ORDER : (Anil Kumar Upman, J.) : 1. These misc. petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have been filed on behalf of the petitioners herein for quashing FIR No.1341/2023 registered at Police Station Mansarovar, Jaipur South for offences under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising out of it. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the complainant-respondent No.2 lodged a report at Police Station Mansarovar, Jaipur South alleging inter alia that there situated a piece of land in Khasra Nos.6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 24, measuring 8 hectares, Village Ganpatpura. It is alleged that on 10.07.2001, a succession and relinquishment deed was executed by co-accused Narani, Manbhar, Kamli, Gopali, Sita, Ganga, Shanti Devi (sisters of accused Harlal Choudhary) and Smt. Kesri Devi (mother of accused Harlal Choudhary) in favour of accused Harlal Choudhary and on the strength of this succession and relinquishment deed, on 24.07.2001, mutation was opened in the name of accused Harlal Choudhary. Thereafter, on 24.10.2003, an agreement to sell was entered between the accused-petitioner Harlal Choudhary and the complainant M/s Gaurav Pvt. Ltd. with respect to the afore-stated land. However, when the accused petitioner Harlal Choudhary failed to fulfill the contractual obligations, the respondent-complainant filed a civil suit for specific performance before the competent civil court, which finally came to be decreed in favour of the complainant company on 12.06.2018. However, the accused Harlal Choudhary, challenged the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2018 passed in favour of the complainant-company by way of filing civil first appeal (No.671/2018) before this Court, which is pending consideration till date. By interim order dated 08.08.2018, the execution of the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2018 has been stayed and both parties were directed to maintain status quo on the subject land. By interim order dated 08.08.2018, the execution of the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2018 has been stayed and both parties were directed to maintain status quo on the subject land. It is further alleged that the accused persons, who were all aware of the interim order of maintaining status quo on the subject land, hatched a conspiracy and in order to get the nature and ownership of the land in question changed, applied for conversion of land under Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 wherein co-accused Smt. Narani Devi, Smt Ganga, Smt. Kamli Devi, Smt. Manbhar, Smt. Gopali, Smt. Sita Gora, Smt. Shanti Devi, sisters of the petitioner Harlal Choudhary, made declarations that there is no issue or dispute with regard to land in question in any court of law. 3. It is also alleged that after entering into agreement to sell the land in question on 24.10.2003, the accused petitioner Harlal Choudhary entered into a collusive arrangement with other co-accused who are his sisters and mother and while keeping the complainant-company in dark, filed a collusive suit (No.160/2006) before learned District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur seeking cancellation of relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001. The said suit was decided and decreed vide judgment and decree dated 25.08.2006 on the basis of compromise entered between the parties i.e., Harlal, his sisters and mother wherein accused Harlal took a stand that he has no objection if the relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001 is cancelled whereas the fact remains that the accused Harlal never disclosed regarding agreement to sell, executed by him in favour of the complainant company regarding the land in question, on the strength of relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001, in the said civil suit for cancellation of relinquishment deed. It was further alleged that the accused persons also did not disclose before the learned civil court regarding pendency of civil suit, instituted by the complainant company for specific performance of contract in which, temporary injunction order for maintaining status quo on the subject land, had already been passed. After disposal of the suit for cancellation of relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001, by playing fraud, with the complainant company as well as with the civil court, the accused persons approached District Collector, Jaipur for recording mutation in their favour on the strength of judgment and decree dated 25.08.2006. After disposal of the suit for cancellation of relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001, by playing fraud, with the complainant company as well as with the civil court, the accused persons approached District Collector, Jaipur for recording mutation in their favour on the strength of judgment and decree dated 25.08.2006. By order dated 18.06.2007, the District Collector, Jaipur directed recording of mutation in favour of the accused persons. The order dated 18.06.2007 passed by the District Collector, Jaipur was challenged by the respondent-complainant by way of filing appeal under Section 76 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 before Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, who vide order dated 15.09.2007 set aside the order dated 18.06.2007, whereby mutation was ordered to be recorded in favour of the accused persons. The accused persons i.e. sisters and mother of accused petitioner Harlal, challenged the order dated 15.09.2007 passed by the Divisional Commissioner by way of filing revision before Rajasthan Revenue Board, Ajmer. The Board of Revenue, vide its order dated 