JUDGMENT : Mr. Gurvinder Singh Gill, J. This order shall dispose off the aforesaid two appeals arising out of judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.08.2002 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Ad hoc), Amritsar rendered in a trial arising out of FIR No.11 dated 25.01.1997 registered at P.S. Goindwal Sahib, under Sections 307/324 IPC, whereby accused/appellants, namely, Lakha Singh and Swaran Singh have been convicted and sentenced as under : Name of convict Under Section Rigorous Imprisonment Fine In default Lakha Singh 326 IPC Three years Rs.2000/- Two months RI Lakha Singh 324/34 IPC One year — — Swaran Singh 326/34 IPC Three years Rs.2000/- Two months RI Swaran Singh 324 IPC One year — — 2. While CRA-D-966-DBA-2002 has been filed by the State of Punjab challenging the acquittal of the accused (Lakha singh and Swaran Singh) with respect to offence under Section 307 IPC, CRA-S-1521-SB-2002 has been preferred by accused/appellants Lakha Singh and Swaran Singh challenging their conviction for offences under Sections 324 & 326 IPC as recorded by the trial Court. 3. The FIR in question was lodged on the basis of statement of Gurmej Singh recorded on 25.01.1997. The translated gist of the FIR reads as under : “I am resident of village Dhunda and I am into cultivation. About 5 months back, my elder brother Nachhattar Singh purchased land measuring 10 marlas outside the village, adjoining the behak of Lakha Singh. I and my brother used to store cow-dung cakes and firewood in the said land and also used tether our cattle there during day time. Lakha Singh, however, on 24.01.1997 closed the passage leading to said land from the side of the village by placing dry branches of trees. Yesterday i.e. on 24.01.1997 at about 3.00 PM, I and my brother went to the said land to fetch firewood and when we were untying our cattle and picking up firewood, then Lakha Singh armed with a Takua and Swaran Singh armed with a Gandassi came there while raising lalkaras that they will teach us a lesson for removing the branches of trees from the passage. I stepped forward and told Lakha Singh not to quarrel and that the matter can be resolved by sitting together, but they did not pay any heed and Lakha Singh gave a Takua blow hitting my head. I stepped forward and told Lakha Singh not to quarrel and that the matter can be resolved by sitting together, but they did not pay any heed and Lakha Singh gave a Takua blow hitting my head. Swaran Singh also gave a blow with Gandassi to me. I raised my left arm to ward off the blow, which hit me on the bicep of my left arm. My brother raised alarm ‘mar ditta – mar ditta’ upon which accused fled away from the spot alongwith their weapons. After making arrangement for a conveyance, I was removed to Guru Nanak Hospital, where Doctors medically examined me and applied bandages. Lakha Singh and Swaran Singh, in connivance with each other, had inflicted injuries to me.” 4. Pursuant to lodging of FIR, the Police visited the place of occurrence and prepared rough site plan of the place of occurrence. Accused Lakha Singh was arrested on 19.02.1997. During the course of interrogation, he suffered a disclosure statement (Ex.PF) on 21.02.1997 to the effect that he had kept concealed ‘Takua’ under the heap of Toria (mustard) crop. Pursuant to said disclosure statement, Lakha Singh led the police party to the nominated place and got Takua recovered, which was taken into possession vide memo Ex.PG. 5. Upon conclusion of investigation, since Swaran Singh was found innocent, challan was presented only against Lakha Singh in the Court of Illaqa Magistrate, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions on 05.06.1997, where charges were framed against accused Lakha Singh for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC on 11.07.1997 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Later on, with the aid of Section 319 Cr.P.C., accused Swaran Singh was also summoned to face trial by the trial Court vide order dated 11.08.1997. Thereafter, charges were amended and both the accused were charge-sheeted under Sections 307/34 IPC and 326/34 IPC on 21.12.1998 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. The prosecution in order to establish its case examined as many as 7 witnesses. PW-1 Gurmej Singh (complainant) and PW-2 Nachattar Singh (eye-witness) stated in tune with the version recorded in the FIR, in their examination-in-chief. 7. PW-3 Dr. 6. The prosecution in order to establish its case examined as many as 7 witnesses. PW-1 Gurmej Singh (complainant) and PW-2 Nachattar Singh (eye-witness) stated in tune with the version recorded in the FIR, in their examination-in-chief. 7. PW-3 Dr. Varinder Kumar Rampal, Medical Officer, Department of Radiodiagnosis, stated that no bone injury was detected upon x-ray examination of the left hand of the injured, but upon x-ray examination of skull, fracture of the right parietal bone was seen. 8. PW-4 SI Sukhdev Singh, who is the Investigating Officer, stated in respect of investigation conducted by him in the matter. PW-5 Rishi Ram, Draftsman, proved the scaled site plan as Ex.PJ. PW-6 Dr. Rattanjit Singh, who had medically examined injured Gurmej Singh in the first instance, has proved the MLR as Ex.PJ. He further stated that possibility of injury No.2 being dangerous to life could not be ruled out. PW-7 Darshan Singh, Librarian, is a formal witness, who brought the bed head ticket in respect of Gurmej Singh and produced the same in original. 9. Upon conclusion of the prosecution evidence, statements of the accused were recorded in terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein entire incriminating evidence was put to them to enable them to explain the same, but both the accused pleaded innocence and false implication. However, they did not chose to lead any evidence in their defence. 