Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 90 (HP)

Banshi Ram v. H. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd.

2024-01-12

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 16.1.2019, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge,-II, Mandi, H.P., vide which the appeal filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (The parties shall be hereinafter referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was asserted that the complainant is a Cooperative Bank registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. It is engaged in the banking business. The complainant through his Branch Manager, Smela advanced personal loan to the accused on mutually agreed terms and conditions. The loan was to be repaid in monthly instalments. The accused failed to pay the money. An amount of Rs.2,46,000/- became due in March 2014. The accused issued a cheque No. 41,89,451/-, dated 5. 3.2014 (Ex.CW-1/B) in the discharge of his legal liability for a sum of Rs.2,46,000/- as full and final payment of his liability. The complainant presented the cheque for realization on the next day but it was returned unpaid with the remarks ‘insufficient amount’. The complainant issued a legal notice dated 15.4.2014 (Ex.CW-1/F) which was duly served upon the accused but the accused failed to pay the amount within the stipulated period. Hence, the complainant was filed for taking action against the accused. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reason to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Suresh Kumar Verma (CW-1) to prove its case. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the case of the complainant in its entirety. He stated that the Manager of the complainant bank was duping local people and showing loan amounts due not only from the accused but also from other persons. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused. 6. The learned Trial Court held that there is a presumption attached to the cheque that it was issued in the discharge of the debt and other liability. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused. 6. The learned Trial Court held that there is a presumption attached to the cheque that it was issued in the discharge of the debt and other liability. There is nothing in the examination of Suresh Kumar Verma (CW-1) to doubt his testimony. The accused failed to step into the witness box to probabilize his defence. The notice mentioned District Mandi but it was struck off and substituted by Bilaspur. The evidence of the accused was insufficient to rebut the presumption. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay compensation of Rs.3,30,000/- to the claimant. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (First Appellate Court). Learned First Appellate Court held that the accused did not dispute the issuance of the cheque and taking of the loan. There is a presumption that the cheque was issued in the discharge of the legal liability. The accused failed to rebut this presumption. The cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The notice was duly served upon the accused but he failed to repay the amount despite receipt of the notice. The plea that the notice mentioned 30 days and it was bad was not accepted. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision asserting that the judgments and order are against the law and facts based on conjectures and surmises. It was mentioned in the notice (Ex.CW-1/E) that the accused is a resident of Mandi whereas he is a resident of District Bilaspur. The presumption is rebuttable and there was sufficient material to rebut the presumption. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Rajesh Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sushant Veer Singh, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Mr. Rajesh Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Courts below did not properly appreciate the material on record. It was mentioned in the complaint and the evidence that the cheque was issued on 5. 3.2014. Rajesh Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sushant Veer Singh, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Mr. Rajesh Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Courts below did not properly appreciate the material on record. It was mentioned in the complaint and the evidence that the cheque was issued on 5. 3.2014. It was presented on the next day and a memo of dishonour was also received on the same day. However, the notice (Ex.CW-1/E) was issued on 15.4.2014 beyond the period of one month prescribed under Section 138 (b) of the NI Act. The notice mentioned the accused to be a resident of Mandi, whereas he is a resident of Bilaspur. The notice mentioned one month instead of 15 days. Hence, the same was not as per law. Learned Courts below did not look into these aspects; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Sushant Veer Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-complainant supported the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below and submitted that no interference is required with the same. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present revision has been filed against the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not appellate Court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207 10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 11. This Court in Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam [Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1015], while dealing with the scope of re-appreciation of evidence by higher Court in criminal revision, observed in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment as under : (SCC pp. 333-34) “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married to Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. All three courts below have given concurrent findings regarding the factum of marriage and its validity. It has been held to be a valid marriage. It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of re-appreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. … The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from [the] facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by a violation of any rule of law or procedure.’ (Vide Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad [Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136], SCC p. 139, para 9) *** 11. Thus, it is evident from the above that this Court being the fourth court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the courts below as the said courts have exercised their discretion in good faith giving due weight to relevant material and without being swayed by any irrelevant material. Even if two views are possible on the question of fact, we, being the fourth court, should not interfere even though we may exercise discretion differently had the case come before us initially. