JUDGMENT : Per Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J. Sole appellant is before this Court in appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence under Sections 302, 201 of the IPC and Section 3/4 Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999. 2. Informant is the son of the deceased Dayamani Devi. As per FIR, the informant who was student of Class IX, had gone to take part in flag hoisting ceremony on the eve of Independence Day. His elder sister Kalawati Devi was married and living in her matrimonial home in another village, whereas his younger sister had also gone to meet her. Father of the informant was a farmer and had left his home in the morning for grazing the cattle and his mother was all alone in the house. At around 1.30 in the day time, when the informant returned home, he did not find his mother and therefore, went behind his house looking for her. He found his mother dead, lying in a pool of blood and her neck had been partially severed and there was also marks of bleeding injury over her left hand. On alarm being raised, people gathered there. Father of the informant had not returned and the informant and villagers went in search for him in the jungle area to inform about the incidence. While searching for him, when they reached Baghmara jungle, his father was also found dead in a field with sharp cut injury over his neck and head. 3. It is alleged that the appellant who was cousin of the informant used to brand his parents as witch and also attributed the illness of his mother to the deceased. He had threatened his parents with life. After committing the offence, the appellant had fled away and he could not be found. Informant suspected that the appellant had committed cold-blooded murder of his mother and father. 4. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Kurdeg P.S. Case No.25/15 was registered under Sections 302, 201 of the IPC and Section 3/4 Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999 against the appellant. Police during investigation and on his disclosure statement, seized the weapon of offence. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted against him and he was put on trial for these offences. 5. Police during investigation and on his disclosure statement, seized the weapon of offence. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted against him and he was put on trial for these offences. 5. Altogether 13 witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution and relevant documents including inquest report, fardbeyan, post-mortem report, disclosure statement and FSL report, have been adduced into evidence and marked as exhibits. The tangi was produced and marked as material Exhibit No.I. 6. Judgment of conviction has been assailed principally on the ground that there is no eye witness to the incidence and the entire case rests on the disclosure statement made by the appellant. It is argued that a judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be returned only on recovery of weapon of offence on the disclosure statement made by the accused. The seizure list witness in whose presence the weapon of offence was said to be seized, has not supported the prosecution case. It is also argued that seizure list witness P.W. 4, has identified his signature on the seizure list which has been marked as Exhibit 3, but has stated that his signature was taken on blank sheet of paper in the police station. Reliance is placed on Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti Versus State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 843. 7. Learned counsel on behalf of State has defended the judgment of conviction and sentence. It is submitted that matter involves cold blooded murder of a woman by branding her as a witch. The material witnesses have consistently stated that, it was the appellant alone who committed the offence, which has been proved by recovery of the weapon of offence on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant. There is no motive to falsely implicate the accused and there is a ring of truth in the testimony of the informant as he has not attempted to make any false statement in his deposition. 8. Death was homicidal, is proved by the Doctor (P.W. 7), who conducted post-mortem examination on both the dead bodies. There is no motive to falsely implicate the accused and there is a ring of truth in the testimony of the informant as he has not attempted to make any false statement in his deposition. 8. Death was homicidal, is proved by the Doctor (P.W. 7), who conducted post-mortem examination on both the dead bodies. He has proved the post-mortem reports which has been marked as Exhibits 4–4/1 and found the following external injuries on the dead body of Dayamani Devi: - i. Deep cut injury on the left side of neck dimension 5" x 3" cutting trachea, left sternum pledo martoid muscle and interning muscle, maggots are present over the body and wound. ii. Cut injury of size 4 cm x 2 cm bone deep with irregular margin present on the lateral aspect of left arm. The Doctor opined that cause of death was excessive hemorrhage due to cut throat leading to shock and hemorrhage. The hard sharp object like axe was used. On the same day, post-mortem examination of Hari Sai was done in which almost similar type of following external injuries were found: Deep cut injury on the anterior aspect of neck cutting trachea, esophagus, internal jugular vein, carotid artery and intervening structure, maggots were present over the wound. The Doctor opined that cause of death was excessive bleeding due to cut throat leading to shock and hemorrhage. 9. There is no direct eye witness to the incidence to the double murder of the old lady aged 62 years and her husband aged 68 years and the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. None of the witnesses including the informant who is the son of the deceased, has claimed that he had seen the occurrence. 