ORDER : (Harinath N., J.) The writ petition is filed challenging the detention order issued vide proceedings REV-CSEC0PDL (PRC)/9/2023-MAGL4, dt.10.11.2023 by the 2nd respondent and was confirmed by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.08, General Administration (SPL.[LAW AND ORDER]) department, dt.02.01.2024. 2. The wife of the detenu has filed the present writ petition challenging the order of detention which is passed on the ground that the petitioner’s husband is considered as a boot-legger within the meaning of Section2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Gundas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986. 3. The petitioner’s husband was involved in eight different crimes and the details of the crimes pending against the petitioner’s husband are tabulated below : S.No. Crime No. Police Station Offences under Sections 1. Crime No.184 of 2023, registered on 14.10.2023 Special Enforcement Bureau, Chittoor Urban Police Station Under Section.7(A) r/w.8(e) of AP Prohibition Act 2. Crime No.7 of 2023, registered on 10.01.2023. Special Enforcement Bureau, Chittoor Urban Police Station Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(B) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020 3. Crime No.252 of 2022, registered on 03.09.2022 Special Enforcement Bureau, Chittoor Urban Police Station Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(A) of APP Act, 2020 and 34(e) of AP Excise 1968 4. Crime No.195 of 2022, registered on 31.05.2022 Special Enforcement Bureau, Chittoor Urban Police Station Under Section.34(e) of AP Excise Act, 2020 5. Crime No.69 of 2022, registered on 28.04.2022 Gudipala Police Station, Chittoor District Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(B) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020 and Section 34(e) of AP Excise Act, 2020 6. Crime No.33 of 2022, registered on 12.03.2022 Gudipala police Station, Chittoor District Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(B) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act and Section 34(e) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020 7. Crime No.216 of 2021, registered on 21.10.2021 Gudipala Police Station, Chittoor District Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(B) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020 8. Crime No.121 of 2021, registered on 08.06.2021 Gudipala Police Station, Chittoor District Under Section.7(B) r/w.8(B) of AP Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020 4. The detenu was first arrested in Cr.No.216 of 2021 and sent to judicial custody. He was granted bail in Cr.No.216 of 2021 and Cr.No.121 of 2021 on 30.10.2021. Thereafter, the detenu was arrested on 14.10.2023 in Cr.No.184 of 2023 and was sent to judicial custody. Thereafter, the detenu was produced through P.T.warrants in Cr.Nos.33 of 2022 and 69 of 2022. The detenu was first arrested in Cr.No.216 of 2021 and sent to judicial custody. He was granted bail in Cr.No.216 of 2021 and Cr.No.121 of 2021 on 30.10.2021. Thereafter, the detenu was arrested on 14.10.2023 in Cr.No.184 of 2023 and was sent to judicial custody. Thereafter, the detenu was produced through P.T.warrants in Cr.Nos.33 of 2022 and 69 of 2022. The detenu was produced through P.T.warrants in Cr.Nos.7 of 2023, 252 of 2022 and 195 of 2022 on 30.10.2023. The main ground raised by the learned counsel for petitioner is that the order of detention is passed without application of mind and that no reasons are assigned for compliance of subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of detention was passed when the detenu was in judicial custody and as such submits that on this ground the order of detention has to be set aside. 6. It is also the stand of the petitioner that there is no mention of any bail application or bail granted to the detenu in six cases. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention, the detention order and the confirmation order ought to be set aside. 7. It is also stated that the order of detention passed by the 2nd respondent refers to a casual, monotonous and bald ground for passing the order of detention. 8. The state in their counter have narrated the involvement of the detenu in various crimes and the details of the crimes registered against the detenu. It is also stated that in so far as the detenu is concerned there has been subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order. The respondents have also denied that the detenu was not served with the order of detention and that acknowledgment was also obtained through the prison authority. 9. The state has also submitted that the boot-legging activities of the detenu has severely hampered the normal life in the society and such activities are spreading danger to public health in Gudipala and its surrounding villages. It is also stated that the detenu has resorted to boot-legging activities as he has found the trade in illicit liquor convenient, easy and fast money generating scheme with good profits. It is also stated that the detenu has resorted to boot-legging activities as he has found the trade in illicit liquor convenient, easy and fast money generating scheme with good profits. It is also stated that the detenu did not change his attitude though several cases were registered against him. The learned Special Government Pleader attached the office of learned Advocate General submits that it is not a case the order of detention can be set aside and prays for dismissal of the writ petition. Consideration of the Court: 10. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 , had held on the question of whether a detention order could be passed against a person in judicial custody, in the following manner: “12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bond fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case”. This principle was followed by another Constitution Bench in Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 1120 . 11. Another Constitution Bench judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has to be noticed in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 at page 209, the Bench had held as follows: “34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [ (1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [ (1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] ; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [ (1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321] and DebuMahato v. State of W.B. [ (1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances”. 12. It has been argued that this judgement is an authority for the principle that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed against a person who is already in prison. A reading of the above passage would show that no such absolute bar has been placed. The observations made above are merely reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. 13. Subsequent judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed this line of reasoning. However, there have been some variations in the manner in which this principle had been followed. The observations made above are merely reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. 13. Subsequent judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed this line of reasoning. However, there have been some variations in the manner in which this principle had been followed. There have also been submissions made, at various points of time, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had taken the view that orders of detention cannot be passed when a person is in judicial custody or otherwise in jail. 14. A three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Rekha v. State of T.N., (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (cri) 596 : 2011 SCC Online SC 571 at page 250, after noticing both trends had held as follows: 8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan v. State [ (2006) 2 SCC 664 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593], A. Shanthi v. Govt. of T.N. [ (2006) 9 SCC 711 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 371] , Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [ (2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627] , etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in HaradhanSaha v. State of W.B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] wherein it has been observed: (SCC p. 209, para 34): “34. … where the person concerned is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or public order.” 