JUDGMENT : (Per the Hon’ble Sri Justice K.Sreenivasa Reddy) Sole accused in Sessions Case No.23 of 2016 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur is the appellant herein. 2. Vide judgment dated 27.07.2016 in the aforesaid Sessions Case, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two years. 3. The substance of charge as against the accused is that the accused, being husband of one Sunanda (hereinafter referred to, as “the deceased”), having addicted to drinking alcohol and developed illicit intimacy with another lady, on 25.10.2013 at about 8.30 PM came to his house in intoxicated state, picked up quarrel with her, became wild, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, and subsequently she died while undergoing treatment and thereby he committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the accused, the deceased and the material prosecution witnesses are residents of Somandepalli village. P.W.1 is junior paternal uncle of the deceased. P.W.2 is mother of the deceased. P.W.3 is brother of the deceased. P.W.4 is wife of P.W.1. The deceased was living with her husband (the accused) along with her daughter at Somandepalli village. The accused was addicted to alcohol and developed illicit intimacy with a lady in the same village, resulting in domestic quarrels in their family. In connection with the same, elders intervened and chastised the accused, but the accused did not change his attitude. There were quarrels between the deceased and the accused, and inspite of several panchayats, the accused did not change his character. On 25.10.2013 at about 8.30 PM, the accused went to his house under intoxication and picked up a quarrel with the deceased. Suddenly, the accused became wild, poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze. When the deceased raised cries, neighbourers rushed to the house of the deceased, and on seeing them, the accused ran away from the scene of offence. The neighbourers put off the flames, shifted the injured to an R.M.P. Doctor and provided first aid. Later, the deceased was shifted to Government Area Hospital, Hindupur. When the deceased raised cries, neighbourers rushed to the house of the deceased, and on seeing them, the accused ran away from the scene of offence. The neighbourers put off the flames, shifted the injured to an R.M.P. Doctor and provided first aid. Later, the deceased was shifted to Government Area Hospital, Hindupur. At about 10.20 PM on that day, on information, P.W.11, who was working as Head Constable in I Town police station, Hindupur, proceeded to Emergency Ward. At that time, Doctor was present there. P.W.11 examined the deceased and recorded Ex.P15- statement of the deceased. After recording the statement, he read over and explained the same to her and she admitted that whatever P.W.1 had written is true and correct. P.W.1 obtained signatures of the deceased and thereafter forwarded a copy of the same to the police station. P.W.20, the then Sub Inspector of Police, Hindupur Rural Police Station, received medical intimation from the District Government Hospital, Hindupur along with statement of the deceased, and based on the same, he registered a case in crime No.102 of 2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 307 IPC under Ex.P27-FIR. On 26.10.2013 at about 11.15 AM, P.W.20 proceeded to the Hospital, along with P.Ws.12 and 17, and recorded statement of the deceased and the same was videographed. Ex.P28 is the videograph. P.W.17 converted the videograph into C.D. and submitted to P.W.20. Thereafter, P.W.20 examined four witnesses in the hospital, observed the scene of offence under Ex.P30- mahazar and prepared Ex.P31-rough sketch of the scene of offence in the presence of P.W.18. P.W.20 examined the R.M.P. Doctor (P.W.7) and recorded his statement. He also examined P.W.8 and recorded his statement. Thereafter, he gave a requisition to P.W.14-Mandal Executive Magistrate to record statement of the deceased and P.W.14 recorded Ex.P20-statement of the deceased. On his requisition, P.W.13-Junior Civil Judge, Hindupur recorded Ex.P17-statement of the deceased. On 29.10.2013, on receipt of death intimation of the deceased from Bangalore Victoria Hospital, he altered Section of Law from 307 IPC to 302 IPC and issued Ex.P32-altered FIR. On 29.10.2013 at about 6.00 PM, on receipt of copy of the altered FIR, P.W.21-the then Inspector of Police, Penukonda took up further investigation, visited the scene of offence, examined P.W.1 and other witnesses and recorded their statements. On 29.10.2013 at about 6.00 PM, on receipt of copy of the altered FIR, P.W.21-the then Inspector of Police, Penukonda took up further investigation, visited the scene of offence, examined P.W.1 and other witnesses and recorded their statements. On 30.10.2013 at about 9.30 AM, P.W.21 conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased under Ex.P33-inquest report. During inquest, P.W.21 examined P.Ws.1 to 4 and recorded their statements. On 30.10.2013, P.W.15-Medical Officer, Forensic Medicine, Victoria Hospital, Bangalore conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. Ex.P21 is the portmortem examination report. According to the Doctor, death of the deceased is due to toxaemia as a result of burns injuries. P.W.21 took up further investigation, arrested the accused and after completion of investigation, laid the charge sheet. 