should not be held liable for confiscation under Sections 111(d), 111(i), 111(j), 111(l) and 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; (iii) penalty should not be imposed on him under Section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.” The petitioner has filed Ext.P3 reply to Ext.P2 show cause notice, where he has taken the stand that he is not at all concerned with the proposals in (i) and (ii) above and that he is not liable to be imposed with any penalty under the provisions of Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Act. The said show cause notice is pending adjudication. 2. While so, the petitioner was issued with a summons under Section 108 of the Act (Ext.P9) for providing certain information and for recording the voice sample of the petitioner in connection with the investigation being carried on by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence. The petitioner submitted Ext.P5 reply essentially taking up a contention that since the show cause notice had already been issued, the petitioner could not be called upon to provide any further evidence or material and therefore it was not proper to issue a summons to him under Section 108 of the Act. It was contended that the officer had become functus officio with the issuance of the show cause notice. It was contended that the officer had become functus officio with the issuance of the show cause notice. The petitioner was favoured with Ext.P6 reply informing him that the issuance of the show cause notice did not take away the jurisdiction of the 7th respondent to issue a summons under Section 108 of the Act. The petitioner through his counsel replied to Ext.P7 again taking up a contention that the 7th respondent had no jurisdiction to issue summons pending adjudication of the show cause notice issued under Chapter XIV of the Act. In reply to Ext.P7, the petitioner was issued with Ext.P8 reply specifically pointing out that the summons was issued in connection with proceedings contemplated under Chapter XVI of the Act. It was also pointed out that one of the conditions imposed by the District and Sessions Court, Ernakulam while granting bail to the petitioner was that the petitioner shall appear before the investigating officer as and when required by him, till the complaint is filed. The petitioner has therefore approached this court seeking the following reliefs:- “(1) To call for the records leading to Ext-P4, Ext-P6, Ext-P8 and Ext-P9 proceedings from the Respondents and issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Ext-P4, Ext-P6, Ext-P8 and Ext-P9 proceedings of the Respondents. (2) To declare that Ext-P4, Ext-P6, Ext-P8 and Ext-P9 issued by the Respondents is without having any jurisdiction and therefore illegal. (3) To issue such appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Sri. Karthik J. Sekhar the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that though the proceedings under Chapter XIV and Chapter XVI of the Act are distinct and different, the guidelines for launching prosecution in relation to offences punishable under the Customs Act, 1963 as contained in Circular 27/2015-Customs dated 23-10-2015 of the Central Board of Excise and Customs (the 2015 Circular) and the circular bearing No.7/2017-Customs dated 06-03-2017 (the 2017 Circular) modifying and replacing paragraph 7 of the 2015 circular indicate beyond doubt that in cases such as this, any proceeding for initiation of prosecution can be commenced only after the adjudication is completed. The learned counsel placed considerable reliance on paragraph 7.3 of the guidelines (as replaced by the 2017 Circular) to contend that it is for the adjudicating authority to take a decision as to whether any prosecution should be launched in the matter. It is submitted that since the adjudication is still pending, the 7th respondent could not have issued any summons stating that the summons was issued in connection with proceedings under Chapter XVI of the Act as proceedings under Chapter XVI of the Act could be initiated only after the adjudication is completed. In other words, it is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in cases covered by clause 7.3 of the 2017 circular, the adjudicating authority has to intimate the 7th respondent as to whether the case is one fit for launching prosecution and only thereafter can the 7th respondent assume any jurisdiction to issue summons under Section 108 of the Act. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the interim order of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Mohit Kirana Store v. C.B.I & C; 2022 (57) G.S.T.L 225 (Raj) in support of the above proposition. The learned counsel also contends on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another; AIR 2019 SC 3592 that the impugned summons has been issued for the purpose of taking the voice sample of the petitioner and the 7th respondent has no jurisdiction to summon the petitioner for taking of a voice sample as the said power is to be conceded only to the Judicial Magistrate. 4. Sri. Sreelal N. Warrier learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the provisions of the 2017 Circular replace paragraph 7 of the 2015 Circular and that the other instructions contained in the 2015 Circular continue to operate. It is submitted that paragraph 6.2 of the 2015 Circular refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal and another; (2011) 3 SCC 581 to establish that adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent of each other and that they can be launched simultaneously and a decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiation of criminal prosecution. It is submitted that the Circulars of 2015 and 2017 referred to above are Circulars intended to ensure that there is no delay in the launching of criminal prosecution wherever the prosecution is found necessary and they do not indicate in any manner that in cases like the present, the decision as to whether a prosecution should be launched is one to be taken by the adjudicating authority under Chapter XIV of the Act after adjudication is completed. