JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. The petitioner is the mother of Sri. Nibras K.N., (the detenu). This Writ Petition is filed challenging Ext.P2 order of detention passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007. The prayer in this writ petition is to quash the said order and to set him at liberty. 2. Short facts: 2.1 By a report dated 17.01.2024, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kannur to the authorized officer under Section 3(1) of the Act. In the said report, it was mentioned that the detenu was continuously engaging in anti-social activities and to prevent him from doing so, necessary orders were required to be passed under KAAPA to classify the detenu as a “known rowdy”. In the proposal, details of 5 cases were provided, out of which, in four cases the final report had already been laid and in one case the investigation was pending. 2.2 Details of the cases in which the detenu was involved are as under: (i) Crime No. 890 of 2019 of the Valapattanam Police Station, registered under Sections 341 and 332 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC, and Sections 146, and 147 of the Railway Act, 1989. The detenu is arrayed as the 2nd accused in the said case. The specific allegation is that on 25.9.2019 at 6.25 p.m., the detenu attacked the Point Man working in the Valapattanam Police Station while he was discharging his official duty when he cautioned the detenu for taking a selfie while standing on the top of the railway bogie. The final report has been laid in this case. (ii) Crime No. 87 of 2021 of the Valapattanam Police Station, registered under Section 392 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The detenu is arrayed as the 2nd accused. The allegation is that he along with the 1st accused snatched the gold chain weighing 2.25 sovereigns from the body of the informant, a lady. The investigation has been completed and final report has been laid. (iii) Crime No. 120 of 2021 of the Edakkad Police Station, registered inter alia under Sections 392, 120B, 468, 471 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC. The detenu is arrayed as the 3rd accused. The allegation is that the accused Nos. The investigation has been completed and final report has been laid. (iii) Crime No. 120 of 2021 of the Edakkad Police Station, registered inter alia under Sections 392, 120B, 468, 471 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC. The detenu is arrayed as the 3rd accused. The allegation is that the accused Nos. 1 and 2 snatched a gold chain weighing 16 sovereigns from a lady and the detenu herein facilitated the commission of the crime by handing over his bike. The investigation has been completed and the final report has been laid. (iv) Crime No. 432 of 2023 of the Valapattanam Police Station, registered under Section 22 (B) r/w. Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The detenu is the sole accused in the said crime. The allegation is that 1.1 gms of MDMA was seized from the possession of the detenu by the police on 9.5.2023 at 10.45 p.m. The final report has been laid in this case. (v) The last prejudicial act was committed by the detenu on 10.12.2023 which led to the registration of Crime No. 1559 of 2023 of the Kannur Town Police Station, registered inter alia under Section 392 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The allegation is that while the complainant, a lady was sitting by the beach, the detenu snatched her gold chain and fled from the spot in a scooter. The investigation has not been completed. 3. Sri. Abdul Raoof, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised the following contentions: 3.1 The order was passed by the detaining authority without proper application of mind. In none of these cases, the detenu had any direct involvement. It is without evaluating the above fact that proceedings under KAAPA have been initiated against the detenu. 3.2 The allegations levelled against the detenu would not amount to disruption of public order and will only lead to violation of law and order. The ordinary law of the land was enough to prevent the detenu from committing prejudicial activities. 3.3 There is a long and unexplained time lapse from the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention. This would snap the live link as no plausible explanation has been offered for the delay. 3.4 The detenu was undergoing incarceration while the detention order was executed. This aspect of the matter was not considered. 3.3 There is a long and unexplained time lapse from the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention. This would snap the live link as no plausible explanation has been offered for the delay. 3.4 The detenu was undergoing incarceration while the detention order was executed. This aspect of the matter was not considered. 3.5 The detenu was in judicial custody from 13.12.2023 and his detention order was executed on 17.2.2024. According to the learned counsel, if the period during which the detenu had undergone judicial custody was also taken into account, the six-month period would have been over by now. 4. In response, the following submissions were made by the learned Public Prosecutor: 4.1. The detenu has got himself involved in five cases affecting public order and the final report has been laid in four of the cases. Three of the cases involved chain snatching from unsuspecting women and those cases clearly fall within the ambit of Crimes which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In one of the cases, the detenu was found in possession of MDMA, a dreaded narcotic substance. The last prejudicial activity was committed on 10.12.2023. This was despite the fact that the detenu had executed a bond in a proceeding initiated under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. on 11.10.2023. The detenu was arrested in the above crime on 13.12.2024 and he was in custody. After satisfying that the detenu was likely to be released on bail and that he would continue to involve himself in anti-social activities that are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, on 17.1.2023, a report was submitted by the District Police Chief. It is on the strength of the report that the detaining authority after satisfying itself objectively and subjectively that it was necessary to prevent the detenu from committing further anti-social acts, that the order of detention was issued on 17.2.2024. It is further submitted that the Government approved the order on 23.2.2024. Later, the case was referred to the Advisory Board, and the Advisory Board by order dated 3.4.2024 confirmed the order. Immediately thereafter, the Government considered the matter afresh and after perusing the relevant records and also the opinion of the Advisory Board ordered that the detention shall continue for a period of six months. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced. 6. Immediately thereafter, the Government considered the matter afresh and after perusing the relevant records and also the opinion of the Advisory Board ordered that the detention shall continue for a period of six months. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced. 6. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the cases in which the detenu got himself involved would amount to a violation of law and order and not public order. The Apex Court in Pesala Nookaraju v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1003, after adverting to all the past precedents, including Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 , Pushkar Mukherjee v. The State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 10 , Dipak Bose alias Naripada v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 4 SCC 43 , Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 , Commissioner of Police v. C. Anita (Smt.), (2004) 7 SCC 467 , held as under: 65. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, it is evident that there is a very thin line between the question of law and order situation and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law and order situation can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Prohibition Act. 66. Just because four cases have been registered against the appellant detenu under the Prohibition Act, by itself, may not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenu may be punished for the offences which have been registered against him. 66. Just because four cases have been registered against the appellant detenu under the Prohibition Act, by itself, may not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenu may be punished for the offences which have been registered against him. To put it in other words, if the detention is on the ground that the detenu is indulging in manufacture or transport or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Prohibition Act but if the liquor sold by the detenu is dangerous to public health then under the Act, 1986, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, therefore, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on material available to it that the liquor dealt with by the detenu is liquor which is dangerous to public health to attract the provisions of the 1986 Act and if the detaining authority is satisfied that such material exists either in the form of report of the Chemical Examiner or otherwise, copy of such material should also be given to the detenu to afford him an opportunity to make an effective representation. xxxx xxxxx xxxx 73. In the case on hand, the detaining authority has specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor by the appellant detenu and the consumption by the people of that locality was harmful to their health. Such statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu appellant is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Not only that, the detaining authority has also recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenu appellant from indulging further in such activities and this satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. It is also well settled that whether the material was sufficient or not is not for the Courts to decide by applying the objective basis as it is matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. 7. The true distinction between the areas of “public order” and “law and order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. 7. The true distinction between the areas of “public order” and “law and order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of “law and order” and “public order” is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order (See: Ashok Kumar v Delhi Administration and other, AIR 1982 SC 1143 ) 8. In the instant case, the detaining authority, based on the involvement of the detenu for offences like chain snatching from women, indulging in offences under the NDPS Act, and incidents of violence against public officers have subjectively satisfied itself that his actions are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and it is necessary to invoke provisions under the Act to prevent the detenu from indulging further in such activities. "Anti-social activity" has been defined under the Act to mean; acting in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause, directly or indirectly, any feeling of insecurity, danger, or fear among the general public or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals, the safety of the public, public health or the ecological system or any loss or damage to public exchequer or to any public or private property or indulges in any activities referred in clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m), (n), (q), 1[(qb)] and (s) of Section 2. Section 3 empowers the authority to issue the order on being satisfied that any person indulging in such anti-social activity. The detaining authority has specifically stated in the grounds of detention that the detenu is indulging in serious anti-social activities and such a statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has specifically stated in the grounds of detention that the detenu is indulging in serious anti-social activities and such a statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has also recorded its satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenu from indulging further in such activities and this satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. Whether the materials are sufficient or not is not for the Courts to decide by applying the objective basis as it is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. 9. The prejudicial activities of the detenu leading to public disorder, as revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal conduct. Although the criminal activities of the detenu in the past pertained mostly to breaches of law and order, they have now taken a turn for the worse. This is not a case of a single activity directed against a single individual. There have been a series of criminal activities on the part of the detenu and his associates during a span of five years. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. [See: Ashok Kumar (supra)]. 10. The next contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the detenu was in judicial custody at the time of issuance of the detention order and this displays non-application of mind. We find that the last prejudicial act was committed by the detenu on 10.12.2023 and he was arrested on 13.12.2023. The sponsorship report was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kannur on 17.1.2024, seeking classification of the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’. The detention order was issued on 15.2.2024 and the same was executed on 17.2.2024. We find that the last prejudicial act was committed by the detenu on 10.12.2023 and he was arrested on 13.12.2023. The sponsorship report was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kannur on 17.1.2024, seeking classification of the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’. The detention order was issued on 15.2.2024 and the same was executed on 17.2.2024. The detaining authority has noted that the detenu was in judicial custody and that there was every likelihood that he would be released on bail and if that happens, he would continue to involve himself in anti-social activities. It was on this basis that the detention order was passed. In Senthamil Selvi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 5 SCC 676 , it has been observed by the Apex Court that the only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. It is the subjective satisfaction based on materials before the said authority that they have come to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. The said subjective satisfaction based on materials under normal circumstances is not liable to be interfered with. 11. The next contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the period that the detenu was in judicial custody has also to be added up while calculating the period of detention of six months as on the date of execution of the detention order, as he was in judicial custody for over two months. We are also not impressed with the said contention. In Government of A.P. and Another v. Anne Venkatersware and Ors., (1977) 3 SCC 298 , the Apex Court had held that Section 428 provides for set off for the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. It only provides for a “set off”, but does not equate an “undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction”. The provision as set off expresses a legislative policy; this does not mean that it does away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and puts things on the same footing for all purposes. It only provides for a “set off”, but does not equate an “undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction”. The provision as set off expresses a legislative policy; this does not mean that it does away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and puts things on the same footing for all purposes. Later, in Abdul Azeez v. Assistant Collector, (2003) 1 KLT 557 , the question posed was whether the period of detention underwent, under the COFEPOSA Act could be taken into account for set off in conviction under the Customs Act. While deciding the issue, the Apex Court held that preventive detention is not punitive but is only a precautionary measure. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved, nor any charge is formulated, and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. In this sense, it is an anticipatory action. Preventive justice requires action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. In the case of punitive detention, the person concerned is detained by way of punishment after being found guilty of wrongdoing where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself. While preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, it is intended to prevent a person from indulging in any conduct injurious to society. However, Section 42 provides for a set-off of the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. In that view of the matter, the period during which the detenu was in judicial custody consequent to the last prejudicial act and is being detained in the execution of the provisions of the KAAPA will operate in separate spheres. Both kinds of detention cannot be put on the same footing for all purposes. Having considered the entire facts, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the respondents. This Writ Petition is dismissed.