10. The learned trial Court, upon marshalling the evidence led by the prosecution, acquitted both the accused in respect of offence under Section 307 IPC, but held them guilty for having committed offences under Sections 326 & 324/34 IPC and 326/34 & 324 IPC respectively and sentenced them vide impugned judgment, as indicated above. Aggrieved by the same, State as well as the accused have preferred separate appeals. 11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused/appellants submitted that they have falsely been implicated in the present case and as a matter of fact, the complainant as well as the solitary eye-witness i.e. PW-1 Gurmej Singh and PW-2 Nachattar Singh during the course of their cross-examination recorded on 13.08.2002 and 08.07.2002 respectively, categorically stated that when their statements had been recorded earlier in the Court, they had been tutored by the police to make such statements and as a matter of fact they had not been able to identify the assailants. 12. 12. Learned counsel has further submitted that in any case it is a case where only 2 injuries were found on the person of injured including one injury on the head and as such, is not a case of multiple injuries from which it could be inferred that the same were caused with an intention to make an attempt to kill the injured. Learned counsel has further submitted that the accused have been seriously prejudiced in explaining the evidence appearing against them in the trial Court inasmuch as a joint statement in terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in respect of both the accused by the trial Court and which not only created ambiguity, but also caused prejudice to the accused to clarify with regard to the evidence produced by the prosecution against them. Learned counsel, while placing reliance upon 1993 ILR(Karnataka) 543 Vaijinath Vs. State of Karnataka, to support his aforesaid submission submitted that the impugned judgment could not sustain and is liable to be set aside. 13. On the other hand, learned State counsel, apart from supporting the conviction of the accused for offence under Sections 324 & 326 IPC, submitted that as a matter of fact the trial Court, upon having returned findings against the accused that they had caused the injuries in question with deadly weapons, a finding with respect to guilt of the accused for an offence under Section 307 IPC ought to have been returned as it is a case where an injury with a sharp edged weapon had been caused on the head of the injured-victim and which was found to be a grievous injury and has also been opined to be an injury, which could have proved dangerous to life. 14. We have considered the rival submissions addressed before this Court and with the assistance of learned counsel have also perused the record of the case. 15. It is the specific case of the prosecution that accused Lakha Singh and Swaran Singh inflicted injuries with the help of Takua and Gandassi on the head and hand of the victim. The factum of existence of such injuries is borne out from evidence regarding medical examination of injured Gurmej Singh, which has been duly proved by PW-6 Dr. Rattanjit Singh. PW-6 Dr. Rattanjit Singh has described the injuries found on the person of Gurmej Singh in the following manner : “1. The factum of existence of such injuries is borne out from evidence regarding medical examination of injured Gurmej Singh, which has been duly proved by PW-6 Dr. Rattanjit Singh. PW-6 Dr. Rattanjit Singh has described the injuries found on the person of Gurmej Singh in the following manner : “1. An incised wound 5 x 2 cm on the dorsum of left hand at the left of basis of index finger and thumb, clotted blood present. Depth was not probed. 2. An incised wound 6 x 2 cm on the posterior region of head. Placed centrally directed antero-posterior, clotted blood present. Depth not probed.” 16. A perusal of the aforesaid description of injuries shows that both the injuries are in the nature of incised wounds, which could very well be possible with sharp edged weapons, as were being carried by the accused in the instant case. Injury No.2 i.e. injury on head, was found to be grievous, as the same upon x-ray examination of skull was found to be a fracture as specifically opined by PW-3 Dr. Varinder Kumar Rampal. Both the Doctors were cross-examined, but nothing substantial could be elucidated during the course of their cross-examination so as to doubt the overall effect of existence of injuries or regarding the factum that the injury was found to be grievous in nature being a fracture. 17. However, this Court finds that although PW-1 Gurmej Singh and PW-2 Nachattar Singh did categorically state regarding the manner of occurrence in tune with the version recorded in the FIR, which is to the effect that Lakha Singh had inflicted a blow with Takua to the injured and Swaran Singh inflicted a blow with gandassi on the left arm of the injured, but when they were recalled for further cross-examinations, they resiled from their statements and went on to state that the statements made by them in their examination-in-chief were pursuant to their having tutored by the police and as a matter of fact, they could not identify the assailants. The Court, in such an eventuality, where a witness resiled during the cross-examination or further cross-examination, is put at caution and is required to scrutinize the testimony minutely so as to rule on the possibility of the witnesses having been intimidated or having been won over. The Court, in such an eventuality, where a witness resiled during the cross-examination or further cross-examination, is put at caution and is required to scrutinize the testimony minutely so as to rule on the possibility of the witnesses having been intimidated or having been won over. Though a semblance of doubt regarding veracity of statements made by the