JUDGMENT : The 2nd respondent, on behalf of the 1st respondent, preferred a complaint before the 3rd respondent seeking eviction of the petitioner from the house owned by the 1st respondent and her sister Prasanna. 16 cents of land in Survey No.94/109 and a house belong to her and to Prasanna and the petitioner is residing there for 13 years with their permission. The 1st respondent wants to sell the property to liquidate her debts, but the petitioner is not surrendering it to her. Therefore, she preferred a complaint seeking a direction to the petitioner to surrender the house. The 1st respondent also filed a suit as O.S. No.116/2020 before the Munsiff court, Thalassery on 9.3.2020 for evicting the petitioner. The petitioner filed a written statement as Ext.P2 on 22.1.2021. While so, the first respondent filed M.C.C.No. 32/2020 before the 3rd respondent under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short ‘the Act’) and the 3rd respondent passed Ext.P3 order on 13.9.2021 directing the petitioner to give vacant possession of the building in Survey No.94/109 with the 16 cents of property. It is also directed that the petitioner be granted 4 cents of property, out 16 cents on payment of Rs.2 lakhs. Petitioner challenges Ext.P3 in this Writ Petition. 2. A counter affidavit is filed by the 1st respondent in which it is stated that 16 cents of property, with a house situated in the said property, are in the joint possession of the 1st respondent and her sister. The petitioner, who is a distant relative, has been residing in the above house from 2014 onwards as permitted. Since the husband of the 1st respondent passed away, she had to incur huge debt which occasioned due to the treatment of her husband and therefore, she has decided to dispose the house property to pay off the debt. In the said situation, the petitioner was directed to vacate the house to enable the 1st respondent sell the property. Invoking the provisions of the Act, the Maintenance Tribunal was approached by the 2nd respondent. 3. On getting notice, the petitioner entered appearance and the matter was settled between the parties in the presence of the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. Invoking the provisions of the Act, the Maintenance Tribunal was approached by the 2nd respondent. 3. On getting notice, the petitioner entered appearance and the matter was settled between the parties in the presence of the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. The petitioner agreed to give vacant possession of the house on condition that 4 cents of property out of 16 cents, is given to him for a consideration of Rs.2 lakhs. It is admitted that O.S.No.116 of 2020 is filed against the petitioner for eviction. The Tribunal has the power to deal the properties of senior citizens. Ext.P3 order is passed as agreed by the petitioner. Therefore, prayed for dismissing the Writ Petition. 4. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Tribunal has only the power under section 23 of the Act to declare any transfer of property effected by senior citizens to be void and another section that can be invoked under the Act is Section 5, which deals with Application for maintenance. In the petition filed before the 3rd respondent, the 1st respondent had sought a prayer to evict the petitioner from the house. The counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the apex court in Sudesh Chhikara vs. Ramti Devi [ 2022 (7) KHC 637 ], whereby the apex court held that the Tribunal can invoke the power under Section 23 of the Act if two conditions enumerated in the Section are attracted; (a) The transfer must have been made subject to the conditions that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and the basic physical needs to the transferor and (b) the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor. If both the conditions are satisfied, by a legal fiction, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence and such a transfer then becomes voidable at the instance of the transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal gets jurisdiction to declare the transferer as void. He also relied on a judgment of a full bench of this court in Subhashini v. District Collector, Kozhikode [ 2020 (5) KHC 195 ]. In paragraph 40, 42 and 48, the Full Bench held as follows: “40. He also relied on a judgment of a full bench of this court in Subhashini v. District Collector, Kozhikode [ 2020 (5) KHC 195 ]. In paragraph 40, 42 and 48, the Full Bench held as follows: “40. The Legislature also has, in different circumstances, provided for an expeditious adjudication unencumbered by the rigour of appeal and revision as found in S.6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A person in possession even without a valid title, could always seek restoration of possession under S.6 where the title would not be a question raised or considered. Appeals or revisions are specifically prohibited and the remedy of the title holder is also saved. This question is to be considered by a judicial body and not by a Tribunal manned by an Executive Officer, ill versed in the rules of evidence and the nuances of a judicial determination. The Legislature cannot be said to have been unaware of such measures and hence we find that there is a conscious deliberate intention discernible from the provision itself which confers a very limited and restricted jurisdiction on the Tribunal constituted with an officer in the executive branch of the State, not below the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. Xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx 42. We have already seen that power to prescribe the procedure for inquiry under the Act, is conferred on the Tribunals constituted under the Act of 2007; subject to that prescribed by the State Government under S.32. The procedure contemplated by the Statute is summary as per S.8(1). Sub-section (2) of S.8 confers the Tribunal with the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling discovery of evidence, documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed. The Rules do not prescribe the Tribunal to invoke any other provisions of the CPC. S.8(2) does not confer the Tribunal with the power of the Civil Court as such and speaks only of the Tribunal being a Civil Court for the purpose of S. 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Cr.P.C. The Tribunal hence, cannot be a substitute for a Civil Court for the purpose of carrying out an inquiry as to the circumstances which led to the execution of the document which is capable of being declared void under S.23(1). Xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 48.These are instances, where a Court of law and also of equity would exercise its jurisdiction to bring out a resolution of the disputes raised; which, however, the Tribunal constituted under S.7 of the Act of 2007 cannot do. The Tribunal constituted under the Act of 2007, under S.23(1) can only declare void the transfer, at the option of the transferor. As we noticed earlier, it cannot even order recovery of possession of the subject property, for which again the transferor will have to approach the Civil Court. On the aspect of option, a disturbing issue arises from sub- section (3) of S.23, which we extracted herein above. Any organisation referred to in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of S.5 is entitled to approach the Tribunal under sub- section (1) of S.23. S.5 has been made specifically for the purposes of maintenance. When it stands extended to S.23(1), there arises the question as to who would exercise the option for cancellation especially if the senior citizen is not in a position to express such will by reason of old age or otherwise.” 