9. On the other hand, Mr Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of this Court in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 7 SCC 603 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 324] and Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 6 SCC 64 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17] wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. 15. These principles were reiterated in the case of Champion R. Sangma vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr., (2015) 16 SCC 253 . 9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order. 10. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order. 10. There are three such factors which were restated in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13) “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.” 16. The law on this aspect is crystalline. There is absolutely no bar for passing an order of preventive detention when the detenu is in judicial custody or in prison. The subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention would depend on case to case basis. The authority passing the order of detention has to ensure that the procedural safeguards before passing the detention order ought to be followed scrupulously. 17. Preventive detention is a method of deterring an antisocial element from disturbing the peace and fabric of the society. However, the extreme action on part of the state denying the fundamental right in the form of detaining him for a considerable period of time has to be exercised by following the necessary safeguards. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of the state to ensure peace in the society and strive towards a crime free society. The state has an equal responsibility of protecting the citizens’ fundamental rights. The antisocial elements definitely infringe upon the fundamental rights of the citizens in the society to a large extent. 18. Passing an order of detention without appropriate grounds and without reference to the conduct of the detenu would have to be set aside. The detention order must enlist the specific reasons for detaining the detenu which withstand the judicial review and oversight. 19. The officers concerned in proposing and issuing orders of detention are the instrumentalities of the state. It is essential for them to prepare a proper check-list and review each case of detention on its individual merits before proposing the issuance of a detention order. It is a bounden duty of the officer proposing to the competent authority to pass an order of detention against anyone to submit to such authority all and relevant material relating to the offence(s) registered against the proposed detenu. 20. It is a bounden duty of the officer proposing to the competent authority to pass an order of detention against anyone to submit to such authority all and relevant material relating to the offence(s) registered against the proposed detenu. 20. It is the bounden duty of the detaining authority to ensure that they consider the material available in detail and pass necessary orders by incorporating the relevant aspects imposing the order of detention. 21. The preamble of the AP Prevention of Dangerous Activities, Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 is as follows ; “An act to provide for preventive detention of bootleggers, dacoits, drug offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders and land grabbers for preventing their dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Whereas public order is adversely affected every now and then by the dangerous activities of certain persons, who are known as bootleggers, dacoits, drug offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders and land-grabbers. And whereas having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, the large scale on which, and the manner in which the dangerous activities are being clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as bootleggers, dacoits, drug-offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders or land-grabbers in the State of Andhra Pradesh and particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to have a special law in the State of Andhra Pradesh to provide for preventive detention of these six classes of persons and for matters connected therewith”. 22. The Act is enacted keeping in view the necessity of keeping the dangerous elements in the society under detention to deter them from disrupting the public order. However, the purpose of the act is defeated by the lethargic attitude of the officers concerned in completely disregarding the prescribed safeguards which ought to have been followed before passing the detention orders. 23. The order of detention which is under challenge in the writ petition is evidently passed without considering the likelihood of release of detenu from judicial custody. It is evident that the detaining authority has not detailed the various bail applications filed by the detenu and the details of bail(s) granted to the detenu. 23. The order of detention which is under challenge in the writ petition is evidently passed without considering the likelihood of release of detenu from judicial custody. It is evident that the detaining authority has not detailed the various bail applications filed by the detenu and the details of bail(s) granted to the detenu. A bald statement is referred in the order of detention as follows : Having examined all facts and circumstances of the case and upon application of my mind and after going through the material produced before me and having being satisfied that there is every likelihood of him being granted/released on bail in the other cases also, I am satisfied to invoke the provisions under A.P. Prevention of dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders And Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1 of 1986) as all his activities are dangerous and prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also to prevent him from further indulging in illegal activities. 24. This cannot be considered as subjective satisfaction when the details of any pending bail applications and other factors are missing in the detention order. The detention order has to be set aside. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamilnadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244 and Champion R. Sangma Vs. State of Meghalaya and another, 2015 ALL MR (Cri) 3673 (S.C.), the order of detention passed vide proceedings REV-CSEC0PDL (PRC)/9/2023-MAGL4, dt.10.11.2023 passed by the 2nd respondent and was confirmed by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.08, General Administration (SPL.[LAW AND ORDER]) department, dt.02.01.2024 deserves to be set aside. The other grounds raised by the petitioner need not be gone into as the detention order is found legally defective on the aspect of subjective satisfaction. 25. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order vide proceedings REV-CSEC0PDL (PRC)/9/2023-MAGL4, dt.10.11.2023 passed by the 2nd respondent and was confirmed by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.08, General Administration (SPL.[LAW AND ORDER]) department, dt.02.01.2024 is hereby set aside and consequently the detenu by name A.Sasi Kumar @ Shashi Kumar @ Shasi Kumar shall be set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this writ petition shall stand closed.