5. In support of its case, prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 21 and got marked Exs.P1 to P36, besides material objects 1 to 6. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused contended that all the material prosecution witnesses did not support the prosecution case and the entire case of the prosecution rests on the Dying Declarations made by the deceased to P.Ws.11, 13, 14 and 20 under Exs.P15, 17, 20 and 28 respectively. According to him, all the dying declarations are inconsistent with each other and the same cannot be relied upon. He further contended that in the absence of any corroboration, the dying declarations cannot be the sole basis for conviction. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the alleged incident is said to have taken place on a spur of moment, and in any event, the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC would not attract as against the appellant herein. Hence, he prays to set aside the conviction and recorded by the trial Court. 7. On the contrary, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the dying declarations Exs.P15, 17, 20 and 28 are consistent with each other pointing the guilt to the accused that it is the appellant/accused who poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire on the fateful day, and from the evidence of P.W.15-Doctor and recitals in Ex.P21-postmortem examination report, cause of death of the deceased is due to toxaemia as a result of burns injuries. He further submitted that irrespective of the fact whether there is corroboration or not, dying declaration can be relied upon to base a conviction, if it is proved that the same is true and trustworthy and not an outcome of tutoring or prompting by any of the relatives or interested persons of the deceased and if the deceased is in a fit state of mind to give the statement, and the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is well reasoned and calls for no interference. 8. The point that arises for determination is whether the prosecution is able to bring home the guilt of the appellant/accused for the charge levelled against him beyond reasonable doubt? 9. On a perusal of the entire evidence on record goes to show that none of the material prosecution witnesses supported the prosecution case. Entire case rests upon Dying Declarations made by the deceased to P.Ws.11, 13, 14 and 20 under Exs.P15, 17, 20 and 28 respectively. 10. P.W.11 was working as Head Constable in I Town police station, Hindupur and he was in-charge of Hospital Out Post on the date of the incident. On 25.10.2013, when he was on duty, at about 10.20 PM, he received intimation from Emergency Ward through a security guard. On that, he proceeded to the Ward and by that time, Doctor was also present. He examined burns of the deceased and recorded her statement. After recording the statement, he read over and explained to her and the same were admitted by the deceased. At the end of the statement, P.W.11 obtained signature of the deceased. P.W.11 further deposed that the Doctor who was present and certified that the patient was conscious and coherent while making the statement. Ex.P15 is the statement recorded by P.W.11. In Ex.P15, the deceased stated that marriage of the deceased with the accused was solemnized about 10 years back and they lived happily for 7 years. For the last 2 years, the accused developed illegal intimacy with an S.C. caste woman of their village, and in connection with that, the deceased and the accused quarrelled number of times. It is further clear from Ex.P15 that on 25.10.2013 night, the accused went to the house, picked up quarrel with her and picked up kerosene can in the house, poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire, and thereafter ran away from that place. It is further clear from Ex.P15 that on 25.10.2013 night, the accused went to the house, picked up quarrel with her and picked up kerosene can in the house, poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire, and thereafter ran away from that place. When the deceased raised cries, neighbours came and put off the flames. 11. P.W.20 worked as Sub Inspector of Police, Hindupur Rural Police Station. On receiving medical intimation from the District Government Hospital, Hindupur along with statement of the deceased, he registered a case in crime No.102 of 2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 307 IPC. Ex.P27 is the FIR. It is his further evidence that on 26.10.2013 at about 11.15 AM, he along with P.Ws.12 and 17 reached the Hospital and recorded dying declaration of the injured, which was videographed. Ex.P28 is the mahazar. He deposed that P.W.17 converted the videography into C.D. and submitted to him. According to Ex.P28, the accused went to the house on the date of the incident, abused the deceased, beat her indiscriminately; that the accused also beat their daughter and necked out her from the house, and thereafter, poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire. 12. P.W.14 worked as worked as Mandal Executive Magistrate, Hindupur at the relevant point of time of the incident. According