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for the grant of reliefs sought in the writ petition. It is clear from the provisions contained in Chapter XIV and Chapter XVI of the Act that the proceedings under Chapter XVI are not dependent on the proceedings under Chapter XIV. Paragraphs 7.1 to 7.3 of the 2015 Circular as replaced by the 2017 Circular read as follows:- “7.1 Prosecution should not be filed merely because a demand has been confirmed in the adjudication proceedings particularly in cases of technical nature or where interpretation of law is involved. One of the important considerations for deciding whether prosecution should be launched is the availability of adequate evidence. The standard of proof required in a criminal prosecution is higher as the case has to be established beyond reasonable doubt whereas the standard of proof in adjudication proceedings is decided on the basis of preponderance of probability. Therefore, even cases where demand is confirmed in adjudication proceedings, evidence collected should be weighed so as to likely meet the test of being reasonable doubt for recommending & sanctioning prosecution. Decision should be taken on case-to-case basis considering various factors, such as, gravity of offence, quantum of duty evaded and the nature as well as quality of evidence collected. 7.2 It is reiterated that in order to avoid delays, the adjudicating authority should indicate, at the time of passing the adjudication order itself (on file and not in the adjudication order) as to whether he considers the case fit for prosecution, so that it could be further processed for launching prosecution. 7.2 It is reiterated that in order to avoid delays, the adjudicating authority should indicate, at the time of passing the adjudication order itself (on file and not in the adjudication order) as to whether he considers the case fit for prosecution, so that it could be further processed for launching prosecution. Where at the time of adjudication proceedings, no view has been taken on prosecution by the adjudicating authority, the adjudication section shall resubmit the file within 15 days from the day of issue of adjudication order to the adjudicating authority/Commissioner to take a view regarding prosecution. Where the prosecution is proposed before the adjudication of the case, Commissioner/Pr. Commr. or ADGRI/Pr. ADGRI shall record the reason for the same and the adjudicating authority shall be informed of the decision so that there is no need for him to examine the case subsequently from the perspective of prosecution. 7.3 In respect of cases investigated by DGRI, the adjudicating authority would intimate the decision taken regarding fitness of the case for prosecution to the Principal Additional Director General/Additional Director General of the Zonal Unit or Headquarters concerned, where the case was investigated and/or show cause notice issued. The respective officer of DGRI concerned shall prepare an investigation report for the purpose of launching prosecution, within one month of the date of receipt of the decision of the adjudicating authority and would send the same to the Director General, DGRI for taking decision on sanction of prosecution. The format of investigation report is annexed as Annexure-I to this Circular. The DGRI/Pr. DGRI should ensure that a decision about launching of prosecution or otherwise, is taken after careful analysis of evidence available on record and communicated to the ADGRI/Pr. ADGRI concerned within a month of the receipt of the proposal.” It is clear from paragraph 7.1 of the Circular referred to above that it is not in every case where the violation of the Act has been noticed that a prosecution should be launched on the allegation that an offence under Chapter XVI has been committed. The said paragraph underscores the settled principle that the standard of proof required in a criminal prosecution is much higher as the case has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whereas the standard of proof in an adjudication under Chapter XIV is only a preponderance of probability. The said paragraph underscores the settled principle that the standard of proof required in a criminal prosecution is much higher as the case has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whereas the standard of proof in an adjudication under Chapter XIV is only a preponderance of probability. It is no doubt true that paragraph 7.3 of the aforesaid circular indicates that it is for the adjudicating authority to intimate the decision taken regarding the fitness of the case for prosecution in cases where the matter is investigated by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and adjudication is by the Customs Commissionerate. However, there is nothing in paragraph 7.3 that would indicate that in all cases where the Director General of Revenue Intelligence decides that a prosecution should be launched, such prosecution can be launched only after the adjudicating authority intimates its decision regarding fitness for prosecution. In Radheshyam Kejriwal (supra) while considering the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, it was held as follows:- “87. Considering the interpretation relating to Sections 50, 51 and 56 by various decisions, I am of the view that in a statute relating to economic offences, there is no reason to restrict the scope of any provisions of the Act. These provisions ensure that no economic loss is caused by the alleged contravention by the imposition of an appropriate penalty after adjudication under Section 51 of the Act and to ensure that the tendency to violate is guarded by imposing appropriate punishment after due transaction in terms of Section 56 of the Act. In fact, it is relevant to point out that Section 23-D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 had a proviso, which indicates that the adjudication for the imposition of penalty should precede making of complaint in writing to the court concerned for prosecuting the offender. The absence of a similar proviso to Section 51 or to Section 56 of the present 1973 Act is a clear indication that the legislature intended to treat the two proceedings as independent of each other. 