5. The Government Pleader, on the other hand, relied on a judgment of the Chattisgarh High Court reported in Neeraj Baghel v. Collector Raipur, Collectorate Premises, Raipur, Chattisgarh (2023 KHC 3390) wherein it was held that when the parents, who are the owners of the house withdraw permission to a son to reside in the house, the son is bound to obey the orders of the parents and the parents cannot be asked to approach Civil court for a suit for eviction. Taking into consideration the principle object of the Act, the Act is enacted principally to ameliorate deprivation caused to the parents by the children. It was held in Neeraj Baghel (supra) that there is no error in the order of eviction and directed the son to vacate the house within a period of 7 days. 6. The Government Pleader relied on another judgment of Allahabad High Court reported in Abhishek Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022 KHC 4512). That was a case in which a direction was issued to son and daughter-in-law to vacate a residential house invoking Rule 21 of Chapter 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014 (for short ‘the U.P. Maintenance Rules, 2014’). That was a case in which a direction was issued to son and daughter-in-law to vacate a residential house invoking Rule 21 of Chapter 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014 (for short ‘the U.P. Maintenance Rules, 2014’). The learned Judge held that the Sub Divisional Magistrate did not have any power to direct eviction and can only direct the children or relative to provide residential needs of parents, if such an application is moved and the Tribunal finds it appropriate to order so. At the same time, it was held that the District Magistrate is empowered under Chapter 5 of the U.P. Maintenance Rules, 2014 to pass orders and to take steps as may arise ensuring that the senior citizen may enjoy the property and such steps may include right to order eviction but as a last recourse and in relation to a specific part of a property which are in the joint possession of the senior citizen as well as the children/relatives. 7. Ext.P3 is the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal. A perusal of the same would show that the request of the 1st respondent was to evict the petitioner herein from the house in which he is in possession, which according to the petitioner, belongs to her and her sister, Prasanna. On receipt of notice from the Tribunal, the petitioner herein appeared, and it is stated in the order that the petitioner agreed before the Tribunal that he will vacate the house provided, he is given 4 cents from the same property on payment of Rs.50,000/- per cent. It is, thereafter, that Ext.P3 order is passed directing the petitioner to vacate the house on registration of the 4 cents of the land in the name of the petitioner. 8. Section 23 of the Act is the only provision regarding property which have been transferred as gift or otherwise. Section 23 of the Act reads as follows: “23. It is, thereafter, that Ext.P3 order is passed directing the petitioner to vacate the house on registration of the 4 cents of the land in the name of the petitioner. 8. Section 23 of the Act is the only provision regarding property which have been transferred as gift or otherwise. Section 23 of the Act reads as follows: “23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.- (1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. (2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part, thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right. (3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5.” So, the application filed by the 1st respondent can only be considered as an application under Section 23 of the Act. The request in the application is to evict the petitioner from the residential house. Admittedly the petitioner is not the child of the 1st respondent. The Act can be invoked against the children or relative. The term ‘relative’ is defined under Section 2(g) of the Act, which reads as follows: “Relative” means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death.” The petitioner is the son of the 1st respondent’s mother’s sister. So, the petitioner will not come under the definition of ‘relative’ under the Act. 9. So, the petitioner will not come under the definition of ‘relative’ under the Act. 9. This court had an occasion to consider a similar issue in the judgment reported in Thoppil Anto v. Glancin T.A. [ 2020 (1) KHC 757 ) as well as in Leelamma Eapen v. District Magistrate, Kottayam [ (2022) 2 KLT 665 ), wherein it was held that the Maintenance Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order eviction to protect life and property of senior citizens and the District Magistrate alone has the power to order eviction under Rule 19(2)(i) of the Kerala Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 (the Rules). 10. The counsel for the petitioner argued that though it is stated in Ext.P3 that he has agreed before the Tribunal that he will vacate the premises on assigning 4 cents of land to him, it is against facts and that no such admission or consent was made by him. Moreover, the application before the Tribunal filed under Section 23 of the Act, is not maintainable, and it ought to have been dismissed in limine. 11. The counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 as well as the Government Pleader submitted that going by Rule 8 of the Rules, if on the date fixed on the notice issued under Rule 6, the opposite party appears and accepts his liability to maintain the applicant and two parties arrive at a mutually arrived settlement, the Tribunal shall pass an Order accordingly. In the facts of the case, the petitioner agreed before the 3rd respondent and therefore, there is nothing wrong with the Tribunal in passing the eviction order. 12. Rule 8 of the Rules gives power to the Tribunal to pass an order if the two parties mutually arrive at a settlement in respect of the liability to maintain the applicant and nothing more. The application filed by the 1st respondent is not for maintenance and it is only for evicting the petitioner from the house. Therefore, Rule 8 cannot be invoked in this case. The Tribunal has accepted the application filed by 1st respondent and passed Ext.P3 order without jurisdiction. Therefore, Ext.P3 cannot be sustained, and consequently, Ext.P3 stands quashed. It is also a fact that a suit for eviction filed by the 1st respondent against the petitioner has been allowed and it is pending in Second Appeal before this Court. The Tribunal has accepted the application filed by 1st respondent and passed Ext.P3 order without jurisdiction. Therefore, Ext.P3 cannot be sustained, and consequently, Ext.P3 stands quashed. It is also a fact that a suit for eviction filed by the 1st respondent against the petitioner has been allowed and it is pending in Second Appeal before this Court. Therefore, the 1st respondent can execute the decree which she had obtained in O.S.No.116 of 2020 subject to the outcome of the Second Appeal. The Writ Petition is allowed as above.