witnesses is created on account of the witnesses having resiled, but resiling during course of further cross-examination also leaves room for believing that resiling at such stage is due to winning over of witness. In any case, even if it is accepted that two injuries had been inflicted, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that it is a case where accused Lakha Singh had inflicted a single blow on head and there is nothing on record to show that he had inflicted repeated blows. The trial Court acquitted the accused in respect of offence under Section 307 IPC mainly on the ground that the opinion of the Doctor as regards injury being dangerous to life could not be relied upon, which had been given at a belated stage. However, the evidence led by prosecution as regards existence of injuries on person of victim is not wanting in any manner and which would constitute offence under Sections 324 & 326 IPC. 18. As far as challenge to acquittal of the accused/appellants in respect of offence under Section 307 IPC is concerned, having regard to the fact that it is a case where accused Lakha Singh inflicted a solitary injury on head of the injured and co-accused Swaran Singh inflicted a simple injury on hand of the injured, we do not find it to be a case where the findings of the trial Court deserve to be interfered at this stage in appeal against acquittal particularly keeping in view the fact that the occurrence had taken place 27 years back i.e. in the year 1997. 19. In view of the discussion made above, the appeal filed on behalf of the State of Punjab i.e. CRA-966-DBA-2002 challenging acquittal of the accused for an offence under Section 307 IPC is dismissed. 20. 19. In view of the discussion made above, the appeal filed on behalf of the State of Punjab i.e. CRA-966-DBA-2002 challenging acquittal of the accused for an offence under Section 307 IPC is dismissed. 20. As far as appeal filed on behalf of the accused/appellants i.e. CRA-S-1521-SB-2002 is concerned, while we do find that there is sufficient evidence on record to support findings of guilt of accused for having committed offences under Sections 324 and 326 IPC, but the trial Court has recorded statements of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. jointly. Since learned counsel has raised this issue and cited 1993 ILR(Karnataka) 543 Vaijinath Vs. State of Karnataka, to contend that trial stood vitiated on said count, we are obliged to consider the said contention. The questions posed in this regard may be stated precisely thus : (i) Whether statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of several co-accused recorded jointly amounts to defective examination and is improper compliance of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C.? (ii) Whether such defective examination of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. would vitiate the trial and entitle him to acquittal? 21. To answer the said questions, it is apposite to bear in mind the bare provisions of the Code and the interpretation made to said provisions by Hon’ble Supreme Court in various of its pronouncements. Scheme of The Code: 22. As per the scheme of the Code, after the entire prosecution evidence is recorded and before an accused steps in to lead evidence in his defence, the Court puts questions to him with regard to the case against him. In other words, it furnishes an opportunity to accused to put forth his stand or his version so as to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. reads as under : 313. Power to examine the accused. In other words, it furnishes an opportunity to accused to put forth his stand or his version so as to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. reads as under : 313. Power to examine the accused. - (1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court – (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary; (b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case : Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). (2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1). (3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. (5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section. 23. Some of the key features, as may be discerned upon perusal of the provisions reproduced, may be stated as under : (a) While the Court may at any stage of the case put any question to the accused, but it is obligatory for the Court to question him after conclusion of prosecution evidence before he leads defence evidence. The use of word ‘shall’ in Section 313 Cr.P.C. makes it mandatory for the Court to do so. (b) The purpose of such examination by Court is to enable the accused to “personally” explain the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence led by prosecution. 24. In Nar Singh Vs. The use of word ‘shall’ in Section 313 Cr.P.C. makes it mandatory for the Court to do so. (b) The purpose of such examination by Court is to enable the accused to “personally” explain the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence led by prosecution. 24. In Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 2015 (1) SCC 496 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that there are two kinds of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and that while examination Section 313 (1) (a) Cr.P.C. is optional, the examination under section 313 (1) (b) Cr.P.C. is general and mandatory. Purpose and importance of examination under Section 313Cr.P.C.: 25. A four Judges Bench of Apex Court, as far back as in 1953 in Tara Singh Vs. State AIR 1951 SC 441 , dwelled on the importance of examination of accused under Section 342 of Cr.P.C. 1898 (corresponding to Section 313 of the New Cr.P.C.1973 ) in the following words : “30. ….. …… …….. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning Trust, therefore, be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is, therefore, in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness, therefore, requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand.” 26. In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1953 SC 468 ) the Apex Court held that any circumstance in respect of which an accused was not examined under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used against him. 27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700 , while highlighting the purpose intended to be served by Section 313 Cr.P.C. held as under : “50. Section 313 of the Code is a statutory provision and embodies the fundamental principle of fairness based on the maxim audi alteram partem. 27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700 , while highlighting the purpose intended to be served by Section 313 Cr.P.C. held as under : “50. Section 313 of the Code is a statutory provision and embodies the fundamental principle of fairness based on the maxim audi alteram partem. It is trite law that the attention of the accused must be specifically invited to inculpatory pieces of evidence or circumstances laid on record with a view to giving him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so. The section imposes a heavy duty on the Court to take great care to ensure that the incriminating circumstances are put to the accused and his response solicited. The words ‘shall question him clearly bring out the mandatory character of the clause and cast an imperative duty on the Court and confer a corresponding right on the accused to an opportunity to offer his explanation for such incriminating material appearing against him. It is, therefore, true that the purpose of the examination of the accused under Section 313 is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the incriminating material which has surfaced on record.” 28. In Naval Kishore Singh Vs. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 502 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the importance of examining accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in following words : “The trial Judge should have kept in mind the importance of giving an opportunity to the accused to explain the adverse circumstances in the evidence and the Section 313 examination shall not be carried out as an empty formality. It is only after the entire evidence is unfurled the accused would be in a position to articulate his defence and to give explanation to the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. Such an opportunity being given to the accused is part of a fair trial and if it is done in slipshod manner, it may result in imperfect appreciation of evidence” (emphasis supplied) 29. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanatan Naskar & Another Vs. Such an opportunity being given to the accused is part of a fair trial and if it is done in slipshod manner, it may result in imperfect appreciation of evidence” (emphasis supplied) 29. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanatan Naskar & Another Vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 8 SCC 249 , held that the scope and object of examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain them. 30. Recently, the utility, object, importance and rationale behind the requirement of a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. came to be examined again by Apex Court in Premchand Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 5 SCC 522 , and the position has been summarised as under : “14. A bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in State of U.P. v. Lakhmi (1998) 4 SCC 336 has extensively dealt with the aspect of value or utility of a statement under section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 The object of section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 was explained by this Court in Sanatan Naskar v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 8 SCC 249 . The rationale behind the requirement to comply with section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 was adverted to by this Court in Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam (2019) 13 SCC 289 . Close on the heels thereof, in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab (2020) 8 SCC 811 , this Court restated the importance of section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 upon noticing the view taken in Reena Hazarika (supra) and M. Abbas v. State of Kerala (2001) 10 SCC 103 . 15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus: a. section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 upon noticing the view taken in Reena Hazarika (supra) and M. Abbas v. State of Kerala (2001) 10 SCC 103 . 15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus: a. section 313, Cr. P.C., 1973 [clause (b) of sub-section 1] is a valuable safeguard in the trial process for the accused to establish his innocence; b. section 313, which is intended to ensure a direct dialogue between the court and the accused, casts a mandatory duty on the court to question the accused generally on the case for the purpose of enabling him to personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; c. when questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court; d. the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognized defences; e. an accused can make a statement without fear of being cross-examined by the prosecution or the latter having any right to cross-examine him; f. the explanations that an accused may furnish cannot be considered in isolation but has to be considered in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, therefore, no conviction can be premised solely on the basis of the section 313 statement(s); g. statements of the accused in course of examination under section 313, since not on oath, do not constitute evidence under section 3 of the Evidence Act, yet, the answers given are relevant for finding the truth and examining the veracity of the prosecution case; h. statement(s) of the accused cannot be dissected to rely on the inculpatory part and ignore the exculpatory part and has/have to be read in the whole, inter alia, to test the authenticity of the exculpatory nature of admission; and i. if the accused takes a defence and proffers any alternate version of events or interpretation, the court has to carefully analyze and consider his statements; j. any failure to consider the accused’s explanation of incriminating circumstances, in a given case, may vitiate the trial and/or endanger the conviction.” 