ORDER: K. LAKSHMAN, J. Heard Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner - accused No.1 and Mr. Palle Nageswar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent - State. 2. This Criminal Revision Case is filed challenging the order dated 22.11.2024 in Crl.M.P. No.3803 of 2018 in C.C. No.26 of 2023 (Old C.C. No.675 of 2017) passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Excise Cases at Hyderabad. 3. The petitioner herein is arraigned as accused No.1 in C.C. No.26 of 2023 (Old C.C. No.675 of 2017). The offences alleged against him are under Sections - 147, 186, 427 read with 149 of IPC. 4. In the complaint dated 23.08.2017, de facto complainant, Executive Engineer, Irrigation Projection, Division-2, Kataram Village and Mandal, In-charge of Peddapalli, alleged that public hearing on Kaleshwaram Project was started at 11.00 A.M. on 23.08.2017 at Reddy Function Hall, Raghavapur Village, Peddapalli Mandal and District. The said hearing was going on smoothly. People were expressing their views. At 12.15 P.M., the petitioner – accused No.1, accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 and also about 300 number of persons started slogans against Chief Minister, lifted and throw chairs and disturbed the proceedings. The District Collector and Environmental Engineer requested them to pacify and asked them to share their views on the dais. There was chaos for a while and police intervened and there was disturbance to Government Employees to discharge duties. 5. On receipt of the said complaint, the police of Basanthnagar Police Station registered a case in Crime No.162 of 2017 against the petitioner and others for the offences punishable under Sections - 147, 353 and 427 read with 149 of IPC. 6. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of de facto complainant as LW.1, Deputy Executive Engineer, Kataram Division as LW.2, Deputy Executive Engineer (Irrigation Department), Kataram Division as LW.3, VRO, Raghavapur as LW.4, VRA, Raghavapur as LW.5. LWs.6 and 7 are panch witnesses. LW.8 is the Investigating Officer. 7. On completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the charge sheet and the same was taken on file vide C.C. No.26 of 2023 against the petitioner and others for the offences punishable under Sections - 147, 186 and 427 read with 149 of IPC. 8. LWs.6 and 7 are panch witnesses. LW.8 is the Investigating Officer. 7. On completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the charge sheet and the same was taken on file vide C.C. No.26 of 2023 against the petitioner and others for the offences punishable under Sections - 147, 186 and 427 read with 149 of IPC. 8. During pendency of the aforesaid C.C., the petitioner herein - accused No.1 and accused Nos.3 to 6 and 8 to 13 filed an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. vide Crl.M.P. No.3803 of 2018 to discharge them from the said C.C. on the following grounds: i) LW.1 lodged a false complaint against the petitioner and others at the instigation of Ruling Party leaders; ii) The petitioner herein being the Vice President of Telangana Congress Committee and also was the former Minister and MLA from Manthani Assembly Constituency and others being representatives of Congress party participated in the said meeting only to bring the grievances of public iii) Neither owner of Reddy Function Hall lodged any complaint against the petitioner and other accused, nor examined them by the police. This itself shows that there was no damage to the property. Thus, Section - 427 of IPC is inapplicable; iv) Section - 186 of IPC is a non-cognizable offence, for which permission of Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section - 195 of Cr.P.C. is required; and v) The case is purely politically motivated. 9. The aforesaid application was opposed by the Public Prosecutor stating that the grounds on which the petitioner and others sought for discharge are triable issues. Contents of charge sheet prima facie constitute the ingredients of the aforesaid offences alleged against the petitioner. The petitioner instead of facing trial, filed the said discharge application. The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of LWs.1 to 5 under Section - 161 of Cr.P.C. and on consideration of the said contents only he has laid the charge sheet against the petitioner and others. 10. Learned trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2024 holding that in the status of eye-witness to the incident, the de facto complainant has got every right to bring to the notice of the police about the damage caused by the petitioner and others at that function hall during the course of meeting. 10. Learned trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2024 holding that in the status of eye-witness to the incident, the de facto complainant has got every right to bring to the notice of the police about the damage caused by the petitioner and others at that function hall during the course of meeting. Hence, it was felt that de facto complainant got locus to complaint about the acts of the petitioner and others in causing damage of the chairs at the function hall. The contentions raised by the petitioner and others are not worthy considering and no just conclusion can be arrived at this premature stage without conducting full-fledged trial. 11. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed the present revision. 12. Both Mr. Dharmesh D.K.Jaiswal, learned counsel and Mr. Palle Nageswar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor, submitted their arguments extensively. 13. Mr. The contentions raised by the petitioner and others are not worthy considering and no just conclusion can be arrived at this premature stage without conducting full-fledged trial. 11. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed the present revision. 12. Both Mr. Dharmesh D.K.Jaiswal, learned counsel and Mr. Palle Nageswar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor, submitted their arguments extensively. 13. Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner contended as follows: i) Contents of charge sheet and statements of LWs.1 to 5 lack the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner and other accused; ii) De facto complainant is only a spectator and is not an aggrieved party; iii) He is not even party to the public hearing proceedings; iv) The petitioner attended the said meeting to express his views; v) There was no intention to him to use any force and damage the chairs; vi) The Investigating Officer did not record the statements of any official from Environmental Department and the District Collector, who were instrumental in conducting public hearing on 23.08.2017; vii) The Investigating Officer has not recorded the statement of either owner of the Function Hall or any employee to show that there was damage to the chairs and that the petitioner and other accused used force in damaging the same; viii) There was no common object to the petitioner and others to form as an unlawful assembly to do certain acts as alleged by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet; ix) Though the said contentions were specifically raised in the discharge application, learned Magistrate without considering the same, dismissed the said application; x) Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled for discharge in the aforesaid C.C.; and xi) In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in State of Karnataka v. V.L. Muniswamy , [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 ] ; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal , [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 ] Dipakbhai Jagdischandra Patel v. State of Gujarat , [ (2019) 16 SCC 547 ] Kundan v. Vasudeo , [2016 SCC OnLine Bom.12682] ; Paresh v. State of Maharashtra , [2022 SCC OnLine Bom. 6689] Bore Srinivas v. State of Telangana , [2021 SCC OnLine TS 3692] ; Mahendra Kumar Sonker v. State of Madhya Pradesh , [ (2024) 8 SCC 244 ] ; K. Dhananjay v. Cabinet Secretary , [SLP (Crl.) No.5905/22, decided on 21.10.2024] ; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335] ; and State of U.P. v. Mata Bikh , [ (1994) 4 SCC 95 ]. 14. Whereas, Mr. Palle Nageswar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor, contended that: i) Scope of discharge application filed by the petitioner and others under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. is very limited; ii) The Court while deciding discharge application, will see the material available on record and also the contents of charge sheet, statements of witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer while conducting investigation; iii) The Court cannot conduct a roving trial while deciding an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner and other accused to discharge them from the said CC; iv) On consideration of the said aspects only, the trial Court dismissed the said application; v) There is no error in it. 15. In the light of the aforesaid rival submissions, though initially the aforesaid crime was registered for the offences punishable under Sections - 147, 353 and 427 read with 149 of IPC, during the course of investigation, the Investigating officer dropped the action against the petitioner and others for the offence under Section - 353 of IPC, and added Section - 186 of IPC. 16. 16. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is apt to note the provisions of Sections - 147, 186 427 and 149 of IPC and the same are extracted as under: “ Section - 146: Rioting - Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting.” “ Section 147: Punishment for rioting -Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” “ Section - 186: Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions - Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” “ Section – 427: Mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees - Whoever commits mischief and thereby causes loss or damage to the amount of fifty rupees or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” “ 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object .— If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.” 17. In view of the above provisions, to constitute the offences under Section - 146 of IPC, it constitutes the following ingredients: (a) Force or violence; (b) Use of violence and force by unlawful assembly or by Member thereof; (c) In prosecution of common object of such unlawful assembly. 18. In the complaint dated 23.08.2017, LW.1 - de facto complainant specifically stated that when the public hearing was going on at Reddy Function Hall at about 12.15 P.M., the petitioner and other accused came there and started slogans against the Chief Minister and threw chairs and disturbed the proceedings. 18. In the complaint dated 23.08.2017, LW.1 - de facto complainant specifically stated that when the public hearing was going on at Reddy Function Hall at about 12.15 P.M., the petitioner and other accused came there and started slogans against the Chief Minister and threw chairs and disturbed the proceedings. Despite specific request by the District Collector and Environmental Engineer requested them to pacify and asked them to share views on the dais. There was chaos for a while and police intervened and there was disturbance to Government Employees to discharge duties. 19. In the statement recorded under Section - 161 of Cr.P.C., LW.1 reiterated the said facts. He has specifically stated that the petitioner and others entered into the Reddy Function Hall wherein public meeting was going on at 12.15 P.M. and started raising slogans that Chief Minister down, down threw chairs and stated that why your are here (nuvvendira ikkada vunnavu). Thus, they have obstructed him from discharging his duties. LWs.2 to 5 also stated on the very same lines. 20. Referring to the statements of LWs.1 to 5, Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that there is improvement in the statements of LWs.1 to 5. They have added names and also that the petitioner and other accused are responsible for the said incident. All of them are official witnesses. The Investigating Officer did not examine any independent witness. However, the said aspects are triable issues. The petitioner and other accused have to take the same as defence during trial and it is for the trial Court to consider the same. Thus, this Court is of the view that there was force used by the petitioner and other accused. They have lifted the chairs and threw. 21. In the light of the above, the contention of Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner that the contents of the charge sheet lacks the ingredients of offence under Section - 146 of IPC is unsustainable. 