10. Out of the 13 witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, P.W.11 and P.W. 12 are the Investigating Officers and P.W. 13 is the Police Officer, who produced the axe before the Court and P.W. 7 is the Doctor, who conducted autopsy on the dead bodies. 11. Out of the remaining nine material witnesses, P.W. 8, P.W. 9 and P.W.10 have not supported the prosecution case and were declared hostile. It is significant to note that testimony of any of these witnesses do not suffer from any exaggeration or contradiction. 12. Section 3 of the Evidence Act adopts a pragmatic prudent men’s test for the prove of a fact. It is significant to note that testimony of any of these witnesses do not suffer from any exaggeration or contradiction. 12. Section 3 of the Evidence Act adopts a pragmatic prudent men’s test for the prove of a fact. The principle for appreciation has been succinctly laid down in Vijayee Singh & Others v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 . “28 . It can be argued that the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’ is vague in nature and the standard of ‘burden of proof’ contemplated under Section 105 should be somewhat specific, therefore, it is difficult to reconcile both. But the general principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely, that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, are to be borne in mind. The ‘reasonable doubt’ is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved” lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, “believe it to exist” and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the court believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and now we come to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved i.e. neither proved nor disproved. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction and it is also different from a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of the entire material on record by ‘a prudent man’. 29. There is a difference between a flimsy or fantastic plea which is to be rejected altogether. But a reasonable though incompletely proved plea which casts a genuine doubt on the prosecution version indirectly succeeds. The doubt which the law contemplates is certainly not that of a weak or unduly vacillating, capricious, indolent, drowsy or confused mind. It must be the doubt of the prudent man who is assumed to possess the capacity of “separate the chaff from the grain”. It is the doubt of a reasonable, astute and alert mind arrived at after due application of mind to every relevant circumstance of the case appearing from the evidence. It is not a doubt which occurs to a wavering mind. 30. Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [(1947) 2 All ER 372, 373 H] while examining the degree of proof required in criminal cases stated: “That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course, it is possible but not in the least probable,” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt....” Regarding the concept of benefit of reasonable doubt Lord Du Paraq, J. in another context observed thus: “All that the principle enjoins is a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. It does not demand from the judge a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth.” 13. Informant (P.W. 1) aged about 15 years, has not claimed himself to be the direct eye witness to the occurrence, but there is no reason to disbelieve his account for the facts which preceded and followed the occurrence. He is never required to close his mind to the truth.” 13. Informant (P.W. 1) aged about 15 years, has not claimed himself to be the direct eye witness to the occurrence, but there is no reason to disbelieve his account for the facts which preceded and followed the occurrence. He has deposed about the dead body of his mother found in the backyard of his house, and that of his father in the jungle area. He has also deposed in para 2 that one Ojha (magician) has been called by the appellant in the preceding night and he had declared his parents to be witch. P.W. 2 is the daughter of the deceased. She is also not an eye witness to the incidence, but has deposed in para 2 that the appellant used to identify her parents as witch. P.W 3 is elder brother of the deceased. He has also only corroborated the extent of murder of the deceased persons being committed, but has expressed his ignorance about any other part. P.W. 5 is also the sister of the informant. She has admitted that she was not an eye witness, but has stated that the appellant used to identify his parents as witch and suspected that it was the appellant who committed the murder of his parents. P.W. 11 is the part I.O. and has corroborated the testimony of eye witnesses regarding the place of occurrence where the dead bodies were found. He has deposed that on the disclosure statement made by the appellant, the weapon of offence i.e. Tangi, was recovered from the forest area concealed under a stone. The Tangi was seized and it was forwarded to FSL for chemical analysis. He has proved the inquest report, the disclosure statement marked as Exhibit 8 and the seizure list of the Tangi (Exhibit 9), which was seized on the basis of the disclosure statement. 14. Credit of a witness can be impeached by manner and procedure laid down in Sections 145 and 155 of Evidence Act. Before placing reliance on the testimony of the witness, it is also to be seen whether the evidence is consistent and in accord with the natural course of human conduct. 14. Credit of a witness can be impeached by manner and procedure laid down in Sections 145 and 155 of Evidence Act. Before placing reliance on the testimony of the witness, it is also to be seen whether the evidence is consistent and in accord with the natural course of human conduct. In the present case, testimony of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 do not suffer from any contradiction and their attention has not been drawn to the statement given to the police to impeach their credit. It also does not suffer from exaggeration, as none have claimed to be eye witness to the incidence and are admittedly witness to what took place before and after the ghastly incidence. I do not see any reason to discard the evidence of the witnesses regarding the death and place of occurrence from where the dead body was found, motive for the offence and the life threat earlier extended by the appellant against the old couple suspecting them to practice witch craft. 