JUDGMENT : (Ashok Kumar Jain, J.) : 1. Instant second appeal is preferred by appellants-defendants aggrieved from dismissal of Civil Regular Appeal No.27/2006 (127/2001) by learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.7, Jaipur City, Jaipur, on dated 21.07.2010 and affirming the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2001 in Civil Suit No.86/1979. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant second appeal are that, the original-plaintiff-Rawal Rajeshwar Singh, Smt. Roopraj Laxmi with two minor plaintiffs-Raghvendra Singh and Yadvendra Singh had filed a suit for occupation, dispossession and mesne profit against Narayan Singh on 06.04.1979 indicating that defendant-Narayan Singh was provided with the premises mentioned in para no.2 of the plaint on license, as an employee of the plaintiff but when he was asked to work at Samod, District Jaipur then he did not return to duty from 01.06.1976 onwards. As a result his services were terminated from 01.09.1976 and the license was also terminated, therefore, a notice dated 03.01.1977 was served for handing over possession of the suit property and also demanding for mesne profit. 3. The original defendant has denied that due to his employment, the premises was given on license. The claim of license was denied by the defendant. The defendant has also denied the family settlement of the plaintiff and further claimed that defendant is in possession of the suit property from time of his forefather as the property was orally gifted to his forefather and at last protection of adverse possession also claimed by him. 4. During pendency of the civil suit Rawal Rajeshwar Singh and Smt. Roopraj Laxmi were expired and their legal representatives were substituted. The defendant-Narayan Singh was also expired and his legal representatives were substituted. Amended plaint and amended written statement were filed by both the parties. 5. Learned Trial Court has framed six issues and later framed three additional issues. 6. Total seven witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs and 23 documents were exhibited by the plaintiff. DW1 was examined on behalf of defendant and five documents exhibited. Learned Trial Court after considering the material on record has decided the issue nos.1, 2, 5 and 8 in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendant but issue nos.3, 4, 7 and 9 against the defendant and in favour of plaintiff. DW1 was examined on behalf of defendant and five documents exhibited. Learned Trial Court after considering the material on record has decided the issue nos.1, 2, 5 and 8 in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendant but issue nos.3, 4, 7 and 9 against the defendant and in favour of plaintiff. As a result of which the following decree was passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants (appellants herein):- ^^vr% mijksDr rudh;kr ds foospu ds vk/kkj ij oknhx.k dk nkok izfroknhx.k ds fo:} e; [kpkZ fMfØ fd;k tkdj izfr oknhx.k dks ;g vkKk nh tkrh gS fd fooknxzLr edku ftldk foLr`r o.kZu okni= ds en la[;k&2 esa fn;k x;k gS] dks [kkyh djds dCtk nks ekg ds vUnj vUnj oknhx.k dks lqiqnZ dj ns vkSj izfroknhx.k dks ;g Hkh vkKk nh tkrh gS fd fookfnr edku [kkyh djds dCtk oknhx.k dks lqiqnZ djus rd 75:- ekgokj ls fnukad 01-09-1976 ls ;wt ,.M vksdwis'ku crkSj vnk djsA fMfØ ipkZ fu;ekuqlkj cuk;k tkosA^^ 7. Aggrieved from the aforesaid, a civil regular appeal was preferred by the appellants-defendants before learned District Judge and same was transferred to learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.7, Jaipur City, Jaipur and this appeal was dismissed on 21.07.2010 but the decree was modified by the Appellate Court in the following manner:- ^^vr% vihykFkhZ izfroknhx.k }kjk izLrqr ;g vihy fo:} vk{ksfir fu.kZ; ,oa fMfØ fnukad 21-03-2001 ,rn~okjk [kfjt dh tkrh gS rFkk fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds vk{ksfir fu.kZ; ,oa fMfØ fnukad 21-03-2001 dh iqf"V dh tkrh gS ysfdu fn, x, vuqrks"k dks fuEu izdkj la'kksf/kr fd;k tkrk gS%& jsLiksMs.V oknhx.k }kjk izLrqr ewy okn] jsLiksMs.V oknh la[;k&4 ;knosUnzflag ds i{k esa rFkk izfroknhx.k ds fo:} fMfØ fd;k tkdj vihykFkhZ izfroknhx.k dks vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd os okn i= dh en la[;k&02 esa of.kZr fookfnr lEifRr dk [kkyh dk dCtk 'kkfUriwoZd nks ekg ds vUnj jsLiksMs.V oknh la[;k&04 ;knosUnzflag dks lEHkyk nsosa rFkk fnukad 01-09-76 ls dCtk lEHkykus rd dh vo/kh dk 75@& :i, ekfld dh nj ls e/;orhZ ykHk ¼ehUl izksfQV½ Hkh vnk djsA ;fn nks ekg dh vof/k es dCtk ugha lEHkyk;k tk, rks jsLiksMs.V oknh la[;k&4 ;knosUnz flag tfj, btjk; dCtk izkfIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxk o e/;orhZ ykHk dh nks ekg ds vUnj vnk;xh u gksus dh fLFkfr esa og jkf'k Hkh tfj, btjk; olwy djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA^^ 8. Aggrieved from aforesaid, the instant second appeal is preferred. Aggrieved from aforesaid, the instant second appeal is preferred. During the pendency of this appeal the respondent no.1/1 has expired. 9. At the time of consideration of appeal, learned counsel appearing for appellants has withdrawn himself and one of the substitute appellant no.1/2-Raghuveer Singh was present in person before this Court and he advanced his arguments. 