22. They have lifted the chairs and threw. 21. In the light of the above, the contention of Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner that the contents of the charge sheet lacks the ingredients of offence under Section - 146 of IPC is unsustainable. 22. As far as Section - 186 of IPC is concerned, as stated above, that the said provisions deals with ‘obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions’ and it says that whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Admittedly, LW.1 - de facto complainant is a public servant. Environmental Engineer and the District Collector were also there on the dais and they are conducting public hearing. The petitioner and other accused went into the Function Hall and obstructed the said proceedings of public hearing. Therefore, prima facie, contents of complaint dated 23.08.2017 and statements of LWs.2 to 5 constitute the offence under Section - 186 of IPC. 23. Mr. Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the police cannot register an FIR against the petitioner for the offence under Section - 186 of IPC in view of bar under Section - 195 of Cr.P.C. In the light of the same, it is relevant to extract Section - 195 (1(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. and the same is as under: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence- (1)No Court shall take cognizance – (a)(i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or xxxxx xxxxx” 24. In the light of the above, it is also relevant to note that Section - 155 of Cr.P.C. deals with ‘information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases’. In the light of the above, it is also relevant to note that Section - 155 of Cr.P.C. deals with ‘information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases’. The same is relevant and, therefore, it is extracted a sunder: “Section – 155: Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.- (1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer, the informant to the Magistrate. (2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. (3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case. (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable.” 25. In the light of the above, Section - 147 of IPC is cognizable and Section - 186 of IPC is non-cognizable while Section - 149 of IPC is an offence cognizable or non-cognizable. Section - 427 of IPC is non- cognizable. Therefore, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to bar under Section - 195 (1) (a)(i) of Cr.P.C. is unsustainable. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that LW.1 - de facto complainant is not at all related to the public hearing. He was only spectator. Therefore, he cannot be treated as ‘public servant’. The Investigating Officer did not record the statement of Environmental Engineer or any person from the said Department and also the District Collector. Therefore, the offence alleged against the petitioner under Section - 186 of IPC is liable to be quashed. 27. But, it is the specific case of LW.1 - de facto complainant that the District Collector requested him to attend the public hearing. He is form Irrigation Department. Therefore, the offence alleged against the petitioner under Section - 186 of IPC is liable to be quashed. 27. But, it is the specific case of LW.1 - de facto complainant that the District Collector requested him to attend the public hearing. He is form Irrigation Department. Public Hearing was with regard to the Kaleshwaram Project. Therefore, LW.1 was present in his official capacity and not in his individual capacity. It is also relevant to note that Section - 21 of IPC deals with ‘Public Servant’, and it says that ‘the words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions mentioned therein’. Admittedly, LW.1 is the Executive Engineer of Irrigation Department is directly connected to the said public hearing. Therefore, he is a public servant. 28. As stated above, Section - 141 of IPC deals with ‘unlawful assembly’ and it says that an assembly of five or more persons is designated an ‘unlawful assembly’, if the common object of the persons composing the assembly is; (i) to overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or Public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant etc. Thus, to attract the offence under Section - 141 of IPC, there should be five or more persons and there should be a common object of persons to do certain acts mentioned therein. There should also be criminal force. 29. Section - 349 of IPC deals with ‘force’, while Section - 350 of IPC deals with ‘criminal force’ and the same are relevant which are extracted as under: “ 349. Force. —A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other’s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other’s sense of feeling: Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described. First— By his own bodily power. First— By his own bodily power. Secondly— By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person. Thirdly— By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.” “ Section 350: Criminal force .- Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.” 30. As discussed above, it is the specific allegation of LWs.1 to 5 that the petitioner and other accused along with 300 members of the Congress Party entered into the meeting hall, disturbed the public hearing of Kaleshwaram Project by raising slogans CM down, down, threw the chairs. The petitioner - accused No.1 stated that LW.1 as to why he was there. Thus, there was force and it is a criminal force. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner in a petition under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. cannot contend that the said acts of the petitioner and others lack the ingredients of offence under Section - 149 of IPC and that there was no force, much less criminal force. These are defences which the petitioner has to take during trial and it is for the trial Court to consider the same. On the said grounds, the trial Court cannot discharge the petitioner herein from the aforesaid Calendar Case. Whether there was force and it was intentional etc., can be considered by the trial Court during trial. On the said grounds, the petitioner cannot file an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. to discharge him from the aforesaid CC. On consideration of the said aspects only, the trial Court dismissed the said application. 