31. The consistent view of Apex Court is that examination of accused is not an idle formality and he is required to be examined with respect to each material aspect and each piece of incriminating evidence appearing against him so as to enable him to explain the same. Each of the incriminating evidence is to be put separately to the accused in an unambiguous manner. Defective examination vitiates trial only if accused stands prejudiced: 32. The four Judges Bench of Apex Court in Tara Singh’s case (supra), while underlining the importance of examination of accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. (Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 1973), elaborated on the effect of its non-compliance in the following words : “30. ….. …… I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice.” 33. A three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajmer Singh Vs. State Of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 76 , while examining the question of retrial upon finding that there was defective examination of accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. (now 313 in new Code), by Sessions Judge, observed as under : “9. ……. ……. ……… It is well settled that every error or omission not in compliance with the provisions of Section 342 does not necessarily vitiate a trial. Errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities, and as held in - ‘Tara Singh’s case, 1951 SCR 729 , the question whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to the accused. We are of the opinion that the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 in this case is not so gross as would justify our quashing the conviction, and ordering a retrial. 34. In Ram Shankar Singh Vs. We are of the opinion that the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 in this case is not so gross as would justify our quashing the conviction, and ordering a retrial. 34. In Ram Shankar Singh Vs. State of West Bengal, 1962 SC 123, another three Judges Bench of Supreme Court, while reiterating the view taken in Ajmer Singh’s case stated the position of law in following words : “……. ……… Duty is thereby imposed upon the Court to question the accused generally in a case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him. This is a necessary corollary of the presumption of innocence on which our criminal jurisprudence is founded. …….. …… ……. Examination of the accused under Section 342 is not intended to be an idle formality, it has to be carried out in the interest of justice and fair-play to the accused : by a slipshod, examination which is the result of imperfect appreciation of the evidence, idleness or negligence the position of the accused cannot be permitted to be made more difficult than what it is in a trial for an offence. ……. ……. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person may be able to appreciate and understand.” The examination by the sessions Judge of the appellants was perfunctory, but as observed in Ajmer Singh’s case every error or omission in complying with Section 342 does not vitiate the trial. ……. ……. …… Failure to comply with the provisions of Section 342 is an irregularity; and unless injustice is shown to have resulted therefrom a mere irregularity is by itself not sufficient to justify an order of retrial. ……. ……. …… Failure to comply with the provisions of Section 342 is an irregularity; and unless injustice is shown to have resulted therefrom a mere irregularity is by itself not sufficient to justify an order of retrial. The appellate court must always consider whether by reason of failure to comply with a procedural provision, which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court the accused have been materially prejudiced in the present case, we are of the view, having regard to the circumstances, that the appellants have not been prejudiced, because of failure to examine them strictly in compliance of the terms of Section 342 of the Code and that view is strengthened by the fact that the plea was not raised in the High Court by their counsel who had otherwise raised numerous questions in support of the case of the appellants.” 35. A three-Judge Bench in Jai Dev Vs. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1963 SC 612 ) held that if it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him, that would no doubt be a serious infirmity. However, it was observed that no general and inexorable rule could be laid that wherever it is found that one of the points used against the accused person has not been put to him, either the trial is vitiated or his conviction is rendered bad and that the ultimate test in determining whether the provision has been fairly complied with or not would be that having regard to all the questions put to him, did he get an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him, that would no doubt be a serious infirmity. 36. Even in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra, ( 1973 (2) SCC 793 ), another three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the fallout of omission to put to the accused a question on a vital circumstance appearing against him in the prosecution evidence held that where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso-facto vitiate the proceedings and the prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. 