JUDGMENT : Notice was issued upon respondent no.2 vide order dated 31.07.2024. Service report is on the record, which suggests that respondent no.2 has left for his heavenly abode. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that he has not been able to find out whether any substitution is made before the learned Court, where the matter is pending or not. 3. In view of the above, this appeal is being heard in absence of respondent no.2. 4. Heard Mr. Rohan Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mrs. Shweta Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State. 5. The present criminal appeal is directed against the order dated 18.04.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge, Jamtara in SC/ST Case No.12 of 2021, whereby, he has been pleased to take cognizance under Sections 341, 323, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(1)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the appellants, pending in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Jamtara. 6. Office objection is made with regard to maintainability of this appeal as it has been filed after lapse of 180 days in light of Section 14-A (3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 7. Mr. Rohan Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that if a cogent reason is made, for the ends of justice this Court is competent to entertain the present criminal appeal. He submits that so far as Section 14-A (3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is concerned, that has already been struck down by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan and others v. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine All 975. He then submits that there is land dispute and for that, the case has been falsely lodged in the complaint form and the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance under the Indian Penal Code sections as well as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act sections. He submits that in view of that, this appeal may kindly be decided on merit. He submits that the appellants are having good case of quashing of the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order taking cognizance dated 18.04.2022. He submits that in view of that, this appeal may kindly be decided on merit. He submits that the appellants are having good case of quashing of the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order taking cognizance dated 18.04.2022. He relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra) and submits that in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the said judgment, it has been dealt with by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court that the said provision is ultra vires. He further submits that earlier the appellants had preferred Cr.M.P. No.3794 of 2022, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.07.2024 with liberty to avail alternative remedy and, thereafter, the present criminal appeal has been filed after expiry of 180 days. He submits that the land dispute is there and for that the present case has been filed against the appellants in which cognizance has been taken against them. He also submits that the case of the appellants is also covered in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and another, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710 . He further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Chakraborty and another v. State of West Bengal and another, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance may kindly be quashed. 8. Mrs. Shweta Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State opposed the prayer on the ground that after much delay, the present appeal has been preferred, however, she is not disputing the ratio laid down by the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court. She further submits that on the complaint, the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance against the appellants and there is no illegality in the said order. 9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the contents of the complaint petition and finds that admittedly there is land dispute between the appellants and the complainant. 9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the contents of the complaint petition and finds that admittedly there is land dispute between the appellants and the complainant. The complainant-respondent no.2 has left for his heavenly abode and it is not known whether any substitution is made before the learned Court, where, the matter is pending, or not. 10. It was pointed out that earlier the appellants had preferred Cr.M.P. No.3794 of 2022, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail alternative remedy and, thereafter, the present criminal appeal is presented. 11. There is no doubt that in light of Section 14-A (3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, there is bar of filing appeal after lapse of 180 days, however, the said provision has been struck down by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra). On a reference made by the learned Single Judge of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, the Full Bench was constituted in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra) and following questions were placed before the Full Bench: (I) Whether a Single Judge of this Court while deciding Criminal Appeal (Defective) No. 523/2017 In re : Rohit v. State of U.P. vide judgment dated 29.08.2017 correctly permitted the conversion of appeal under Section 14 A of the Act, 1989 into a bail application by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.? (II) Whether keeping in view the judgment of Rohit (supra), an aggrieved person will have two remedies available of preferring an appeal under the provisions of Section 14 A of the Act, 1989 as well as a bail application under the provisions of Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.? (III) Whether an aggrieved person who has not availed of the remedy of an appeal under the provisions of Section 14 A of Act, 1989 can be allowed to approach the High Court by preferring an application under the provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.? (IV) What would be the remedy available to an aggrieved person who has failed to avail the remedy of appeal under the provision of Act, 1989 and the time period for availing the said remedy has also lapsed? 12. (IV) What would be the remedy available to an aggrieved person who has failed to avail the remedy of appeal under the provision of Act, 1989 and the time period for availing the said remedy has also lapsed? 12. The aforesaid questions have been answered by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, which read as under: (i) Question No.(I) is answered in negative as Rohit Vs State of U.P. and another, (2017) 6 ALJ 754 has been overruled by Full Bench of this Court in In Re : Provision of Section 14 (a) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, (2018) 6 ALJ 631. (ii) Question No.(II) is answered in negative holding that an aggrieved person will not have two remedies namely, i.e. filing an appeal under Section 14A of the 1989 Act as well as filing a bail application in terms of Section 439 Cr.P.C. (iii) Question No.(III) is answered in negative holding that the aggrieved person having remedy of appeal under Section 14A of the 1989 Act, cannot be allowed to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (iv) Question No.(IV) - There will be no limitation to file an appeal against an order under the provisions of 1989 Act. Hence, the remedies can be availed of as provided. 13. Second proviso of Section 14-A (3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been struck down being in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution by a Full Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in In Re : Provision of Section 14-(a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 reported in (2018) SCC OnLine All 2087 and in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 , paragraph 22 of which reads as under: “22. The Court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act.” 14. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act.” 14. In view of the above striking down of the second proviso of Section 14-A (3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 shall have effects throughout the territory of India to which the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is applicable including the State of Jharkhand. Hence, the objection raised by the Stamp Reporter is overruled. 15. I.A. No.7519 of 2024 has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the present criminal appeal and the reason is assigned that a petition was filed within time in the form of Cr.M.P., however, later on that Cr.M.P. was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail alternative remedy. 16. It is well settled that if wrong form is made, the period spent in pursuing the same can be condoned. 