31. Whether there was force and it was intentional etc., can be considered by the trial Court during trial. On the said grounds, the petitioner cannot file an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. to discharge him from the aforesaid CC. On consideration of the said aspects only, the trial Court dismissed the said application. 31. Section - 425 of IPC deals with ‘mischief’, and to constitute the said offence, there should be an intention on a person to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits mischief. As discussed above, it is the specific case of LW.1 and 2 to 5 that the petitioner and others entered into the meeting hall, disturbed the public hearing on Kaleshwaram Project by raising slogans against the CM saying CM down, down and threw the chairs. Thus, they have disturbed and obstructed the public hearing. They have also abused LW.1 saying that whey he was there (Nuvvendira Ikkada Vunnavu). Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner cannot contend that the contents of charge sheet lack the ingredients of offence under Section - 425 of IPC. 32. The learned Magistrate while dealing with an application for discharge under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 33. In State of Tamil Nadu v. N.Suresh Rajan , [ 2014 11 SCC 709 ] , adverting to the earlier decision on the subject, the Apex Court held as follows: “At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and holds that the material would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 34. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Soundirarasu , [ (2023) 6 SCC 768 ] , referring the earlier judgments, the Apex Court held that: “At the stage of filing of an application for discharge, only a prima facie case has to be seen. The learned Magistrate cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses. Primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge held to be the test of existence of prima facie case, and at this stage probative value of materials on record is not be gone into. Even strong suspicion founded on the material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 35. In V.L. Muniswamy , (supra) the Apex Court held that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration as to whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. For the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the Court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 36. For the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the Court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 36. It is relevant to note that the said application was filed under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in subject crime. The challenge was to the order passed by the High Court under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C. whereas, in the present case, the petitioner filed an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. to discharge him from the CC. 37. In the light of the same, it is relevant to note that Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. “Section 239 of Cr.P.C.: When accused shall be discharged-If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.” 38. Thus, the learned Magistrate has to consider charge sheet and the documents sent under Section - 173 of Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate has to examine the same and on examination of the same, if the learned Magistrate comes to a conclusion the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused recording reasons. Thus, the scope of discharge under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. is very limited. On consideration of the said aspects only, the learned Magistrate passed impugned order dismissing the discharge application filed by the petitioner under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the facts of the aforesaid decision are different to the facts of the present case. 39. In Prafulla Kumar Samal, (supra) the Apex Court laid down the following principles in paragraph No.10, which are relevant and extracted hereunder: “10. 39. In Prafulla Kumar Samal, (supra) the Apex Court laid down the following principles in paragraph No.10, which are relevant and extracted hereunder: “10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” Perusal of impugned order would reveal that the learned Magistrate considered the contents of charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer and the statements of LWs.1 to 5 and dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate has also assigned specific reasons. Therefore, this decision is also not helpful to the case of petitioner. 40. In Dipakbhai Jagdischandra Patel, (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.23 which is as under: “23. Therefore, this decision is also not helpful to the case of petitioner. 40. In Dipakbhai Jagdischandra Patel, (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.23 which is as under: “23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.” As discussed above, the learned Magistrate on consideration of the contents of charge sheet and statements of LWs.1 to 5 only dismissed the discharge application. The contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Investigating Officer did not record the statement of owner of the function hall or any official of Environmental Department and the District Collector and there was no criminal force etc., cannot be considered in a petition under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. The same are defenses and the petitioner has to take the said defences during trial and it is for the trial Court to consider the same. Therefore, the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision is not useful to the petitioner herein. 41. Therefore, the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision is not useful to the petitioner herein. 