37. In Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma Vs. 37. In Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma Vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2010 (10) SCC 439 , it has been held as under : “31. Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code make it obligatory for the court to question the accused on the evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular circumstance, instead he must show that such non-examination has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission of the court” (emphasis supplied) 38. The ratio, as may be discerned from the judgments referred to above, is that an accused, in order to take benefit of defective examination would be required to establish that on account of such defective examination, he has been prejudiced in defending himself. A petty defect or omission of an insignificant question would not result in prejudicing the accused. However, in case it is established that an accused has been prejudiced, then as to whether the trial would stand totally vitiated and an accused would ipso-facto be entitled to acquittal or not is another material issue which has come up repeatedly before the Courts and it has been held that such defect is a curable defect. A Curable Defect : 39. In Harnam Singh Vs. State (Delhi Admn) (1976) 2 SCC 819 , it was held as under : “22. Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, casts a duty on the Court to put, at any enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately. Failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately. Failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused. If the irregularity does not, in fact, occasion a failure of justice, it is curable under Section 537 of the Code.” (emphasis supplied) 40. The question as regards re-trial or acquittal of accused upon prejudice having been shown to the Court on account of improper examination of accused under Section 33 Cr.P.C. was examined by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 2015 (1) SCC 496 . While referring to earlier judgments including Asraf Ali Vs. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328 and Ganeshmal Jashraj Vs. Government of Gujarat & Anr., (1980) 1 SCC 363 , the courses available to the appellate court have been briefly summarised as under :- “(i) Whenever a plea of non-compliance of Section 313 Cr.P.C. is raised, it is within the powers of the appellate court to examine and further examine the convict or the counsel appearing for the accused and the said answers shall be taken into consideration for deciding the matter. If the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any reasonable explanation of such circumstance, the court may assume that the accused has no acceptable explanation to offer; (ii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, if the appellate court comes to the conclusion that no prejudice was caused or no failure of justice was occasioned, the appellate court will hear and decide the matter upon merits. (iii) If the appellate court is of the opinion that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has occasioned or is likely to have occasioned prejudice to the accused, the appellate court may direct retrial from the stage of recording the statements of the accused from the point where the irregularity occurred, that is, from the stage of questioning the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the trial Judge may be directed to examine the accused afresh and defence witness if any and dispose of the matter afresh; (iv) The appellate court may decline to remit the matter to the trial court for retrial on account of long time already spent in the trial of the case and the period of sentence already undergone by the convict and in the facts and circumstances of the case, may decide the appeal on its own merits, keeping in view the prejudice caused to the accused.” The present case : 41. Adverting back to the facts of the present case, the instant case is a case where the questions put to accused prima-facie seem to be in order and well drafted and all the material incriminating circumstances have been put to them, but the statement has been recorded jointly of both the accused. The word “personally” existing in Section 313 Cr.P.C. tends to suggests that explanation as regards incriminating evidence has to be sought individually from each of the accused. Such opportunity as afforded to the accused to explain his stand on the incriminating circumstances is in addition to what his counsel would have already done by way of cross-examination. 42. Bombay High Court in Balkrishna Anant Hirlekar Vs. Emperor : AIR 1931 Bombay 132 : (32 CriLJ 572), in a case where the statements of the accused under Section 342 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 were recorded jointly in a single paragraph, observed as under : “It has repeatedly been held by this Court that failure to record the statement of an accused person is an illegality which vitiates the trial, and it is evident that a joint statement in the form in which we find it in this case, is not a compliance with the section, for it is quite conceivable that some of the accused may have had a different defence.” 