22.09.2009 dismissed the revision and affirmed the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner. The accused persons, assailed the orders dated 15.09.2007 and 22.09.2009 passed by learned Divisional Commissioner and Board of Revenue, Ajmer respectively by way of filing writ petition before this Court. It is also alleged in the complaint that during pendency of suit for specific performance, the accused petitioner Harlal Choudhary fraudulently and mischievously submitted through his written statement that agreement to sell dated 24.10.2003 was not in fact a concluded agreement to sell but was only a proposal given to respondent Company. He also submitted a copy of agreement to sell dated 24.10.2003 before the learned civil court. However, the learned Civil Court found the same to be forged and manipulated and recorded finding to this effect in the judgment and decree. It is further alleged in the complaint that the on the representations made by the sisters of Harlal, JDA issued lease deeds in regularization camps on 30.09.2023 and when the complainant company came to know about this fact, objection was raised on its behalf upon which inquiry was initiated by the JDA. 4. After getting conversion of the land under Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and seeking pattas from JDA, the sisters of Harlal Choudhary, gave a power of attorney dated 23.08.2023, in favour of accused Manoj Choudhary, son of Harlal Choudhary with respect to the subject land. 4. After getting conversion of the land under Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and seeking pattas from JDA, the sisters of Harlal Choudhary, gave a power of attorney dated 23.08.2023, in favour of accused Manoj Choudhary, son of Harlal Choudhary with respect to the subject land. It was thus, finally alleged that the accused Harlal Choudhary induced respondent no.2/company to enter into agreement to sell and received Rs.35,00,000/-(thirty-five lacs rupees) way back in the year 2003, projecting himself to be sole owner of the land in question. On the inducement made by the accused Harlal Chodhary, the respondent company entered into agreement to sell of the land in question but the accused persons hatched a conspiracy as mentioned above and caused wrongful loss to the company. It was thus, prayed that appropriate legal action may be taken against the accused persons. 5. On the basis of the report, FIR No.1341/2023 has been registered at Police Station Mansarovar, Jaipur South for offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC, which is pending investigation. The petitioners herein have prayed for quashing of the impugned FIR. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently and fervently contends that the impugned FIR is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law. It is contended that from a bare perusal of the FIR, it is clearly revealed that it is purely a civil nature dispute which has been given a colour of criminal case. Learned counsel also contends that on 08.05.2014, the suit for specific performance of contract, instituted by the respondent No.2 was dismissed for want of prosecution, by the learned civil court and on 16.03.2016, it was restored after nearly two years. Learned counsel thus, submits that during the period, when there was no T.I. order in currency, the sisters and mother of the petitioner Harlal Choudhary initiated proceedings for opening of mutation on the basis of agreement for partition dated 27.08.2014. On 28.08.2014, the Tehsildar partitioned the subject land in nine equal shares in Jamabandi. Smt. Kesari Devi, mother of the petitioner Harlal, thereafter, executed a registered Will dated 02.11.2015 in favour of her grandsons i.e., co-accused Manoj Choudhary and Ashok Choudhary. She expired on 09.01.2016 and after her demise, her share of property transferred in favour of Manoj Choudhary and Ashok Choudhary. Smt. Kesari Devi, mother of the petitioner Harlal, thereafter, executed a registered Will dated 02.11.2015 in favour of her grandsons i.e., co-accused Manoj Choudhary and Ashok Choudhary. She expired on 09.01.2016 and after her demise, her share of property transferred in favour of Manoj Choudhary and Ashok Choudhary. It is further contended that the judgment and decree dated 25.08.2006 passed by learned civil court in suit for cancellation of relinquishment deed dated 10.07.2001 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between accused persons, was never challenged by the complainant company. There was no stay or restrained order passed by any civil court and therefore, proceedings for conversion of land under Section 90A of Land Revenue Act were initiated. Learned counsel submits that all these events, clearly point out that the controversy involved in this matter is purely of civil nature. It is also argued that the basic ingredients of alleged offences are totally missing and therefore, no offence under Sections 420 and 406 IPC are made out. Learned counsel vehemently argues that the complainant company is misusing the process of law as a tool to create pressure upon the petitioners for taking undue advantage in the litigation filed on behalf of the petitioners. It is also argued that the controversy involved in this matter is already subject matter of various litigation before this Court. It is also contended that there is unexplained delay in lodging of the impugned FIR which shows that the complainant has not come with clean hands and the impugned FIR is an afterthought. 