10. The appellant while relying upon the evidence led by himself has submitted that the suit property was orally gifted to his forefather and they are in possession on the suit property for quite longer time than the claim of plaintiff. He also submitted that the suit property is in their share and they are the owners of this property. He also submitted that the plaintiffs were well aware about the hostile possession of Narayan Singh and they have not taken any steps within 12 years, therefore, on the basis of adverse possession they are also entitled for protection and the plaintiffs-respondents have no right to dispossess the appellants. He also submitted that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have acted contrary to the established principle of law and erroneously passed the judgment and decree against the appellants. He submitted that the substantial question of law are suggested in the memo of appeal and the appeal is liable to be admitted on the substantial question of law as proposed by the appellants in the memo of appeal. He also submitted that one of the daughter of the deceased defendant-Narayan Singh was not substituted as a party and the suit suffers from defects. He also submitted that no evidence to establish title and incident of employment of Narayan Singh was produced before the Trial Court and the Trial Court has committed serious illegality while passing the judgment and decree against the appellants. 11. A perusal of record also indicated that the appellants had relied on judgment in the cases of Maqboolunnisa Vs. Mohd. Saleha Quaraishi reported in (1998) 9 SCC 585 , Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mohamed Haji Latif and Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1413 , Bankey Behari Vs. Surya Narain @ Munnoo reported in (2004) 11 SCC 393 , Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam reported in AIR 2003 SC 761 , Wadi Vs. Amilal & Ors. reported in 2002 WLC (SC) Civil 726. Also relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Shankar Lal & Ors. Vs. Surya Narain @ Munnoo reported in (2004) 11 SCC 393 , Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam reported in AIR 2003 SC 761 , Wadi Vs. Amilal & Ors. reported in 2002 WLC (SC) Civil 726. Also relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Shankar Lal & Ors. Vs. The Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Shahpura & Ors. reported in 2006 (3) RLW 2049 and Banshilal Vs. Mohan Lal reported in 1996 (1) WLC (Raj.) 137. 12. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondents-plaintiffs on the ground that aggrieved from concurrent findings of fact the instant second appeal is preferred by the appellants and the question of fact cannot be re-agitated in second appeal preferred under Section 100 of CPC. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Govind Das Vs. Kanhiya Lal and Anr. reported in (2000) 9 SCC 219 , Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and Ors. reported in (2019) 17 SCC 71 and Naresh and Ors. Vs. Hemant and Ors. reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1490 and submitted that from a perusal of the substantial question of law as suggested by the appellants clearly indicates that these are question of fact that both the Courts below have answered in their judgments and any issue of facts cannot be raised in second appeal. He also submitted that from the evidence on record, it was well established that defendant was in the employment of plaintiffs and the suit property was given on license but on termination of his employment his license was revoked. He also submitted that after serving a notice Narayan Singh had failed to hand over the possession of the suit property and the plaintiffs were forced to file a civil suit for possession. He also submitted that a licensee has no right to challenge title of the employer by way of claim in written statement and submitted that no evidence or specific facts were pleaded by defendant to claim that the suit property was ever gifted by way of an oral gift. He submitted that a false and untenable claim was made by Narayan Singh and his legal heirs but same was not established before the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. He submitted that a false and untenable claim was made by Narayan Singh and his legal heirs but same was not established before the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. He also submitted that a gift of immovable property can only be effected by way of a registered deed and not by oral statement and the evidence of oral gift is not admissible. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Gomtibai (Smt) (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. Vs. Mattulal (Dead) through LRs. reported in (1996) 11 SCC 681 and Sudish Prasad and Ors. Vs. Babui Jonhia alias Manorama Devi and Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 181 . He further relied upon Tenzing Samchok Bhutia Vs. Health Care & Family Welfare Department, Government of Sikkim reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Sikkim 175. 13. Heard appellant-defendant and learned Senior Advocate for respondents-plaintiffs. Perused the record. Also perused the judgments as referred in support of appeal and also by learned Senior Advocate. 14. A perusal of the timeline submitted by learned Senior Advocate for respondents-plaintiffs reflects that the civil suit was filed on 06.04.1979 wherein written statement was filed on 13.09.1979. During the pendency of this civil suit, original defendant-Narayan Singh died on 19.11.1981. The legal representatives including wife and sons of Narayan Singh were taken on record on 13.09.1984. The Trial Court has passed a judgment and decree on 21.03.2001 and the first appeal was dismissed on 21.07.2010. 15. The instant second appeal was filed on 21.08.2010 and since then it has been pending for admission. During pendency of this appeal, an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was filed on 12.10.2022 by Smt. Ram Kanwar (daughter of Narayan Singh) for impleadment but same was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.03.2024. After this withdrawal, an application for recalling under Section 151 CPC was filed and same was dismissed at a cost of Rs.25,000/- on 09.05.2024. 