17. The Court finds that sufficient reason is made out to condone the delay and, as such, the delay in filing the present appeal is, hereby, condoned. 18. Accordingly, I.A. No.7519 of 2024 is disposed of. 19. So far as merit of the case is concerned, that has been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. The Court has looked into the contents of the complaint and finds that the allegations are made in paragraph 2 of the complaint that there is a land on Nala Bazar near Thana Road which is the ancestral property of the complainant recorded in the name of Kala Bouri @ Kalachand Bouri being Plot No.433 of Mouza Nala appertaining to AKJ no.16 having an area 1.58 acres of land. It is further disclosed that the land is vacate since from a long time of the complainant and it has not been allotted to any person. Thus, it is crystal clear that the complaint is civil in nature and for that, complaint case has been filed, in which, the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance under Sections 341, 323, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Thus, it is crystal clear that the complaint is civil in nature and for that, complaint case has been filed, in which, the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance under Sections 341, 323, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. If such a situation is there in the case in hand, the case of Hitesh Verma (supra) is attracted, wherein, in paragraph nos. 14, 16 and 18, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435 , at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below: “Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original) 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 18. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.” 20. In the case of B. Venkateshwaran and others v. P. Bakthavatchalam, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 14, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering that the ingredient of Sections 3(1) (v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not made out, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interfered and quashed the entire criminal proceedings. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said judgment read as under: “3. We have heard Shri Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the appellants - original accused and the respondent appearing in person. We have also gone through the complaint and considered the allegations in the complaint made against the accused. Having considered the allegations in the complaint and the material on record, it appears that initiation of the criminal proceedings by the respondent against the appellants - original accused for the offence under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is nothing but an abuse of process of law and the court and also provision of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It appears that a private dispute was going on between the parties with respect to the illegal construction. As per the allegations in the complaint, the original complainant had purchased the vacant land and constructed the building. It appears that a private dispute was going on between the parties with respect to the illegal construction. As per the allegations in the complaint, the original complainant had purchased the vacant land and constructed the building. It is alleged that adjacent to his house and on the common pathway, the accused have unlawfully encroached upon the pathway and started constructing the temple and thereby have put up illegal construction on his water pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB Cable. In the entire complaint, there are no allegations that the complainant is obstructed and/or interfered with enjoyment of his right on his property deliberately and willfully knowing that complainant belongs to SC/ST. From the material on record, it appears that a civil dispute is converted into criminal dispute and that too for the offence under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Prior to filing of the complaint, it appears that the temple was already in existence since many years. The complainant, who resides adjacent to the temple, filed WP No. 1272 of 2007 before the Madras High Court. Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court, the Commissioner of Corporation, Chennai conducted the inspection and found that there was absolutely no encroachment by the temple. It appears that thereafter the complainant filed another Writ Petition No. 30326 of 2013 before the Madras High Court. The High Court directed the official respondent to proceed with the inquiry against both the parties. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it was the case on behalf of the original accused that in fact complainant had violated all building norms and had constructed a building in blatant violation of the set-back rules and had also put-up unauthorized construction on the ground floor and first floor. That thereafter, the Temple filed writ petition being No. 3322 of 2017 before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 10.2.2017 stayed the proceedings against temple. It appears that thereafter the complainant filed a private complaint for the aforesaid offences under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. From the aforesaid, it seems that the private civil dispute between the parties is converted into criminal proceedings. It appears that thereafter the complainant filed a private complaint for the aforesaid offences under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. From the aforesaid, it seems that the private civil dispute between the parties is converted into criminal proceedings. Initiation of the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, therefore, is nothing but an abuse of process of law and Court. From the material on record, we are satisfied that no case for the offences under Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is made out, even prima facie. None of the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are made out and/or satisfied. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion and view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, therefore, is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition is hereby quashed and set aside. The criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants, initiated by the respondent herein - original complainant for the offence under Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 including summons issued by the learned Special Court in a private complaint filed by the respondent herein are hereby quashed and set aside. Present appeal is allowed accordingly.” 21. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668, the charge-sheet as well as criminal proceedings were under challenge and in paragraph 18 of the said judgment, facts were taken care of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interfered. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668, the charge-sheet as well as criminal proceedings were under challenge and in paragraph 18 of the said judgment, facts were taken care of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interfered. Paragraphs 18 and 23 of the said judgment read as under: “18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge- sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court's jurisdiction under section 438, Cr. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court's jurisdiction under section 438, Cr. P.C. and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. 23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other offence.” 22. In view of the above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and further coming to the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that there is land dispute between the parties and for that, complaint case has been filed and the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance. In view of the above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and further coming to the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that there is land dispute between the parties and for that, complaint case has been filed and the learned Court has been pleased to take cognizance. If such dispute is brought before the High Court, the High Court is having more responsibility to examine the things by way of reading the materials in between the line so that any innocent person cannot be prosecuted in the malicious prosecution. The facts of the present case clearly suggest that for a civil dispute with regard to the land, the complaint case has been filed. 23. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the entire criminal proceeding arising out of SC/ST Case No.12 of 2021 including the order taking cognizance dated 18.04.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge, Jamtara, pending in that Court are, hereby, quashed. 24. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and disposed of.