15. Coming to the evidence of the I.O. (P.W.11) regarding recovery of the weapon of offence, it has been deposed by him that it was recovered concealed under a stone from the jungle area. Much has been argued to assail the finding of the learned trial Court for placing reliance on it. 16. Scheme of the Evidence Act makes a distinction in the relevancy of evidence, its mode of proof, and the effect of which has been dealt in Part I, II and III of the Evidence Act. 17. In the present case, there is no doubt about the relevancy of disclosure statement, question is being raised regarding the proof of it by seizure list witness P.W. 4, wherein he has stated that he had signed over a blank sheet of paper. This witness has not been declared hostile and no question was put to him regarding the weapon of offence being recovered in his presence or not. Unless the witness had been cross-examined and had said that he had not witnessed its recovery, no adverse inference can be drawn on this score, particularly when the disclosure statement has been proved by the I.O. (P.W. 11) and marked as Exhibit-8. Seizure list has been proved by the I.O. as Exhibit 9. Unless the witness had been cross-examined and had said that he had not witnessed its recovery, no adverse inference can be drawn on this score, particularly when the disclosure statement has been proved by the I.O. (P.W. 11) and marked as Exhibit-8. Seizure list has been proved by the I.O. as Exhibit 9. Tangi was produced in the Court and marked as Material Ext- I and it was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. As per FSL report, (Exhibit-10) human blood was found on the tangi. Against the weight of these evidences, merely because the seizure list witness identified his signature as Exhibit-3, but said that it was signed on a blank paper, cannot be a ground to reject the disclosure statement. Seizure of weapon on disclosure statement has been proved by the I.O., and there is no law that testimony of an official witness is to be approached with initial distrust, on the contrary there is a presumption under Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act, that official act has been regularly performed [see Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 SCC 588 ]. Even if the panch witnesses turn hostile a seizure cannot be disbelieved even if it is otherwise duly proved by other witnesses [see Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657 ]. The facts of the present case is distinguishable from the authority relied upon, in as much that in Ramanand case (supra) panchnama had not been proved unlike in the present case. The objection raised regarding the proof of the disclosure statement is therefore, not sustainable and is accordingly dismissed. 18. Coming to the evidential effect of the disclosure statement, law on point has been exposited in Anter Singh (supra) wherein it has been held, “15. The objection raised regarding the proof of the disclosure statement is therefore, not sustainable and is accordingly dismissed. 18. Coming to the evidential effect of the disclosure statement, law on point has been exposited in Anter Singh (supra) wherein it has been held, “15. At one time it was held that the expression “fact discovered” in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact, now it is fairly settled that the expression “fact discovered” includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, as noted in Pulukuri Kottaya case [ AIR 1947 PC 67 : 74 IA 65 : 48 Cri LJ 533] and in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251]” 19. What follows from the above ratio, is that accused can be credited with the especial knowledge of the fact so discovered on the basis of confessional statement in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and it is incumbent upon him to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, of how it came within his knowledge. In the present case, no explanation has been offered by the appellant, regarding his knowledge about the fact of tangi being concealed in a jungle area under a rock which was found to have human blood on it. 20. On the basis of the prosecution evidence, following incriminating circumstances appear against the appellant: - I. Appellant had earlier branded both the deceased as witch and had extended life threat to them. II. After the incidence, the appellant fled away from his house. III. On his disclosure statement, weapon of offence was recovered from jungle area concealed under the rock. No explanation has been put forward. IV. Appellant has not offered any explanation to the incriminating circumstances against him. 21. From the above proved circumstances, the only irresistible inference that can be drawn is that it was the appellant and none else who committed the double murder after branding them as witch, he suspected them to be practicing witchcraft causing illness of his mother. Judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference and is accordingly affirmed. Criminal appeal stands dismissed. From the above proved circumstances, the only irresistible inference that can be drawn is that it was the appellant and none else who committed the double murder after branding them as witch, he suspected them to be practicing witchcraft causing illness of his mother. Judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference and is accordingly affirmed. Criminal appeal stands dismissed. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, is disposed of. Let the Trial Court Records be transmitted to the Court concerned along with a copy of this judgment.