JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. The order of mine shall dispose of the above titled Revision Petitions, which have been filed by the applicants, against the order, dated 10th November, 2023, passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Court’). 2. By way of order, dated 10th November, 2023, the learned trial Court has dismissed the bail applications, filed by the petitioners, under Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’), pertaining to ECIR/SHSZO/04/2019, dated 19th July, 2019, registered under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’), with the Directorate of Enforcement, Sub Zonal Office, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as ‘ED’), for releasing them on bail, on account of the fact that the ED could not file the complete charge sheet, within the stipulated period, as per Section 167 CrPC. 3. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petitions, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 4. The petitioners have been arrested by the ED, in case, bearing No. ECIR/SHSZO/04/2019, dated 19th July, 2019, registered with ED. 5. According to petitioner-Hitesh Gandhi, he was arrested on 29th August, 2023, at 09.20 p.m. and the final report, consisting of complaint, was filed by the ED on 21st October, 2023, whereas, according to petitioner-Arvind Rajta, he was arrested on 30th August, 2023 at Shimla and ED has filed the incomplete report, on 21st October, 2023. 6. Elaborating their stand, it has been submitted by the petitioners that the complaint, without accompanying the documents and statements relied upon, cannot be said to be final report/charge sheet, in the eyes of law. 7. According to the petitioners, the ED has failed to file the charge sheet, within the stipulated period of sixty days, as such, they are entitled for the relief of statutory bail. 8. It is the further case of the petitioners that the learned trial Court, vide order, dated 10th November, 2023, has wrongly rejected their applications, as the learned trial Court has totally lost sight of the matter that the period of sixty days is to be calculated from the date of first remand given by the Court and not from the judicial remand, as held by the learned trial Court. 9. 9. Another ground, upon which, the impugned order has been sought to be quashed, is that the applications, under Section 167 (2) CrPC moved by the applicants, have wrongly been dismissed by the learned trial Court, as report, under Section 173 (2) CrPC means the report, which includes all the documents and statements of witnesses, so relied upon by the prosecution, whereas, on 21st October, 2023, the ED has filed the complaint and at that time, no documents whatsoever were annexed with the same. According to the petitioners, the documents were filed on 31st October, 2023, as such, the report, which was filed on 21st October, 2023, was incomplete, which has resulted into the accrual of the right of the petitioners to be released on default bail. 10. Even, according to the petitioners, on 31st October, 2023, the report, under Section 173 (2) CrPC was incomplete, as, ED has filed the documents on 2nd December, 2023, in the shape of pen driver, alongwith the application, filed before the learned trial Court. 11. To buttress their contentions, the applicants have relied upon the reply, filed by the ED, in the application, filed under Section 167 (2) CrPC, before the learned trial Court. 12. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to set aside the order, dated 10th November, 2023, passed by the learned trial Court with a prayer to allow the applications, filed under Section 167 (2) CrPC, for releasing them on bail. 13. Per contra, the learned Deputy Solicitor General of India has prayed that the learned trial Court has rightly considered the factual position and passed the order, which does not require any interference, by this Court. 14. In this case, it is not disputed that as per the documents, both the applicants were arrested on 30th August, 2023. There is a mark difference between ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’. 15. The arrest memos were duly signed by the applicants. No doubt, as per the documents, produced on the record, petitioner-Hitesh Gandhi was associated in the investigation of the case, on 29th August, 2023 and was directed to appear before the Assistant Director, forthwith, on 29th August, 2023. As per the grounds of arrest, petitioner-Hitesh Gandhi was apprised about the same on 30th August, 2023 and was arrested on 30th August, 2023 itself. 16. As per the grounds of arrest, petitioner-Hitesh Gandhi was apprised about the same on 30th August, 2023 and was arrested on 30th August, 2023 itself. 16. Similarly, petitioner-Arvind Rajta was directed to appear before the Assistant Director at Sub Zonal Office, Shimla, forthwith, on 30th August, 2023 and he was arrested on 30th August, 2023. 17. In view of the above, it can be said that petitioner-Hitesh Gandhi was in custody of ED on 29th August, 2023 and petitioner-Arvind Rajta was in custody on 30th August, 2023, but, both were arrested on 30th August, 2023. It is not the case of any of the petitioners that they were forced by the ED to put their signatures over the arrest memo, which does not contain the actual date. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case, titled as Vikram Singh and others versus State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2010 SC 1007 , has distinguished between the words ‘arrest’ and ‘custody’. Although, in the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the above terms in relation to the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, however, the said decision has bearing on the merits of the present case, as, the petitioners were associated in the investigation, by the ED, prior to their arrest, on 30th August, 2023. The relevant paras-12 and 16 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word “arrest” used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover, in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are descriptive of a person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion. * * * 16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been disposed of in the fields of village Daulatpur and the dead body was recovered and taken into possession by Memo Ex.PGGG signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar. We are unable to accept Mr. Sharan's bare submission that the evidence of Manohar Lal and Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar should not be believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of the prosecution, as no other material adverse circumstance has been brought to our notice.” 19. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Lahore High Court in case, titled as Hakam Khuda Yar versus Emperor, reported in AIR 1940 Lahore 129 . Relevant portion of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “……… As regards the first point, the term "custody" is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but the question is whether he can be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but the question is whether he can be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery when received from an accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is not in the custody of the police. If the information is relevant when it comes from a person in the custody of the police, there seems no good reason why it should not be so when it comes from an accused person, who is not in the custody of the police and therefore not under the influence of the police. The real intention of the Section very probably is to make information from an accused person which leads to discovery relevant even when the person is in police custody. But the language of, the Section makes such information relevant only when it comes from an accused person in the custody of the police. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended-- that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. However, apart from the above anomaly, the intention of the Section seems, I think, clear enough and that is to make information leading to a discovery relevant, even when it comes from an accused person who is in the custody of the police and thus subject to police influence. Ordinarily information coming from an accused person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. But if the information leads to the discovery of a relevant fact, that discovery is considered to be a guarantee of the truth of the information as has been pointed out already and hence such information is made relevant by Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. This Court has therefore put a wide interpretation on the word "custody" as used in Section 27. In AIR 1933 Lah 609, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shadi Lal and Coldstream J. that 'police custody' does not necessarily mean custody after formal arrest and that it also includes 'some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by the police.” 20. In view of the above, both the petitioners were proved to be arrested on 30th August, 2023, as per the documents, i.e. arrest memo, which has not been disputed by the petitioners, till date. 21. In this case, ED has filed complaint, under Sections 44 and 45 of the PMLA, alongwith list of documents, list of witnesses, on 21st October, 2023. On that day, the learned trial Court has passed the following order : “Office to check and report on 31.10.2023.” 22. On 31st October, 2023, the learned trial Court has passed the order, which is reproduced, as under: “Office report seen. Office raised objection regarding non-filing of the documents of the complaint. At this stage, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the complainant filed the documents in bulk. Criminal Ahlmad sought time for checking the documents. Allowed. Be listed for checking of documents on 01.12.2023.” 23. Pursuant to the said order, the Criminal Ahlmad has made the following report on 1st December, 2023: “Present Complaint filed by the Director Enforcement Under section 44 and 454 PML Act. I have gone through the complaint and found correct as per index prepared by the Complainant alongwith 28 sets of accused copies filed but copies of others documents not filed.” 24. Admittedly, those documents were filed by the ED on 2nd December, 2023, when the learned trial Court has passed the following order: “Office objections removed as the documents in the shape of Pen Drive alongwith application filed. It be registered. Now, to come up for consideration on 06.12.2023.” 25. Admittedly, those documents were filed by the ED on 2nd December, 2023, when the learned trial Court has passed the following order: “Office objections removed as the documents in the shape of Pen Drive alongwith application filed. It be registered. Now, to come up for consideration on 06.12.2023.” 25. On the basis of the admitted factual position, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioners, have vehemently argued that the petitioners are entitled for the default bail, under Section 167 (2) CrPC, as the ED has not filed the complete report, within the statutory period. 26. The provisions of Sections 167 and 173 CrPC are reproduced, as under: “167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, - (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation II.--If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be. Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution. Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub- inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where no order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2): Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify. * * * 173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. - (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. (1A) The investigation in relation to an offence under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be completed within two months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station. (2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, weather with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170. (ii) The officer shall also communicate, In such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation, (4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order- for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit. (5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate alongwith the report- (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; (b) the statements- recorded under section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject- matter of the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request. (7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in sub- section (5). (7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in sub- section (5). (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub- section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub- sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).” 27. Now, the questions, which arise for determination before this Court, are - whether the report, which has been submitted by the ED, in this case, on 21st October, 2023, is compliance of Section 173 or not and whether the complaint filed by the ED on 21st October, 2023, is the sufficient compliance of Section 167 CrPC. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case, titled as Central Bureau of Investigation versus R.S. Pai and another, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 82 , has elaborately discussed the provisions of Sections 173 (5) CrPC. Relevant para 7 of the judgment is reproduced, as under: “7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. In our view, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution and the context in which the police officer is required to forward to the Magistrate all the documents or the relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word “shall” used in sub- section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. In our view, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution and the context in which the police officer is required to forward to the Magistrate all the documents or the relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word “shall” used in sub- section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. Normally, the documents gathered during the investigation upon which the prosecution wants to rely are required to be forwarded to the Magistrate, but if there is some omission, it would not mean that the remaining documents cannot be produced subsequently. Analogous provision under Section 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was considered by this Court in Narayan Rao v. State of A.P. [ AIR 1957 SC 737 : 1958 SCR 283 : 1957 Cri LJ 1320] (SCR at p. 293) and it was held that the word “shall” occurring in sub- section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of Section 207-A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the scheme of sub-section (8) of Section 173 also makes it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is not precluded. If further investigation is not precluded then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation. In such cases, there cannot be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained.” (self emphasis supplied) 29. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case, titled as Narendra Kumar Amin versus Central Bureau of Investigation and others, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 417 , while holding that the provisions of Section 173 (5) CrPC are directory. Relevant paras 12 to 15 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “12. In this regard the learned Senior Counsel squarely relied on the three -Judge Bench judgment of this Court in CBI v. R.S. Pai [ (2002) 5 SCC 82 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 950] wherein at para 7, regarding relevant documents to be submitted at the time of charge-sheet, it is held as under: (SCC p. 85) “7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge- sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. In our view, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution and the context in which the police officer is required to forward to the Magistrate all the documents or the relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word ‘shall’ used in sub-section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. Normally, the documents gathered during the investigation upon which the prosecution wants to rely are required to be forwarded to the Magistrate, but if there is some omission, it would not mean that the remaining documents cannot be produced subsequently. Analogous provision under Section 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was considered by this Court in Narayan Rao v. State of A.P. [Narayan Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1957 SC 737 : 1957 Cri LJ 1320 : 1958 SCR 283 ] (SCR at p. 293) and it was held that the word ‘shall’ occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of Section 207-A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the scheme of sub- section (8) of Section 173 also makes it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is not precluded. If further investigation is not precluded then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation. In such cases, there cannot be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained.” In the said decision it is held that if some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained.” In the said decision it is held that if some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. The Bench proceeded further to observe that if further investigation is not precluded, then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation and the word “shall” used in sub-section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. Therefore, it is contended that the High Court is justified in refusing to grant default bail in favour of the appellant. 13. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions we have examined the impugned order [Narendra K. Amin v. CBI, Special Criminal Application No. 2167 of 2013, decided on 16-8-2013 (Guj)] to find out the correctness of the findings and reasons recorded keeping in view the statutory provisions under Sections 173(2) and (5) read with Section 2(r) CrPC and with reference to the judgments on which both the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon. In our considered view, it is an undisputed fact that the charge-sheet was filed on 3-7-2013 that is 90th day. Section 2(r) CrPC defines the expression “police report” as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2) CrPC. The particulars to be furnished in the police report which are extracted as above are complied with in the instant case. Therefore, filing of the police report as required under Section 173(2) is within 90 days in the instant case. 14. The High Court while dealing with this aspect has carefully considered the aforesaid relevant aspects of the case and stated its reasons at para 10.1 which reads thus: “10.1 From the above, it was seen that the contents of the charge-sheet set out in its prefatory details, showed the revelations in the investigation. The investigating officer mentioned the role played by the accused persons. The investigating officer opined on the basis of the material collected by him during the investigation that the prima facie commission of offence in his view was made out. The investigating officer mentioned the role played by the accused persons. The investigating officer opined on the basis of the material collected by him during the investigation that the prima facie commission of offence in his view was made out. It was evidently clear that the charge- sheet as presented incorporated all the necessary details required under Section 173(2) including that whether the offence was committed and by whom, which was in terms of clause (d) of Section 173(2). What is described as bare and empty format, in fact disclosed the contents necessary in law to be mentioned. It could not be viewed as a format hollow in its contents not to enable the Magistrate to take the cognizance.” Therefore, the High Court is right in rejecting the prayer of default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. Upon the filing of the police report, cognizance was taken by the learned ACJM on 3-7-2013 which is evident from the order passed by him which is extracted above. It is pertinent to point out that the said order remains unchallenged by the appellant. Therefore, it is not open for him to turn around and contend that cognizance was not taken by the learned ACJM on 3- 7-2013. On this count, the contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Ram Jethmalani appearing for the appellant are wholly untenable and liable to be rejected. 15. The observation made at para 76 of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, para 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] that the report is complete if it is accompanied by all documents and statements of witnesses as required under Section 173(5) CrPC cannot be construed as the statement of law, since it was not made in the context of the police report under Section 2(r) read with Sections 173(2), (5) and (8) CrPC. On the contrary, the three-Judge Bench of this Court in the decision in CBI v. R.S. Pai [ (2002) 5 SCC 82 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 950] case, after referring to the earlier judgment of the coordinate Bench in Narayan Rao case [Narayan Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1957 SC 737 : 1957 Cri LJ 1320 : 1958 SCR 283 ] categorically held that the word “shall” used in sub-section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but directory. The said statement of law is made after considering the provisions of Section 2(r) read with Sections 173(5) and (8) CrPC. Therefore, filing of the police report containing the particulars as mentioned under Section 173(2) amounted to completion of filing of the report before the learned ACJM, cognizance is taken and registered the same. The contention of the appellant that the police report filed in this case is not as per the legal requirement under Sections 173(2) and (5) CrPC which entitled him for default bail, was rightly rejected by the High Court and does not call for any interference by this Court.” 30. Perusal of the record shows that alongwith the complaint filed on 21st October, 2023, by the ED, list of documents relied upon, alongwith the number of pages has also been mentioned. The list is consisting of date of documents relied upon and as per the list, the documents, relied upon by ED, are consisting of 31608 pages. 31. Not only this, through Annexure-2, ED has submitted the list of 71 witnesses with the description of documents to be proved by the said witnesses. 32. Simply the documents, which have been relied upon by the ED, have not been submitted on the day, when complaint was filed, but, the list containing the details of those documents, with due pagination, as well as, the list of witnesses, with the description of the document(s), sought to be proved through witnesses, is attached with the complaint, does not entitle the petitioners to say that investigation has not been completed within the statutory period, entitling them to seek default bail. There is due compliance of the provisions of Section 167 CrPC, in the present case. 33. In view of the above, there is no occasion for this Court to differ with the conclusion, arrived at by the learned trial Court, but, for the reasons, so recorded above. 34. Consequently, the revision petitions are dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 35. Send down the record.