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count is required to be interfered with.” 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Suresh Kumar reiterated the contents of the complaint in his proof affidavit (Ex.CW-1/A). He stated in his cross-examination that he had brought the record pertaining to the cheque. He had not sanctioned the loan. He did not know who had visited the branch to take the loan. The loan was disbursed by Suresh Kumar Kaushal who was posted as a Manager at the Samela branch. He was dismissed from his service, although he did not know the reason. He did not know that he had sanctioned the loan in favour of those persons who had not applied for the loans. He admitted that the accused is a resident of Tehsil Ghumarwin and the address of the accused was mentioned in the notice (Ex.CW-1/E) as a resident of District Mandi. He did not know that he had sanctioned the loan in favour of those persons who had not applied for the loans. He admitted that the accused is a resident of Tehsil Ghumarwin and the address of the accused was mentioned in the notice (Ex.CW-1/E) as a resident of District Mandi. He admitted that the address of the accused was mentioned as a resident of District Mandi in the complaint. He denied that the accused had not taken any loan nor he had issued any cheque. He denied that the Manager had issued a chequebook in the name of the accused and he had signed the cheque. He denied that notice was not issued under Section 138 of the NI Act. 16. This witness has specifically denied that the Bank Manager had issued a chequebook in the name of the accused and he signed himself in the name of the accused. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof. The accused did not provide any evidence to show that the chequebook was never issued to him by the bank. He has not shown that he has taken any action against the forgery of his signatures. He did not file any complaint before any person regarding the forgery of his signatures. He did not step into the witness box to prove the suggestion that no chequebook was issued to him. He never filed any application for comparison of his signatures. Therefore, in these circumstances, the version of this witness was believable that the accused had issued the cheque in the name of the complainant. 17. Section 139 of the NI Act provides that it shall be presumed that unless the contrary is proved that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or any other liability. Hence, the Court is bound to raise the presumption laid down under Section 139 of the NI Act. This presumption was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde Versus Sripad 2022 (1) SCC 742 as under: 11. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the rival contentions, the record would disclose that the signature on the documents at Exhibits P-6 and P-2 is not disputed. Exhibit P-2 is the dishonoured cheque based on which the complaint was filed. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the rival contentions, the record would disclose that the signature on the documents at Exhibits P-6 and P-2 is not disputed. Exhibit P-2 is the dishonoured cheque based on which the complaint was filed. From the evidence tendered before the JMFC, it is clear that the respondent has not disputed the signature on the cheque. If that be the position, as noted by the courts below a presumption would arise under Section 139 in favour of the appellant who was the holder of the cheque. Section 139 of the N.I. Act reads as hereunder:- "139. Presumption in favour of holder- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." 12 Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in the context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the presumption for the passing of the consideration would arise as provided under Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which reads as hereunder: - "118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments - Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: - (a) of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration." 13. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr., 1999 (7) SCC 510 wherein it is held as hereunder: "9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date on which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Trial Court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW-1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect." 14. The learned counsel for the respondent has however referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, 2019 (5) SCC 418 wherein it is held as hereunder: - "25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in the following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of the preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. 25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come into the witness box to support his defence. 26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of PW1, when the specific question was put that the cheque was issued in relation to a loan of Rs.25,000 taken by the accused, PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received a monetary benefit of Rs.8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000 being admitted in the year 2010 and a further payment of a loan of Rs. 50,000 with regard to which Complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there was a burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per the own case of the complainant, he made a payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts." 15. In that light, it is contended that the very materials produced by the appellant and the answers relating to lack of knowledge of property details by PW-1 in his cross-examination would indicate that the transaction is doubtful and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for the respondent to tender rebuttal evidence but the case put forth would be sufficient to indicate that the respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption. 16. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court needs no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. 16. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court needs no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. In, Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption, the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the transaction between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in view the various transactions and extent of the amount involved. However, the legal position relating to presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act on a signature being admitted has been reiterated. Hence, whether there is a rebuttal or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. This position was reiterated in Tedhi Singh vs. Narayan Dass Mahant 2022 (6) SCC 735 wherein it was held: 7. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides that the Court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption, however, is expressly made subject to the position being proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is in the context of this provision that the theory of 'probable defence' has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which has also been adverted to in Basalingappa (supra), this Court notes that Section 139 of the N.I. Act is an example of reverse onus [see (2010) 11 SCC 441 ). It is also true that this Court has found that the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist. 19. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist. 19. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131 wherein it was observed: “As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque is not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary.” 20. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 wherein it was observed at page 161: 33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will be seen that the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. [The rules discussed herein below are common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are hence, not repeated—reference to one can be taken as reference to another] 34. It will be seen that the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. [The rules discussed herein below are common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are hence, not repeated—reference to one can be taken as reference to another] 34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a “shall presume” clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court “shall presume” the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase “unless the contrary is proved”. 35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that the cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35 ] ] 36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40]]. Therefore, the mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption. 37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. 37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further. 38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of “preponderance of probabilities”, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184 : AIR 2010 SC 1898 ]] 21. Therefore, the Court has to start with the presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability and the burden is upon the accused to prove the contrary. 22. The cross-examination of Suresh Kumar is not sufficient to rebut the presumption as there is nothing in the same to show that the cheque was not issued in the discharge of legal liability. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. 22. The cross-examination of Suresh Kumar is not sufficient to rebut the presumption as there is nothing in the same to show that the cheque was not issued in the discharge of legal liability. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. It was held in Sumeti Vij vs. Paramount Tech Fab Industries AIR 2021 SC 1281 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed: “21. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant has recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case of the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied) 23. It was submitted that no record was produced regarding the disbursal of the loan and it is sufficient to rebut the presumption. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uttam Ram Versus Devinder Singh Hudan and another (2019) 10 SCC 287 that the complainant is not to prove the debt as in a civil court in view of the presumption but only to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused. It was observed: “20. The Trial Court and the High Court proceeded as if, the appellant is to prove a debt before a civil court wherein, the plaintiff is required to prove his claim on the basis of evidence to be laid in support of his claim for the recovery of the amount due. Dishonour of a cheque carries a statutory presumption of consideration. The holder of the cheque in due course is required to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Dishonour of a cheque carries a statutory presumption of consideration. The holder of the cheque in due course is required to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since there is a statutory presumption of consideration, the burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for any debt or other liability.” 24. It was laid down in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131 that the complainant is not to state the nature of the transaction or the source of funds. It was observed: “By the impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has reversed the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and has acquitted the accused on the ground that, in the complaint, the Complainant has not specifically stated the nature of transactions and the source of fund. However, the High Court has failed to note the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary. The aforesaid has not been dealt with and considered by the High Court.” 25. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the complainant is not required to prove the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability as this is a matter of presumption. Rather, the accused is required to disprove the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability. 26. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the complainant is not required to prove the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability as this is a matter of presumption. Rather, the accused is required to disprove the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability. 26. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the judgments passed by learned Courts below that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque under Section 139 of the NI Act. 27. Suresh Kumar stated that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Memo (Ex.CW-1/C) shows that the cheque was returned for reason No.7 which is insufficient funds. There is a presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act regarding the correctness of the contents of the memo of dishonour. The accused denied for want of knowledge in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Thus, there is no specific denial of this fact. No other evidence was led to rebut the presumption. Hence, learned Courts below had rightly held that the version of the complainant was duly proved that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. 