7. Learned counsel contends that to buttress their case to somehow make the case of forgery, one line in the entire FIR has been inserted by the complainant that in the judgment dated 12.06.2018 in the civil suit, the defendant Harlal had propounded a copy of agreement dated 24.10.2003 which did not have signature of Dharmendra Jain, the then, Director of the complainant company but only his name. The trial court had given a finding that the agreement presented by the company was correct and the last page of photocopy given by Harlal was incorrect. It is submitted that while Harlal claimed the handwritten material on the last page was alteration made by the company, the company claimed that the last page of photocopy agreement was altered by Harlal. It is submitted that while Harlal claimed the handwritten material on the last page was alteration made by the company, the company claimed that the last page of photocopy agreement was altered by Harlal. While both the agreements were on record of the civil suit, no FIR was ever lodged by either side. Further, the finding given by the learned civil court regarding the document being fabricated is erroneous as the burden to prove the agreement dated 24.10.2003 was on the Company. The learned civil court, instead of delving into the question as to whether the hand written portion of document was interpolation or not, generalized the issue and fastened burden of proof on the accused defendant which vitiates the judgment and presently, this issue is subject matter of civil appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil first appeals. It is further submitted that the finding based on test of preponderance in civil case cannot be used for launching criminal case. If the court finds that any evidence given by the petitioners were false, then the court itself had power to enquire under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also argues that certain offences have been found proved by the investigating agency but by virtue of Section 195 CrPC, investigation is not permissible. In support of his case, learned counsel places reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Mohd. Ibrahim vs.State of Bihar reported in (2009) 8 SCC 754; 2. A.M. Mohan vs State reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339; 3. Alpic Finance Ltd. vs. P. Sadasivan reported in (2001) 3 SCC 513 ; 4. R. Nagendra Yadav vs. State of Telangana reported in (2023) 2 SCC 195 ; and 5. Paramjeet Batra vs State of Uttarakhand reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673 8. With these submissions, learned counsel Shri Hora, prays that the misc. petitions may be accepted and the impugned FIR may be quashed. 9. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor, learned Senior Advocate Shri V.R. Bajwa, assisted by Smt. Savita Nathawat and Shri Amar Kumar as well as learned counsel Shri Sandeep Pathak firmly oppose submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners. It is submitted that impugned FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offences and as such, invoking of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. so as to quash impugned FIR is totally unwarranted. It is submitted that impugned FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offences and as such, invoking of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. so as to quash impugned FIR is totally unwarranted. The accused Harlal with dishonest intention, induced complainant company to enter into an agreement to sell and received Rs.35,00,000/-way back in the year 2003, projecting himself to be the sole owner of the land in question. The respondent company on the dishonest inducement of the accused Harlal entered into the agreement and paid major portion of the settled sale consideration. The accused petitioner Harlal, instead of executing the agreement to sell, hatched a conspiracy with his other co-accused who are his family members and caused wrongful loss to the company. The aforesaid facts clearly attract basic ingredients of cheating. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Bajwa further submits that the learned civil court in its judgment and decree dated 12.06.2018 clearly held that the copy of agreement dated 24.10.2003, presented by accused Harlal was incorrect and fabricated, which strengthen the case of the complainant. So far as the issue of delay in lodging of FIR is concerned, learned counsel submits that as per the orders of the civil court, the possession of the land remained with the respondent company and it is only on 10.11.2023, the accused persons trespassed onto the land and tried to take over the possession of the respondent company and therefore, the FIR has been registered on 16.11.2023. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Bajwa further argues that Section 195 CrPC, lays an embargo only on taking of cognizance and has no bearing at the investigation stage. More so, when offences relating to the sweep of Section 195 Cr.P.C. are committed with other set of offences which are not entrapped in the provisions of Section 195 CrPC, then Section 195 Cr.P.C. has no interplay at all for scuttling an investigation going on with respect to cognizable offences committed by accused persons like cheating and forgery. It is also contended that mere pendency of civil litigation before this Court will not create a bar for continuance of criminal proceedings. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that in a catena of judgments, it has been held that if criminality exists, civil proceedings with regard to same facts will not debar criminal proceeding. It is also contended that mere pendency of civil litigation before this Court will not create a bar for continuance of criminal proceedings. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that in a catena of judgments, it has been held that if criminality exists, civil proceedings with regard to same facts will not debar criminal proceeding. It is submitted that the facts as mentioned above, are more than sufficient to show that the petitioners have committed the alleged offences for which, they are liable for criminal prosecution. Shri Bajwa, places reliance on the following judgments and craves dismissal of the misc. petitions:- 1. V.R. Dalal vs. Yogendra Naranji Thekhar : (2008) 15 SCC 625 2. Medchel Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. & Anr. : (2000) 3 SCC 269 3. Lalmuni Devi vs. State of Bihar : (2001) 2 SCC 17 4. Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs State of Gujarat : JT 2018 (1) SC 141 5. State of Punjab vs Raj Singh & Anr. : (1998) 2 SCC 391 ; and 6. Narayan Das vs State of Karnataka & Ors. : (2003) 11 SCC 251 . 11. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material available on record. 12. The primary issue that has been raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners is to the effect that it is a civil nature dispute and that the registration of criminal case is an abuse of process of law. Invariably, in the case relating to cheating and fraud, there is generally some element of civil nature. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of 'M. Krishnan versus Vijay Singh and another' reported in 2001 (4) R.C.R. Criminal 405 that civil and criminal proceedings can be proceeded simultaneously. Both cases are to be decided by adopting separate yardsticks. 13. The offences affecting the rights of a person in respect to his property and more so offences such as Criminal Breach of Trust, Stolen property, Cheating, Fraudulent Deeds and Disposition of Property, etc. a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused can be brought to justice. Similarly, in this type of cases a civil suit can also be initiated for recovery of money, property or title dispute as regard to the loss incurred. a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused can be brought to justice. Similarly, in this type of cases a civil suit can also be initiated for recovery of money, property or title dispute as regard to the loss incurred. Regarding the facts and circumstances of the case, the criminal proceedings may be given more significance than the civil proceeding, however there is no hard and fast rule regarding the same. Both civil and criminal proceedings can be initiated by the victim simultaneously with distinct impetus and objective. 14. The issue as to whether criminal proceedings are permissible while civil litigation is pending or decided or as to whether civil and criminal litigation can go simultaneously in regard to same allegations has been decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that civil and criminal cases can go simultaneously, if the allegation of criminality exist in the FIR. Reference of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "MS Sheriff vs the State of Madras & Ors. ( AIR 1954 SC 397 ) and in the case of "P Swaroopa Rani vs M Hari Harayan @ Hari Babu" [ (2008) 5 SCC 765 ] are relevant. Paras 13 to 17 of the judgment in the case of P Swaroopa Rani (supra) are quoted hereunder for ready reference - “13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. [See M.S. Sheriff v State of Madras AIR 1954 SC 397 , Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 and and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants (2005) 12 SCC 226 ] 14. It is furthermore trite that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a forged document has been filed. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) stating: 25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195 (1)(b) (ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) stating: 25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195 (1)(b) (ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner: “The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.” In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined: 32. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.” In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined: 32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.... It was concluded: 33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 15. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute. 16. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in staying the investigation in the said matter. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Gupta on Mahar Jahan and Ors. v. State of Delhi and Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 421 wherein this Court was dealing with a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court noticed that a civil dispute was given the colour of a criminal case. As therein a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was pending, when a civil suit was also pending before a competent court of law, it was opined: 4. This Court noticed that a civil dispute was given the colour of a criminal case. As therein a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was pending, when a civil suit was also pending before a competent court of law, it was opined: 4. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the parties that this very property which is the subject-matter of these criminal proceedings is also the subject-matter of the civil suit pending in the civil court. The question as to possession over the property or entitlement to possession would be determined by the civil court. The criminal proceedings have remained pending for about a decade. We do not find any propriety behind allowing these proceedings to continue in view of the parties having already approached the civil court. Whichever way proceedings under Section 145 CrPC may terminate, the order of the criminal court would always be subject to decision by the civil court. Inasmuch as the parties are already before the civil court, we deem it proper to let the civil suit be decided and therein appropriate interim order be passed taking care of the grievances of the parties by making such arrangement as may remain in operation during the hearing of the civil suit. It was furthermore observed: “7. We have simply noted the contentions raised by the parties. The civil court, in our opinion, would be the most appropriate forum to take care of such grievances and pass such interim order as would reasonably protect the interests of both the parties. The civil court may issue an ad interim injunction, may appoint a Commissioner or Receiver or may make any other interim arrangement as to possession or user of the property which is the subject-matter of proceedings in the civil court exercising the power conferred on it by Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” It was, therefore, a case where this Court quashed a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the matter pending before it arose out of a civil proceedings. Such observations were made keeping in view the fact that possession of the parties over the property in suit was in question. 17. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15670 of 2006 is allowed.” 15. Such observations were made keeping in view the fact that possession of the parties over the property in suit was in question. 17. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15670 of 2006 is allowed.” 15. Criminal complaint cannot be quashed only on the ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of a civil nature. If ingredients of offence alleged against the petitioner-accused prima facie make out in complaint/FIR, then the criminal proceeding shall not be interdicted. 16. Further the delay occasioned in lodging the FIR cannot be a sole ground to quash the criminal proceedings, if the facts and circumstances of a case prima facie make out a criminal case. As per the material available on record, the complainant company was in possession of the land in question till 10.11.2023 and thereafter, the accused persons trespassed onto the land in question and therefore, on 16.11.2023, the impugned FIR has been lodged. Thus, the argument of delay in FIR has no force. 17. Another argument which is advanced by the counsel for the petitioners that certain offences have been found proved by the investigation for which Section 195 Cr.P.C applies, so in view of provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. investigation is not permissible. The question arises about application of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and stage at which it will apply. I do not find any force in the submission advanced by the counsel for the petitioner. 18. Section 195 Cr.P.C. and power of police to make investigation has been considered in State of Punjab vs. Raj Singh (1998) 2 SCC 391 . It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. does not prohibit entertainment of a complaint and investigation by police. Section 195 would come into picture only when the matter is placed before Magistrate for taking cognizance of offence under relevant Sections of IPC, in respect whereto, Section 195 Cr.P.C. is attracted. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. does not prohibit entertainment of a complaint and investigation by police. Section 195 would come into picture only when the matter is placed before Magistrate for taking cognizance of offence under relevant Sections of IPC, in respect whereto, Section 195 Cr.P.C. is attracted. Relevant observation of judgment reads as under:- "From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 Cr.PC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC.’’ (emphasis supplied) 19. Reiterating the same, in M. Narayandas versus State of Karnataka 2003 (11) SCC 251 , Court said: "Not only are we bound by this judgment but we are also in complete agreement with the same. Sections 195 and 340 do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under the Criminal procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed.” (emphasis added) 20. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed.” (emphasis added) 20. In M. Narayandas (supra), Court also held that when Police completed investigation and submitted charge sheet, Court concerned itself can file a complaint on the basis of material collected during investigation and after following procedure laid down under Section 340 Cr.P.C. The proceeding before this Court are thus not at the stage when 195 Cr.P.C. will be attracted and therefore neither the order of Magistrate directing Police to register FIR nor the investigation conducted by Police nor the charge sheet submitted, by itself, can be said to be bad and barred by Section 195 Cr.P.C. It is only, if Magistrate would have taken cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C and when have passed order of summoning and that would have been challenged, section 195 Cr.P.C. would have attracted. 21. So far as the question as to whether in case of filing of a forged document, a complaint is to be filed by the Court or not is concerned was considered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) and has held as under: “33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Criminal Procedure Code would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.” 