88. There is nothing in the present Act to indicate that a finding in adjudication is binding on the court in a prosecution under Section 56 of the Act or that the prosecution under Section 56 depends upon the result of adjudication under Section 51 of the Act. 88. There is nothing in the present Act to indicate that a finding in adjudication is binding on the court in a prosecution under Section 56 of the Act or that the prosecution under Section 56 depends upon the result of adjudication under Section 51 of the Act. It is reiterated that the two proceedings are independent and irrespective of the outcome of the decision under Section 50, there cannot be any bar in initiating prosecution under Section 56. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that the adjudication by the authorities concerned and the prosecution are distinct and separate. No doubt, the conclusion of the adjudication in the case on hand, the decision of the Special Director dated 18-11-1996, may be a point for the appellant and it is for him to put forth the same before the Magistrate.” Therefore, the provisions of the 2015 Circular, as modified by the 2017 Circular, only indicate that the adjudicating authority may recommend the launch of a prosecution in cases where no prosecution has been launched if the facts of the case require such a recommendation to be made. These Circulars do not provide that no prosecution shall be launched simultaneously with a proceeding for adjudication under Chapter XIV of the Act. 6. Section 108 of the Customs Act deals with the power of any Gazetted officer of the customs to summon a person to give evidence and to produce documents. Section 108 is part of Chapter XIII of the Customs Act and does not in any manner distinguish between proceedings for adjudication under Chapter XIV and proceedings for prosecution under Chapter XVI of the Act. In either case, it is open to the competent authority to issue summons under Section 108 of the Act. A reading of the provisions of Section 138 B of the Act also indicates that subject to certain conditions a statement given under Section 108 will be relevant for the purposes of proving in any prosecution for the offences under the Act, the truth of the facts which it contains. The circumstances under which such a statement can be used are specified in Section 138 B (a) and (b) of the Act. The circumstances under which such a statement can be used are specified in Section 138 B (a) and (b) of the Act. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to note the circumstances under which the statement under Section 108 of the Act could be used in a prosecution for offences under the Act. The order of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Mohit Kirana Store (supra) on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is an interim order. In the light of the findings as above I see no reason to follow the prima facie view of the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Mohit Kirana Store (supra). 7. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that only a Judicial Magistrate could have summoned the petitioner to take the voice sample, I am of the view that the said contention is only to be rejected. The issue considered by the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha (supra) was whether the provisions of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, which protects a person against any self-incrimination would be defeated if a person who is accused of an offence is called upon to give a voice sample during the course of an investigation into an offence, and (2) as to whether in the absence of any specific provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the Magistrate could authorise the investigating agency to record voice sample of the person accused of an offence. While answering the said questions it was held as follows:- “25. In the light of the above discussions, we unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.” The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted on account of the fact that the questions that arose and were considered in Ritesh Sinha (supra) was on the basis that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising a Magistrate to permit the investigating agency to record a voice sample of an accused during the course of an investigation. While holding that a Judicial Magistrate can do so until appropriate provisions are incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure and by invoking the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court held that the Judicial Magistrate could authorise the collection of voice sample by an investigating agency. This declaration has no bearing in cases where Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 applies. The provisions of Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 read as follows:- 108. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents:- (1) Any Gazetted Officer of customs shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making under this Act; (2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned. (3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents and other things as may be required: Provided that the exemption under section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this section. (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).” A reading of Section 108 of the Customs Act together with provisions of Section 138 B of the same Act indicates beyond doubt that Section 108 authorises a Gazetted officer of Customs to summon a person to give evidence or for the production of any document or any other thing. The provision therefore authorises the collection of a voice sample as well and there is no need to read into the provisions of Section 108 of the Act any restriction requiring the application of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha (supra) which, as already noted, was on the basis that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising a Magistrate to permit the investigating agency to record a voice sample of an accused during the course of an investigation. 