43. In 1993 ILR (Karnataka) 543 Vaijinath Vs. In 1993 ILR (Karnataka) 543 Vaijinath Vs. State of Karnataka, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court, in a case of jointly recorded statements of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. held as under: “3. The Lahore High Court as far back as in the year 1926 in the case of Musammat Ghasiti And Anr. v. Emperor, 27 Crl L.J. 408 relying on a Decision in the case of Allu v. Emperor, 75 Indian Cases 980 observed that because the Magistrate in that case did not examine each accused separately but recorded their statements collectively which was forbidden by Section 364 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 trial itself was vitiated. The learned Chief Justice Sir Shadi Lal concluded the Judgment with the following observations:- “It, however, appears that the Magistrate did not examine each accused separately, but recorded their statements collectively; and this is an illegality which vitiates the proceedings. Accordingly, I set aside the conviction and sentence and remit the case to the magistrate for trial in accordance with law from the stage at which the illegality was committed.” 44. The question as to whether statement of two or more accused recorded jointly is ipso-facto treated to be defective or as to whether the same is required to be scrutinised in context of evidence led by prosecution is a question which has to be answered not just bearing in mind the word ‘personally’ as existing in Section 313 Cr.P.C., but on the basis of a very basic rationale that two persons cannot be expected to have spoken in unison while answering all the questions even if they thought identically. An anology, in this context, may be drawn from the view taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in State (N.C.T. of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, 2005 (11) SCC 600 , wherein while discussing admissibility and reliability of joint disclosure statements made under Section 27 of Evidence Act and it was observed as under : “14. …… …… …… ……. It seems to us that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other person would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later, or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may reduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to the police officer at the same time. We do not think that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one after the other without any break - almost simultaneously, and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, we find no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27. However, there may be practical difficulties in placing reliance on such evidence. It may be difficult for the witness (generally the police officer), to depose which accused spoke what words and in what sequence. In other words, the deposition in regard to the information given by the two accused may be exposed to criticism from the stand point of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects, as pointed out by Mr. Gopal Subramanium. Whether and to what extent such a simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon by the Court is really a matter of evaluation of evidence. With these prefaratory remarks, we have to refer to two decisions of this Court which are relied upon by the learned defence counsel” 45. Similarly, in a case under NDPS Act, where an offer in terms of section 50 of the NDPS Act was extended jointly has been held to be non-compliance of the salutary provisions by Hon’ble Apex Court. The relevant extract from State of Rajasthan Vs. Parmanand, 2014 (5) SCC 345 reads as under : “14. Similarly, in a case under NDPS Act, where an offer in terms of section 50 of the NDPS Act was extended jointly has been held to be non-compliance of the salutary provisions by Hon’ble Apex Court. The relevant extract from State of Rajasthan Vs. Parmanand, 2014 (5) SCC 345 reads as under : “14. In our opinion, a joint communication of the right available under section 50(1) of the NDPS Act to the accused would frustrate the very purport of Section 50. Communication of the said right to the person who is about to be searched is not an empty formality.” 46. In a case where there is omission to put specific question pertaining to some circumstance of the case to an accused during his examination in terms of section 313 Cr.P.C., it is left to the Court to assess as to whether such question has caused prejudice to accused or not having regard to the nature of such circumstance being incriminatory or not. However, a case of joint statement/examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. rests on a different pedestal inasmuch as a joint statement, would from its very inception would be leading to ambiguity as regards attribution of stand of each accused and thus be bad. Such a statement would ipso-facto vitiate proceedings of trial from the point when such statement was recorded. However, having regard to the ratio of judgments rendered in Harnam Singh’s case (supra) and Nar Singh’s case (supra), such a defect is a curable defect and the appellate Court can get it rectified by remanding the matter to trial Court with a direction to record statements afresh and thereafter decide the matter afresh. In exceptional cases, particularly where a substantial period has elapsed ever since commission of the offence as in the present case where the offence was committed more than two decades earlier, the appellate Court may chose to acquit the accused on account of such defective compliance. The questions (i) & (ii) stand answered accordingly. 47. In the present case, having regard to the fact that the occurrence in question had taken place in the year 1997 i.e. 27 years back and there is nothing on record that the accused have been involved in multiple cases, we do not deem it appropriate to remand the matter despite the fact that defective examination of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is otherwise a curable defect. The accused, under these circumstances, are entitled to be acquitted. 48. The appeal, filed on behalf of accused, as such, is accepted and the appellants are acquitted of all the charges framed against them. Their bail bonds/ surety bonds shall stand discharged. 49. A photocopy of this order be placed on the connected file.