22. It is a case of filing of a forged document/false affidavit before the Court/Authority, which was not manipulated while it was in custodia legis, therefore, the bar as contained under section 195 Cr.P.C. of Criminal Procedure Code would not be applicable and the FIR or the complaint by the complainant is maintainable under section 200 of Criminal Procedure Code. 23. From the above narrated facts and material available on record, some facts, prima facie appear to be established but need to be proved during trial are emerged. 23. From the above narrated facts and material available on record, some facts, prima facie appear to be established but need to be proved during trial are emerged. An agreement was executed by the petitioner Harlal in favour of complainant introducing himself as sole owner of the property in question as relinquish deed was executed by the other share holder like his mother and real sisters. It is an admitted fact that major portion of sale consideration had been received by the petitioner Harlal. A suit for specific performance of aforesaid agreement was filed by the complainant against petitioner Harlal wherein interim order/temporary injunction was granted by competent Civil Court in favour of complainant. It is admitted fact that aforesaid suit has been decreed in favour of complainant and he has been declared entitled to get executed sale deed in his favour after making payment of remaining sale consideration. 24. Admittedly the fact of pendency of suit of specific performance and injunction order in the same was not disclosed by the petitioner Harlal while filing written statement to the suit filed by his mother and sisters to declare the relinquish deed null and void. Apart from above, the sisters and mother of the accused Harlal, at one point of time, filed suit for cancellation of relinquishment deed and got the property partitioned in nine equal shares and disturbed the agreement to sell executed by Harlal, with the complainant company the and subsequently, transferred their shares of land, in favour of sons of Harlal, namely Ashok Chouhdary and Manoj Choudhary, which questions the conduct of the accused petitioners. 25. The complainant is in possession of property in question as held by the Civil Court and apart of finding of Civil Court, two documents were filed before the Civil Court i.e. agreement on which complainant relied upon and another one which was filed by the petitioner Harlal alleging that it was proposal. In both documents it is mentioned that possession of the property in question has been handed over to the complainant and 35 lakhs Rupees as sale consideration has been paid by the complainant to the petitioner Harlal. 26. In both documents it is mentioned that possession of the property in question has been handed over to the complainant and 35 lakhs Rupees as sale consideration has been paid by the complainant to the petitioner Harlal. 26. In the proceedings under Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, it was not disclosed to the Authorities that with regard to the property in question, legal proceedings are pending rather it was mentioned by the petitioners who are sisters of the petitioner Harlal in the affidavit that no legal proceedings are pending. 27. The factual aspect as narrated above, prima facie, raise a finger of suspicion towards ill-intention of the accused petitioners to defraud the complainant, by hatching a criminal conspiracy and obtaining a collusive decree from the civil court. Prima facie, it is also appearing that a document was prepared and same was filed before the civil court by the petitioner Harlal wherein signature of the Director of the company was not available while major portion of sale consideration had been made in favour of the petitioner Harlal. The submission of the petitioners’ counsel that the agreement to sell was not a concluded agreement but rather it was a proposal only, cannot be accepted because no one would transfer a huge amount of Rs.35,00,000/-only on the basis of proposal. Further, while passing decree in the suit filed by the mother and sisters (co-accused) of the petitioner Harlal to declare relinquish deed null and void, the civil court, had categorically put a caveat in its judgment by mentioning that the suit is being disposed off in the light of compromise only and the decree passed by the court does not mean that any order with regard to the mutation has been passed. In my considered opinion, bare perusal of the FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences and same are required to be investigated by the investigating agency properly. It cannot be a thumb-rule that in all cases where civil proceedings are going on or pending, criminal proceedings must be quashed. It is a well-established principle that civil and criminal cases are distinct in nature, governed by different laws, and have different purposes. The civil suit primarily focuses on the rights and liabilities of the parties involved, whereas the criminal case aims to punish the accused for the commission of a crime. It is a well-established principle that civil and criminal cases are distinct in nature, governed by different laws, and have different purposes. The civil suit primarily focuses on the rights and liabilities of the parties involved, whereas the criminal case aims to punish the accused for the commission of a crime. It will depend upon facts of each case and only when criminality does not exist, jurisdiction under section482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings. 28. In wake of discussion made hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the impugned FIR No.1341/2023 PS Mansarovar, Jaipur South, lodged against the petitioners. Accordingly, the misc. petitions are dismissed. All pending application\s are also disposed of. The observations made hereinabove are only prima facie and shall not prejudice investigation/trial in any manner.