8. Though it is not specifically contented that the summons issued to the petitioner would amount to a violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, this question may also be considered as it is incidental to some of the grounds raised in the Writ Petition. The scope and meaning of the words “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself” in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India were comprehensively considered by a 11 judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad; AIR 1961 SC 1808 . Since this issue may arise in other cases as well, I deem it necessary to extract the relevant paragraphs of the judgment in Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra) in extenso. It was held:- “8. The several questions for decision arising out of this batch of cases have to be answered with reference to the provisions of clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution which is in these terms: “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” These provisions came up for consideration by the Full Court in the case of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra [(1954) SCR 1077]. Though the question directly arising for decision in that case was whether a search and seizure of documents under the provisions of Sections 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came within the ambit of the prohibition of clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution, this Court covered a much wider field. Besides laying down that the search and seizure complained of in that case were not within the prohibition, this Court examined the origin and scope of the doctrine of protection against self-incrimination with reference to English law and the Constitution of the United States of America, with particular reference to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On an examination of the Case law in England and America and the standard text books on Evidence, like Phipson and Wigmore, and other authorities, this Court observed as follows: “Broadly stated the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against “testimonial compulsion”. It is suggested that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness stand. We can see no reason to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is ‘to be a witness’. A person can ‘be a witness’ not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness (see Section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the like. ‘To be a witness’ is nothing more than ‘to furnish evidence’, and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes. So far as production of documents is concerned, no doubt Section 139 of the Evidence Act says that a person producing a document on summons is not a witness. But that section is meant to regulate the right of cross-examination. It is not a guide to the connotation of the word ‘witness’, which must be understood in its natural sense i.e. as referring to a person who furnishes evidence. But that section is meant to regulate the right of cross-examination. It is not a guide to the connotation of the word ‘witness’, which must be understood in its natural sense i.e. as referring to a person who furnishes evidence. Indeed, every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. Nor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence so procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is ‘to be a witness’ and not ‘to appear as a witness’. It follows that the protection afforded to an accused insofar as it is related to the phrase ‘to be a witness’ is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. Whether it is available to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case.” 9. This Court did not accept the contention that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion is to be confined to oral testimony at the witness stand when standing trial for an offence. The guarantee was, thus, held to include not only oral testimony given in court or out of court, but also to statements in writing which incriminated the maker when figuring as an accused person. After having heard elaborate arguments for and against the views thus expressed by this Court after full deliberation, we do not find any good reasons for departing from those views. But the Court went on to observe that “to be a witness” means “to furnish evidence” and includes not only oral testimony or statements in writing of the accused but also production of a thing or of evidence by other modes. But the Court went on to observe that “to be a witness” means “to furnish evidence” and includes not only oral testimony or statements in writing of the accused but also production of a thing or of evidence by other modes. It may be that this Court did not intend to lay down — certainly it was not under discussion of the Court as a point directly arising for decision — that calling upon a person accused of an offence to give his thumb impression, his impression of palm or fingers or of sample handwriting or signature comes within the ambit of “to be a witness”, which has been equated to “to furnish evidence”. Whether or not this Court intended to lay down the rule of law in those wide terms has been the subject-matter of decisions in the different High Courts in this country. Those decisions are, by no means, uniform; and conflicting views have been expressed even in the same High Court on different occasions. It will serve no useful purpose to examine those decisions in detail. It is enough to point out that the most recent decision, to which our attention was called, is of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of State of Kerala v. K.K. Sankaran Nair [AIR 1960 Kerala 392]. In that case, Ansari, C.J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, has made reference to and examined in detail the pronouncements of the different High Courts. Ultimately he came to the conclusion that the decision of this Court in Sharma case [(1954) SCR 1077] also covered the case of a specimen handwriting given by an accused person, under compulsion. 