to his evidence, on receipt of intimation Ex.P18 from the police, he proceeded to the Hindupur Government Hospital, identified the injured person with the help of duty doctor and asked the duty doctor to certify the mental condition of the patient to make the declaration. The Doctor certified that the patient was conscious and coherent to give the statement, under Ex.P19. Ex.P20 is the dying declaration recorded by P.W.14. According to Ex.P20, the deceased questioned the accused about coming to house in drunken state and going to concubine’s house and also for not working anywhere; in connection with that, the accused picked up a quarrel and poured half litre kerosene, which was available in the house, on her and lit fire to her. 13. P.W.13 worked as Junior Civil Judge, Hindupur at the relevant point of time of the incident. 13. P.W.13 worked as Junior Civil Judge, Hindupur at the relevant point of time of the incident. According to her evidence, on 26.10.2013, she received Ex.P11-hospital intimation at 4.10 PM to record statement of the deceased, proceeded to the hospital by 4.15 PM, identified the declarant with the help of duty doctor and the Doctor certified that the patient was conscious and coherent to give the statement under Ex.P12. It is her further evidence that after putting preliminary questions to the declarant and on satisfying that the declarant was fit to make the declaration, she recorded the statement of the deceased Ex.P17. According to Ex.P17, on the date of the incident, the deceased came to house in intoxicated state, quarrelled with the deceased, poured kerosene on her and lit fire. 14. A statement made by a person either verbal or written as to cause of his death or any of the circumstances leading to his death, when the cause of the death of such person comes into question, is admissible in evidence under Section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Law is well settled that if the dying declaration is found to be true and trustworthy and not an outcome of tutoring or prompting by any of the relatives or interested persons of the deceased, then it can be acted upon and conviction can be maintained even without any corroboration. 15. Law is well settled that if the dying declaration is found to be true and trustworthy and not an outcome of tutoring or prompting by any of the relatives or interested persons of the deceased, then it can be acted upon and conviction can be maintained even without any corroboration. 15. On this aspect, in KUSHAL RAO V STATE OF BOMBAY, AIR 1958 SC 22 , wherein it was held thus (Para 16): “On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (a) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence that other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as for as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the lying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” In Paniben v. State, (1992) 2 SCC 474 , wherein the Hon”ble Apex Court summed up the principles governing dying declaration, as under: “(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (iii) This Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it, is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.” 16. On a perusal of the Dying Declarations made by the deceased to P.Ws.11, 13, 14 and 20 under Exs.P15, 17, 20 and 28 respectively, it is apparent that the accused had gone to his house in a drunken state and a quarrel ensued between the accused and the deceased and thereafter he poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire to her. All the dying declarations are consistent with each other, which point the finger at the accused. In such circumstances, in the absence of any corroboration, the dying declarations can be relied upon to base a conviction. 17. P.W.15 was the Medical Officer, Forensic Medicine, Victoria Hospital, Bangalore, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased is due to toxaemia as a result of burn injuries sustained. 17. P.W.15 was the Medical Officer, Forensic Medicine, Victoria Hospital, Bangalore, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased is due to toxaemia as a result of burn injuries sustained. P.W.17 was managing a photo studio by name Lakshmi Photo Studio in Indira Park Municipal Complex, Hindupur. P.W.12 was working under him. According to P.W.17, on 26.10.2013 at about 10.45AM, he along with P.W.12, videographed dying declaration of the deceased; they made the videograph into C.D. and submitted to P.W.20, who drafted the dying declaration of the deceased, and he signed the same. There is corroboration between evidence of P.Ws.12, 17 and 20 in connection with recording of the dying declaration by videographing. 