16. A perusal of the entire record show that the plaintiffs described Narayan Singh as their employee and the suit property as described in para no.2 was given to him due to his employment. The original defendant-Narayan Singh, denied the para nos.2 and 3 of the plaint and in para no.4 has claimed full ownership on the suit property. The defendant has also denied the notice. The original defendant-Narayan Singh, denied the para nos.2 and 3 of the plaint and in para no.4 has claimed full ownership on the suit property. The defendant has also denied the notice. In specific objections, the defendant has claimed that he is in possession on suit property from the time of his forefather as the property was orally gifted by forefather of the plaintiff to the forefather of the defendant. Further, stated that the defendant is in possession as a owner of suit property for last 12, years so plaintiff is not entitled for possession. 17. DW1 (present appellant) deposed himself on behalf of appellant-defendant and the Trial Court after considering the entire evidence of plaintiff and defendants have decided the civil suit. We have gone through the evidence on record as well. 18. A perusal of record indicated that the Appellate Court has affirmed findings on issues no.1 and 2, which means that the issues related to facts which were agitated by defendant or after death of original defendant by legal representative (substituted defendant) were affirmed by the First Appellate Court. Issue no.1 pertains to oral gift and this issue was decided against the appellants-defendants. Similarly, issue no.2 pertains to adverse possession and it was also decided against appellants-defendants. 19. A perusal of cross-examination of DW1 Raghuveer Singh clearly indicate that the claim of the appellants-defendants was not established as the original defendant was in the employment of the plaintiffs. The forefathers of original defendant were residing at Samod, therefore, no specific averment was made in the evidence to establish the claim that the property was orally gifted to the forefather of the appellants-defendants. Similarly, when the hostile title was claimed, same is required to be established, but from the evidence on record no specific claim based on adverse possession was proved before the Trial Court. There is no misreading or non-reading of any material on record by learned Trial Court or by the First Appellate Court on issues no.1 and 2. 20. Similarly, the First Appellate Court has also endorsed the findings of the Trial Court on issue nos.3, 4, 7 and 9, the findings clearly indicate that the First Appellate Court after a thorough examination of facts and law had concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court. 21. 20. Similarly, the First Appellate Court has also endorsed the findings of the Trial Court on issue nos.3, 4, 7 and 9, the findings clearly indicate that the First Appellate Court after a thorough examination of facts and law had concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court. 21. The issue of oral gift and adverse possession are findings of fact and these facts were not established before the Trial Court and the Appellate Court has also concurred with the findings recorded by the Trial Court, therefore, the contention of appellant before this Court that the ownership of the property rests with appellant is ill founded and the issue of ownership and also of adverse possession are findings of fact, which cannot be re-agitated under Section 100 of CPC. 22. In case of Maqboolunnisa Vs. Mohd. Saleha Quaraishi (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the case of rent control and same is not applicable in the instant case. In case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mohamed Haji Latif and Ors. (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a party in possession of best evidence which would light on issue of controversy, if withholds same then adverse inference against him be drawn. Herein this case, nowhere this issue was established as from admission of DW1. It is on record that original defendant-Narayan Singh was in the employment of Samod Thikana, thus, this judgment is not applicable in the instant case. 23. In case of Bankey Behari Vs. Surya Narain @ Munnoo (supra), the issue is that of family partition/settlement and herein this is not the issue for consideration, therefore, this judgment is also not applicable in the instant case. In case of Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam (supra) again the issue of execution of will was raised but same cannot be agitated by one license is established, thus, this judgment is not applicable. 24. In case of Wadi Vs. Amilal & Ors. (supra), the issue pertains to application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC but a fact is quite clear that in case any application is filed to fill up a lacuna then the same cannot be allowed, therefore, this judgment is not application and moreover, no application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is filed for taking any evidence on record. Hence, this contention cannot be allowed. 25. In case of Gomtibai (Smt) (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. Vs. Hence, this contention cannot be allowed. 25. In case of Gomtibai (Smt) (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. Vs. Mattulal (Dead) through LRs. (supra) and Sudish Prasad and Ors. Vs. Babui Jonhia alias Manorama Devi and Ors. (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court considered that when there is claim of oral gift of immovable property then, same has to be a registered instrument and the claim by way of oral gift has no sanctity in eye of law. 26. Very recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering in the case of Hemavathi (supra) has observed that if no substantial question of law arose in a case then the record appeal should not have been entertained and ought to have been dismissed at the stage of admission. Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered some judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and the relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under:- “In this context, the law on the practice to be followed while considering a regular second appeal, has been reiterated by this Court in C.A. No. 4935 of 2023 in Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar vs. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar and Anr. dated 07.08.2023, and the relevant extracts in this regard are exposited as under: a) Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708 , as relied upon in C.A. Sulaiman vs. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee (2006) 6 SCC 392 : “7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.” b) State Bank of India vs. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 9215: “15. It is a matter of concern that the scope of second appeals and as also the procedural aspects of second appeals are often ignored by the High Courts. Some of the oft-repeated errors are: (a) Admitting a second appeal when it does not give rise to a substantial question of law. (b) Admitting second appeals without formulating substantial question of law. (c) Admitting second appeals by formulating a standard or mechanical question such as “whether on the facts and circumstances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for interference” as the substantial question of law. (b) Admitting second appeals without formulating substantial question of law. (c) Admitting second appeals by formulating a standard or mechanical question such as “whether on the facts and circumstances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for interference” as the substantial question of law. (d) Failing to consider and formulate relevant and appropriate substantial question(s) of law involved in the second appeal. (e) Rejecting second appeals on the ground that the case does not involve any substantial question of law, when the case in fact involves substantial questions of law. (f) Reformulating the substantial question of law after the conclusion of the hearing, while preparing the judgment, thereby denying an opportunity to the parties to make submissions on the reformulated substantial question of law. (g) Deciding second appeals by reappreciating evidence and interfering with findings of fact, ignoring the questions of law. These lapses or technical errors lead to injustice and also give rise to avoidable further appeals to this Court and remands by this Court, thereby prolonging the period of litigation. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not involving substantial questions of law are not entertained, and at the same time ensure that cases involving substantial questions of law are not rejected as not involving substantial questions of law.” c) Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216 : “16 A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, 9 the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same.” d) Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684 : “11. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same.” d) Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684 : “11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code; it is restricted to such substantial question or questions of law that may arise from the judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a second appeal is entertainable by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High Court to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial question of law and a decision on such question.” e) Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt, (2016) 11 SCC 235 “18. In the instant case, the High Court has not yet admitted the matter. It is not in dispute that no substantial question of law has been formulated as it could not have been when the appeal has not been admitted. We say so, as appeal under Section 100 CPC is required to be admitted only on substantial question/questions of law. It cannot be formal admission like an appeal under Section 96 CPC. That is the fundamental imperative. It is peremptory in character, and that makes the principle absolutely cardinal.” 27. Similarly, in case of Govind Das Vs. We say so, as appeal under Section 100 CPC is required to be admitted only on substantial question/questions of law. It cannot be formal admission like an appeal under Section 96 CPC. That is the fundamental imperative. It is peremptory in character, and that makes the principle absolutely cardinal.” 27. Similarly, in case of Govind Das Vs. Kanhiya Lal and Anr. (supra) it was held that the plausible concurrent findings of the fact of the Court below were required to be accepted. In case of Naresh and Ors. Vs. Hemant and Ors. (supra) again considering Section 100 of CPC Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in case of concurrent findings of fact it is not necessary to interfere in the findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by Appellate Court. Similarly, in case of Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and Ors. (supra) jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was explained. 28. Considering the scope of the present appeal under Section 100 CPC, the appeal cannot be entertained as it does not give rise to any substantial question of law which requires adjudication by this Court. It appears that from the material on record that no specific substantial question of law arises, therefore, there are no grounds to admit the appeal and the second appeal is liable to be dismissed at the stage of admission. 29. In view of discussion made herein above, the instant second appeal is hereby dismissed. 30. No order as to cost. 31. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of.