10. “To be a witness” may be equivalent to “furnishing evidence” in the sense of making oral or written statements, but not in the larger sense of the expression so as to include giving of thumb impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body by an accused person for purpose of identification. “Furnishing evidence” in the latter sense could not have been within the contemplation of the Constitution makers for the simple reason that — though they may have intended to protect an accused person from the hazards of self-incrimination, in the light of the English law on the subject — they could not have intended to put obstacles in the way of efficient and effective investigation into crime and of bringing criminals to justice. The taking of impressions of parts of the body of an accused person very often becomes necessary to help the investigation of a crime. It is as much necessary to protect an accused person against being compelled to incriminate himself, as to arm the agents of law and the law courts with legitimate powers to bring offenders to justice. Furthermore it must be assumed that the Constitution-makers were aware of the existing law, for example, Section 73 of the Evidence Act or Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act (33 of 1920). Section 5 authorises a Magistrate to direct any person to allow his measurements or photographs to be taken, if he is satisfied that it is expedient for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure to do so:“Measurements” include finger impressions and foot-print impressions. If any such person who is directed by a Magistrate, under Section 5 of the Act, to allow his measurements or photographs to be taken resists or refuses to allow the taking of the measurements or photographs, it has been declared lawful by Section 6 to use all necessary means to secure the taking of the required measurements or photographs. Similarly, Section 73 of the Evidence Act authorises the court to permit the taking of finger impression or a specimen handwriting or signature of a person present in court, if necessary for the purpose of comparison. 11. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. The giving of finger impression or of specimen signature or of handwriting, strictly speaking, is not “to be a witness”. “To be a witness” means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing, by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation. “To be a witness” means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing, by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation. A person is said “to be a witness” to a certain state of facts which has to be determined by a court or authority authorised to come to a decision, by testifying to what he has seen, or something he has heard which is capable of being heard and is not hit by the rule excluding hearsay, or giving his opinion, as an expert, in respect of matters in controversy. Evidence has been classified by text writers into three categories, namely, (1) oral testimony; (2) evidence furnished by documents; and (3) material evidence. We have already indicated that we are in agreement with the Full Court decision in Sharma case [(1954) SCR 1077] that the prohibition in clause (3) of Article 20 covers not only oral testimony given by a person accused of an offence but also his written statements which may have a bearing on the controversy with reference to the charge against him. The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw some light on the controversy. If it is a document which is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon by the court to produce that document in accordance with the provisions of Section 139 of the Evidence Act, which, in terms, provides that a person may be summoned to produce a document in his possession or power and that he does not become a witness by the mere fact that he has produced it; and therefore, he cannot be cross-examined. Of course, he can be cross-examined if he is called as a witness who has made statements conveying his personal knowledge by reference to the contents of the document or if he has given his statements in court otherwise than by reference to the contents of the documents. In our opinion, therefore, the observations of this court in Sharma case [(1954) SCR 1077] that Section 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of the word “witness” is not entirely well-founded in law. In our opinion, therefore, the observations of this court in Sharma case [(1954) SCR 1077] that Section 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of the word “witness” is not entirely well-founded in law. It is well established that clause (3) of Article 20 is directed against self-incrimination by an accused person. Self-incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression. The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person, which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony. When an accused person is called upon by the court or any other authority holding an investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is not giving any testimony of the nature of a “personal testimony”. The giving of a “personal testimony” must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement or may refuse to make any statement. But his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the expression “to be a witness”. 12. In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. A specimen handwriting or signature or finger impressions by themselves are no testimony at all, being wholly innocuous because they are unchangeable except in rare cases where the ridges of the fingers or the style of writing have been tampered with. They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that its inference based an other pieces of evidence is reliable. They are neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the third category of material evidence which is outside the limit of “testimony”. Upon the principles laid down in Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra) the summons issued to the petitioner to take his voice samples would not violate the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. It is also not disputed before me that one of the conditions upon which the petitioner was granted bail by the District and Sessions Court, Ernakulam was that he shall appear before the authorities as and when called upon to do so. Therefore, I am of the view that the petitioner cannot defy the summons issued to him under Section 108 of the Act in the facts and circumstances of this case. The writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.