18. It is also pertinent to mention here that a perusal of the impugned judgment goes to show that the dying declaration recorded by P.W.20 was displayed on laptop in open court and the same was heard. The said videograph was also shown to the accused. The accused, after seeing the said C.D., absconded from attending the Court. It is observed that the court procured his attendance by issuing warrant against him. The subsequent conduct of the accused would go to show relevancy under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 19. Apart from the same, P.W.19-V.R.O. testified that when he was present in the office, P.W.21 summoned him and took him to Chakarlapalli railway station, where they noticed the accused in corner of the road and he tried to skulk away. Police apprehended him in the presence of P.W.19. The accused is alleged to have made a confessional statement before P.W.21. In the examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC, when the accused was asked as to how he received burn injuries on his left hand, he replied that he does not know how he received the burn injuries on his left hand. It is the bounden duty of the accused to explain as to how burn injuries were sustained to his left hand. In the absence of any explanation, the Court is at liberty to draw an inference for not explaining the same. 20. It is settled law that credibility of a witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. In the absence of any explanation, the Court is at liberty to draw an inference for not explaining the same. 20. It is settled law that credibility of a witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. When all the dying declarations are consistent and inspire confidence, there is no difficulty in maintaining a conviction basing on the same without there being any corroboration. 21. The other ground raised by the accused is that the incident is said to have taken place in a spur of moment and the accused was in intoxicated stage during the relevant point of time of the incident. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to Section 86 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated:- In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with, as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.” A person, who does an act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless it is shown that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. 22. It is not the case of the accused that the accused was administered to be under the influence of intoxication without his knowledge or against his will. The accused was in the habit of consuming liquor everyday and used to go to home and quarrel with his wife. The accused was voluntarily in the state of intoxication at the time of the incident. Voluntary consumption of liquor is not a ground to extenuate himself from culpability of the crime. In view of the said reason, the accused cannot take the plea that he was under a state of intoxication. 23. The accused was voluntarily in the state of intoxication at the time of the incident. Voluntary consumption of liquor is not a ground to extenuate himself from culpability of the crime. In view of the said reason, the accused cannot take the plea that he was under a state of intoxication. 23. Learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on a judgment of the Hon”ble Apex Court in Suraj Jagannath Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1885 of 2019, wherein it is held thus: “Applying the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Bhagawan (supra) and Santosh (supra) to the facts of the case on hand and the manner in which the accused poured the kerosene on the deceased and thereafter when she was trying to run away from the room to save her, the accused came from behind and threw a match stick and set her ablaze, we are of the opinion that the death of the deceased was a culpable homicide amounting to murder and Section 300 fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC as submitted on behalf of the accused. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.” 24. To sum up, the version in all the multiple dying declarations that have been made by the deceased is consistent. They point the guilt to the accused alone and none else. In such circumstances, law does not require that there must be corroboration to base a conviction on the basis of the said dying declarations. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that it is the accused, who caused death of the deceased. The accused had intention to cause death of the deceased. None of the exceptions of Section 300 IPC would apply as to bring the case within the purview of either Section 304 Part I or 304 Part II of I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge, upon proper appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly convicted and sentenced the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and there are no grounds to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge. The Criminal Appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 25. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming judgment dated 27.07.2016 passed in Sessions Case No.23 of 2016 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur. 26. As can be seen from the record, the appellant was enlarged on bail by order of this Court dated 06.10.2021 in terms of the order of a Division Bench of the combined High Court in Batchu Ranga Rao v. State of A.P., 2016(3)ALT (Crl.) 505 (DB) (A.P.). Therefore, the appellant/accused is directed to surrender before the Superintendent, Central Prison, Kadapa, to undergo remaining sentence as recorded by the trial court. Failing which, the trial Judge shall take necessary steps in accordance with law. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.