41. In Kundan, (supra), A Division Bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad held that when the offences under Sections 186 and 353 of IPC are stated to have arisen out of the same incident, it was not possible to separate them since the facts were indivisible. Therefore, it was necessary for the learned Magistrate to consider the provisions of Section 195 (1)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. and considering the specific bar contained therein for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the IPC, to refuse to take cognizance of the charge sheet for the abovementioned offences in the absence of the complaint in writing, as defined in Section 2 (d) of Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said offences. As discussed above, in the present case, there is more than one offence. Whether the contents of charge sheet and statements of LWs.1 to 5 lack the ingredients of aforesaid offences cannot be considered in a petition filed under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. by learned Magistrate and this Court under Revisional Jurisdiction. Therefore, the facts of said case are altogether different to the facts of the present case. 42. In Paresh, (supra), a Division Bench of High Court of Bombay also reiterated the aforesaid principle. The facts of the said case are also inapplicable to the facts of the present case. However, it was a petition filed under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C., whereas in the present case, the petitioner filed an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. to discharge him from the aforesaid CC and the same was dismissed. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed the present revision. 43. In Bore Srinivas, (supra), also it is an application filed under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the facts of the said case are not useful to the facts of the present case. 44. In Mahendra Kumar Sonker, (supra) the Apex Court considered the facts of the said case, more particularly, the allegations levelled against accused therein. The accused made an attempt to wriggle out, and in the process, jostling and pushing appears to have happened, in the process of the appellant therein trying to extricate himself from the arrest. 44. In Mahendra Kumar Sonker, (supra) the Apex Court considered the facts of the said case, more particularly, the allegations levelled against accused therein. The accused made an attempt to wriggle out, and in the process, jostling and pushing appears to have happened, in the process of the appellant therein trying to extricate himself from the arrest. Therefore, the ingredients of assault and criminal force have not been attracted. It was a case where the trial Court convicted the accused, confirmed by the High Court. In appeal, on examination of the facts, more particularly, considering the evidence, both oral and documentary, the Apex Court came to a conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the assault and criminal force. Therefore, the facts of the said case are different to the facts of the present case. 45. In K. Dhananjay, (supra) the offence was under Section - 353 of IPC. As discussed above, in the present case, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer dropped the said offence in the charge sheet. 46. In Bhajan Lal, (supra) the Apex Court laid down certain parameters in exercise of inherent powers of High Court under Section - 482 of Cr.P.C, whereas, in the present case, the petitioner filed discharge application and the same was dismissed and the petitioner filed the present revision. Therefore, he cannot take shelter under the said judgment. 47. In Mata Bikh, (supra) the Apex Court examined the expression ‘public servant’ and held that a public servant concerned who has promulgated an order which has not been obeyed or which has been disobeyed, does not prefer to give a complaint or refuses to give a complaint then it is open to the superior public servant to whom the officer who initially passed the order is administratively subordinate to prefer a complaint in respect of the disobedience of the order promulgated by his subordinate. The word ‘subordinate’ means administratively subordinate i.e., some other public servant who is his official superior and under whose administrative control he works. 48. As discussed above, in the present case, respondent No.2 is de facto complainant, who is an Executive Engineer, Division No.2, Kataram and In-charge of Peddapalli. Public hearing was going on in respect of Kaleshwaram Project. Therefore he is an interested person. The District Collector asked him to attend the said public hearing. 48. As discussed above, in the present case, respondent No.2 is de facto complainant, who is an Executive Engineer, Division No.2, Kataram and In-charge of Peddapalli. Public hearing was going on in respect of Kaleshwaram Project. Therefore he is an interested person. The District Collector asked him to attend the said public hearing. He was present in the public hearing on 23.08.2017 as part of his duty and he is discharging his duties as public servant. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that LW.1 was only an Executive Engineer, he is not an interested person, and that he cannot be treated as public servant is unsustainable. 49. As discussed above, the scope of an application under Section - 239 of Cr.P.C. to discharge an accused from Calendar Case is very limited. Learned Magistrate has to consider contents of charge sheet and the statements of witnesses and on examination of the same if the learned Magistrate comes to a conclusion that there is material against an accused to frame charge, he cannot discharge the accused. As stated above, learned Magistrate considered the contents of charge sheet and also the statements of LWs.1 to 5 and came to the conclusion that prima facie the same constitutes the offences against the petitioner. He has assigned reasons considering the offences alleged against him and scope of discharge petition filed under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the petitioner herein failed to make out any case to interfere with the said order. Thus, this revision fails and is liable to be dismissed. 50. The present Criminal Revision Case is accordingly dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to take all the aforesaid defences before the trial Court and it is for the trial Court to consider the same uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this criminal revision case shall stand closed.