28. Suresh Kumar Verma stated in his proof affidavit that the cheque was issued on 5.3.2014 and it was presented for collection before the bank on the same day i.e. 5.3.2014. The memo intimating this fact was supplied on 6.3.2014, which was enclosed with the complaint as proof. It was submitted based upon this averment that the notice of dishonour was received on 6. 3.2014. The notice (Ex.CW-1/E) was issued on 15.4.2014 beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Section 138(b) of the NI Act and the complaint is not maintainable. This submission is not acceptable. The memo mentions the date 19.3.2014. The forwarding memo (Ex.CW-1/D) also mentions the date 19.03.2014; hence, the date 6.3.2014 mentioned by the complainant in his proof affidavit is a clerical error. The best proof of the contents of a document is the document itself and no oral evidence is admissible to vary its contents. Hence, the contents of the document (Ex.CW-1/C) are to be preferred to the oral testimony of Suresh Kumar and it has to be held that the memo of dishonour was received on 19.3.2014 and not on 6.3.2014. The best proof of the contents of a document is the document itself and no oral evidence is admissible to vary its contents. Hence, the contents of the document (Ex.CW-1/C) are to be preferred to the oral testimony of Suresh Kumar and it has to be held that the memo of dishonour was received on 19.3.2014 and not on 6.3.2014. The notice was issued on 15.4.2014 within 30 days, hence the same is within the limitation provided under Section 138 (b) of the NI Act. 29. The notice mentions the name of the accused, his parentage his village Rehag, Post Office Chahehali, District Mandi, HP, which was scored off and was substituted by Bilaspur. The postal receipt (Ex.CW-1/F) mentions the name of the accused as resident of Village Rehag, P.O. Chalehali, District Bilaspur. Hence, it is apparent that the notice was sent to the address of District Bilaspur and not to the address of District Mandi. Therefore, the submission that the notice was not sent to the correct address is not acceptable. 30. The accused disclosed his address as a resident of Village Raheg, District Bilaspur in the bail bond furnished by him. He disclosed the same address in the notice of accusation put to him as well as the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. Hence the notice was sent to the correct address. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajeet Seeds Ltd. Versus K. Gopala Krishnaiah 2014 AIR(SCW) 4321 that Section 27 of the General Clauses Act raises a presumption regarding the delivery of a letter sent to a correct address. It was observed: 10. It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that the service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. 31. No evidence was led to rebut this presumption. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the notice was served upon the accused. 32. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555 that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed: “It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.”(Emphasis supplied). 33. The notice (Ex.CW-1/E) mentions that the amount of the cheque be paid within one month otherwise the action shall be taken. It was submitted that the period of one month mentioned in the notice will make it bad as the period of 15 days is required to be mentioned as per Section 138 (c) of the NI Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rahul Builders v. Arihant Fertilizers & Chemicals, (2008) 2 SCC 321 that Section 138 does not speak of a 15-day notice. It was observed:- 8. Section 138 does not speak of a 15 days' notice. It contemplates service of notice and payment of the amount of cheque within 15 days from the date of receipt thereof. When the statute prescribes for service of a notice specifying a particular period, it should be expressly stated. In the absence of any such stipulation, it is difficult to hold that 15 days' notice was thereby contemplated. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in arriving at the aforementioned finding. 34. Therefore, the notice cannot be faulted for mentioning 30 days instead of 15 days. 35. Therefore, it was duly proved that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability, which was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’ and the accused failed to pay the money despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the accused. 36. The learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and had awarded the compensation of Rs.3,30,000/-. The legislature had introduced the offence of dishonour of cheques to instil confidence in the public about the transaction carried with the cheque. 36. The learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and had awarded the compensation of Rs.3,30,000/-. The legislature had introduced the offence of dishonour of cheques to instil confidence in the public about the transaction carried with the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar 2019 (4) SCC 197 that the penal provision of Section 138 is a deterrent in nature. It was observed: “9. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments including cheques and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments including cheques in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to the callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.” 37. In view of this consideration, the sentence of one year is not excessive. 38. Learned Trial Court had awarded the compensation of Rs.3,30,000/-. The sentence was imposed on 16.8.2018. The cheque was issued on 5.3.2014. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S Kalamani Tex and another Versus P. Balasubramanian JT 2021(2) SC 519 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed:- “20. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of the NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation and unless there exist special circumstances, the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. [R. Vijian v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260 , 20]” 39. Therefore, the amount of compensation of Rs.3,30,000/- is not excessive and no interference is required with the same. 40. No other point was urged. [R. Vijian v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260 , 20]” 39. Therefore, the amount of compensation of Rs.3,30,000/- is not excessive and no interference is required with the same. 40. No other point was urged. 41. Therefore, the judgments and orders passed by learned Courts below are fully sustainable and no interference is required with the same. 42. In view of the above, the present revision fails and the same is dismissed. 43. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.